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THE INCARNATE LORD

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THE
INCARNATE LORD

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION IN ITS RELATION TO ORGANIC CONCEPTIONS

BY

LIONEL SPENCER THORNTON M.A.

OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE RESURRECTION

εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, καινὴ κτίσις·
τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν, ἰδοὺ γέγονεν καινά.

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PREFACE

THE subject of Christology has been a matter of continuous interest to the writer of this book since he first began to study theology at Cambridge, more than twenty years ago. At that time theological discussion frequently turned upon the kenotic theories which had become prominent in this country through the writings of Bishop Gore and others. Since then a number of works bearing upon Christology have been published, and other aspects of the subject have engaged attention. In the writer's recollection two convictions gradually took shape in his mind; namely, first, that the biblical revelation of God contains the key to all our theological perplexities ; but, secondly, that this key can be most profitably used with the help of wider, non-biblical studies. Recently an invitation to contribute to a volume of essays (*Essays Catholic and Critical*, ed. E. G. Selwyn) gave an opportunity of recording some conclusions reached upon the subject of the Christian conception of God. Shortly afterwards a memorandum upon the Incarnation, prepared for the Archbishops' Doctrinal Commission, made it clear that materials contained in these two papers could be developed more fully. In this way the writer had the advantage of some very valuable criticism from colleagues before the present volume came to be written. A few sentences from these papers have found their way into the text of *The Incarnate Lord*, together with a short passage from a sermon preached before the University of Cambridge last year and published in the *Cambridge Review*.[1] In all other respects the material contained in the present volume is new. The writer owes more than he can say to his colleagues on the Doctrinal Commission. But the debt is impalpable, and perhaps larger by way of reaction than of agreement. That is as it should be. But in any case it is well to make clear the fact that, whatever the author's obligations (and they are many), no one else is to be held responsible for arguments advanced in the text or for material used, except where a contrary indication is given. It is hoped that the footnotes and additional notes provide an adequate record of such obligations as can be registered. In one case particular trouble has been taken to indicate the extent of the author's debt (see Additional Note C.).

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[1] Vol. xlviii. No. 1182.

A preface provides an opportunity for some last words. It happens sometimes that, after his work has reached the printers, a writer comes across fresh material about which he would not wish to remain silent. So it is in the present instance. A volume entitled *Time and Western Man* by Mr. Wyndham Lewis (Chatto & Windus, 1927) came to the notice of the present writer too late to receive more than the brief attention which can be given to any subject in a preface. This is unfortunate, as Mr. Lewis' book contains a critique of current time-philosophies, a subject highly relevant to the argument contained in the following pages. It is possible, however, to take the book just mentioned as a text for some last words upon certain topics which find a prominent place in the present work. Mr. Lewis is an author whose distinction and versatility are already well known. In the book now under consideration he proclaims himself a disciple of Plato. He is also an artist turned philosopher, who has a special predilection for space as against time. Thus we know where his interests lie.

Mr. Lewis has no difficulty in exposing the foibles of some of the time-philosophers, not to mention lesser fry such as the camp-followers of Freud and behaviourists of the Watson school. He has many shrewd observations to make as to the connexion of these movements with the more popular tendencies of the day. These lighter matters we can pass over. For every widespread movement of thought is accompanied by a large fringe of popular manifestations. Mutual connexions can be traced, and the more obvious vulgarities and absurdities can be exploited. Whether it is a fair procedure to make Bergson the spiritual father of all the follies of the age is another question. In his treatment of these topics Mr. Lewis exhibits a certain aristocratic *motif*, upon which something further will be said presently. With some of the more obvious criticisms passed upon recent evolutionary philosophy the present writer finds himself in close agreement. The theory that the fundamental message of Plato can ever become obsolete seems so preposterous that it is difficult to find the patience to listen to anyone who can bring himself to talk such nonsense. So far all is clear. But at this point Mr. Lewis has made a serious blunder, which goes far to spoil the argument of his book. In his haste to destroy 'the enemy' he has unfortunately mixed up Whitehead the Platonist with the wretched crowd of behaviourists and gland-worshippers, upon whom his invective is so justly poured forth. Mr. Lewis gives no indication of his having read *Religion in the Making*. If he had done so he could hardly have written in this way. To identify the God of Whitehead with the emergent time-god of Alexander is a first-class blunder, for which there is really no excuse.[1] As to Dr. Whitehead's Platonism an independent witness may be cited with regard to the only work of his to which Mr. Lewis refers. Mr. R. B. Braithwaite, reviewing *Science and the Modern World* in *Mind* (Vol. xxxv. No. 140), bemoans 'Dr. Whitehead's Platonic feeling towards eternal objects.' He is unable to conceive why 'Dr. Whitehead sketches a method of getting "abstractive hierarchies" of these objects.' This essentially pedestrian reviewer cannot understand the interests of a Platonist. Whatever criticisms may be passed upon these 'abstractive hierarchies' it cannot be denied that they belong to the Platonic order. Yet Mr. Lewis makes no mention of them. Is it possible that he conveniently ignores what he does not understand? In one who has written so much about the 'insincerity' of Bergson it is easier to believe that this is a case of unintentional oversight. Nevertheless the mistake seriously detracts from the value of his book.

There is another matter upon which the present writer finds himself in agreement with Mr. Lewis, namely his criticism of Dr. Broad's very unsatisfactory theory of sense-data. The writer in question is one of those who seem to wish to be classified as realists, but who are not genuine realists. Dr. Broad's elaborate paraphernalia of sense-data separate the subject from the object instead of bringing them together.[1] In this mistake he keeps company with the authors of *Critical Realism*, who perpetually offer us a shadowy datum when we want a genuine object. The present writer holds that there are adequate grounds for believing the reality of the object to be genuinely given in and through all its appearances or manifestations. The subject is developed at some length in the text of this book. If we are to stop short with a humdrum analysis of 'sense-data,' the result seems to be inevitably that 'sensationalism' which Mr. Lewis criticizes (*op. cit.* pp. 412 ff.). His own alternative to sensationalism is of the type which, for want of a better word, must be labelled 'idealist.' He wants the material object to be slightly unreal. For this purpose he performs the trick of removing it from its rightful heritage in time. He delights to think that 'the famous "spatializing" instinct produces a more "unreal" world than does the temporalizing instinct.' He positively revels in this world of 'unreality,' 'our static dream' as he calls it (*ibid.* p. 453). Elsewhere he indicates that this unreal world is the creation of the person who contemplates it. Mr. Lewis proclaims himself in certain important respects an ally of Thomist theology. It would be interesting to hear what his scholastic allies think of this strange use of the term 'reality.' When the schoolmen wrote of the *res sacramenti*, they certainly did not mean an unreal 'reality' created by the contemplating worshipper to be his private static dream. This particular brand of idealism is certainly not Platonism, notwithstanding all Mr. Lewis' Platonic gestures. It would be more correct to call it 'unrealism'; and it is necessarily also a kind of individualism. For when you take objects of sense-experience out of time they become unhistorical, and therefore fantastical. History belongs to man in his social capacity. The reference is, of course, to genuine history, not to the bastard history of Croce. Mr. Lewis has curious connexions here with the persons whom he is criticizing. Bergson gathers up time out of its extended series into the narrow compass of a momentary experience, where a white heat of mystical emotion (*durée*) is the individual's refuge from the barren reaches of an external succession. In this way time is robbed of its rational meaning and becomes the emotional content of the present for the individual. Similarly for Croce history is gathered up into the hungry maw of the individual mind, and all else is barren chronology. Thus on both sides time is pressed together into the present and so becomes meaningless. But Mr. Lewis, in full view of these errors, gives himself over to 'the present' of his unreal dream and congratulates himself on having done better than the rest. By his 'spatializing' trick he escapes both the hot glow of psychological *durée* and the restless urge of emergent evolution hurrying to reach its time-god. But his refuge is a private Nirvana of classical Asiatic calm, a home for tired aristocrats, weary of history, democracy and the troubles of the age. At its best is this anything more than the individualism of the artist, rightly occupied with his own particular visions, rightly refusing to be bothered with extraneous matters? If it is that and no more, it is doubtless justified as a personal attitude. But then it cannot be regarded as necessarily suitable for others. Here, however, comes in the aristocratic *motif*, to which reference has already been made.

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[1] *Time and Western Man*, p. 385. For fuller details on this point see below, pp. 461, 463, 466, 467.

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[1] *Scientific Thought.* Part II.

Mr. Lewis is not interested in everyman. He identifies the social aspects of life with the evils of 'democracy,' which in his use of the term means everything vulgar and third-rate. Here again we can, of course, understand and sympathize. But we must also discount prejudices. Mr. Lewis identifies the 'reality' of the space-time realists with the great river Flux. With the important exception of Whitehead, this identification seems to be substantially correct. If this is all that we can make of reality, then it is natural to conclude, as this writer does, that there is nothing stable outside personality, and that such reality as we require must be created by ourselves. This is a very characteristic modern attitude. Physical science is supposed to lead inevitably to sensationalism and phenomenalism, whilst for its own purposes it is supposed to keep strictly within a mechanistic scheme. Consequently science must as far as possible be put into a straight jacket. Compare, in this connexion, Mr. Lewis' attitude towards science with that of some contemporary theologians. Science becomes a sort of evil beast which must be chained up. Mr. Lewis calls it White Magic (*op. cit.* p. 310). Where the theologians in question are concerned they seem anxious to coop up science, out of harm's way, so that they may be free to indulge either in 'vitalism' or in 'personalism' according to their respective tastes.[1] This is a prevailing manifestation of the dualism to which reference is made in the opening chapters of the present work. The difficulty, if not impossibility, of giving an intelligible meaning to the Incarnation from this point of view has been one of the main causes leading to the writing of the present volume. The difficulties into which this excessive 'personalism' leads may be seen in Mr. John Macmurray's essay entitled 'Objectivity in Religion' in a volume called *Adventure* (ed. Canon Streeter).[2] The writer of that essay, unlike Mr. Lewis, gives an important place to the organic conception, finding support for it in the whole tradition of German idealism. But he sharply separates 'personality' from every application of organic theory. Consequently, he is able to make a complete antithesis between the social religion of priesthood and the personal religion of the prophets. Our Lord is then placed in line with the prophets, succeeding where they failed, because He was the Incarnation of God in a human personality (*op. cit.* p. 202). The present writer finds many points of contact between his own essay and Mr. Macmurray's.[3] But the definitions of the Incarnation attempted in the present work differ radically from his; and the difference will be found, in part, to arise out of a quite different treatment of the organic conception. Briefly, it is impossible to accept the sharp separation which this writer sets up between organism and personality. Important distinctions have to be made here; but after a very different fashion. Another ground for the differences between the argument developed here and Mr. Macmurray's will be found in the theory of revelation set forth in Part I of the present volume. *Organism* and *revelation* are two of the dominating conceptions of this book. In the author's mind they are intimately connected, for reasons which, it is hoped, will become clear to the reader as the argument proceeds.

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[1] With all respect to a great New Testament scholar, I have in mind here Canon Streeter's *Reality*.

[2] Macmillan, 1927.

[3] The argument runs so nearly parallel in certain details that it is as well to record the fact that Mr. Macmurray's essay first came to the notice of the present writer when his own work had been sent to the printers.

Similarly the important work entitled *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation* (edited by A. E. J. Rawlinson. Longmans, 1928) has appeared too late for it to be taken into consideration in the present volume.

The mention of revelation brings us back to Mr. Lewis and his criticism of Dr. Broad's sense-data. If we are shut up to a choice between sceptical realism of this type and some form of the doctrine that the human mind creates its own objects, then we are in sorry case. For this particular strand of idealism seems to the present writer to be in conflict with the religious doctrine that God is the Creator of the world, and that we, His dependent creatures, are recipients of His revelations mediated to us through the works of His creation. In other words, the true alternative to sceptical realism is not 'idealism' as expounded by Mr. Lewis, but a more genuine and thoroughgoing realism. For us God is the One Absolute Reality; and all knowledge must be in some sense knowledge of Him rather than of our own achievements and creations. We do not create private worlds of experience; for all experience is primarily experience of God's self-revelation. This is surely the essence of Platonism on its religious side. With this key in our hands we have no cause to belittle science or to dismiss the need for a philosophy of nature. It was Aristotle's great achievement that, starting from the interests associated with the Ionian tradition, he effected a new synthesis between those interests and elements derived from Eleatic and Platonic sources. Dr. Whitehead appears to be engaged in a similar task to-day. It is rash to condemn a Platonist for keeping company with disciples of Heraclitus; you never know what may come of it. When people talk of a reconciliation having been effected between religion and science, they are talking of what, in reality, is largely a negation. The reconciliation has consisted in both parties agreeing to keep to separate compartments. How can the religion of the Incarnation continue to tolerate such a position?

In the present volume the counterpart of revelation is experience. This word has acquired unfortunate associations, from which it ought to be rescued. Experience is sometimes contrasted with reason or with rationalism, as though there were something necessarily irrational about it. Or it is contrasted with authority, as though it were something essentially subjective and arbitrary. It is supposed that a philosophy of experience must necessarily conform to the sceptical empiricism of Hume and lead to a dethronement of reason. Or again, on the other side, since the Methodist revival in this country and later the influence of Schleiermacher in Germany, emphasis upon religious experience has been supposed to mean giving oneself over to emotionalism, feeling, enthusiasm, pragmatism, mysticism, 'devotional values,' and, in short, anything and everything which can fill with horror the thoroughgoing *a priori* rationalist. There is, of course, justification for such fears. The subject swells the pages of Mr. Wyndham Lewis, and receives expression elsewhere from a variety of different standpoints to-day. This controversy, however, between reason and experience must inevitably be inconclusive, just because it takes two aspects of our mental equipment and sets them at loggerheads with one another. Experience depends equally upon the surface impressions of the senses and upon the central intuitions of reason. Around these lies the whole complex organic structure of mind, with its various functions and processes. The whole of this mental equipment is dependent upon the 'given.' Experience is always occupied with 'reality' other than itself; and knowledge is an orderly apprehension and interpretation of what is given in experience. Thus revelations of reality from beyond determine the whole process of knowledge; and these revelations must be referred to the Creator by the religious believer. Such revelations of reality are mediated to us in the time-series through the whole organic structure of the universe and of history, including our own individual organisms and the social organisms of which we are parts. They are interpreted in a developing process of thought and experience through the active functioning of mind in these individual and social organisms with their mutual tension and interdependence. Such a conception of knowledge seems to provide adequate conditions of objectivity, including, on one side, safeguards against the incursion of arbitrary factors from unduly private worlds of experience, and, on the other side, characteristics of elasticity which make possible a living development. To an organic and developing universe correspond organic and developing wholes of experience. But both presuppose an eternal order of reality underlying their relative unities.

These positions have been worked out more fully in Part I. of this essay. Conclusions reached there have been applied in Part II. to a fresh investigation into the doctrine of the Incarnation. For the sake of completeness it was found necessary to include in the later chapters a similar application of principles to the doctrine of the Trinity. The kernel of the argument will be found in chapters ix. and x. But in the author's mind chapter xiv. is equally important. For there conclusions are reached which provide a key to the book as a whole. Chapters xi. to xiii. gather materials which prepare the way for these conclusions ; and chapter xv. develops them further to some final corollaries. From this arrangement it follows that Part II. can hardly prove intelligible without the foundations laid in Part I. On the other hand, with this proviso, each of the two parts will, it is hoped, be found to have a unity of its own. The object which the writer has had in mind throughout has been twofold. From one point of view the book is an attempt to investigate afresh the historic doctrine of the Incarnation. From another point of view it is an attempt to examine afresh the foundations of Christian theism. The two subjects were found to be inseparable ; and that fact is, in the author's mind, the point of departure from which his work, such as it is, may best be interpreted. The title was chosen to emphasize a thought fundamental to the whole argument. The Lordship of Christ over the universe and over history is the citadel of our faith. His Incarnation is for Christians the focus of all knowledge and of all experience. Allegiance to the Incarnate Lord is the necessary presupposition of our continuing belief in God, as Christians understand that word, and the predetermining factor for all lesser loyalties.

The author is under obligation to the Syndics of the University Press at Cambridge for granting him permission to make a number of quotations from the works of Professor A. N. Whitehead. His personal thanks are due to Mrs. Beardall for her great kindness in undertaking most generously the heavy burden of typing out the whole of the manuscript; to Mr. W. J. Bolt for his kindness in reading the proofs and preparing material for the indexes; to the Brethren of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd, in whose house at Cambridge nearly half of the book was written; and finally to the publishers and printers for their courteous consideration, and for the care and accuracy with which the book has been prepared for publication.

MIRFIELD.
Easter, 1928.

SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS

PART I. THE DOMAINS OF EXPERIENCE AND THE NEW CREATION IN CHRIST

PAGE

CHAPTER I.—THE INCARNATION AND THEISM . . 3

I. The doctrine of the Incarnation offers timely help in fundamental difficulties of theistic belief. Rational grounds for belief in God are difficult to maintain, when the deepest elements in human experience are not allowed to bear their testimony. But we must avoid separating (*a*) religion from metaphysics and (*b*) the figure of Jesus from the historical development of religion. Two convictions: (i) dogmatic development inevitable and justifiable, (ii) the actual development of Christology true and defensible. The Incarnation disclosed the true character of the bond between God and creation and determined the Christian conception of God. On the other hand the biblical conception of God provides rational grounds for accepting the Incarnation. Thus Christian theism and the Incarnation are mutually supporting beliefs. The Incarnation illuminates its own *terminal concepts*; and these provide our best approach to the doctrine.

II. *Terminology and terminal concepts.* Christianity has been obliged to clothe itself in forms which had other associations. Resulting difficulties. Three questions: (i) What terminology can be found to-day for expressing the doctrine of the Incarnation? (ii) Do the terminal concepts of revelation justify the doctrine? (iii) Given adequate definitions, does the doctrine vindicate Christian theism? These questions cannot be separated. The doctrine is the result of a historical sequence of revelation, experience and interpretation. Knowledge moves from concrete apprehension through thought-forms to expression in terminology. The language of religion begins in mythological imagery; but may finally adopt a technical terminology which has quite different origins. Examples of this process. In a given whole of religious experience and tradition there may be gradations of value and permanence as between its different elements. Thus there may be transformations of terminology with persisting identity of the whole expressed. This has been the case with Christianity. But terminology has its own associations; and so changes in expression tend to modify underlying concepts. An element of variability is thus introduced which makes possible a living development, elastic and yet continuous. These facts involve both loss and gain.

III. Possibility to-day of a new synthesis after periods of disintegration and radical change. Survey of thought since the Renaissance. The dispersive tendencies of the modern period, and its radical dualism of inner and outer worlds (Descartes to Kant). The thinking self contemplates its own ideas. The concept of mechanism dominates the external world increasingly. Transformations inaugurated by Hegel and Darwin. Dualism was not overcome in the nineteenth century ; but the scientific temper is now coming to the rescue.

IV. *Time and history.* The dominance of history in the nineteenth century. Traditional Christianity suffered a double attrition between monistic idealism and historical criticism. Christian theism in apparent conflict with new conceptions of development and evolution. The nineteenth century has shown (*a*) that theism needs the support of historical religion and (*b*) that historical Christianity requires a metaphysical interpretation. The field of time and history has become common ground for a new synthesis. The transition through James and Bergson. But vitalism is a false lead. History and the sciences are being brought together in a new way ; and in this scheme the concept of time is central. The fruits of these ideas can be taken up into Christian theology.

CHAPTER II.—THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE 28

I. The gospel is both other-worldly and historical. This involves difficulties which indicate strength rather than weakness. Recent theology has reflected the prevailing bifurcation of interests, *i.e.* historical criticism and problems of the self-conscious mind. The new movement towards philosophic realism. The organic conception of the universe has now won its way to the front. It involves (*a*) the acknowledgment of a hierarchy of grades and (*b*) the recognition of an objective reference in all knowledge. The representational theory of knowledge is one-sided and has proved inadequate to the complexities of the universe. The centre of interest has passed from the traditional idealisms to new philosophies of nature. The modern acknowledgment of grades, viz. matter, life, mind and spirit.

II. *The cosmic series.* Its characteristics : (i) general *structure.* The mode in which the series is built up. A single interrelated system with (*a*) horizontal and vertical relations and (*b*) 'higher' and 'lower' significance. The advance of the series marked by increasing complexity controlled by unification of structure. The mode characterising a particular structure will be called its *highest law of being.* (ii) The concept of the *organism* : a whole which pervades its parts and

expresses its own law of unity through them. An organism may thus be a complicated hierarchy, a microcosm of the series. Extended use of the term *organism* to indicate certain characteristics which pervade the whole series. (iii) *Transformation* a further characteristic of the series. The parts go together within a whole under transformed conditions. Entities are not pigeon-holed in compartments. The significance of the series lies in *ascending transformations.*

III. *Physical objects* transcend succession and persist through time. So also does our relation to them in perception. Organisms cannot be understood in abstraction from their life-stories, *i.e.* their mode of persistence through space-time. The series is in process of development. Its relation to time has advancing significance as *individuality* rises in importance. Man is a *spiritual organism* standing at the head of the series and conformed to its general structure. His spiritual significance is rooted in the series. Individual curves of development in the series either (*a*) return into the flow of physical events, or (*b*) move upwards on the level of spirit. The significance of the series can be fully manifested only through man.

IV. The structure of the human organism. Mind is an organic structure which we share with animals. In man it becomes an organ of spirit. Dualistic theories concerning the human organism are unsatisfactory. Mind an organic kingdom. There is no central nucleus or self other than the organism as a whole. 'The self-conscious ego' is conditioned by 'the unconscious.' But the whole organism of man is conditioned by a law or *principle of unity* proper to the level of spirit. This principle determines man's position in relation to the series. Lateral connexions in the series develop into social organisms. The relation between the individual and social organisms of man to be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III.—SPIRITUAL ORGANISMS AND THE ETERNAL ORDER 54

I. Characteristics of spiritual organisms. Man becomes aware of himself as transcending change and succession. He *apprehends* order and significance in the external world and *responds* with coherent purpose. The life of the spirit is set in this framework. Man has experience of an *eternal order* which transcends the series and is also immanent in it. (*a*) We apprehend manifestations of the eternal order in concrete environment. Thus (*b*) we come to recognise the transcendent character of that order and (*c*) to reflect upon our relation to it. Apprehension evokes response, which is also threefold, but in the reverse order. An inner *nisus* finds expression in concrete activity. The individual is thus a peculiar focus of relationship with the eternal order.

II. Relation of the individual to the social organism. Human individuality begins with maximum dependence upon

society. But its development has continuous social significance. Eternal worth attaches to both individual and social forms. They are interlocked in the eternal order. Development of individuality in man must fulfil the condition that all other levels of activity are co-ordinated within the rhythm proper to the level of spirit. A spiritual organism is unified through its *transcending principle of unity.* Physical and psychological determinism are relatively true in cross-sections of the organism, but not in the organism as a whole. The rhythm of the whole is determined by communion with the eternal order.

III. In the ascending series of organisms there is *advancing concreteness* of individuality and of organic interconnexions. Concreteness of individuality is developed through a tension of whole and parts, of unity in variety; a tension which rises in significance as the transcending principles of unity move upwards in the series. (*a*) Advancing integration of individual organisms of spirit through communion with the eternal order provides the key to the meaning of concreteness in the series. The measure of concreteness is the measure in which the eternal order is immanent in the series. (*b*) The ascending significance of the concrete in the social aspect of the series. The individual's experience of the eternal order, always mediated through the external world, finds its highest line of mediation through the social organism. The immanence of the eternal order in the social organism is a fact implicit in individual experience of that order.

IV. In spiritual organisms the social and individual principles are two *foci* in one system of reciprocal relations. Connexions and contrasts between the cosmic series and the eternal order. There is increasing incorporation of the eternal order into the series; but an abiding contrast between the two orders. The transcendence of the eternal order is an unchanging background; but *the principle of transcendence* flows down from that order with increasing significance into the developing series. *Tension* a constant characteristic of the series. With man there is a *transformation of the mode of tension* effected through his capacity for *self-transcendence* in response to the eternal order. The rhythm of spirit is self-transcending in its conformity to the eternal order. This is an activity of the whole self and therefore *self-determination.* The social aspect of individuality expresses this principle, but does not exhaust it.

CHAPTER IV.—GOD AND THE UNIVERSE . . . 82

I. The preceding description of the universe, drawn without reference to religious experience, is necessarily incomplete. But it is fully compatible with, and may support, a religious interpretation. The universe is patterned out of two contrasted characteristics, repetition and novelty. Continuous entry of *the new* upon a field of *repetitive energy* must be referred to the *creative activity* of the eternal order. Two interpretations here excluded : (*a*) negation of concrete value in the series, (*b*) confusion of the eternal order with actualisation in the series. The series must be explained in terms of movement towards concreteness. The apparent abstractiveness of the eternal order due to its refraction through aspects. Grounds for concluding that the eternal order is unchanging all-embracing concreteness. If there are adequate religious grounds, this conclusion supports belief in God. Both the entry of the new and repetitive energy must be referred to creative activity of the eternal order.

II. *Religion* has its own roots in human nature, but, in its development, is parallel to and closely associated with other forms of experience. Its twofold emotional attitude of awe and fascination is distinctive ; yet analogous to a twofold experience of the eternal order. Religious experience is naturally interpreted in terms of concrete social relationships. Polytheism reflects multiplicity of experience not yet co-ordinated. The main lines of advance in ancient history moved to co-ordinated experience through a process of *rationalisation.* But only in Judaism and its connexions did religion remain at the centre of the process. Elsewhere the distinctive contribution of religion tended to disappear, namely, communion with God as transcendent yet concrete individuality. Hebrew religion was rationalised in terms of concrete activity. Its ethical trend eliminated caprice, resisted sensuality and syncretism, and involved an advancing incorporation into religion of ethical factors which ultimately issued in monotheism.

III. The incorporation of the eternal order into the series must be interpreted in terms of directive movement. This involves three phases of apprehension, referring to (i) detailed structure, (ii) the universe as a whole in its developing movement, (iii) the unity of history. Foundations of this interpretation were laid in Greek thought ; but the scheme did not envisage an incorporation of actuality into history. Hebrew religious thought started from historical experience and found in history a growing unity of significance derived from an unfolding purpose of God. Various aspects of this interpretation were held together in a developing social experience ; whilst there was also a historical unity of individual experiences. This interpretation, although incomplete, converged towards the idea of a *kingdom of God* as the transcendent goal of history.

IV. The Platonic conception of an eternal order and the apocalyptic conception of a kingdom of God may be found to meet in the concrete experience of man. The significance of man lies in his capacity for movement towards pure actuality. Character developed through growing comprehension of eternity becomes increasingly concrete and individual. The eternal order is interlocked with concrete individuality in experience. Its fuller incorporation into human life would effect a transformation of history into the kingdom of God. God is Absolute Actuality ; and the eternal order is His manifestation to reason in divergent modes of apprehension.

ADDITIONAL NOTE A.—ACTIVITY AND ACTUALITY . . . 109

PAGE

CHAPTER V.—GOD AND MAN IN THE ETERNAL ORDER 111

I. The standpoint of theism now assumed. Its difficulties. Paradox of contrast and affinity between God and creation. The cosmic series, including man, an unfinished process. Psychology and history give no indication of ultimate harmony. The trend of the series avoids equilibrium and moves through relative harmonies to new conditions and forms. Harmony not an end in itself. It may spell stagnation and, in human life, death to higher aspirations. There can be no final term to the series in its own order. Man the organic summation of the series. But the principle of self-transcendence precludes a final goal of the series within its own processes.

II. The law of spiritual self-transcendence renders the problem of incompleteness more acute. It makes man a stranger in the place of his origin ; and involves experiences of *non-attainment* in his communion with the eternal order. The problem of evil arises in ethical failure ; but casts its shadow upon our whole experience of non-attainment. It is primarily ethical, but has cosmic aspects. The tragedy of creation is failure to attain finality in God. Man is the bridge to finality ; but he cannot span the gulf. Evil is neither an illusion nor an inevitable concomitant of finite creaturehood, but a withholding of creation from its movement towards God. The arrest of this movement due to man's estrangement from God.

III. The facts of non-attainment appear to stultify theism. A solution must be sought in other aspects of experience. Knowledge is determined by its objects, which are given to mind as both immanent in and transcendent over experience. The advancing significance of objects in the series determines an advancing *progression of knowledge* ; and there is a progressive correlation between perception and the series of objects with increasing immanence of significance. In the progression of knowledge there is advancing apprehension of the eternal order rising towards concreteness. In the directive movement of the universe we apprehend an ascending *revelation* of reality.

IV. Revelations of the eternal order. Its ultimate standards far transcend our capacities for apprehension and response ; yet they also lie at the roots of our spiritual being. They are infinitely beyond, yet infinitely near and intimate. The significance of human life does not lie in attainment or non-attainment, but in an affinity with the eternal order which marks it out as our true home. Revelations of the eternal order, as of religion, are at once awe-inspiring and captivating. These facts do not solve the difficulties of theism ; but they assure us of a *nexus* with eternity, and suggest the possibility of a solution which must be sought in the sphere of religion.

CHAPTER VI.—GOD AND MAN IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 134

I. Religious revelation. Three considerations corresponding to three stages in Hebrew religion : (i) crude social analogies ; (ii) rational developments and individual values ;

(iii) reincorporation of developments into social forms. In (i) God is regarded as a concrete activity. In (ii) rationalisation moves towards Absolute Actuality. But this heightening of transcendence is accompanied by deepening of religion in its intimate aspect. As in the eternal order, so here, contrasted aspects interact with mutual enhancement. This experience involves a tension of contrast between Creator and creature, which is resolved by passage into the harmony of communion with God. The contrast remains, but is taken up into harmony. Sin is a state of estrangement from God, in which tension remains unresolved and the sense of contrast is bereft of encompassing harmony.

II. Religion is complicated by the fact of sin. This involves reconsideration of factors in the argument. (i) Corresponding to the progression of knowledge there is *a progression of revelation* in the series. Its mediation advances from instrumentality of objects to individual agents of revelation, where man's response embodies creative activity of the eternal order. (ii) In man revelation is launched out of a serial progress into *an infinite order of revelation*, which includes within itself the progression of revelation in the series and discloses ultimate standards. (iii) *Religious revelation* has God as its revealed content and revealing agent, and as the creative ground of its recipients. Its penetrating activity surpasses all other forms of revelation. The infinite order of revelation comes to its limit in the concrete activity of ethical response. It assures us that the good is ultimate, but has no solution for the problem of ethical failure. Religion is a more ultimate form of concrete activity than ethical response.

III. Religious revelation is capable of including within itself all other forms of revelation. Revelation, interpreted in terms of *activity*, is the corollary of creation. It is the creative activity of God drawing man to his true end. In a sinful world revelation passes into the form of *redemptive activity*. God was revealed to Israel through His saving acts. Revelation, with its selective system of mediation through instruments and agents, is the objective side of man's communion with God; but it can advance only through development of man's spiritual capacities. So in the historical revelation of the Bible the instruments and agents of revelation developed from lower to higher forms, mediating with advancing adequacy the redemptive activity of God to sinful Israel. The sacrificial system provided for the religious impulse an embodied response in fixed instrumental forms; whereas prophecy emphasised the rôle of the agent as mediator of revelation and redemption through ethical apprehension and response. Thus it tended to throw up idealised pictures embodying Israel's response in individual form. The response to this scheme of mediation was inadequate. Judaism concentrated upon (*a*) the fixed routine of response to the Law; (*b*) apocalyptic hopes of divine intervention. The tension of contrasts remained unresolved.

PAGE

CHAPTER VII.—THE NEW CREATION . . . 158

I. Summary of preceding argument. The threefold progression of the organic series, of the revelation which it conveys, and of the system of mediation. The infinity of the eternal order. Its return to concreteness, demanding further transformation. Religious revelation: its analogies with, and assimilation of, other modes of revelation. The rabbinic and apocalyptic forms of Judaism represent its failure to attain interior harmony. This failure the prelude to further transformation.

II. These lines of approach require a fulfilment which they fail to attain. Jesus Christ not the product of history. He fulfils it by entry from beyond. The New Testament the literature of a developing religious experience. The significance of this organic whole, in its historical movement, to be sought in the unities which underlie detailed structure. Three central unities: (i) the whole experience Christo-centric; (ii) Christ mediates a new revelation of God and (iii) of man as object of God's love. The life and teaching of our Lord exhibit these three unities. (*a*) The ethical aspect of the eternal order is finally incorporated into religious form, and (*b*) the kingdom of God is incorporated into history in the Messiah and His life-story. A new order of reality constituted in the contrasts of the Kingdom. Their tension was resolved by the resurrection.

III. Apostolic experience of *a new order* expressed in a doctrine of *new creation*. The Kingdom embodied in Christ has passed over into the fellowship of the Spirit. A twofold experience of Christ, as indwelling yet transcendent, contains implicitly the solution of all problems of contrast and non-attainment. A deep-rooted experience of salvation from sin was a fundamental feature of life in the Spirit, and was referred to Christ and His death as its ground and cause. The revelation of messianic righteousness accentuated the problem of sin. Yet the gospel proclaims, and experience attests, forgiveness and renewal by God's saving grace. The central position of Christ's death in apostolic interpretation has its counterpart in the passion narratives of the gospels. Ethically the New Testament widens the contrast between God and sinful man. The crucifixion is both the centre of this contrast and the means of its solution in a new harmony of salvation from sin. The ethical revelation in Christ is transmuted into a religious revelation of saving grace.

IV. This experience of salvation involves a twofold reference to Christ as indwelling *content* of the new life and transcendent *object* of experience. Identification with Christ means that the reality of the Kingdom embodied in the messianic life-story and its crowning events is reproduced in the new community and its members. Christ is the content of the Christian life-story and the *goal* of the new life. *Christian experience is an organic whole which finds its principle of unity in Christ.* This inner penetration has its counterpart in a transcendent reference to Christ as historical mediator of the Kingdom and the New Order. The absolute quality of this experience was referred to a corresponding finality of Christ's redeeming action in history; and so became the starting-point of Christological interpretation.

CHAPTER VIII.—GOD AND MAN IN CHRIST. THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE 186

I. The significance of man in God's sight revealed by Christ and embodied in His human response. The experience of life in the Spirit constitutes a revelation of a new humanity. Its content is referred to Christ in *the twofold reference of Christocentric experience*, and is reproduced in the new community. The starting-point of the new life is the new harmony of reconciliation. But, as in other domains of experience so here, the initial harmony of present experience sets up a *nisus* towards fulfilment in a more ultimate harmony. This distinction, at first minimised by an apocalyptic outlook, received increasing recognition in the ethical emphasis of the New Order.

II. The problem of ethical harmonisation transcended in the new religious experience. The old order is taken up by transformation into the New Order in accordance with a cosmic law of continuity. But transformation involves tension and conflict of old and new, of 'flesh' and 'spirit.' The crucifixion was the ultimate embodiment of this principle in history. The new creation is the renewal of the old order. Redemption is a process whereby the old order is refashioned into conformity with the new and ethical dualism is overcome. The New Testament reaffirms the unfinished character of man, even within the new order; but points to a solution through God's redeeming action in Christ by the Spirit.

III. The descriptions of Christian experience in the New Testament point to further developments. But dogmatic development is a slow organic growth; and its matured expression must not be read back into the New Testament. The spiritual unities of history are to be sought in the permanence of experience underlying expression. Difficulties involved here. The analysis of Christian experience must be brought into relation to the general *structure of experience* in its successive domains. Summary of these: (i) The progression of the organic series includes (*a*) underlying energy, and (*b*) transcendent forms and principles (*c*) immanent in objects instrumental to their mediation. (ii) The eternal order includes ultimate standards, (*a*) transcendent yet (*b*) underlying the spirit of man and (*c*) embodied in concrete activity with a twofold reference and contrasted routes of embodiment. (iii) Religious revelation gathers up these aspects of experience into a new concrete whole.

IV. Continuity of structure, pervading successive stages of revelation, culminates in the New Order in Christ. This continuity traced with respect to (i) successive manifestations of creative activity as transcendent source and underlying ground and (ii) characteristic lines which culminate in the Christo-centric aspects of Christian experience through the contrasted routes of embodiment. The eternal standards of the Kingdom are adequately embodied in Christ, who is (*a*) transcendent object, (*b*) indwelling content, and (*c*) ultimate goal of experience. Christ fulfils and sums up in Himself the universe, man and history. All domains of human experience are taken up by transformation in respect of both form and content into the new order of experience which has its centre in Christ. These facts require for their explanation the doctrine of the Incarnation.

ADDITIONAL NOTE B.—FORMS, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS . 214

PART II. THE INCARNATION AND CHRISTIAN THEISM

CHAPTER IX.—THE INCARNATION AND ORGANIC CONCEPTIONS 219

I. Four successive domains of experience. Their relation to Christ. The Incarnation the climax of an ascending movement incorporating creative activity. Concrete individuality actualised through incorporation of universality. In God universality is one with concrete individuality. Concreteness interlaced with eternity in the universe and history. Jesus Christ is Absolute Actuality incorporated into history in the form of concrete individuality. Coherence of theism and the Incarnation.

II. The Incarnation reveals, because it redeems. Creation is taken up into redemption. The cosmic series, gathered up into the human organism of Christ, attains its destiny in Him through 'the taking of the manhood into God.' Christ not a product of creative activity, but the Logos-Creator self-incorporated into the series. The Incarnation incorporates the eternal order in its wholeness into the time-series, and takes up the human organism to the 'level' of deity. No difficulty involved which is not already implicit in creation. The universe an inadequate organ of the eternal order, because its fragmentary principles of unity cannot provide a goal for the cosmic process. The Incarnation means that *Absolute Actuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word becomes the principle of unity in a human organism.* The organism of Jesus Christ is a new creation, the adequate organ for the expression of His deity.

III. The question of terminology. The Nestorian controversy reopened. Difficulties of theology in the fifth century. The problem eased to-day by new conceptions, such as (*a*) activity, (*b*) multigrade evolution, (*c*) unfinished organic development. Chalcedon broke with ancient categories; but is supported by these new conceptions, e.g. *closed* metaphysical entities are abolished by *transformation*. The decisive factor, however, is not a problem of metaphysics, but the question: ought we to offer to Jesus Christ the worship which is due to the Creator? Yet the elimination of metaphysics will not save the purity of the gospel; and may leave it at the mercy of mythology. Critique of Loofs' position. All the principles of unity proper to a human organism exist in the Incarnate Lord. But His status is not determined by such principles. For in Him *the highest law of being* is that law which is proper to deity. In Him the human organism is fulfilled by union with the Logos.

IV. The Incarnate Lord organic to the universe and to man; but not Himself an organism. The series belongs to Him. In His human organism He had a genuinely human life-story. The relation of perfection to development involved in this fact. The two ideas complementary for Christian theism. The relation of eternity to the series involves a perfection at each level. The perfection of a level is *constituted* by its transcending principle of unity, *manifested* in its directive movement, and *actualised* through transformation. The perfection proper to man involves developing wholeness of character in respect of vision and response, actualised in the form of unbroken communion with God. Such perfection we see in the human life-story of Christ. How do the gospels relate this human perfection (*a*) to deity, (*b*) to sinful humanity?

V. (*a*) Our Lord's human life shows affinity with us in every point except sin; but also an absolute contrast. Our relation to the eternal order, and His. He identifies Himself both with the authority of the Kingdom and with man's submission to its claims. He stands with us beneath its claims; yet He is in possession of its standards and ends. He expresses His deity through a human response, yet within His possession of the Kingdom. His human sonship. (*b*) Christ became organic to our sinful humanity for its redemption. Sympathy with the sinner is based upon community with the eternal order, not upon community with sin. Christ *possesses* the eternal order; and His tension with sinful environment corresponded to this fact.

CHAPTER X.—THE INCARNATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY 253

I. Relation of one terminology to another indirect; and determined by religious concepts. The Christology of ch. ix. to be tested by its relation to (*a*) Adoptionism, (*b*) Monophysitism.

II. *Adoptionism* gives a unique position to Christ, but as a finite individual within the organic series. This theory involves grave difficulties: (i) The climax of *creation* a perfect human individuality to whom God is adjectival. Universality and individuality in God are separated; theism is implicitly surrendered; and the tension of individual and social principles is not overcome. On the organic theory of creation Adoptionism is irrational. (ii) Christ the agent of a supreme *revelation.* If He belongs to the organic series, His revelation of the eternal order cannot be absolute or final. But Christ is the centre of all lines of revelation, makes claims of an absolute character, and is the focus of an experience which has universal implications. (iii) The tension of contrasts between God and the sinner overcome in *redemption*; which God alone can effect. The Redeemer must be very God.

III. The *Apollinarian-Monophysite* tendency in history. Has it a necessary connexion with orthodoxy? Its wider affiliations in the theory that the divine supersedes the human. Implications of the Christian doctrine of creation neglected. The Renaissance countered *supersession* with *emancipation.* Neither theory adequate if creation is to find its end in God. On the organic theory supersession is impossible. But can we avoid duplication of individuality in the Incarnate Lord?

IV. The distinction between (i) graded and incomplete embodiment of the principle of individuality in an organic evolution and (ii) Absolute Individuality in God. Individuality in man not fully constituted. His significance lies in capacity for passage beyond present incompleteness through dependence upon the eternal order with advancing concreteness of individuality. Monophysite supersession violates this principle, and surrenders the contrast between God and creation for which theism stands. Man's highest activity is worship, which is a recognition of dependence upon divine activity. This presupposes *a principle of self-giving in God.* Finite individuality in all its stages is a manifestation of the Creator's self-giving. Supersession dishonours the Creator in His creatures.

V. Grace transforms human individuality and carries it to its consummation in the New Order. The individual and social principles are correlated in the new humanity of Christ by transformation to the level of the new creation. They are subsumed under the principle of individuality as it exists in Him. This synthesis belongs to the eternal order; and corresponds to the absolute incorporation of that order through the Incarnation. The principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is therefore *super-organic*, and belongs to the level of deity. This conclusion agrees with the definition in ch. ix. (end of § ii.). Distinctions between (1) highest law of being, (2) transcending principle of unity, (3) principle of individuality. Of these (3) is the most important. For the ascending principles of unity are graded by progressive incorporation of a single principle immanent in the whole series. This is the principle of individuality, which manifests in the series the self-giving of the Creator. In man this principle becomes self-transcending, and therefore cannot complete

PAGE

itself. It is finally actualised through the absolute self-giving of God in the Incarnation.

VI. *The principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is Absolute Individuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word.* All supersession theories are superfluous. The organic principle of unity proper to Christ's human organism does not determine His status, but is taken up to the level of deity and subsumed under Absolute Individuality. The conception of God implied in this doctrine to be more fully explored.

CHAPTER XI.—THE INCARNATION AND GOD. THE STATUS OF THE REDEEMER 286

I. Behind patristic theology lay the experience of redemption first formulated by St. Paul. Its structure. Individual transformation (*a*) by the Spirit within the body of Christ, (*b*) by mystical union with Christ. Correlation of these two aspects. Christ as content of the new life. The synoptic 'cross-bearing' maxim has become an interior principle of transformation through death to self. The individual is taken up by transformation into the organism of the new humanity to conform to its higher rhythm. No room here for a 'dispersive incarnation.' The Incarnate Lord supplies the principle of individuality to His organism, into which all men can be taken up to be completed in Him. This is a relation of Creator to creatures.

II. The Christology of the New Testament. Two lines developed, starting from (*a*) the glorified Son of Man, (*b*) the synoptic sonship understood as 'messianic.' The 'image of God.' A cosmic status becomes the background of the Redeemer's headship over the new creation. Development in Colossians, Hebrews, Ephesians and the prologue of St. John. The Logos-doctrine.

III. The Johannine sonship. The fourth evangelist teaches the equality of the Son with the Father, and describes their mutual relations. 'Son' has become a metaphysical title. But the main theme is the relationship in which the Son stands to mankind as the representative of the Father. The discourses are revelations of Christ's redeeming activity, involving a corresponding revelation of the Son's relation to the Godhead. The Johannine Christ stands above the new community as its Redeemer and receives its adoring worship. The fellowship of the disciples based upon an abiding relationship between Father and Son. Contrast of these two unities. The former is an imperfect unity growing towards perfection. It will find its goal when it is taken up into the perfect unity which exists between the Father and the Son.

IV. The real basis for a fusion of Greek and Jewish thought about God lay in the Johannine emphasis upon a transcendent order of abiding relationships. The revelation of the Kingdom was incorporated into the New Order in the form of a transformed *κοινωνία* whose inner principle is *ἀγάπη*. These are

referred back to a transcendent fellowship of Persons in the life of God. This is the trend of New Testament thought and the key to Johannine theology. Its justification in the synoptic revelation and in the experience of the New Order. Such a doctrine demanded the further definition which we owe to Tertullian and Origen. The latter gave philosophical form to the Christian conception of God. The Logos-doctrine expressed the cosmic functions of Christ; but did not sufficiently differentiate the experience of the redeemed community. Patripassianism compelled a return to the theology of sonship.

V. Origen fused the theology of sonship with the Platonic conception of an eternal order. Succeeding reactions and tendencies. The real issue was determined by the demands of soteriology. Athanasius used two weapons: (*a*) concentration upon soteriology, (*b*) the revelation of divine sonship. Both came from Scripture. The Johannine sonship is the last word of the New Testament upon redemption. Development of Christology to Augustine. Two aspects of the movement: (i) The Logos-doctrine sets the redeemer at the head of creation. (ii) The second aspect sets the mediator within the eternal order, which creation and the gospel presuppose. A twofold religious interest treasured the historical reality of the redeemer and found His status in a transcendent order. The theology of sonship rests upon the gospel revelation interpreted through an experience of redemption.

CHAPTER XII.—THE WORD AND THE SPIRIT. THE MISSION OF THE PARACLETE 317

I. Theology of the Spirit undeveloped until the fourth century. Reasons for this. In the New Testament the Spirit's activity is concentrated upon the new creation. The Spirit inaugurates the new dispensation (*a*) in the messianic life-story, (*b*) in the new community. The new creation is referred back from the new community to Christ. Its twofold derivation, from (i) the Holy Spirit, (ii) the pre-existent Logos, not co-ordinated in the New Testament. Does St. Paul identify Christ and the Spirit? Identity and contrast in functions ascribed to them. A marked distinction of thought and language unfavourable to simple identification. Tendency towards hypostatisation of the Spirit. The Spirit belongs to the level of Christ's super-organic individuality and shares its qualities. The form and content of the new organism derived from Christ. But the Spirit fashions the human material of the old order to receive the form and content of the new order.

II. Two kinds of creative activity in the New Order: (i) transcendent and formative, (ii) immanent and quickening. These are complementary, and are carried back to the origins of the messianic life-story. Ultimate differentiation of the Word and the Spirit. *Twofold creative activity*, (*a*) in the organic series (objects and events); (*b*) in the eternal order and (*c*) in religion (revelation and response). The cosmic aspects of the Spirit's activity not prominent in early Christian thought, and never yet fully worked out. But in the New Testament the scope of the New Order is universal. Its purpose the restoration of creation to its true development. This implies a cosmic activity of the Spirit. The Spirit of Christ must be understood in terms congruous with the significance of Christ. The underlying activity of the eternal order through all domains of experience is the creative activity of the Holy Spirit. Deity of the Holy Spirit. These conclusions depend, for Christo-centric experience, upon the status of the Incarnate Lord.

III. Is the Holy Spirit a *Person*? Analogies from human capacity for mutual spiritual penetration are valuable, but inadequate to the facts. The Spirit exercises functions of deity complementary to those of the Incarnate Lord. The relation of the synoptic record to apostolic history does not support the analogy from human influence. Parallel between the relation of Johannine to synoptic teaching in the case of the Son and in the case of the Spirit. The gift of the Spirit in St. John. Points of agreement with the synoptists. Reserve of chs. i.–xii. In ch. iii. synoptic teaching is transformed into a statement about the New Order. But a further transformation in chs. xiv.–xvi. contains the parallel with Johannine Christology. A tendency of thought in the apostolic age was crystallised in St. John into the conception of a third divine Person. The Paraclete passages contain the final teaching of the New Testament concerning the significance of the Holy Spirit, given in a dramatic framework which has the historical perspective of the synoptic gospels.

IV. Status of the Paraclete in relation to the Father and the Son. He is the *alter ego* of the Son. The Johannine conception of revelation. Analysis of John xiv. 15–31, especially *vv.* 18–24. The divine indwelling is here made to depend upon the ethical response of true discipleship. The allegory of the vine (ch. xv.) reverses this teaching. But the two truths are not contradictory, as 1 John iv. 7–21 shows. The indwelling of the Father and the Son in the disciples and the ethical response of love are mutually complementary facts of the New Order; and both are effected through the coming of the Paraclete.

CHAPTER XIII.—THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY IN GOD: (i) DATA AND APPROACHES . . . 355

I. Relation of the Johannine Trinity to later theology, and to St. Paul's teaching. St. John reached a fuller stage of theological reflection than St. Paul concerning the divine *κοινωνία*, an eternal order of love actualised on earth in the Christ-loving response of the disciples through the coming of the Paraclete. This teaching, when related to that of St. Paul, points to a mutual indwelling of Father, Son and

Spirit on the level of deity. There is interpenetration with distinction of functions. The doctrine of *coinherence.*

II. Return to the principle of individuality as discussed in ch. x. Argument of that chapter summarised. Created individuality completed in the Incarnate Lord. Further differentiation of Absolute Individuality in the doctrine of the Trinity. The principle of individuality examined with respect to the contrasted aspects of unity and plurality. Spiritual organisms find their higher unity of interconnexions in no function of the series, but in the controlling character of the eternal order. *Limitations of the finite principle of individuality* withhold its full manifestation in created spirits.

III. The principle of individuality in man limited in three respects: (i) In its self-regarding aspect through incompleteness of self-harmonisation, (ii) in its social aspect through incompleteness of mutual dependence and interpenetration, (iii) in its communion with the eternal order through non-attainment. These limitations of individuality fall under three aspects: (*a*) In its organic character it is unfinished; (*b*) in relation to the eternal order it is finite; (*c*) its ethical failure is not inevitable. There is nothing in the structure of created individuality as such to hinder its advance towards unification. If ethical failure were transcended, our conception of individuality would be transformed. Its true meaning would be manifested in terms of twofold unification: (1) the individual unit transcending its present disharmony; (2) interpenetration of individuals in a unified fellowship. The solutions of non-attainment reached in Part I show a pathway which conducts us towards this goal of unification through *cumulative wholes of experience.*

IV. The positive aspects of the eternal order. The persistence and quality of its claims assure us of a destiny for finite individuality corresponding to ultimate union with that order. The concept of the kingdom of God transfers the ultimate significance of individuality from man to God; and shifts the centre of interest from the completion of man to the self-giving of God. All significant aspects of finite individuality, *including its social aspect,* are derived from and reflect the fullness of Absolute Individuality. Thus the revelation of the Trinity completes the implications of the Kingdom. That revelation was given in the crowning epoch of the divine activities of self-giving; and its significance belongs to its own distinctive order of experience. Its ultimate justification depends upon its inclusive character.

V. The doctrine of the Trinity includes contrasted aspects, representing and guaranteeing divergent orders of experience. It is the completion of biblical monotheism, as the New Order is the fulfilment of the kingdom of God. Its two main aspects, the unity of the Godhead and the distinction of Persons, represent broadly the respective interests of reason and religion. Thus there arises a tension of interests in the application of *the analogy from finite to absolute individuality.* This tension sets the stage for a true use of the analogy.

PAGE
CHAPTER XIV.—THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY IN GOD: (ii) CONCLUSIONS 387

I. *Modalism* and *tritheism*, excluded by the Church, remain as permanent possibilities of thought. Precarious background of modalism. Its conflict with New Testament experience. All genuine monotheism affirms absolute individuality in God; and the principle of individuality is always found to include plurality. The dilemma of modalism. It clings to the principle of individuality in God, yet refuses the implications of the analogy. Monism is at least consistent, whereas modalism directly contradicts experience. Hebrew monotheism rational within its own range of experience, but incomplete. Biblical monotheism as a whole does not support a theory which does violence to the most fully developed stage of its advancing order of experience.

II. Modalism involved in classic difficulties of theism without the distinctively Christian solution. The idea of creation. The transcendence of God over creation cannot be placed lower than the transcendence of the eternal order over the organic series. An economic Trinity does not secure eternal relations of *self-giving* within the Godhead. This involves an inevitable consequence that God is made dependent upon creation for His self-expression; and is therefore reduced to a level lower than that of the eternal order. It follows that either (1) Love is not an essential attribute of God, or (2) the life of God is incomplete. Modalism reduces religion to mythology and undermines worship. Danger of religious sentimentalism. Worship includes response to the eternal order; and this involves contrasted aspects of deity inseparably interwoven. Final recognition of these facts in the revelation of the Trinity in the New Order.

III. The analogy from finite to absolute individuality must be pressed all the way; but within limits determined by the contrast between the series and the eternal order. Spiritual organisms are actualised through self-transcendence, of which there are two stages: (*a*) transcendence over *organic plurality*, (*b*) spiritual self-transcendence. The former falls outside, the latter is integral to, the analogy. This distinction holds for both knowledge and conduct. Contemplation presupposes a spiritual fellowship in which spiritual goods are shared; and the self-giving of love demands a social order in which this the ultimate response to reality shall be made. This *spiritual plurality* is in permanent contrast with organic plurality; and offers a true analogy to the Holy Trinity.

IV. The social organism is built up out of *individuals*. How then can the analogy avoid tritheism? Organic plurality involves spatio-temporal *externality*, with advancing differentiation of individuals in the series through increasing *internality*. The significance of human society is (*a*) constituted in its transcendence over organic plurality; but (*b*) actualised through spiritual co-operation of its members, involving the positive stage of self-transcendence. In the true social order the mutual relations of society and its members are expressed in terms of function and vocation within a wider reference to the goods of the eternal order. This conception of spiritual plurality in unity provides a true analogy to the Holy Trinity. Analogy is necessarily inadequate; so here in three aspects. Interpenetration of finite individuals never complete on account of (1) organic externality, (2) wider reference of creaturehood to the Creator, (3) ethical failure. The revelation of the Trinity can be fully accepted only within experience of redemption from sin.

V. Conclusions concerning the Holy Trinity. Terminology: *person*, *personality*, *individuality*, *actuality*, *activity*. God is *Three Persons in One Absolute Individuality*, or *Three Personal Centres of One Absolute Actuality*. Limitations of thought and language. The eternal relations and processions. The purpose of creation. The Trinity and the eternal order. Creation and the Creator. The twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit and the finite principle of individuality. Creation, revelation and redemption. The Incarnation the divine remedy for sin. The eternal response of the Son and the response of creation. The Incarnate Son brings creation to its true end in God. Analogy and contrast between the new creation and the old. The organic conception of the Incarnation. *The Incarnate Lord became finitely individual in His human organism, but is not in Himself a finite individual.*

VI. The doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation mutually illuminating. Eternity enters into finite temporality while remaining transcendent over it. Expression of this law in man and his incomplete individuality. If the Incarnate Lord were a finite individual, He would not be completely individual. The Persons of the Trinity are perfectly individual because they are not separate individuals. The Eternal Son became, by His absolute self-giving, finitely individual in His organism, while remaining in full possession of Absolute Individuality. He transcends the contrast of individual and social principles, but, possessing both, manifests the former in His human life-story and the latter in the social experience of the New Order.

CHAPTER XV.—THE INCARNATION AND MAN . . 426

I. The Son is the *Absolute* or *Eternal Object* in whom the Father is expressed. All *objects* of knowledge are derived from the formative activity of the Word and are partial revelations of Him. The activity of the Spirit immanent in *events* and in spiritual experience. The unities of revelation and inspiration and the divergent domains of experience. The Incarnation conforms to the structure of the universe and fulfils man's religious need. The Son has entered history as the Eternal Object incarnate. He is the focus of revelation in history and its ultimate principle of unity. His life-story is its supreme event. But redemption is more than a completed cosmology. Sin is a withholding of *response* from creature to Creator. The eternal response of the Son to the Father is embodied in the new creation through the way of the Cross; and the response of redeemed humanity is made in the Son.

II. The organism of the Incarnate Lord possesses permanently two aspects. These were manifested successively in history. But the response of His life-story is actualised in eternity. The new organism is (1) the ultimate medium of God's self-revelation, and (2) the adequate completion of the organic universe. In His Godhead the Son possesses the individual and social principles. He transcends their developing contrast in His organic creations; and reunites them in Himself through His new organism. In accordance with organic structure the Incarnate Lord is the individuating principle of the new organism on His own 'level.' But He is the social principle of unity for finite spiritual organisms taken up into union with Him.

III. Divergent domains of experience are taken up into the new organism in the transformed history which is the process of the new creation. Religion, although diverging from other domains, is yet in principle capable of including them without supersession of their relative autonomies. The true social organism a worshipping community, in which gifts of creation are transformed into materials of worship. In the response of the Incarnate Lord the Kingdom is present in actuality. The Church the social nucleus of the new organism and the organ of the Kingdom, through which the Incarnate Lord is present in and acts upon the transformed and transforming processes of the new creation.

IV. The twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit functions on a new level in the new social organism. The redeemed community is the product of the twofold creative activity of the ascended Lord and of His outpoured Spirit. The response of the Son, the new way of the Kingdom, is reproduced in the new life of redeemed humanity. That life has its source in the domain of religious experience; but passes out into all domains. Christianity the most human religion, because the most divine. This way of response leads through conflict to spiritual liberty; which may be reached through all domains of experience, but is finally actualised in the spiritual interchanges of worship. The Incarnate Lord penetrates redeemed humanity as the focus of all spiritual activities, and thus embraces all penetrations of man's spirit by the refracted aspects of eternity.

V. The new organism develops through history in two ways. (i) The first way builds up the social nucleus *intensively* through spiritual equipment and training of individuals in the worshipping community. (ii) The second way moves out *extensively* into the complex life of man and lifts the diverse spheres of human activity towards their true end in the kingdom of God.

PAGE

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
C.—OBJECTS AND EVENTS 456
D.—THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT . 469
E.—ORIGEN AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY . 473

INDEXES:
INDEX OF REFERENCES 477
INDEX OF PERSONS 480
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 483

ABBREVIATIONS

DCB	Dictionary of Christian Biography, &c. (Eds. Smith and Wace).
ERE	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Ed. Hastings).
ICC	International Critical Commentary.
JTS	Journal of Theological Studies.
PG	*Patrologia Graeca* (Ed. Migne).
RV	Revised Version.
WH	Westcott and Hort's Text of the New Testament.

Other abbreviations, which refer only to Additional Note C, will be found on p. 456.

PART I

THE DOMAINS OF EXPERIENCE AND THE NEW CREATION IN CHRIST

CHAPTER I

THE INCARNATION AND THEISM

I

THE doctrine of the Incarnation asserts the union of God and man, of the Creator and His creation. The problem of the Incarnation raises the double question as to how such a union as the doctrine declares is possible and as to how we are to conceive the union in such a way as will do adequate justice to both of its terms. If, however, the doctrine of the Incarnation makes high demands upon faith and raises problems of its own which theologians have found almost insoluble, yet on the other hand the doctrine has been found to throw light upon questions and difficulties of a kind more serious and fundamental and more urgently requiring a solution than any difficulty within the sphere of technical Christology. The difficulties in question are those which any form of theism has to face, if we take theism to mean belief in a creative God. For reason is dissatisfied with any form of dualism which cannot be resolved into unity. But theism seems to assert a fundamental difference between God and creation, while at the same time asserting some fundamental bond and affinity which renders knowledge of, and communion with, God possible for created beings. For many minds this seems a paradox impossible to maintain, intruding an arbitrary transcendence into what should be regarded as one continuous whole of experience.[1] Substantial grounds for this criticism have been furnished in the past when theistic philosophers have taken up a position of detachment from any living historical embodiment of theism in religion.[1] It is a plain fact of history that theism as a philosophy has found difficulty in maintaining itself apart from the supporting alliance of some great historical religion such as Christianity. The eighteenth century's vain search for a self-sufficient natural theology is a further illustration of the same theme.[2] But no scheme of argumentation can bear the weight of the theistic paradox, if the deepest elements in human experience are not allowed to bear their testimony. Thus it was a distinct advance when Kant shifted the weight of the argument to man's moral consciousness. A further advance logically follows and is being tentatively made to-day under the impetus of anthropological studies. If the moral consciousness can be called as a witness, then why not the religious impulse? Some would go further still, arguing that the religious impulse in general has too doubtful a record to be regarded as a reliable witness. According to this view the only sure ground for belief in God is to be found in that revealing light which radiates from the historical figure of Jesus Christ and in the faith which is thereby quickened. This central and characteristic theme of the Ritschlian school was a much needed protest against a rationalism which hesitated to take its stand upon directly religious ground. But in so far as this mood was intended to be exclusive and to rule out all other lines of evidence for the truth of theism, it was actually destructive of the positions which it desired to maintain. If there is no witness for God in nature and in the general experience of the human race, then the breach between God and His creation is made to appear even more formidable, and it is difficult to understand how any religious revelation can find a place at all. This position is in fact being rendered untenable by the comparative study of religions with its psychological equipment. The assimilation of Christianity to other religions has proceeded apace under the new studies, and consequently no supposition of a special revelation can shield Christianity from the sceptical arguments which interpret all religious phenomena in terms of psychological illusion.

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[1] See the discussion of religion by F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xxv. pp. 438 ff. See also B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 156; cp. p. 254; and from another point of view, but more explicitly than Bosanquet, S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. bk. iv., especially pp. 388 ff. Cp. also an article to the same effect and by the same author in *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xxv. no. 2.

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[1] For a recent plea against such detachment see F. W. Butler, *Christianity and History*, pp. 60–76.

[2] Cp. C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, ch. ii., and W. R. Sorley, *A History of English Philosophy*, p. 40, and ch. vii. § 11. For fuller details see Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. i., especially chs. ii. and iii.

Quite apart, however, from thus opening the door to scepticism, any view which isolates the historical revelation in Christ altogether from the wider revelation through creation itself cannot be made to appear rational. The philosophy of theism then must be persuaded to give up its detached attitude towards those historical religions which profess theistic beliefs and towards the religious experience to which they witness. Christian theology, on the other hand, must not allow itself to be overborne by those agnostic and irrational tendencies which hand over the guardianship of religious experiences to psychology. The bond between reason and revelation must be upheld; for in the last resort all experience involves interpretation in terms of metaphysical beliefs. If then we avoid the error of keeping religious revelation and the metaphysics of theism in separate compartments, and the further error, often associated with the first, of sharply isolating the figure of Jesus from the historical development of religion, within which that figure appears—if we steer clear of these two mistakes—then we can welcome unreservedly the modern return to the Christ of the gospels. For this return logically involves a shifting of the defences of theism to much stronger ground. It involves a move from the camping grounds of theism in general to the positions proper to a particular kind of theistic belief which has appeared in history. Its proper designation is the Christian belief in God, or, in brief, Christian theism.

The point of view from which the present enquiry begins has for its starting-point two convictions in respect of the historical element in Christian belief. (1) The first is that dogmatic development beyond the New Testament forms of thought was inevitable and historically justifiable. (2) The second is the more venturesome conviction that the actual course of Christological development was in its main lines of advance through the conciliar definitions the true and defensible development of primitive Christian thought. The first point is one which perhaps it is difficult for any reasonable person to deny, although unanimity even on this point is probably not attainable. The second point, on the other hand, involves judgments of a complex kind derived ultimately from two very different sources, namely historical criticism on the one hand and the reasoned interpretation of religious experience on the other. Thus the second point is one which evades all attempts at demonstration from the nature of the case, and is in fact keenly disputed to-day by men of piety and learning, notably in Germany. Nevertheless every argument must start somewhere, and no theology can hope to be constructive unless it is based upon sincere religious convictions. Such convictions are best stated clearly at the outset. Their justification or otherwise must be found in the extent to which the argument succeeds in co-ordinating the relevant facts in one harmonious interpretation.

We can now resume the main theme of this chapter, which is that the doctrine of the Incarnation when accepted as true is found to bring invaluable aid to theistic beliefs. The present writer is concerned to put the connection higher still and to say that the Incarnation itself provided the revealing principle of theism by disclosing the true nature of the bond between God and His creation. This is a key which enables us to interpret the actual course of Christological thought in history. The fact of such a bond was recognised in the historical figure of Jesus Christ as known in the devotional experience of the Church. By this bond a new kind of union between God and creation had been set up. This was the starting point of theology from St. Paul onwards. By this standard of reference men found, as time went on, that they had to revise their conceptions of the two terms in the union, namely God and creation. By the last sentence it is not intended to suggest that any consciously deliberate revision of these conceptions was undertaken, say, in the patristic period or even later. Whatever happened in this respect was in the main unconscious and not clearly understood. Moreover, in some respects such a revision of concepts was never carried to its conclusion. Some of the conciliar decisions logically represented radical revisions of current thought. But the revolution, if there was one, was silent, unorganised and largely unrecognised in its own time. For example, the decision taken at Nicaea in the fourth century, while in form a Christological decision, involved in fact a drastic breach with current philosophical concepts about the relation of God to the universe. It was in fact a proclamation that there is a distinctively Christian doctrine of creation,[1] radically different, for example, from the current scheme of Neo-Platonic cosmology. Some would perhaps prefer to place the decisive epoch further back, in the time of Origen,[2] and there is certainly a sense in which many theologians would find it within the New Testament period. But allowing for such considerations, it is clear that here if anywhere we have an example of that revision of concepts to which reference has been made. In other words, while the centre of interest in Christian thought during this period is and continues to be the Person of Christ, in actual fact the development of Christology involves and carries with it the development of a distinctively Christian theism. This may be put in another way by saying that the doctrine of the Incarnation appears in history as the 'regulative principle' of the Christian conception of God.

But on the other hand something like the reverse of this proposition would appear to be equally true, namely that the Christian conception of God actually determined the course of Christological development. This idea will not be acceptable to those who hold that the course taken by Greek theology involved an unjustifiable incrustation of mythological accretions upon the original gospel.[3] Nevertheless two considerations must be urged in its favour: (*a*) The first is the point often made, yet always in danger of being overlooked, that the fathers were a great deal more interested in Scripture than in philosophy. This is surely true even of Origen, when we remember that for all his speculations he does not allow himself to forget that there is a tradition handed down whose authority derives from Scripture.[1] It is true that Stoic influence sometimes bulks very large, particularly in the second century.[2] But such influence is followed by a definite return to Scriptural ideas.[3] The influence of such a reaction from philosophy to Scripture is clear enough as between the earliest and later works of St. Athanasius. What emerges from the evidence is that the revelation of God given in Holy Scripture was regarded as governing and controlling the development of men's thoughts about the Christ. (*b*) The other ground which must be urged in favour of the same point is of a different character. It is this, that when we seek to show the rationality of the Incarnation we find ourselves sooner or later driven back upon conceptions of God which have their source in the literature of the Old and New Testaments and in the revelation which that literature conveys to us. The value of this consideration can only be made clear by drawing out the content of the biblical conception and applying it to the illumination of the doctrine in question. Such an undertaking must form part of any serious treatise upon the Incarnation, and will accordingly find a place in the present work. At this stage it is sufficient to take note of the point that we do in fact seek the grounds of our faith in the Incarnation in a distinctively Christian doctrine about God derived from Holy Scripture.

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[1] The point has been made recently by Mr. L. Hodgson in *J.T.S.* and Append. IV. to *Nestorius, the Bazaar of Heracleides*, edd. Driver and Hodgson. See below, p. 233, n. 5.

[2] So apparently Dr. M. B. Stewart in his Paddock Lectures, *God and Reality*, ch. ii.

[3] Cp. Loofs, *Nestorius*, p. 130.

At first sight, then, we seem to be involved in a circular argument. The Incarnation is regulative for the Christian conception of God, and on the other hand we can only justify the Incarnation by appealing to this same conception. The dilemma is, however, a superficial one. For in the study of Christian doctrine we are engaged in something more than merely following the tracks of a logical sequence of ideas. We are seeking to appreciate the content of a revelation of God given to experience. The revelation is one; but its stages and aspects are diverse. This diversity is reflected in the devotional experience of the Church. Yet within that experience the unity of revelation is recognised and its various aspects are found to throw light upon one another. It is in this sense that belief in the Incarnation comes to the aid of more general theistic beliefs by illuminating the two mutually dependent conceptions of God and creation. The illumination of these two terminal concepts is in turn the starting point from which we can best hope to approach with understanding the mystery of the Word made flesh for our salvation.[1]

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[1] Cp. the whole form of the opening passages of the *de principiis*, and his voluminous work as a commentator.

[2] In the Apologists; but also in Clement and Tertullian.

[3] The replacement of the Logos-idea by that of the divine sonship, first in Tertullian and Origen and later in the creed of Nicaea itself, is important. See further, ch. xi.

II

When Christianity entered the field of history, it entered a world in which these terminal concepts were as yet unilluminated by the light of the gospel. It was a world whose leading conceptions were in some important respects in sharp contrast to the inner message of the gospel. To say this is not to forget all that has been written about the preparation of the Gentile world for Christ; nor again to ignore the point more frequently made to-day, that both in its origin and in its progress Christianity was considerably affected by influences playing upon it from that same

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[1] The doctrine that God became man in the Incarnation is a doctrine whose significance and rationality depend upon the precise meaning which we attach to the two *terms*, God and man. The doctrine asserts a certain relationship to have been set up between God and man. Those who differ as to the spiritual content of the term 'God' or of the term 'man,' or of both, will inevitably differ in their attitude towards the doctrine of the Incarnation, *e.g.* as to its actual credibility as a historical fact, or as to the kind of language in which it can properly be stated, or as to the value of the statements which have been made about it in the past. The concept of the Incarnation, therefore, is a complex concept concerning a particular relationship of two terms. Our attitude towards this complex concept depends upon the two terms involved, namely God and man, and upon the meaning of the concepts for which the two terms stand. In certain aspects of the Incarnation the term 'creation' is involved as being more comprehensive than the term 'man.' It is in this sense that I have used the phrase *terminal concept* in the text in reference to God, man and creation.

Gentile world. Indeed the truth of both these considerations illustrates the theme of this chapter. The actual development of Christian thought in history needs to be studied sympathetically in the light of the genuine difficulties which it had to face. It had a new message to deliver about a strange new bond between God and the universe of His creation. But it came into a context where these ideas lay in the twilight shadows of a world whose greatness already belonged to the past. Yet it had to work upon this context, to handle its materials and its ideas, and to fashion out of them a language through which the new message could be conveyed and the new truth manifested. For it is only through language and ideas which belong to the very substance of human life, thought and civilisation in any particular age that a message of religious truth can be conveyed to that age. Thus the Christian message had to be clothed in forms which were not its own. It had to make these forms its own and express itself through them ; although these forms had, traditionally, other associations of a very different character, from which they could not be altogether and immediately dissociated. It had to work upon terminal concepts as yet unilluminated because time was needed for that process. Yet it could not adequately manifest itself through such concepts until they had been radically assimilated to its own inner spirit, if so be that such a process were actually possible.

For the manifestation of the Christian message on the field of history through the centuries in human thought, language and institutions is so clearly inadequate to the full content of that message as recognised in Christian devotion and aspiration, that the question inevitably arises as to whether the medium can ever be adequate to that which seems to transcend it so completely. Thus the special problem of Christology, in its more technical sense, which takes its rise in discussions of terminology and in the search for adequate theological language to describe the union of God and man in the one Christ, passes into the wider problem as to the meaning to be attached to those ultimate concepts of God and creation which lie behind all such discussions of terminology. And then again the contemplation of these concepts in their contrast raises the more practical question as to whether we can find a rational meaning for this doctrine which asserts an actual union of the transcendent God with His creation, an entry into time and space, into nature and history, with their apparently unending change, succession and process, of that which is eternal and unchanging and absolute in perfection and completeness. These difficulties certainly find abundant illustration in the centuries of Christian thought. They spring to the mind inevitably and seem to stare at us out of the pages as we read the literature of the patristic age and the record of its strife of words and documents.

The object of the present work is to examine the doctrine of the Incarnation on the wider field of Christian theism. Its scope is the justification of Christian beliefs as embodying the only rationally satisfying form of theism which has appeared in history. Its aim is to show that the Incarnation is itself the true and adequate theodicy of Christian theism. With such an aim in view it is possible to distinguish three main questions which have to be faced: (i) The first is concerned with *terminology*. This question asks: what kind of language does the general equipment and present state of knowledge suggest as the best medium for expressing the Christian conception of the union between God and man or between God and creation, the union which is indicated in the doctrine of the Incarnation and which is declared by that doctrine to have been actually set up? (ii) The second question is concerned with *terminal concepts* or ideas which are to be expressed in this terminology. This question asks: how does the content of the revelation which the Church has received afford rational justification for the idea of the union which is asserted in the doctrine? The terminal concepts or ideas in question are those of God and creation or of God and man. (iii) The third question is the widest of all and is not easy to define. It asks how, given these terms, concepts and ideas properly defined, can *the theodicy of Christian theism* be discerned in the doctrine of the Incarnation when fully set forth in its broad outlines?

There will be no attempt made in what follows to keep these three questions apart or to deal with them separately. That procedure would be most unsuitable; for all these questions are really bound up together. The Christian conceptions of God and of creation were given in essence in the revelation recorded in the Scriptures. The revelation there recorded moved through earlier stages to its fulfilment in Jesus Christ. This historical sequence with its crowning event was the medium through which the revelation was given. The historical revelation again was 'interpreted within the experience which it created';[1] and this historical sequence of revelation, experience and interpretation formed the continuous matrix out of which the doctrine of the Incarnation came into existence. But the doctrine thus originating possessed from the first its own terminal concepts of God and creation implicit within it. And if we go behind the doctrine to the record of the revelation we find that this is still in a sense true. Further, the revelation first and the doctrine later were never without some sort of terminology or language which gave provisional form to the developing content of ideas. All this is in accordance with the facts of human nature. The apprehension of truth gives rise to imaginative or conceptual thought which must clothe itself in language, and the three elements in the process react upon one another within a whole of experience and tradition. But it is important to observe that whilst the whole in question is affected by all the three elements which belong to it, there is a gradation of value among these elements. The least central element is that of terminology, and within certain limits it is also the most variable element. The language of religion in its beginnings is poetic, symbolic and pictorial. It registers primitive reactions to experience in crude mythological images. With the stage of reflective thought more general concepts appear constructed from wider generalisations of experience, social and individual, historical, moral and rational. Yet these wider concepts for the most part retain traces of the earlier mythological forms and imagery. A third stage is reached in which scientific observation and rational reflexion develop an abstract terminology of their own which has a different genealogical descent from that of religious terminology proper. When the two distinct streams of religious tradition and scientific or philosophical thought meet in the same field of influence, one or other of certain definite results will follow. (*a*) Either there will be a mutual exclusion of the contrasted influences on both sides; or (*b*) there will be mutual influences of a more or less spontaneous character which will be reflected in a mixture of terminology in both spheres; or (*c*) one side, for example religious tradition, may deliberately adopt for its own purposes a terminology taken from the other stream of thought, in this case the terminology of science and philosophy. Examples of the first case would be comparatively rare and unimportant, perhaps never wholly successful in achieving the desired exclusion. But it must be observed that in this matter the two sides are not in the same position. Scientific thought does not stand in need of religious imagery within its own proper sphere.[1] Whereas religion cannot safely remain altogether impervious to scientific and philosophic thought. For the second kind of result (*b*) there are plenty of examples. Plato's use of the myth is perhaps the best known instance which can be quoted. In Jewish religious thought the treatment of the Wisdom idea would be a parallel instance arising from the opposite side. In the New Testament it seems possible to detect a blending of religious-pictorial and philosophical-speculative concepts, and in the patristic writings the crossing and re-crossing of the two streams becomes much more pronounced.[2] Examples of the third kind of connexion between the two traditions of thought would be the introduction of the word ὁμοούσιος into the Creed of Nicaea, the introduction of words like ὑπόστασις and φύσις into the definition framed at Chalcedon, and on a much larger and more systematic scale the translation of Christian theology into Aristotelian categories by the schoolmen. The qualification must be added that it is not possible to draw clear-cut lines of division between all cases of the second and third types (*b* and *c*). Further, in the case of at least one important word, namely Logos, there is a twofold genealogy to be traced in the two distinct traditions of thought.

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[1] Butler, *Christianity and History*, p. 115. Cp. Von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses* (Second Series), ii.: 'The Place and Function of the Historical Element in Religion,' especially § II.

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[1] But it cannot avoid anthropomorphisms; cp. B. H. Streeter, *Reality*, ch. i.

[2] Cp. the combination of philosophical concepts concerning the relation of the Logos to creation and man with the biblical language of Genesis i.–iii. in the Greek fathers, *e.g.* from Justin to Athanasius.

It has been observed that a whole of religious experience, and the historical tradition within which such a whole is framed, may contain gradations of value and permanence as between the different elements which make up the whole. In the first place such a continuous whole may undergo repeated modifications in respect of its terminology, and yet there will be a genuine identity of the whole persisting through such changes. Thus the Christian revelation received its first expression in the prophetic, apocalyptic and rabbinic thought-forms of Judaism. This original expression of Christianity underwent a succession of profound modifications when it was transferred to Mediterranean and European soil and passed through the moulds of Greek philosophy, Roman law and perhaps other cultural influences. These modifications, however, were not entirely a matter of terminology pure and simple. That perhaps can never be. For language and ideas interact in thought-forms which have their own traditional associations. A change of terminology may thus carry with it inevitably a change of mental associations which in turn sets up definite modifications in the psychological content of ideas or concepts. Thus even the more fundamental religious concepts, such as those which in reference to the doctrine of the Incarnation have been called terminal, namely the concepts of God and creation or of God and man, may undergo partial modification in the field of new cultural thought-forms and through the associations connected with a particular terminology.

We have entered here upon a very wide subject which might easily carry us over the whole field of theology. But without allowing ourselves to forget the subject with which this book is chiefly concerned, namely Christology, it must be observed that the variability in the historical whole of revelation or doctrine, which has been noted in the sphere of terminology and its associations, is a factor which makes living development possible in religious thought. Such living development does not normally mean a ceaseless kaleidoscopic change, where continuity of theme and content would be reduced to a minimum. The normal development of religious thought in its main lines is much more closely parallel to a continuous organic growth. But as the growth and development of organisms proceeds by way of rhythmic swing in this direction and in that with periodic movements and counter-movements of compensation, so it appears to be in the development of religious thought. If this is true it throws important light upon the considerations which should be borne in mind as we try to estimate the value or legitimacy of this or that movement in the history of doctrine. Thus the change from Jewish to Greek categories of thought was an adventurous experiment which exposed the Christian revelation to serious dangers. But to have remained within the old categories would have involved even more serious dangers of cramping narrowness and stagnation. The grooves of Jewish thought were not so exclusively sacrosanct that the gospel must be confined to them for ever. This had already been discovered in St. Paul's lifetime, and there could be no turning back.

Nevertheless it must be recognised that every such movement carries with it the possibility both of gain and of loss. In the new framework new aspects of religious truth have their opportunity to develop; and as the process proceeds the gospel is found to be a broader message with many aspects, making diverse appeals to human nature and having points of contact with different strands of the human tradition. All this makes for elasticity and richness of interpretation. The universal scope of the gospel becomes increasingly manifest in its power of assimilation. But assimilation may overreach itself, and then there is loss instead of gain. Alien associations may gain control and obscure or distort the proportions of Christian truth. The movement has now been carried too far in one direction, and if the true rhythm of development is to be maintained there must be a counter-movement of compensation. Such a compensating movement has frequently taken the form of a return to the sources of doctrine, those germinal concepts and thought-forms in which the original revelation was expressed in Holy Scripture. Reactions from Greek philosophy to the language and thought of Scripture have already been noted in this chapter as having occurred within the period of patristic theology. Later periods such as the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries provide even more striking examples.

III

Periods of radical change and cultural upheaval, such as the European Renaissance and the intellectual revolution of modern times, bring about situations of the gravest difficulty for Christian thought. Time-honoured traditions and classic systems of interpretation lose their appeal and are dethroned to make way for new experiments. Landmarks disappear and lines of continuity become exceedingly tenuous. Cohesion of thought gives place to dispersiveness. Rival traditions grow up and become stabilised. Specialised studies lead to bifurcation of interests and mental habits. Theology follows in the general track and is affected by both the advances and the limitations of the age. Consequently in a period of disintegration a clear synoptic view of religious truth becomes exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless periods of disintegration are themselves subject to the principle of compensation and are succeeded by new movements towards synthesis and construction. The present epoch is not likely to be an exception, and there are already signs pointing to the possibility of a new movement of synthesis in theology as in other spheres. But the possibility of such a synthesis must be estimated upon the background of the preceding period. This period begins with the age of the Renaissance, when a radical cleavage took place in human thought between the inner world of the spirit and the outer world of material fact. The concrete whole of our experience was thus sharply dissected into parts. The life of the spirit was handed over to religion and philosophy; whilst the grosser part was divided between the specialised studies of science and the practical economic activities of man.[1] This radical dissection was crossed by a more many-sided movement of dispersion whose general trend was towards a new autonomy of spheres and disciplines, theoretical and practical. Life became departmentalised and the wholeness of experience was broken up. These very cursory remarks about a great historical movement are not made in a spirit of barren criticism. An objective attitude towards history does not find everywhere perversities to be abused but facts to be sympathetically understood. When so regarded the movements out of which our modern world arose are seen to have played an indispensable part in the inauguration of a new synthesis. The new synthesis has not yet appeared; and we are able to see in a long-distance perspective that its arrival has been many times anticipated by the persistent optimism of the human spirit.

The dispersive tendencies of thought and life which lie at the root of our modern world received stable form in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For the conscious formulation of its leading ideas the movement is heavily indebted to Descartes. These leading ideas may be summarised as follows: (i) First the dichotomy of thought and things, already mentioned, whereby two separate spheres are set up to form centres of two different sets of interests, on the one hand the inner life of the spirit, on the other hand the outer world of material things. (ii) These two spheres exhibit respectively a new autonomy of their own. But there is no adequate interpenetration. Each is, on the whole, a closed circle to the other. Philosophers may find for them a metaphysical connexion as two aspects of one substance (Spinoza) or a theological connexion through pre-ordained harmony (Leibnitz) or by the mediating activity of the Divine Mind (Berkeley). (iii) The inner life of the spirit pursues its own way. In religion there are the various pietist movements, as in Germany and later in this country. The task of philosophy is mainly introspective. The thinking self contemplates its own ideas (Locke, Berkeley, Hume). (iv) The concept of mechanism dominates the sphere of the external world in increasing measure. Descartes applied it to the animal kingdom, Hobbes to the life of man in society. The scientists triumphantly vindicated its efficacy as a principle of interpretation in their own domain. As time went on that domain tended to enlarge itself and, as Hobbes had daringly suggested, to include the practical and economic activities of man within one system of nature, a system which finds the type of its fixed and immutable laws in the mathematical principles of Newton. The abstracting principle of analysis and the mechanistic or external conception of causation were applied introspectively to the sphere of mind (for example by Hobbes [1]) as well as in the scientific interpretation of nature. The playful scepticism of Hume as to the validity of these principles was ignored by the scientists and swept away by the labours of Kant. In one sense Kant intensified the existing principles of dualism and mechanism. In another sense he prepared the way for a great advance. He held stiffly to the tradition that philosophy can only deal with the inner world of mind. But within that inner world he rehabilitated the unity of scientific thought and vindicated the synthetic character which belongs to all judgments of value. Thus it is not surprising that with Hegel the pendulum swung sharply over to a new doctrine of the identity of thought and things.[2]

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[1] This is in various forms a recurring theme of much modern literature. Different aspects of the subject can be studied in the following selection: J. N. Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius*; R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*; L. Pullan, *Religion since the Reformation*; E. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*; W. R. Sorley, *A History of English Philosophy*; A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, ch. ii.; and *Science and the Modern World*, especially ch. ix.; T. E. Hulme, *Speculations*; J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, ch. xii. The sentence in the text, to which this note refers, is not intended to suggest that individuals were wholly occupied *either* with the inner world *or* with the outer world. The names of Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz and Kant would be sufficient to refute such a suggestion without going further.

The bare assertion of such unity, however, could not of itself have overcome the previous reign of dualism. The new doctrine indeed must have seemed an incomprehensible paradox. But ideas of continuity and development were in the air. The revived interest in history and the historic past which accompanied the romantic movement, the incorporation of the idea of history into philosophy which was so striking a feature of Hegelianism, and finally with Darwin the entry of the scientific concept of evolution into the field—these were potent factors which in the course of the nineteenth century completely changed the situation. The harvest of these new ideas was indeed delayed. The Hegelian paradox was one which required time for digestion before the elements of truth which it contained could be sifted out. Moreover the Newtonian concept of matter remained undisturbed; mechanism marched to new triumphs, and its domain, always encroaching upon the human sphere, seemed at last to have rendered obsolete the age-long belief in the human soul. In its first effects Darwinism seemed only to reinforce the materialistic interpretation of the universe. Meanwhile many people sought refuge in the new idealistic philosophy, imported into this country through the mediating minds of such thinkers as Lotze, Stirling and T. H. Green. A refuge it was; for a strange separation between metaphysics and science persisted and no adequate cross-connexions were made. The philosophy of the Absolute became, if anything, more Olympian; and this tendency, appears for the present to have reached its goal in the contemptuous attitude of Croce, who relegates the sciences to the level of economic disciplines.[1]

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[1] *Leviathan*, Part i.

[2] For a recent defence of Hegelianism from the side of realism, see J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, chs. xix. ff.

The scientific temper, however, has come to the rescue. Science has moved from earlier fields first to biology and then to the study of man. Here, with the help of its new concept of evolution, it is joining hands with history in the border territories of anthropology and psychology. Some minds may see new terrors in this combination. In actual fact it seems to be already providing a new field of mediation in which there is ground for hope that the long-sought synthesis may take place. For in its latest phases science itself is undergoing a radical revolution; and that not simply in those studies, just mentioned, which bring it into contact with the life of man. New contributions from mathematics and the physical sciences have dethroned matter from its old position of autonomy and have brought it back into a wider area, a common meeting-ground where philosophy, history and the sciences can enter into new understandings and adjustments.[1]

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[1] *What is Living and what is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel*, E. tr. Ainslie, ch. viii.

IV

In this new situation theology also has a part to play. The forces of the spirit are now beginning to insert themselves into the spatio-temporal series which science and history disclose. This fact must have momentous consequences for theology. For during a great part of the nineteenth century it must have seemed to many minds that Christian theism was fighting a losing battle. It suffered a double attrition between the monistic tendencies of idealism on the one side and the dissecting analysis of science and historical criticism on the other. According to the one the transcendence of God and the particularity of His action in history were irrational. On the other side mechanism could find no place for the soul and its claim to religious experience, whilst the abstracting principle of analysis and a naïve conception of causation taken over from the natural sciences seemed in the hands of historical critics and anthropologists to evacuate the spiritual content and significance of sacred literature and religious history.

The nineteenth century seemed to be dissolving the traditional structure of Christianity by tearing down its monopolist claims to possess a peculiar revelation enshrined in a specially inspired literature, a literature which in its turn was supposed to contain within itself, particularly in the phenomena of prophecy and miracle, convincing evidence of its right to be set apart as immune from the ordinary rules of criticism and investigation. Yet in fact, when once the Bible was taken out of the hands of the dogmatic theologians and put into the hands of the historians, nothing could stop the movement of unfettered critical inquiry which followed. At first this movement proceeded under the guidance of an interpretation of history which made history singularly unreal. The Ritschlian reaction which followed bore impressive testimony to the conviction that Christian faith is rooted in concrete historical fact and that this faith continues to find its inspiration in the historical figure of Jesus. Ritschl showed true insight in asserting that the Christian belief in God is inseparable from the central figure of history.[1] The facts were, however, unduly simplified. The application of the historical principle was too piecemeal. Nevertheless, the principle had only to be followed up. If religious faith finds in the portrait of Christ in the gospels grounds for believing that God has disclosed Himself through the medium of history, then we have a clue to the interpretation of history which may carry us over a much wider area. Neither criticism nor faith can suffer arbitrary barriers to be set up in this sphere.

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[1] In criticism of the seventeenth century 'scheme of scientific ideas,' with its 'fundamental duality' of *material* and *mind*, compare the following: 'In between there lie the concepts of life, organism, function, instantaneous reality, interaction, order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles' heel of the whole system.' A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (1st ed.), p. 84. See further below, Additional Note C.

One of the gravest issues with which Christian thought has been confronted during the past century has been the apparent impossibility of reconciling the theistic concept of transcendence with ideas of development and evolution which have come into prominence during this period and which have been applied to the interpretation of history. We have to distinguish carefully here between two or three quite distinct ideas which are only too easily confused in popular thought. The first of these is the Hegelian conception of development. According to this view continuity and rationality are to be found in history, because the historical process is the developing expression of the Hegelian Idea. Thus history is to be interpreted teleologically and explanations are to be sought in ends not in origins. For the full expression of the Idea is to be sought at the end and not at the beginning of the process. Thus the process of history has a logical structure like the process of thought. The Darwinian theory of evolution turned men's minds in precisely the opposite direction. It suggested a type of continuity whose explanation must be sought not in ends but in origins. When, however, this scientific theory was made the instrument of a new philosophy of evolution by Herbert

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[1] The treatment of this subject in my *Richard Hooker: a Study of his Theology*, ch. viii., was unduly unsympathetic to the achievement of Ritschl.

Spencer and others, great confusions were introduced. For such a philosophy must necessarily find explanations in origins, and must therefore represent all development as 'preformed' out of an original source and thus predetermined by its original character. This was to erect the traditional scientific concept of causation into a universal philosophical dogma. This concept of causation had been supremely successful in the sphere of physical science with its mechanistic methodology. Consequently Spencer's philosophy involved a mechanistic interpretation of evolution as a metaphysical explanation of the universe. It yielded, in fact, nothing but an empty formula which left no room for the appearance of new facts. Here then were two quite different explanations of continuity—the Hegelian conception of an inner logical structure of teleological development and the Spencerian conception of a mechanistic evolution or unfolding from origins. With some inconsistency, however, the theory of evolution was popularly supposed to point forward to a goal of human striving.

A serious consequence of these various theories was that the religion of the Incarnation which found its centre of reference in a divine entry into history in the past seemed to be out of keeping with the thought of the age. Neither the immanent development of the Hegelian Idea nor the mechanistic conception of evolution left room for such past action of divine transcendence upon the field of history as the doctrine of the Incarnation asserted. On the other hand, the second aspect of these movements of thought, namely that aspect which faced towards the goal of the historical process, seemed to be not less incompatible with the Christian reading of history. For according to one view the manifestation of the Idea in history is to be sought, not in a particular event of the past, but in the full development of the process; whilst according to the widely diffused doctrine of evolutionary progress towards a future goal the ideal end of human endeavour must be sought in that future, and could not have been revealed once for all in the historical Christ.[1]

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[1] This view is represented to-day by the philosophy of Professor Alexander; cp. *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii., and *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xxv. no. 2.

All the more fascinating then is the spectacle of a search for the 'Jesus of history' which has been carried on for over a hundred years and continuously since Strauss. In the opinion of Wrede, Schweitzer, Loofs and many others to-day, this search has ended in failure. Loofs, for example, has lately given his opinion (and many theologians in this country would say the same) that the search was bound to fail when carried on under naturalistic or purely immanental presuppositions into agreement with which the facts had to be forced.[1] What alternatives then remain? The theory that the figure of Jesus is nothing but a myth has not received the support of serious historians. There remains then the conclusion that the gospels cannot be interpreted by the unaided principles of historical science. Some metaphysical interpretation is inevitable. If we say with Loofs that the Catholic dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation are unjustifiable mythology, there still remains the necessity for an alternative interpretation. Loofs' own explanation[2] is certainly not less mythological and, as will be shown later in the present work, far more difficult to justify at the bar of reason. When Ritschl invoked judgments of value to interpret the gospel record, he was, in fact, summoning to his aid a principle of interpretation which involved the whole metaphysic of theism. Thus we return to the point which was urged at the beginning of this chapter. The course of nineteenth-century thought has shown that the philosophy of theism is left in a precarious state when it fails to enlist the support of concrete historical religion. On the other hand the historical element in Christianity cannot be explained on historical principles alone. It is both historical and 'meta-historical.' In other words, it calls for a metaphysical interpretation.

On what lines must this interpretation be sought to-day? This is the question to which this book seeks to give an answer. The answer will be sought in accordance with the leading ideas of this introductory chapter. The philosophy of theism and the doctrine of the Incarnation must be brought into a new alliance. The field in which these two elements will be found to meet is that general meeting-place in which all thought to-day is seeking a new synthesis, the field of time and history interpreted on the widest lines For Hegel there remained a hiatus between nature and history. In history there is discernible an order, which may indeed be temporal but is primarily logical. On the other hand 'his thought seems to have been that you can hardly speak of an "order" in Nature at all.' 'The disguise characteristic of "Nature" would be gone if the order of "development" were also the order of temporal succession.'[1] If, however, time is to be taken seriously, the historical process must be extended backwards and forwards to include the entire cosmic series on this planet and in the universe as a whole. For human history is but one chapter in this long succession. On the other hand, the mechanistic interpretation of evolution was also incapacitated by its cramping categories from giving an intelligible place to human history in the evolutionary series. The scheme was hopelessly inadequate to such a subject. Thus the most characteristic movements of thought in the last century did not show themselves capable of linking together nature and history, or of doing justice to the facts of temporal succession disclosed in the cosmic series which includes both nature and history within itself. During the past generation or so, however, all this has been changed. In conclusion, therefore, let us try to elucidate more clearly what is meant by saying that the field of time and history has become the common meeting-ground upon which thought is to-day seeking for a new synthesis.

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[1] Loofs, *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?*

[2] *Ibid.* Lecture VI.; cp. *Nestorius*, pp. 126, 130.

Through the influence of Hegel philosophy had begun to incorporate into itself the idea of historical development. Through the work of Darwin science was provided with a new concept which linked together the immensely varied objects of its investigation under one general scheme. The new concept of evolution seemed to gather the infinity of detail into one connected and continuous process. But there was an obvious disparity between the two schemes (Hegelian and Darwinian), and a number of provisional attempts to fill the gap only succeeded in raising false issues. In this respect

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[1] The sentences quoted are from an essay by Professor A. E. Taylor, in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, p. 445. The whole passage is illuminating. Cp. also the criticism of Spencer in the same essay.

Spencer introduced a cloud of confusion which still obscures the vision of many. Bergson and William James are transitional. They raised a standard of revolt and prepared the way for new ideas.[1] The former declared war both upon the older teleology and upon Spencer. 'Finalism is inverted mechanism' sums up his attitude to both.[2] James denounced a 'block universe,'[3] but failed to provide a reasonable alternative. This sort of thing could not last. Neither vitalism nor pragmatism as philosophical theories can provide a resting place for reason. But what philosophical reaction could not accomplish was gradually brought about in another way. On the one hand a steady criticism of evolutionary incursions into philosophy was undertaken from the standpoint of teleology and values. On the other hand the concept of mechanism as a magic key which would unlock all doors began to lose its glamour for some of the scientists. In biology, anthropology, psychology and sociology the objects of investigation were clearly less tractable to ideas of mechanistic causation. These objects presented themselves as wholes which could not be adequately explained as nothing more than a collection of the parts into which they had been analysed. All this was reflected in Bergson's theory of creative evolution. But Bergson gave a new twist to the old tradition of dualism which has thrown its evil shadow over the modern centuries. His dualism belongs to the past.[4] But his very failure has drawn attention to new truths which were already in the air. Of these new truths the most important are those which are concerned with time and creation. The concept of evolution is meaningless unless it involves the idea of a process into which new factors enter. But the entry of the new gives meaning also to the idea of time. Bergson was right in holding that there is more in time than a bare succession. But he spoilt his own thesis by splitting time into two antithetical parts. Duration (*la durée*) and succession are barren concepts when thus artificially separated. The true time of our universe is duration perpetually incarnate in a succession, just as the true view of reason is that it is intuition (Kant's synthetic unity of apperception) expressing itself through a conceptual order organised by the intellect. This conceptual order again corresponds to the world of physical objects and things which can be broken up in scientific analysis. But the conceptual order and the whole work of scientific analysis alike presuppose the unity of perception which characterises our everyday experience of the material or sensible world. Thus the philosophical concept of reason is seen to be capable of correlation with a concept of time which is required by the facts of everyday experience. This concept of time in turn is the key to a new conception of the cosmic series which unfolds itself to our minds under the patient analysis of scientists and historians.

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[1] In this aspect of their work A. N. Whitehead has gone so far as to compare James and Bergson respectively with Descartes and Locke: *Science and the Modern World*, ch. ix.

[2] *L'Évolution Créatrice* (ed. 4), p. 42; and p. 391, where Hegel is brought under the same condemnation as Leibnitz.

[3] *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 310, 328.

[4] The same judgment, it seems, must be passed upon the neo-vitalism of some modern scientists such as H. Driesch and J. S. Haldane. Cp. A. N. Whitehead, *op. cit.* (1st ed.), p. 150, 'Biology apes the manners of physics. It is orthodox to hold that there is nothing in biology but what is physical mechanism under somewhat complex circumstances. One difficulty in this position is the present confusion as to the foundational concepts of physical science. This same difficulty also attaches to the opposed doctrine of vitalism. For in this later theory the fact of mechanism is accepted—I mean, mechanism based upon materialism—and an additional vital control is introduced to explain the action of living bodies. . . . The appeal to mechanism on behalf of biology was in its origin an appeal to the well-attested self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis of all natural phenomena. But at present there is no such system of concepts.'

History to-day is being enriched and deepened by the illuminating methods of psychology and its field extended and enlarged by the incorporation of anthropology. Psychology in turn pushes its roots down into the biological sphere. Thus there is a general linking up of all departments in the modern hierarchy of knowledge which surveys the cosmic series of the time-process. Finally, the theory of relativity, modern discoveries in physics, and the new philosophy of nature have brought the world of the 'inorganic' within the same orbit. Here, too, time becomes all-important. A quotation from a recent pronouncement will perhaps make clear the remarkable change which is taking place in modern conceptions of time in relation to the physical order. 'Instead of regarding one's self as, so to speak, swimming along in an ocean of space, one is rather to think of one's self as somehow pursuing a path in a four-dimensional ocean of time.' [1] The full significance of these new ideas for theology must be considered in subsequent chapters. We are here only concerned to note the fact that the hierarchy of the sciences is being linked with history in a new way, and that in this scheme the concept of time occupies a central position.

Now the doctrine of the Incarnation asserts that He who entered into the historical process by becoming man for our salvation is also the Creator and Lord of the physical universe, the source and sustainer of its existence and of all its processes. If then we can discern a movement wherein 'the forces of the spirit are beginning to insert themselves into the spatio-temporal series,' such a movement is bound to be of the highest significance for Christian theology. Christianity claims to be the absolute religion, whose light can illuminate all paths of knowledge. The fruits of such new ideas as we have been considering can be taken up into the gospel of the Incarnation; and if the Christian claim is true, these new treasures of knowledge will make their contribution to faith and to theology, whilst theology in its turn will have gifts to offer to seekers in these other fields.

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[1] Dr. A. A. Robb in *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, ch. xi.: 'Time and Space,' p. 422. In ch. x. of this same collection Professor Soddy denies that there is evolution of the 'inorganic' elements. This point, however, seems to be in any case quite distinct from that of *time* in the 'inorganic' world. In a different context in the same work (ch. i.) Dr. J. H. Jeans allows himself to speak of 'stellar evolution.' Moreover the modern account of the periodic table, with its transmutations through radioactivity, and again the quantum theory of the atom give a new significance to time in the physical order. Cp. further, Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. i.; C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, ch. ix.; A. N. Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, *The Concept of Nature* and *Science and the Modern World*; also J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, chs. ii. and iii., and C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, Pt. I.

CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE

I

THE doctrine of the Incarnation declares that the transcendent Creator has entered into the order or process of space and time, of nature and history, in the Person of Jesus Christ. The doctrine thus affirms a contrast between God and the world-process and at the same time affirms a connexion set up between these two in an event of history. Of these two affirmations there is a sense in which the first was by no means new. It had already in the ancient world widespread ramifications both in religious interpretation and in philosophical thought. On the other hand the second affirmation was and is the utterly distinctive doctrine of Christianity. The new thing, 'the gospel,' was this second affirmation in a context which actually gave a new content to the first affirmation also. Thus, while the Christian gospel had points of contact with much in its early environment on one side, in respect of the main burden of its message it was a thing apart, altogether new and strange. This double fact was then and has been ever since the peculiar problem and difficulty of the Christian religion. If it had been wholly other-worldly, as some would to-day understand it, its task would have been comparatively easy. It could have joined hands readily with much that was noble and relatively true in the spiritual movements of the Graeco-Roman world. But its second affirmation altogether blocked that line of advance. The essential content of its message made it to be not only other-worldly but also world-affirming, historical, assimilative, active. Always a stranger in the world, it must ever find for itself speech, dress, embodiment in the land of its pilgrimage. Its gospel is for all times and ages ; yet it must share the thoughts and speak the language of each particular time, place and epoch. Its doctrine is of eternity laying hold of history, of God becoming man. Accordingly it must be both divine and human, eternal and temporal, delivering its unchangeable message in forms adaptable to successive cultures through the endless varieties of history.

We are here concerned primarily with one aspect of this formidable task, the theology of the Incarnation and its adequate expression under these difficult conditions. There are two difficulties in particular which we need to bear in mind in this connexion, both of which must be recognised as inevitable, given the general conditions outlined above. In the first place the new wine of the gospel had to be poured into vessels belonging to an old order, vessels altogether too narrow to hold it. The thought-forms and philosophical language employed were in many respects unsuitable and inadequate for the purpose. Of this something has already been said in the first chapter. But secondly in the march of history the thought-forms of the ancient world have to a very considerable extent become obsolete, uncongenial and unfamiliar. Under the conditions of another age, radically different in culture, traditions and habits of thought, the whole task accomplished by ancient Christian theology clamours for reinterpretation. These difficulties are sufficiently familiar to Christian thinkers to-day. Mention has been made of them here only in order to draw attention to the fact that they are seen to be inevitable whenever the significance of the gospel is understood. Such difficulties do not rightly indicate weakness, but rather strength.

Recent discussions on the subject of the Incarnation have been occupied almost exclusively with two questions, namely (1) the historical origins and development of the doctrine, and (2) the relation of our Lord's human mind and consciousness to His divine omniscience as God. In this theology reflected faithfully the bifurcation of interests which characterised so much of nineteenth-century thought. For we see here reflected on the one hand the application of scientific criticism and analysis to historical processes, and on the other hand the predominant interest in problems of the self-conscious mind and its introspective processes which were the legacy of Descartes to the modern tradition in philosophy and psychology and which thinkers like Kant and Green did so much to accentuate.[1] While in no way denying the importance of these interests the present writer is deeply convinced that the subject needs to be approached from an altogether different standpoint to-day, a standpoint which has already been indicated in part in the previous chapter.

Luther, Descartes, Kant and Ritschl represent a movement of thought which, taken as a whole, finds the pivot of the higher human experiences and realisation of values in self-consciousness.[2] There is a certain one-sidedness and subjectivity about this whole tradition which is profoundly unsatisfactory, a fact which has been making itself felt increasingly since Hegel's day.[3] Everywhere a contrasted tendency is now at work which can claim to be no mere rebound from the inward to the outward. The progressive organisation of the sciences, physical and historical, along lines which lead to increasing cross-connexions and unifications has already been referred to in the previous chapter. Another important sign of the times is the revival of philosophic realism. While some forms of modern realism in philosophy are best understood as simply a reaction from subjective idealism, a reaction which contains within itself the germs of a similar subjectivity,[4] this is by no means a fair account of the realist movement taken as a whole. For on the one hand the 'natural piety' of Professors Alexander and Lloyd Morgan recognises or 'acknowledges' a hierarchy of grades and values in the scheme of the universe; and on the other hand the influence of this movement of thought may be seen in the fact that there is an increasing tendency to-day to recognise the objective reference of all knowledge, and that amongst philosophers representing very diverse traditions and points of view.[1]

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[1] Cp. Hegel's criticism of Kant and Fichte 'because they restricted philosophy to "pure self-consciousness"'; quoted from J. E. Turner, *A Theory of Direct Realism*, p. 259, and cp. p. 272.

[2] The connexion between the religious and philosophical sides of this tradition is clear enough. The religious assurance of justification has its counterpart in Descartes' 'clear and distinct idea,' and again Ritschl, while retaining Luther's doctrine of the centrality of justification, clothed the assurance of faith in the philosophical dress of Kantian judgments of value.

[3] Dr. J. E. Turner has recently claimed that the most thorough-going realism is compatible with Hegelianism, *op. cit.*, chs. xix.–xxii.

[4] Especially the authors of *New Realism* in America; amongst English writers, Mr. Bertrand Russell has represented a similar point of view. Such positions are criticised in detail by Dr. L. A. Reid in his *Knowledge and Truth*, and by Dr. J. E. Turner in *A Theory of Direct Realism*, already cited. These two books, taken together, provide a comprehensive survey and criticism of modern theories of knowledge, particularly those held by modern realists of various types.

The two points referred to in the last sentence are closely connected as new factors in the situation. Together they serve to mark off sharply what may now be called *the organic conception of the universe* from the conceptions which have so largely prevailed in previous centuries of the modern period. The concept of the organism is one which will occupy a prominent place in the present work, as the writer believes that this concept is destined to prove of the utmost importance for the theology of the Incarnation. Accordingly the present chapter will be devoted to the elucidation of its meaning when applied to the interpretation of the universe as a whole, with a view to setting forth the cosmic aspect of the Incarnation on lines suggested by this conception.

The organic conception is one which has been slowly winning its way to prominence for some time.[2] It received an immense impetus during the last century from the rising importance of biology and allied fields of study. In the narrower sense *organism* seems to be a biological concept and the organic sciences those which have relation to living creatures. It is difficult, however, to confine the word to this its early scientific meaning. Like other concepts, which have originally had special meanings attached to them in science, the concept of the organism has been found valuable and illuminating in a much wider context. There is ample precedent in the history of thought for such wider extension in the use of scientific terms. We have, of course, to remember that such extended uses have their dangers if they are allowed to harbour false analogies. But, on the other hand, there seems to be a genuine justification for some such procedure in the undoubted fact that all spheres of scientific study are interrelated and that the different fields of specialised observation overlap and to some extent shade off into one another.

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[1] Detailed references will be found in the two works cited in the last note. In addition to these the following may be cited as representing stages in the movement of recent epistemology: (i) Bergson's own introduction to *Matter and Memory* (the English translation of *Matière et Mémoire*, 5th ed.). This introduction supersedes the original French Preface (see translator's note). Here Bergson pleaded for a return in epistemology to the position of common sense as the proper starting-point, leaving matter 'half-way between the place to which Descartes had driven it and that to which Berkeley drew it back' (p. x). (ii) The valuable statement by W. R. Sorley in his *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (1918), pp. 192–218. (iii) F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses* (First Series), pp. 51–7, where detailed reference is made to recent continental works. (iv) A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, chs. iv. and v., especially pp. 100–6 and 128–34 (1st ed.).

[2] In Kant's *Critique of Judgment* we find a recognition that the living organisms are organised and self-organising beings which can be appreciated as such only through a synthetic judgment concerning the whole (Part II., Div. I., § 65, E. tr. by J. H. Bernard; and cp. the editor's Introduction, pp. xvii, xviii). Again, it is claimed for Hegel that he taught not only the organic structure of thought, but also the organic unity of thought with its object. (Examples are given by Turner, *op. cit.*)

The organic conception of the universe was defined above as including two special characteristics.[1] These are (*a*) the acknowledgment of a hierarchy of grades in the universe, and (*b*) the recognition that all knowledge has an objective reference. Of these two characteristics we shall be concerned mainly with the first in this chapter. But as there is a close connexion between them, some further explanation of the point of view which connects them together seems desirable. The dualism of earlier thought postulated two contrasted entities, mind and matter, thought and extension. These were regarded either as two substances (Descartes) or as two modes of one substance (Spinoza). The scientists assumed that matter could be analysed by mind in terms of mechanism. Philosophers like Locke and Kant did not deny the validity of this process; but they asserted that the analysis results in a reconstruction which is really mental. According to this view what the scientist knows is not the real world of matter but a kind of representative world which exists for thought in the mind. Again it was not denied that the representation really represents.

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[1] The definition is, of course, my own. Its justification is to be sought in the argument of this book taken as a whole.

Hence its complete validity both for science and for practical life. The weaknesses of this whole tradition of thought were mainly two. In the first place the view of knowledge implied was at best only a half-truth, in the second place the real characteristics of the universe were obscured and distorted. And these two defects have their roots in the same mistake, the mistake of supposing that in the process of knowledge there is only one centre of reference, namely, the mind of the knower. In actual fact knowledge is a relation between subject and object, the knower and the thing known, in which both sides count for something. The object known is not passive to the mind of the knower so that he can make of it what he will. It actively determines the content of his knowledge and makes it to be of a particular kind in accordance with the characteristics of the object. This is a different thing from saying that what is known in the mind does accurately represent the real object. If there is to be reliable knowledge at all this last must obviously be in some sense true. But the real danger of the view of knowledge here criticised is that it puts the whole activity of knowledge on the side of the knower and in consequence there is a bias in favour of the knower determining the characteristics of his objects. This leaves room for all kinds of *a priori* dogmatism which obscures and distorts the real world by interpreting its characteristics in terms or categories which are quite unjustifiably imposed by the mind. Now when this takes place the resultant interpretation will no longer be rational. It may even be no more than a reflection of prevailing prejudice and fashion. This is in fact what actually happened. Physical science gave an immense prominence to its own method of analysis and interpretation in terms of mechanistic causation. Consequently the universe came to be interpreted in terms of mechanism. The interpretation was not adequate to the facts of the real world; but it happened to be congenial to the predominant interests of thought. Consequently rationality gave way to prevailing interest.

This one-sided theory of knowledge proved inadequate to the facts of the universe. As the various sciences won their way to autonomy, it became increasingly evident that there are characteristics of reality which cannot be adequately understood by the methods of purely quantitative analysis which have prevailed in the physical sciences. Moreover, every advance in knowledge has steadily moved away from the comparatively simple scheme of ideas which served both philosophy and science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The universe is much more varied and complex than men had supposed. Moreover the immense advances of science in comparatively recent years have effected not only an increase in our stock of knowledge but a radical transformation of our forms of thought, and such advances and transformations give promise of further developments to which no limit can be set. All this has been reflected in the general course of recent philosophy. From the traditional idealisms of the last century men have turned with renewed interest to speculations about the universe whose characteristics the sciences are unfolding. In the past generation or so a series of new philosophies of nature have appeared, deriving their impetus from the new concept of evolution and from the still more recent theory of relativity. Bergson, Alexander and Whitehead have been leaders in this new movement. Widely diverse in their conclusions, such writers represent stages in a new epoch of speculation, in which the universe is made to appear in very different guise from that which was familiar to the nineteenth century. One of the most striking features in these newer points of view has been already referred to as a main topic of discussion in this chapter. Evolution is no longer regarded as advancing along one level of uniform development. There is widespread recognition to-day that the universe is stratified in a number of different grades or levels corresponding roughly to the spheres of different sciences or groups of sciences. A common classification is the fourfold one, which recognises matter, life, mind and spirit as the successive grades of the series. At present the principal line of demarcation lies between the so-called inorganic and the organic, that is between the living and the non-living. But we cannot be certain that this distinction will always remain so sharply defined as it appears at present. In any case there is a great deal of continuity and overlapping as between the different grades, and some distinctions, which are useful for practical purposes, cannot be overpressed. In the present state of thought there are considerable differences amongst both scientists and philosophers as to the ways in which the cosmic series of grades is to be interpreted. Thus there is a controversy amongst biologists as to whether the mechanistic method alone can prove adequate to the explanation of biological objects such as the cell and the organism; and there is a similar divergence of opinion amongst evolutionary philosophers. Some admit that evolution is *creative*, while others prefer simply to acknowledge the *emergence* of new factors which are not merely resultants of previous factors. These differences of opinion are interesting and perhaps characteristic of the rapid transitions of thought which are taking place in our time. It does not, however, fall within the scope of the present work to enter the arena of such controversies. The standpoint of this book is that of Christian theism, and it is obvious that for such theism creation must mean something very much more significant than it can ever become in an interpretation of the universe which confines itself to an evolutionary scheme. Similarly the question of mechanism and its methodological limits is one which can be safely left for the scientists to settle amongst themselves. It has now become simply a question of scientific method and the extent to which it can be usefully employed.

Fuller knowledge of the universe and its complexities has led to a widespread recognition amongst philosophers of the fact that knowledge is determined not by the mind alone but by the characteristics of the objects which are the materials of knowledge. This carries with it the further truth that the world which we know is the world of real objects or things-in-themselves, and not a kind of surrogate world of representative phenomena as Kant held. As far as knowledge is concerned realism is making good its case, and this profoundly important fact will receive fuller consideration in subsequent chapters. For the present, however, we are concerned not with knowledge in itself but with the characteristics of this real universe which we know.

II

The universe as it is known to-day presents the appearance of an ascending series like the steps of a ladder or the stories of a building. Corresponding to each grade in the series there is a typical unit of structure which determines the characteristics of that grade. It is as if each story in the building were built out of a composition of material peculiar to itself. This illustration is in some respects quite misleading; but it may serve for the present. The series of units or types of unity which characterise the graded sequence includes such entities as the electron, the atom, the molecule, the cell and the multi-cellular organism. This list is not exhaustive, and moreover the degree of significance attaching to particular units will depend upon the view which is taken of the graded series as a whole. Thus according to one view, in the list given above, the atom and the cell have peculiar significance as the typical units respectively of matter and of life. Attention must here be confined to certain aspects of the series taken as a whole. Two points are of special importance: (1) The mode in which the series is built up, and (2) the conception of the organism which pervades the whole series.

(1) Each main grade in the series is connected with the rest of the series in a certain manner. Each lower grade provides the basis for that which lies next above it. The cell, for example, is the first unit in the series of living entities. The living organism, plant or animal, is a whole built up out of a variety of parts and organs; of these parts the living cell is apparently the fundamental unit. Thus the cell provides the foundation of the more complex organism; and such an organism requires and pre-supposes the cell as the unit of its more complex structure. As the cell to the organism, so the atom to the molecule. The general principle, that the whole not only includes but rests upon units which are its parts, appears to be broadly characteristic of the series all through. Thus no single entity in the series is self-explanatory. Any explanation requires that such an entity should be understood in terms of its relations with what lies above and below it in the

series. Further there is what might be called a horizontal reference between entities at any given level and similar entities belonging to the same rank in the series. If we descend to the bottom of the series as known at present, and if electrons and protons are taken to be entities of that lowest rank; then, although vertical relations can only be upwards and not downwards, yet there is a cosmic relation between all such lowest entities in the universe at any given moment. It may be convenient for purposes of science to fix attention upon a proximate 'field' of influence or inter-relationship; but such proximate fields shade off indefinitely into the whole system of the universe. This means that the whole series is knit together in one vast inter-related system, in which all the parts have a significance not only for the proximate wholes into which they are built but ultimately for the series taken as a whole. But where all is significant there are different degrees of significance; and this justifies the symbolic language of 'higher' and 'lower.' Every entity in the series has its significance *for the series* in the fact that it is taken up into the structure of a more complex entity on the level next above it. It is in this way that the series is built up. Thus the series is characterised by increasing complexity of structure as it advances. On the other hand, this increasing complexity is continually counterbalanced by progressive unification of structure. The *principle of unity* manifested in the cell has a much more profound character than that which appears in the atom or the molecule. The mode or degree which characterises any particular kind of structure in the series will be called hereafter its *highest law of being*. At every step the whole which is typical for that grade is something more than a collection of its parts. The parts are held together in a unity; and the particular *principle of unity* which is there manifested is the *highest law of being* on that level. It is the distinctive principle which informs entities on that level.

(2) An organism may be thought of as an entity having the double character which has just been described. It is neither a collection of parts nor an undifferentiated whole, but a whole which pervades its parts and expresses its own law

of unity through them. The parts have their own modes of unity and laws of being, their own cycles of events, their own sequences of change—in short they exhibit characteristics which belong to their respective levels in the cosmic series. These characteristics of the parts are taken up into the unity of the whole. The parts persist or 'go together' within the whole under transformed conditions and so subserve its higher functions. Thus an organism may be a highly complicated hierarchy which includes many grades of being, a microcosm within the larger cosmic series.

The concept of the organism suggests the living entities which are objects of investigation for the biological sciences. The organic conception of nature, however, is being extended to-day at both ends of the cosmic series, downwards into the domain of physical science, and upwards into the spheres of mind and spirit. With this extended use of the word the idea of the organism is found to provide a key to the cosmic series as a whole. Attention is thus drawn to certain characteristics which pervade the whole series, notwithstanding the immense differences and contrasts which are to be recognised between its two ends. Of these characteristics two have already been mentioned: (*a*) the manner in which the series is continuously built up out of parts into wholes; and (*b*) the organic unity of the whole as pervading and controlling the parts. (*c*) A third characteristic has also been implied, namely that at each stage of this process there is a change which may be called *transformation*. 'The parts go together within the whole under transformed conditions.' Here it must be observed that the interconnexions which link up the whole series are not the fixed connexions of a static or stereotyped system. The series pulses with energy and movement, action and reaction, tendency and development. Thus there is the perpetual flow of sensations with reaction or response in living organisms; and again a *continuum* of psychical events subserving trains of perception, conation, reflection and action in human experience. Every entity is the centre of an inflow of energy, influence or action from a surrounding field and of a corresponding outflow of energy, reaction or response from the entity to the surrounding field. Now this inflow and outflow is not only horizontal but also vertical. It moves up the series as well as across it. In certain aspects it moves downwards also (in phenomena of dissolution such as appear in the radioactive elements and more generally in all forms of decay and degeneration).[1] But the significance of the series as a whole is to be found in its upward movement. Consequently we are here concerned only with inflow and outflow in the upward movement of the series. The point to observe here is that no entity is simply pigeon-holed in a compartment by itself. There is a general law that each entity is a centre of movement and tendency which passes beyond that entity. But further there is a tendency of the actual entities themselves towards transformation on to the level of higher entities. There is a tendency of lower entities which disposes them to subserve higher patterns and rhythms. When this takes place under the necessary conditions, whatever they may be, then the result is an instance of what may be called *ascending transformation.* Thus, to take examples, a plant is subject to inflow of energy from soil, atmosphere and sunlight. The plant so reacts that units of chemical energy are thus taken up into the plant-organism and are subject to such transformations that they subserve the patterns of movement which characterise the plant. These patterns of movement in turn conform to that law of being which constitutes the living organic unity of the developing plant. Suppose the plant is edible food for some animal. Influences flow out from it to which the animal reacts or responds. The plant is eaten and a fresh process of transformation is set going. But plant or animal may become food for some human being. In such a case under further processes of transformation its own organic unity has first been dissolved; and then its elements have been again subsumed to serve the unity of a human body. Thus the chemical elements and energies of plant or animal life have been taken up as parts into a higher organism; and there those elements through transformation conform again to the patterns and rhythms of the human body. But the human body is not in itself a complete organism. It is an organ of that spiritual organism which we call man. Consequently the transformations which nourish the human brain and nervous system also subserve mind within the unity of a spiritual organism. Thus ascending transformations pass up to subserve the level of spirit.

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[1] Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p. 3.

III

With this general view of the cosmic series as a whole and of organisms in their relation to the series, we must now pass to another aspect of the subject which has a central bearing upon the main theme of the present work. Reference has been made to the unity which pervades a whole and makes it more than the sum of its parts. All the physical objects which we perceive in the world around us have a certain kind of unity, in that they persist as wholes, despite the general flow of events which is the passage of nature. If there were no such persistence of objects we could never perceive them. The natural world around us is in a perpetual state of flux. Its procession of events is so swift and their details so minute as to elude for ever the net of human perception. Yet we perceive objects which endure and so transcend the flow of events. We perceive them as enduring within a duration of time. Thus both the objects themselves and our perception of them transcend the succession of events in space-time. We perceive objects whose identity persists or endures through what may be called a duration of time, that is time experienced as a unity corresponding to the unity of the object.[1] Now when we consider living organisms—that is to say physical objects of a class which embody the characteristics of an organism in a higher or fuller sense than is the case with inanimate things—we find that such living organisms cannot be understood as entities in abstraction from their life-story. The life-story of a living organism is its mode of persistence through time. Thus whilst all the physical objects of perception are known as persisting through time, living organisms are known as persisting through time after a peculiar manner which we call living growth or development. The unity which constitutes the highest law of being in a particular living organism (say, one of the higher mammals) is a unity which cannot be known through taking a cross-section of the organism, whether spatially or temporally. Spatially its unity pervades the whole of the organism and all its parts, and extends into its field of influence. Temporally its unity extends through its life-story. As in its spatial aspect the unity of the whole extends to its parts, so temporally the unity of the whole persists through all its changes of growth and decay. Thus we can speak of an organic unity of development, because there is persistence of identity through change and succession. Now when we combine in thought the organic unity of development through time with the fact of unity in complexity, of wholeness pervading a variety of parts, which we conceive the organism as possessing at any given moment of time, then we have a concept of the complete life-story of the organism as a concrete entity immanent in the spatio-temporal succession of events, yet transcending it. But what has been said of the living organism is in a greater or less degree true of all entities in the cosmic series from the lowest to the highest. The mode and degree, however, in which this is to be understood as true will depend upon the position which any particular entity occupies in the ascending cosmic series. Moreover, the extent to which ideas of evolution and development can be extended to inanimate matter is a problem for specialists which lies quite outside the main theme of this book.[1] It is, however, clear that we can no longer leave inanimate matter altogether outside the field of time and history. It is organic with the developing series of life, mind and spirit, and with them co-exists as part of a developing universe. Thus we may say that the cosmic series as a whole is in process of development through time; but the manner in which it is related to time is one which has an advancing significance as we ascend the series.

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[1] For the terminology employed in the preceding passage see further Additional Note C, *Objects and Events*.

Physical objects are known by their persistence through time. But they are known in two ways. They are perceived as individual objects, distinct from other objects. But they are understood through comparison with other objects and through classification as members of a particular class of objects to which we attach some general meaning based upon past experience of similar objects. Science is concerned with objects as members of a class and takes note of characteristics common to the class. It deals with those aspects of objects which are not peculiar to their individuality. Thus it is most successful in dealing with objects in the lower stages of the cosmic series, for there individuality is least significant. History, on the other hand, is most concerned with the individual and with the endless variations and differences which appear at their maximum in the story of man. Thus history is most concerned where individuality and difference count for most, at the upper end of the series. The difference between these two methods is, however, a relative question. For the lowliest physical objects have some marks of difference, however minute, whilst the method of science can and must be pressed right up the scale into the complex life of man. Thus the convenient distinction between science and history is a distinction of method to which no *a priori* limits can be set. But the distinction draws our attention to important aspects of the cosmic series and of its relation to time. At the bottom of the series individuality seems to mean almost nothing ; yet even here we distinguish, in theory at least, between one event and another and between one entity and another. But as entities are organised in increasing complexity, individuality advances in significance. The more complex the system of part-events which go together in a whole, the more important becomes the mode of unity which pervades the variety of parts and endures through the mazes of concurrent successions of events. Thus the individuality of living organisms and of their life-stories is more significant for the series than the persistence of inanimate things through time. This fact is, however, frequently obscured by the importance which inanimate things assume as parts of the immediate environment of man and as embodiments of his proximate field of influence, with which his bodily life is in constant interaction. In fact this point illustrates the argument. Animals are confined in the main to a particular habitat and live through a certain cycle of events which corresponds to their species. Their range of possibilities is narrowly confined both spatially and temporally. Man stands on an altogether higher plane in both respects. His field of influence in space and time has a far wider range. Thus he subdues or destroys living organisms of lower type and moulds the inanimate things of the external world until they seem to share and reflect something of his own individuality. But more important, through memory, reflection and choice he is able to transcend the mere passage of spatio-temporal events in ways which lift his individuality to a level of significance far beyond that of a biological life-story, and of which even psychology and kindred sciences can only describe the framework without being able to fill in the meaning of the picture.

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[1] See note on p. 27 above.

The difference between man and other living organisms is a point which will require further consideration in respect of human nature itself. We are at present concerned with that aspect of the subject which throws light upon the organic scheme of the universe as a whole. The immense significance of man in himself must not be allowed to obscure his position in and relation to the cosmic series at the head of which he stands. From this point of view a human being is a particular kind of organism belonging to the level of spirit, that is the highest grade known to us in the series as it exists on this planet. This spiritual organism is a whole which includes parts, such as mind and body, belonging to different levels yet gathered up into the whole on the level of spirit. In accordance with the general character of the cosmic series the physical events of our bodily life are transformed by the fact of their association with mind in the unity of a spiritual organism. Thus the series is gathered up into man; and he stands at the head of it, a kind of microcosm in which there is included a hierarchy of all the grades. He is in some sense representative of the whole series and more completely so than any lower entity can be.

In accordance with what is characteristic of every other grade of the series, the spiritual organism of man is developing in space-time and is therefore an unfinished product. The sense in which this fact is true of man will receive consideration at a later stage. But it is of the highest importance not only for the metaphysical but also for the religious interpretation of man and his place in the universe to recognise that he is organic with the rest of the cosmic series, and that his spiritual significance is rooted in and emerges from the general conditions which are manifested in the whole cosmic order. A radically false step would be taken at this point, if we assumed, in the face of all the evidence, that there is a sharp discontinuity between the spiritual aspects of human nature and the system of physical events which underlie man's bodily constitution. Incarnate spirit or embodied mind is here subject to the same general conditions as are found to govern the series as a whole. In whatever terms we seek to do justice to the creative activity which underlies the universe, nothing is to be won for Christian theism by assuming that creation is incompatible with the continuities which are actually to be discerned. Nor is it any part of the case for the truth of Christianity to set the life of the spirit on a pedestal removed from and sharply contrasted with the physical order. At every stage in the ascending series of the universe there is an entry of creative activity and an ' emergence ' of new factors and conditions which are the products of that activity. Wherever the interests of continuity require us to speak of the emergence of the new, there the new which emerges can also be recognised as due to creative will. A later stage in the argument will indicate grounds for believing that interpretation in terms of creation can settle accounts with reason in a way for which we shall look in vain on any other interpretation.

Man then is a spiritual organism subject in some sense to those limiting conditions of space-time which condition the cosmic series as a whole. The series as a whole is developing along many levels. It moves upwards by transformation through all its levels, and downwards in part through all levels ; and all these lines of development either return into the series through degradation or move upwards through man to the level of spirit. Man also on that highest level is subject to the same general law of development. Now in the case of physical organisms we can see readily that there is no final term in such a process of development. The physical organisms follow a curve of ascent and descent which passes back (by dissolution) into the general passage of events characterising the physical elements of the universe. On the levels of life and emergent mind more complex forms of development appear. But they also follow a curve of ascent and descent in individual organisms. As to the destiny of these individual curves the facts of the cosmic series give us no clear guidance. We must acknowledge our ignorance. It is only when we come to consider the level of spirit that lines of guidance as to individual destiny begin to open up. But it would be premature to discuss that question at the present stage of the argument. We are here considering man's relation to the series as a whole. The development of the series as a whole can clearly be in only one of two directions. Either there is degradation downwards into the flow of physical events ; or an ascent towards fulfilment in the destiny of man, whatever that may prove to be. In the former case there is no final term of development. But that fact is without special significance for the series as a whole ; since degradation into the flow of physical events means a kind of negative development toward infinity in the 'bad' sense of the word. Infinity at the lower end of the series is the empty infinity of endless repetition, a bare routine of recurrence without variety (like the ceaseless fall of drops of water). The ascending development to the level of spirit is, on the other hand, positive and increases in significance ; so that it presents an overwhelming impression that in this direction it moves towards some fulfilment which will give meaning to the series as a whole.

In the present section the development of the series has been connected with an advancing significance of individuality. We have also seen that living organisms exhibit a tendency at work in the series towards advancing significance of individuality. But the drift of this tendency in that intermediate stage gives no clear guidance as to the destiny of individual curves of organic life. Individuality below the level of spirit has the appearance of being organised in such strict subordination to species and to the wider groups of the animal kingdoms, that it may well have no other significance than the development of the series as a whole, which is subserved by its brief curve of individual development. On this view the individual organism sinks back by dissolution into the series as a whole and ultimately into the empty infinity which marks the flow of physical events. Thus wherever we look we find unfinished cycles of ebb and flow in development until we turn to man. If the developing system of nature is to transcend these repetitive cycles and pass into a higher order of reality, such a fulfilment can only be reached through the advancing significance of individuality on the level of spirit. In other words, nature as we know it can find its end only through the spiritual organism which we call man.

IV

Before the fulfilment of the cosmic series through man can be further explored, the structure of the human organism requires more detailed consideration. The human individual, like other living organisms, is a developing whole built up out of a multiplicity of parts, extending in this case over all grades of the cosmic series. But what is significant of the human organism is mind developing on the level of spirit. Mind appears far down the cosmic series as an organ which controls in increasing measure the biological life-story. In the human organism mind is an organ of spirit. Taken up on to the level of spirit, mind continues to exhibit laws of being which characterised its cycles of events on lower levels. But these laws of mental being have now been taken up into a new context, where they no longer dominate the situation. On the level of spirit these earlier mental sequences persist under transformed conditions in which they provide a basis for yet wider functions. Thus on the one hand the main structure of mind in man appears to be continuous with the mental structures of animals; and on the other hand this mental structure in man provides intricate and delicate moulds and conditioning channels into which and through which the activities of the spirit flow, and within which the resources of the spirit are generated and developed. Mind as an organ of spirit exhibits the general organic structure which is characteristic of organisms in the cosmic series. It is a whole, that is to say, within which a variety of distinctions exist, yet pervaded by a principle of unity which gives individual significance to the whole. As in physical organisms there is a structure built up out of parts and persisting through the passage of physical events, so the mind is to be regarded as a mental or psychical whole whose active development is unfolded and expressed through a variety of functions, with a persistence of identity through the flow of psychic events.

In human thought there has been prolonged effort to analyse and to understand the complexities of the human organism, its double character as 'body and soul,' its individual unity, its many levels of experience, the various forms of its activity, its continuity with other organisms in many aspects of experience, its superiority over other organisms in respect of reason and capacity for self-direction, its limitation by bodily conditions and its power of transcending those conditions. Complexity of structure has been observed; and this complexity has frequently led men to separate the various elements so sharply that the individual unity of the organism was in danger of being dissolved under speculative analysis. Examples of this tendency are to be found in the ancient and widespread theory of metempsychosis, and again in the attempt of Aristotle's Arabian followers to break up reason or mind into separate entities or principles, universal and individual. Similarly in the modern centuries there has been the long tradition of a sharp bifurcation between mind and matter with its dreary consequences in the various theories of psycho-physical parallelism. There are many signs that this dualism is breaking down notwithstanding recent attempts to prop it up under the aegis of Spinoza's name.[1] Behaviourism, parallelism and the dualistic animism to which these writers take exception, appear to be all tainted with the old dualistic tradition.[2] Until that tradition is overcome, materialism will always be near at hand. Its natural enemy for centuries has been the sacramental view of human nature inculcated by Christianity. That view is now receiving striking confirmation from the organic conception of the universe, which leaves room everywhere for the recognition of creative activity on all levels and at the same time insists upon the organic interconnexion of spirit with the levels which precede it. The organic view has the advantage of getting rid of dualism not only in respect of matter and mind, but also in respect of mind itself. Thus in the modern centuries there have been two accounts of soul or mind. According to one tradition we have thinking substance, pure ego, self-conscious ego. According to another we are offered an empirical ego, associations of ideas or sensations, mind-stuff, or a stream of psychic events. It was a great advance on these theories when James Ward brought into organic connexion the self or self-conscious ego and its presentational *continuum*.[1] Modern psychological studies show us mind as an organic kingdom, in which no sharp separation can be made between the self and its complex microcosm of functions, activities and states shading off into a fringing borderland of psychic events, where in turn it is interlocked through the body with all levels of the external world.

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[1] By the two leading exponents of emergent evolution, S. Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan. Cp. *Life, Mind and Spirit*, ch. i. § 5, and *passim*.

[2] *Ibid.* ch. iii. § 8. For animism see W. McDougall, *Body and Mind* (4th ed., 1918). This book includes a searching criticism of parallelism; for which see also J. B. Pratt, *Matter and Spirit* (1922).

It is a mistake, therefore, to look for a central nucleus or self which can be distinguished from the organism as a whole and separated from the remainder as one part from another. That view became impossible as soon as the faculty psychology was given up. Mind is not like a machine which can be made up out of parts fitted together, however delicately, yet in an external way. It is a further mistake to identify this supposed centre of the organism with its capacity for self-consciousness, either in the sense of self-awareness and introspection, or in the sense of conscious ratiocination. As the human organism develops these characteristics emerge and mature. But it would not be difficult to point to other aspects which are as fundamentally important. Indeed, we are still hampered in our ideas on this subject by the exaggerated individualism and narrow introspective intellectualism which reigned in the past. Human nature has suffered much from its interpretation at the hands of experts. Philosophers have not unnaturally offered interpretations which reflected their own self-analysis and which were limited by their horizons of interest and experience. The naïve experience of ordinary people is usually nearer to the facts, although so largely inarticulate because it pertains to minds untrained in self-observation and unskilled to give a scientific and coherent account of themselves. From this dilemma, however, we are partially rescued by accumulations of scientific observation and experiment and by the application of results so derived to the concrete life of man. *A priori* dogmatism dies hard and is usually left stranded high and dry by a steadily flowing tide of facts. The self-conscious ego is in this inconvenient position to-day. It is not to be supposed that all the new theories in the psychological and sociological group of sciences will last. But at least these new studies represent prolonged efforts to get at the facts of human nature through direct observation; and already some general results have been reached which look like permanent achievements. Of these one which appears likely to hold pre-eminent importance is the new concept of the unconscious or sub-conscious mind. Either term is open to criticism; but that cannot be helped. It does not greatly matter, provided that we are on our guard against untested assumptions. The psychologists have not destroyed the self-conscious ego; but they are compelling it to acknowledge its close organic connexions with other tracts of mind which are still largely unexplored and unknown. The regions of the unconscious are a sphere of activity in which memory and habit play their parts, and in which consciousness is held in contact and tension with the life-history of the individual mind and with its racial and social antecedents. Thus, just as matter has been taken down from its pedestal of simple mechanical certainties and is being re-integrated with the ascending cosmic series, so also the self-conscious ego is being compelled to step down from its pedestal of simple *a priori* certainties and to acknowledge its present dependence upon a complicated field of psychic influences with long trains of hidden events which stretch down into the unknown past.

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[1] See his *Psychological Principles* (1918), pp. 30, 31, 76, 77. Cp. also pp. 34 ff. and the whole of ch. xv. The relation of this book to the much earlier article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (9th to 11th eds.) is stated in the Preface.

In the case of all living organisms which possess mind (in however rudimentary a degree) the inflow of influences from the external world with its consequent train of events follows a well-marked course. Through the channels of sense the organism becomes aware of its environment. Excitation of one kind or another follows, and the organism reacts in attraction towards or repulsion from the external conditions. In man there is a similar sequence of events. Through sensation the mind becomes aware of objects. Mental processes are started. Impulses stir into activity. Instinctive reactions are set up. Emotional response takes place; and finally all these processes culminate in action which is the response of the organism as a whole to the influences which have affected it. Now there are aspects of this complex process which are strictly parallel to corresponding processes in the animal kingdoms. But there are present other factors which belong to the level of spirit and are peculiar to man. But these factors which belong to the level of spirit are present in the mind as a whole and condition all its functional activities. It is not unnatural that we should attach most significance to our conscious experience. For this is the mental region of which we seem to be able to give the clearest account; where we can watch our own processes of thought and activity, and where through reflection we become aware of meanings, form purposes and effect decisions. Yet every stage of such conscious activity is based upon conditions which stretch down into the unconscious. We should find no coherent meanings in present consciousness apart from memory, the gateway through which the present is continuous with the past; and memory has its roots in the unconscious. Again both meaning and purpose depend upon imagination which is suffused with emotional tone. The emotions again seem to link up our conscious thought and action with hidden springs of the inner life. So again both our conscious interpretation of reality and conduct based upon such interpretation have a background of sentiments, dispositions and habits round which particular emotions cluster; and these again are associated with impulses, instincts and dim strivings which are hidden away from our conscious life. It is the function of consciousness to give rational articulation to intuitions which reach down to the roots of the mental life. This does not make life irrational, unless we are determined upon a dualistic interpretation of mind which restricts the activities of reason to consciousness. On such a view the door would certainly be opened to scepticism. But fortunately psychology does not require us to adopt such a view; whilst the organic conception of the universe provides a more tenable explanation. On the level of spirit there is a highest law of being which conditions the whole organism of man and pervades the whole structure of the human mind. Those elements in the structure of mind which have a previous history in lower organisms are now taken up by transformation. On the level of spirit they are capable of conforming to the rhythms proper to a spiritual organism and of subserving the ends towards which activities of spirit are directed. Thus mind on the level of spirit is a whole, in which the old is once more taken into the new; and the significance of the whole is in all its structure and in all its modes of activity. But this integration of mind with spirit is only the highest instance of a wider integration. In the spiritual organism of man, body and mind, there is a gathering up of the whole cosmic series to the level of spirit. To sum up, there is no centre of the human organism distinct from and other than the organism itself. But there is a law or principle of this, as of all other organisms, by which its position is determined in the cosmic series.

Thus far the argument has been concentrated upon the characteristics of the individual human organism in its relation to the series. But of course this is only one side of the story. All cosmic entities are organic centres of events in the ascending development of the series. But all such entities are also in organic connexion of a special kind with other entities of their own grade through the interaction of fields of influence. These lateral interconnexions develop on the levels of life and mind into social organisms, so that every individual organism belongs to a wider organism which is the social group of its own kind. These extend into more and more inclusive groups and orders which reach out ultimately into the whole organic universe. The human race must be regarded as an organism of this kind including within itself all the smaller social organisms of man. The social organism like the individual has its life-story which is what we commonly mean by history. But we must be on our guard here against false analogies. The social organism of man is not above the individual in the ascending series. Its connexions with the individual are lateral. Consequently the individual remains a peculiar focus of the activities proper to the level of spirit. In all such activities his individuality remains a centre of events whose significance cannot be displaced by the social organism to which he belongs. On the other hand, although he is an indispensable centre of events in the ascending series on the level of spirit, yet as such a centre his individuality cannot function out of relation to its cross-connexions with other such centres in the social organism. The individual organism of man, then, is a centre which is in mutual relations with other organisms within the social whole to which he belongs. But on the other hand the social organism is something more than a collection of individuals. If it were only that it would not be an organism. Whether it be correct to speak of a 'group mind' or a 'corporate personality' is largely a question of the precise meaning given to such phrases. But if it were false to speak of the social organism on the level of spirit, then the whole tendency of the cosmic series would seem to negate itself at its most significant stage. Such a view would require very weighty arguments in its favour to win acceptance, arguments which do not seem to be forthcoming.[1]

The difficulties with which we are faced in dealing with this subject have their origin in the general characteristics of organic life on the level of spirit. That topic has been reserved for consideration in the chapter which follows. Two main problems confront us at this stage. In the first place there is the problem of human individuality and its relation to the social organism and to the realm of spirit as a whole. In the second place there is the unfinished character of spiritual organisms, individual and social, to which (in respect of the individual) passing references have been made in this chapter. Neither of these questions could be conveniently investigated in a general survey of the organic conception of the universe. For they involve the introduction of considerations which will carry us to a fresh standpoint with regard to the series as a whole. In concluding this chapter it will be sufficient to take note of the fact that the social organism does not make its first appearance with man. It is a feature which is impressed upon the series as a whole. But we have seen grounds for supposing that below the level of spirit the subordination of the individual to the group is a fairly constant law. Highly specialised social organisms appear as far down as the insect world. What has still to be determined is the question whether this general rule of subordination is carried through to the highest level, and if so in what sense it must be understood. This question will take us into a new stage of the argument.

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[1] In *Holism and Evolution*, ch. xii. pp. 339–40, General Smuts dogmatically denies the existence of social organisms without discussing the subject.

There is nothing but political expediency in favour of the Austinian theory of the state, which denies significance to intermediate social organisms. On this see further, J. N. Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State* (2nd ed.), pp. x, 13 ff., 79, 83 ff.; and *The Divine Right of Kings*, Preface to 2nd ed.

CHAPTER III

SPIRITUAL ORGANISMS AND THE ETERNAL ORDER

I

IN the preceding chapter the spiritual organism of man was considered in its relation to the cosmic series upon which it is built. Now we have to examine its special characteristics as an organism on the level of spirit. And we must start from certain considerations which have already claimed attention. It has already been pointed out that the movement of the series is in the direction of an advancing significance of individuality, and that it is only with man on the level of spirit that the individual organism emerges into a position of peculiar importance in distinction from the ebb and flow of events in the series as a whole. The general significance of organisms has been found in that unity of being whereby they persist through and transcend change and succession. In the case of living organisms, as mind emerges, there is a *continuum* of sentience rising towards an organic unity of psychical experience, in which there are inter-connexions between past and present and between present and future. At first awareness is of the present only; but organic connexions with past and future are implicit in this. The conscious life of children at first shares with animals this characteristic of absorption in the present, despite the fact that both child and animal are developing as enduring units in their life-stories. But as the human organism matures there emerges an organic unity of mind which rises far beyond this stage of experience. For whereas other organisms transcend change and succession, the human organism becomes aware of itself in this relation. The human mind is aware of its own continuity as an enduring entity in contrast to the flow of events. Such self-awareness, however, is reached in reaction to the external world and through the medium of social environment. The individual is never in isolation; and individuality is meaningless as well as helpless apart from its interactions with the organic universe. Through memory and reflection the individual is able to combine present perception with past impressions, to disengage the permanent from the transient, to discover connexions, order, meanings in the external world, and so to anticipate in some measure the probable course of future events. Further, he is able not only to co-ordinate and interpret his impressions of the external world, but also to act towards it in accordance with his interpretations. Thus his activity is not merely behaviour in blind reaction to stimulus. It is intelligent action selecting means to ends in accordance with coherent purpose. Thus through the co-ordinating processes of mind man is able to apprehend and to understand the organic unity of the external world as it presents itself to him; and again under the guidance of experience, thus more or less unified, he is able to respond suitably to its ordered meanings and connexions.

Now all this coherence and order, stability of experience, and power of selective response is but the framework of mental conditions within which the real issues of human life are set. It is mind on the level of spirit setting the stage upon which the activities proper to spirit come into being. Mind is here at a higher level than in the sub-human kingdoms. Although it is rooted in a physical system and has connexions with all levels of the cosmic series, it can function here only in a context which has significance for the level of spirit. Thus the mental conditions which we observe in man make possible modes of experience which transcend the space-time series in a greater degree than on any lower level. But this is in itself not the life of spirit but a setting which makes that life possible. Intellect and selective action *may* be exercised for ends other than those proper to the level of spirit. It is possible that something of this kind actually occurs below the human level. But in the case of spiritual organisms all such employment of intellectual processes is within a context which has spiritual significance. For within this framework of mental conditions man has capacities for apprehending an order of reality which lies beyond the cosmic series. In that order of reality man finds himself confronted with ultimate values and with standards of reference which transcend all other levels of his experience. They must therefore transcend the series in which he is rooted, the series which is represented in these other levels of his experience. So much has been written upon this subject in recent years that it would be quite superfluous to enter upon those detailed considerations which can be found adequately treated by competent writers.[1] Such a course would also carry us beyond the main lines of thought to which the present work must be confined. We are here concerned only with those aspects of the subject which bear directly upon the relation of the Incarnation to the cosmic scheme and which show man's place in a plan of creation moving to its fulfilment in Christ.

The order of reality with which we are now concerned is one which transcends man's life as that life is rooted in the cosmic series. For human life is on one side simply an extension of the series with those typical factors which are present in the series. Enough has already been said on that point. But whilst the human organism reaches down into the series, it also reaches up beyond it into an *eternal order*. The ultimate standards of reference which we acknowledge may properly be called eternal, if we take that term to indicate an order of reality whose significance in no way depends upon the conditions of change and development characterising the series of events in space-time. That element in our experience which refers itself to these ultimate standards of reference has no meaning at all unless it has at least this meaning. Man, then, has experience of an eternal order of reality different from and other than the organic series of the universe, of which in all other respects he forms part. Now it would be impossible to exaggerate the transcendent 'beyondness' of this eternal order as it is given to our experience. None the less the fact that it *is* given to our experience shows us clearly that it has an immanent as well as a transcendent aspect. If we had no capacity for appreciating beautiful things seen or heard in the world around us, then beauty as an ultimate standard of reference might certainly exist; but it could make no claim upon our acknowledgment. If we had no capacity for recognising and approving noble actions or goodness of character in persons with whom we have to do, then goodness as an ultimate standard of reference might certainly exist, but it could not claim our allegiance. Now these standards do claim our allegiance, because we are capable of recognising their manifestations and embodiments in the world around us. Consequently we must conclude that the eternal order of reality is immanent in some sense in the cosmic series and in ourselves, notwithstanding its utter transcendence over both. In this analysis we observe that our apprehension of the eternal order has three aspects which are closely interrelated. If we take them in the order of their historical emergence, we apprehend first the manifestations of eternal reality which are given in the organic universe around us, including the social organism to which we belong. We do not apprehend truth or beauty in the abstract. We apprehend objects in their concrete situations, characters and connexions; we apprehend them in their relations with other objects in ever widening contexts of order and arrangement, meaning and significance. Thus from the perception of particular objects in their relative permanence we pass to wider apprehensions of the universe—or this or that part of it—as a whole. What is conveyed to us in such growing apprehensions is a revelation of reality in one or other of its aspects. What we commonly call knowledge of truth is such an apprehension of the reality of things disclosed. Our acknowledgment of truth as an ultimate standard of reference is our recognition that through such concrete experiences we are in touch with an order of reality whose meaning and significance satisfies our reason, yet an order of reality which we did not make or mould into conformity with reason. It is an order which imposes the evidences of its reality upon us, which prescribes to us the pathway of knowledge, and which will only yield up its secrets to us if we submit ourselves to it sympathetically and follow humbly the way which it marks out for us. Thus we first apprehend the eternal order in the meaning, beauty or significance of particular objects in the context of the external world That is to say, we first recognise the eternal order as immanent in the organic universe around us. But the revelation thus given to our apprehension is recognised as exhibiting qualities and characteristics not subject to change with the moving process of events and in no sense exhausted by the particular objects in which we have found them manifested. Thus, secondly, we come to recognise the supra-temporal and transcendent character of the order to which these qualities and characteristics belong, and lastly we come to reflect upon our relation to this order as something of which we have direct experience.

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[1] Especially in the series of Gifford Lectures, *e.g.* W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God.*

If we turn from our apprehension of the eternal order to consider our response to that order, we find that this response has the same threefold character. For in the first place we are not passive spectators of that order, as though it simply played upon our mental life without co-operation upon our part. In knowledge we certainly do *not* make a representative world ; but we apprehend what is given to us in sensation and perception. Receptivity means active assimilation. The object determines the character of our knowledge ; but the knower has to make it his own. Moreover the entry of influences here, as on other levels, evokes not only the response of assimilation but a further response of self-expression. Assimilation into experience always tends to pass into outflowing activity which incorporates the results of such assimilation. This is in accordance with a general tendency of the organic series. On the level of spirit it means that apprehensions of the eternal order reach their full effects in man when they evoke in him spiritual activities which incorporate and express the eternal realities apprehended. Thus the threefold apprehension of the eternal order passes into a threefold response to that order. But the response is in the reverse order. Thus appreciation of beauty sets up in the individual artist an inner *nisus* towards expression which reaches its fulfilment in the creation of a beautiful object. A parallel sequence is followed in the case of moral response. The individual absorbs ethical ideals through living with good people and learning to appreciate their characters and motives. Thus he comes to recognise the transcendent claims and appeal which goodness makes, and there is set up within him a *nisus* towards realisation in himself of that good which he so recognises. Lastly, moral enthusiasm finds its fulfilment in concrete activity expressing itself in and through the social organism and impressing itself upon the external world.

Now it will be evident from this analysis that the individual is a peculiar focus of man's relations with the eternal order ; and this fact exhibits the pre-eminent position and significance of the individual organism on the level of spirit. It justifies us in speaking of the eternal worth of the individual. The individual is here no longer merged in the tribe or species as appears to be the case with animals. The individual organism has become a bearer of eternal values and must have a destiny beyond the space-time series in the eternal order. The validity of this line of thought depends, however, upon the validity of the whole interpretation of the universe which is here being undertaken. It is not, therefore, advanced as a separate argument for immortality. It could not so stand by itself. The interpretation of man's destiny is a corollary of Christian theism, which becomes secure only if the interpretation of the universe as a whole, offered by Christianity, is secure. The subject will not therefore be pursued further here. For we are concerned with the eternal significance of the individual at this point simply in respect of the problem adumbrated at the end of the last chapter—the problem, namely, of his relation to the social organism.

II

The individual is a bearer of ultimate values, a peculiar focus of man's relations with the eternal order. But this does not mean that these ultimate values of the eternal order have only individual significance. Precisely the reverse is the case. It means that the individual has universal significance and consequently that he can reach his fulfilment only in and through the social organism. One aspect of this subject is expressed in the fact that the individual is historically dependent upon the social organism. This is true in some sense at all levels of the human organism, biologically, mentally and spiritually. The individual life-story with its range of experience emerges out of the racial life-story with its far wider ranges of experience ; and upon this supporting background it is nourished into maturity. Its aesthetic and intellectual powers and its ethical dispositions are educated, sharpened and refined through the medium of social tradition. Moreover in primitive and rudimentary forms of human society the individual is subordinated to his tribe or social group, its local habitat, its customs, its traditional leaders, its system of culture, far more rigorously than is the case in more complex developments of the social organism. The last-mentioned fact is one which is open to plausible misinterpretation. The facile conclusion may be drawn that human progress is bound up with an increase of individual as against social factors in racial development. Such a conclusion would lead logically to a Nietzschean view of human nature, to which most advocates of the theory would not be willing in practice to carry it. There is, however, an important truth which this theory obscures. Whenever and wherever man emerged in the development of the cosmic series, then and there emerged capacity for apprehension of the eternal order. For it is precisely this capacity which differentiates man from other living organisms. But the development and refinement of this capacity or group of capacities has been slow and precarious ; and its earliest manifestations were of the crudest and most exiguous kind, as they are still in the earlier stages of the individual life-story. The individual child begins his career in a state of almost passive dependence upon the social organism and with nothing but a potential capacity for apprehension of the eternal order. So also it must have been in the beginnings of the racial life-story. In both cases individuality begins at the lowest level and develops to maturity *pari passu* with the development of capacities for apprehending the values and standards of the eternal order. But individuality is not the same thing as individualism. The one depends for its development upon interconnexions with the social organism which increase its social significance; the other is a form of degradation which retards the development of the individual and spells disaster to the social organism.

Thus we must conclude that the development of individuality, through increasing capacity for apprehension of values and standards in the eternal order, is a process which does not leave the social organism behind or render it obsolete. On the contrary this development of the individual enhances the value and importance of the social organism and raises it to higher levels. For it is a general principle of the organic series that the level of an organism is decided by the characteristics of the parts out of which it is built up and upon which it rests. So it is also with the social organism. It does not follow, however, from this that the social organism is on a higher level in the cosmic series than the individual. For whatever may be true of lower levels in the series, on the level of spirit new factors have entered into the situation. Man is not only rooted in the series, with its scale of lower and higher. He is also emergent out of the series by his capacity for apprehending an eternal order which transcends the succession of events in space-time. On the level of spirit eternal worth attaches both to the social organism and to the individuals of which it is composed. Thus at the upper end of the ascending cosmic series the scale itself undergoes transformation. It has reached a relatively final term, where the parts still exist for the whole and in dependence upon it. Yet the whole also exists for the parts and finds its significance in their individual fulfilment. For that individual fulfilment is itself as much social as individual in its significance.

The interconnexions between the individual and society are built up within the eternal order. For on the level of spirit both the individual and the social organism find their principles of unity in relation to the standards of reference which belong to that order. It will be remembered that at each grade in the organic series the complexities and varieties of parts and their organisation are held together within a whole by a pervading principle of unity which is proper to that level of the series. The principle of unity on the level of spirit is to be found in man's capacities for apprehending and responding to the standards of the eternal order. This truth applies alike to the individual and social organisms; for their destinies are bound up together. The good of each is interlocked at every point with the good of the other. Consider then the principle of individuality in man. Its development as a whole depends upon fulfilment in the eternal order. For at no level below that order can its complexities be woven into such a harmony as is required for its welfare as a whole. The spiritual organism of man, including as it does in principle all levels of the cosmic series, is capable of development along a number of different lines. Man's mental life is open to influences from all these levels and is capable of reaction to all such influences, and of response to his environment as a whole through any or all of them. But only along one path of development can all such lines of reaction and response be unified, namely, that path of development which maintains the developing harmony of the whole as a spiritual organism. This means that all particular lines of inflow and outflow, of apprehension, reaction and response, which sway the individual organism at the various levels of its structure, require inclusion and co-ordination within the wider rhythm of apprehension and response which is proper to the level of spirit. Such co-ordination on the level of spirit is in accordance with the guiding lines of development which characterise the organic series; although in accordance with the two-fold character of spiritual organisms such co-ordination is achieved in the eternal order, that is on a level which passes beyond the events of the series.

If, on the other hand, some particular and partial line of development is followed, for example, sensual gratification or self-regarding acquisitiveness, the true principle of individuality cannot reach its fulfilment. For a cycle of events is set going which belongs to this or that level of the complex organism and which has its appropriate place within a wider process of development, but which cannot provide the main pathway for the organism as a whole. In such a case individuality is passing into the false development which is individualism. It is entering a *cul-de-sac* from which there is no outlet for individuality as a whole. This is the region of one-sided overgrowths and (if we like the current phrase) of psychological complexes, which lead to disintegration of the true individuality. The individual is here following a private curve of development, which has no healthy cross-connexions with the social organism and which can never lead back to the welfare of the social organism as the true curve of individual development must always do.

Spiritual organisms, then, move towards fulfilment through their connexion with the eternal order and through partaking in the principle which characterises that order, namely, its transcendence over the series of events in space-time. At an earlier stage of the argument attention was called to a general tendency manifested in the organic series, whereby organisms transcend the succession of events in virtue of their respective principles of unity. In the case of spiritual organisms spiritual individuality, developing in communion with the eternal order by due apprehension and response, constitutes such a transcending principle of unity. All organisms persist as enduring and developing wholes by virtue of their transcendence as wholes over the succession of events in space-time. This is achieved through the gathering up of events into conformity with some higher rhythm which realises the single curve or pathway of the organic whole. Now in the case of man this general scheme of organic development is reproduced on the highest level of the series. The scheme is of the general organic type; but the transcending principle of unity is on the level of spirit with all that this fact signifies. In the human organism there are complex successions of events which follow various patterns, physiological and psychological, at successive levels. But these are taken up by transformation into the unity of a spiritual organism and are capable of conformity to the highest law of being on the level of spirit. This highest law of being is no other than that transcending principle of unity which has already been described as individuality developing in communion with the eternal order. Now if we take a cross-section of the human organism, the individual behaviour and conduct appear to be determined by an enchained succession of events, physical or psychological, according to the level at which the imagined cross-section is taken. Such cross-sections are necessarily taken in particular scientific studies; and the facts to which attention is thus called, when treated in isolation, give an air of plausibility to theories of physical or psychological determinism. But in fact such determinism (though relatively true in its own context) is never a true account of the spiritual organism as a whole. For in that larger whole all successions of events are gathered into the domain of spirit; and this remains true whether the organism is following its main pathway of development or not. For even if the organism is moving along lines of one-sided development or degeneration towards disintegration, it is still a spiritual organism. Its false developments are not purely physical or psychological sequences of events. They are perversions of mind on the level of spirit. They have their origin on the level of spirit, and their significance lies there. Thus they are not to be regarded as merely lapses into a flux of determined events, but as bad or one-sided transformations which are carrying the organism away from its true pathway of development. Psychology, therefore, can never resolve the human mind into a system of enchained and determined psychical events, any more than the physical sciences could resolve the physical organism into a parallel system of physical events.

Moreover, if psychological determinism represents only a relative truth within its own context, other teachings of psychology point in quite another direction. For here mind is regarded as a developing whole with a persistent tendency to seek that line of development which will preserve the balance of all functions in a growing harmony. There is a *nisus* of the whole towards harmony, which seeks realisation by resolution of one-sided developments into the larger life of the whole. If psychological determinism were the dominant law of mind, then this *nisus* towards harmonisation would be utterly meaningless. The truth of the matter is that the only law which can determine the whole is the law of the whole. Now in the case of mind on the level of spirit the law of the whole (the highest law of being) is the developing individuality which is its own transcending principle of unity. Consequently, what determines the psychological *nisus* towards harmonisation is not a succession of events, whether physical or psychological, nor this or that function of mind taken by itself, nor any supposed nucleus or self other than the whole, but the spiritual organism itself as a developing individual whole in communion with the eternal order, transcending all events of the cosmic space-time series within itself; not displacing or superseding the sequences or functions or interplay of influences proper to its various levels, but gathering them all into conformity with its own rhythm on the level of spirit. That rhythm of the whole is determined by the character of the individual's communion with the eternal order through apprehension and response.

Nevertheless, whilst all developments on the level of spirit have spiritual origin and significance, false developments of individuality appear to point towards psychological determinism precisely because, when harmonisation of the individual is arrested by such false developments, the energies of the spiritual organism are pressed into a narrowing cycle of events. There is retrograde or degenerate transformation towards routines of habit which thwart and enchain individuality. The natural balance and tension between a variety of functions leaves room for a rich interplay of energies and patterns of events at all levels within the co-ordinating unity of the whole, and provides an adequate foundation of material for the higher activities of spirit, in accordance with a general law of the organic series. But this wide interplay, preserving balance and proportion of functional activity, is pressed into a narrower channel when degenerate or inadequate transformations take place. Wide interplay is replaced by uniformity; balance and proportion are replaced by undue strain upon particular parts of the system. Pressure of change and increased flow of sensation, interest and reaction are intensified on one level or in some particular group of functions. This has the effect of speeding up the rate of succession. But its swift passage of events leaves less room for variety, relaxation and recuperation; whilst the limited range of possible changes in interests, under such restricted conditions, sooner or later becomes exhausted. Thus such partial lines of development follow a curve of diminishing variety which leads back towards the routine of bare repetition. What is harmful in such a process is not the facts of routine and succession—for these have a necessary place in the development of the organism—but the forcing of the spiritual organism into particular routes of succession. Under harmonisation, on the other hand, routines of habit are formed which are congruous with the plan of the whole, under due response to apprehensions of the eternal order. Much of the routine of habit thus formed appears to pass into the domain of the unconscious, where it provides material within which the deeper impulses of mind can function freely and healthily in the interests of the whole.

III

In the preceding chapter it was remarked 'that the cosmic series as a whole is in process of development through time; but the manner in which it is related to time is one which has an advancing significance as we ascend the series.' The meaning of this statement must now receive fuller amplification in its bearing upon the level of spirit. The modern meaning given to the idea of a succession of events in space-time is one which has been reached only through rigorous scientific analysis far beyond the limits of sense-perception. The 'ideal' limit of this succession is the negative infinity of sheer repetition which has meaning only in the realm of mathematics. We can conceive the actual universe of the cosmic series as rising from this ideal limit through the actual events of space-time in an ascending order of concrete entities, which as wholes transcend the bare succession of repetitive energy in increasing measure. But successions of events are taken up into these wholes; and therefore by the gathering up of events into patterned systems there can be an increasing concreteness of events. There is thus an ascending series of concrete organisms, which increase in significance as their mode of transcending succession by endurance through space-time increases. From one point of view every organism is itself an event; and there are ascending series of events which correspond broadly to the ascending movement of the organic series towards the concrete.[1] Increase of concreteness means increase of organic wholeness in transcendence over succession, with increasing significance for the life-story of the organic whole in question. The higher the organism (broadly speaking) the more concrete and individual is its life-story; and consequently the more concrete become the events of that life-story in their particularity and individual significance. Thus the level of spirit is the most concrete level of all. Here the concrete organic wholes have the highest degree of particular significance and differentiation which obtains in the cosmic series. Here biological uniformities have passed into the background and individual varieties into the foreground. Species and type give way to the individual and his eternal significance. But if this ascending concreteness moves towards increase of individuality and, through the individual as focus, towards the eternal order, it also moves towards increasing organic wholeness and more subtle organic connexions; consequently towards increasing significance of the social organism. For the significance of the social organism does not consist, we can now see, in its dominance over the individual. If that were the case an ant-heap would mean more than a society of human beings. The more individuality there is, the more concrete must be the organic connexions of the social organism which is composed of such individual units. This concreteness of organic connexions in the social organism is built up and developed from the resources of the eternal order through the interplay of individual organisms which are in communion with that order.

The concreteness of organic connexions on the level of spirit can be traced in the sequence of apprehension and response which marks man's relations with the eternal order. It has been pointed out that this sequence begins and ends in the concrete.[1] We do not apprehend truth or beauty in the abstract; nor are the higher responses of the spirit directed towards abstractions. We pursue concrete ends and objects; and our actions are conditioned by concrete situations, although under reference to standards of the eternal order. Moreover the passage from apprehension to response is through the gateway of a particular individual experience, where the concrete particularity of the individual and his experience stamps all apprehensions with some measure of individual interpretation and so gives rise to endless varieties of response. Now here we gain fresh light upon the significance of individuality on the level of spirit. The law of development through 'variations,' whose biological significance was discerned by Darwin, is here seen at work on a higher stage. The richness of quality which belongs to the level of spirit is exhibited in the diversities of interpretation and response which mark the interconnexions of the social organism through the play of individuality. Now individuality has two aspects: its social aspect, whereby it faces outwards towards the social organism, and its self-regarding or individual aspect whereby it faces inwards towards its own inner life. In both of these aspects the concreteness of individuality is developed through that tension of whole and parts, of unity in variety, which characterises all organisms in their transcendence as wholes over successions of events in the space-time series; a tension which rises in significance with the ascending series as the transcending principles of unity in the series move upwards towards the eternal order. The function of these transcending principles of unity is of the same general type all the way up the organic series. In every organic whole there is a principle of unity which transcends and pervades diversities and so imposes unity upon the complex successions of events which are comprised within those diversities. Now in the self-regarding aspect of individuality on the level of spirit the individual through communion with the eternal order develops in accordance with this general law. In proportion as there is true development of individuality, there is increasing harmonisation through balance of functions and subordination of all routines of habit to this developing stability of the whole. By this means rich complexity and variety are preserved within an advancing integration of the whole in respect of experience, knowledge and character. Wisdom, stability, simplicity and goodness are typical marks of individuality so harmonised and integrated. Such a developed individual is, according to the measure of unification attained, an instance of concreteness on the level of spirit, that is to say the kind of concreteness towards which the organic series as a whole is developing. And at this upper end of the series we can see more clearly than at earlier stages what this movement towards concreteness signifies and in what direction it is leading. The complexities and variations are harmonised in the individual organism by a transcending principle of unity which can only perform this function adequately as it is directed and sustained from the resources of the eternal order. The meaning of concreteness in the organic series thus becomes luminous on the level of spirit. It consists in an immanence or embodiment of the eternal order in the space-time series and its successions. This fact becomes luminous on the level of spirit, because there first and not earlier the immanence of the eternal order is embodied in individual organisms which are aware of themselves as enjoying that relation to the eternal order. But seeing that we apprehend the eternal order in the external world in revelations of reality and beauty, and again that we respond to that order by concrete actions which express themselves in the external world, we must conclude that the eternal order is immanent in some sense in the whole organic series. Now the ascending significance of concreteness in the organic series is the line of direction which shows us the pathway of this immanence of the eternal order, rising from a bare limit or zero-point to that mode of immanence which we discern within ourselves on the level of spirit. The measure of concreteness is the measure in which the eternal order is immanent in the space-time series.

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[1] On *events* see further Additional Note C, *Objects and Events*.

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[1] Pp. 57–59 above.

Thus far we have traced the ascending significance of the concrete in its individual aspect. The same general principles are seen at work in the social aspect of the organic series culminating in the social organism of man. This aspect of the series can first be discerned in the organic cross-connexions of all entities on their own level through interpenetration of fields of influence. Even below the level of living organisms we can discern principles of unity combining objects into groups of the same class. It is through this community of objects in some classifying principle of unity that we apprehend revelations of order and significance even in the inanimate world. This law, whereby there is community of organisms on their own level, emerges with advancing significance through the social organisms of the animal kingdoms to the social organisms of man on the level of spirit. Now Darwin believed that variations in individual organisms have, in these animal kingdoms, determining effects for the species and for the organic series as a whole. But here the individual is merged in the social organism. Harmonisation of complexities and varieties in the individual has significance simply according to whether such harmonisation furthers the destiny of the social organism. In other words, the individual principle of unity is merged under the social principle of unity. But again there have been whole species and social groups in the animal kingdoms which have become extinct. Consequently it would appear that the principles of unity manifested in their social organisms are merged again in wider principles of unity in the organic series as a whole.

On the level of spirit both the principles of unity which are present and the varieties and complexities which they co-ordinate have attained a much higher stage of concreteness. In particular the individual principle of unity is not simply merged under the principle of unity manifested in the social organism. The two principles are integrated together in a more significant manner. As there is community of the individual with the eternal order, so also there is community in the eternal order between individuals within the social organism, and again community of the social organism with the eternal order. The individual has direct experience of communion with the eternal order. Yet, as we have seen, that direct experience is mediated through the external world by apprehensions and responses which begin and end in the medium of the external world where the immanence of the eternal order is discerned. Now the external world is no other than the ascending organic series of which the highest stage is the social organism on the level of spirit. Consequently the individual's direct experience of the eternal order, which is always dependent on the mediation of the external world, finds its highest and most significant line of mediation through the social organism to which the individual belongs. Now as our communion with the eternal order is through the mediation of the external world in ascending stages of concreteness, our most concrete communion with the eternal order comes through the mediation of the social organism. The individual's community with the eternal order is thus rooted in the social organism, because the significance of the eternal order is social as well as individual. The eternal order incorporates itself into the organic series with ascending significance through the interactions of individual wholes with their parts and of social organisms with their individual units. The first of these modes of incorporation has already been sufficiently analysed. We are now concerned with the second mode of incorporation, namely, through interactions of social organisms with their individual units. The possibility of this mode of incorporation depends upon the possibility of due interaction between the social and individual principles of unity along lines proper to the level of spirit. The law of interaction here is closely analogous to that which has already been examined in the analysis of the self-regarding aspect of individuality. As there complexities and diversities of function are held in tension and drawn towards developing harmony by the principle of individuality; so here the individual organisms, with all their diversities of interpretation in apprehension and response towards the eternal order, are held in tension by the transcending principle of unity embodied in the social organism; and through that tension they are drawn towards a developing harmony along a pathway which leads up to the fulfilment of the social order.

The possibility of due interaction between the social and individual principles of unity is thus actually realised within certain limiting conditions which have yet to be considered; and the harmony of the social organism towards which this process moves is the ultimate end in which the social organism seeks its fulfilment. This process of the social organism depends for its realisation upon the social aspect of individuality, that is upon the fact that the individual seeks not only internal harmony within himself, but also external harmony with the social organism. All this, of course, has its foundations in those social functions and tendencies of mind with which social psychology is occupied. But these social factors at work in mind are the materials upon which the resources of the eternal order can work in the life of the spirit. The determining factor on the level of spirit is always the eternal order with its standards of reference immanent with the concreteness of spirit in the individual and in society. The mode by which the eternal order is immanent in the social organism is one which cannot be so luminous to us as the mode of its immanence in our own individuality, of which we have direct experience. But that it is so immanent is a fact which is directly implicit in that very same individual experience which is so luminous. For we have no solitary experience of the eternal order, notwithstanding the fact that individual experience may sometimes (as in the mystic's rapture) include conscious awareness of nothing else but the eternal order and its direct contact with individuality. This is a case where a disproportionate attention to the conscious and self-conscious elements in experience may be misleading. It is not suggested that such an experience is in itself disproportionate. It has almost certainly a very important function in the life not only of the individual, but also of society. The disproportion is asserted not of the experience itself, but of an interpretation of that experience which explains it on individualistic lines by ignoring the organic connexions of the individual with society and the external world. These organic connexions are, throughout such an experience, implicit in unconscious areas of the mind and provide the foundations which make such an experience possible.

The immanence of the eternal order in the social organism is a fact implicit in our individual experience of that order. For all such experience of the eternal order is experience of common order, meaning and significance and of organic interconnexions in the universe; and although all such experience is stamped with individual interpretation, yet it is always an interpretation of something given in an objective order to which all individual interpretations refer back. This is equally true alike of thought and action, of apprehension and response. For every response to the eternal order in human conduct is the issue of an interpretation which refers itself to something given in standards of the eternal order. The actual response is a concrete embodiment in conduct of that interpretation; and therefore the embodied response, equally with the interpretation, is not privately but objectively ordered with reference to the common standards of the eternal order. Nevertheless the whole sequence of apprehension, interpretation and response exhibits the two aspects of individual variety on the one hand and common order, meaning and significance on the other. This combination of unity in variety is the hallmark of concreteness and the constant sign of transcending principles of unity, through which the eternal order is immanent in the multiplicity of the universe. In the social organism on the level of spirit it makes possible a common social experience and the whole concrete embodiment and expression of that social experience, radiating through a rich variety of social groupings to the individual units, and returning through a network of influences, which percolate the individual units and pass out again into the social organism as a whole.

IV

The relations between the individual and society are thus of a kind in which neither is simply subordinated to the other. This justifies an observation made earlier in this chapter, to the effect that there is a transformation of the organic series as a whole on the level of spirit. For through the communion of the individual with the eternal order an altogether new factor is introduced. At all earlier stages of the series there is subordination of one principle of unity to another which is more inclusive. Thus the unity of the cell is subordinated to that of the living organism through intermediate groupings of organs and parts. The living organism again is subordinated to the species and, through the transience of species, to wider groupings of the animal kingdoms and so finally to the organic series as a whole. In this sequence each principle of unity is merged in those above it or beyond it. Now the relation of the individual to the social organism is in many respects parallel to that of the cell to the living organism. But there is this great difference that, whereas the cell is taken up by transformation into the rhythm of a principle of unity which transcends its own, this would be a very misleading definition of the relation of the individual to the society on the level of spirit. Even below that level the social organism is not higher in the organic scale than its individual unit. It covers a larger range of organic interconnexions. Its span is wider; and below the level of spirit the significance of the individual is merged in that wider span. But on the level of spirit this no longer holds good. The social organism has a wider range; but the individual with narrower range has on the other hand direct experience of the eternal order. The social organism becomes the repository of an experience which is given directly to individuals. The experience circulates through the social organism from and through individual centres of experience. On the other hand the direct experience of the individual is mediated to him through the social organism and its total context of the external world. It would appear then that on the level of spirit the social and individual principles are two *foci* in one system. Each is indispensable to the other; for each has characteristics which are needed by the other. In the social organism experience of the eternal order is the more extended. It is extended over space and time. It spans the diversities of locality and the changes of the centuries from one period to another through history. The individual's experience, on the other hand, is extended only over his own life-story or that part of it which he has completed; and its spatial span is also more restricted. The individual, however, while more limited in range, has the advantage in intensity of experience. Society therefore depends upon individuals for fresh accessions to its store of experience; whilst the individual cannot advance beyond society to new fields of thought and action, unless he has first assimilated in large measure the collective wisdom and equipment of society, which has been accumulated through history. Again, society develops on a level which represents roughly the average of possibilities to which its individual members can attain at any particular period of time or in any particular locality. If the individual's attainment is below this average level, supposing his total attainment to be capable of computation, then he is a drag on the development of society. The proper function of the individual, therefore, is to rise above the average attainment; and where a large proportion of individuals fulfil this function the average level of attainment in society as a whole is raised. Such a process reacts again in favour of individual attainment, which always starts from the level of its immediate social environment. Only in exceptional cases and in particular respects is the individual normally capable of rising far beyond this level.

Such considerations lead us towards a fresh turning-point in the argument. We have been examining the mutual relations of the cosmic series and the eternal order as they meet on the level of spirit. We have found in the cosmic series as a whole a gradual approach to this intersection of the two orders which takes place on the highest level of the series. Characteristics of the series in its ascent point again and again to the fact that the eternal order provides a background for the series as a whole. But as we pass to the last grade of the series the eternal order passes from background to foreground. The significance of the series as a whole is clearly to be looked for at its upper end, where the eternal order becomes dominant. For we can give no rational meaning to the series as a whole or to any part of it, unless we find it in the tendency of the series and of all its stages to pass upward through developing concreteness to the level of spirit, that is to the dominant significance of the eternal order. Now the significance of the eternal order is something other than what is mainly characteristic of the cosmic series. The main characteristic of the series is change and development from stage to stage through successive processes and arrangements of events. But a flat-level process of bare succession or routine has no significance in the series except in so far as it is taken up by transformation to conform to an ascending process, in which the determining factors are principles of unity transcending succession. Now these principles of unity move in orderly advance towards the highest principles of unity in the series which are found on the level of spirit. On that level the significance of the series is found in the fact that it conducts us beyond itself to an eternal order, which has quite other characteristics. The two orders are therefore found to present characteristics which are respectively in strongest contrast to one another. Yet the significance of the cosmic series is found in its movement towards the eternal order; and one important aspect of the eternal order is found in its accessibility to and capacity for entering into relations with the series. In short, the eternal order is both transcendent over and immanent in the series. It is important here to observe both the character of the contrast and the character of the connexion between the two orders. The connexion between the eternal order and the cosmic series has the appearance of advancing in significance from stage to stage, as though there were an increasing incorporation of the eternal order into the series; until man, the highest representative of the series, becomes aware of this process and of its significance through his direct awareness of the eternal order in his individual experience. The character of the contrast between the two orders, however, has an absolute quality which remains constant. Throughout the series the transcending principles of unity yield marks of order, meaning and significance connecting the series with an eternal background which is other than itself. The beauties of colour, sound and shape which are incorporated into the organic universe always retain, wherever they are manifested, a given significance which cannot be exhausted by their particular embodiments nor changed by the developing processes and organisms in which they are embodied. Again, the principles of order which pervade the series, and which provide the basis for the mechanistic methodology of science, are principles whose significance is not exhausted by any of their endless embodiments and whose abiding constancy is not changed by the multiplicity of situations and connexions in which they are expressed. This is the reason why the background of the universe must be regarded as an order which is eternal, not as a series or process which passes through stages of development.

The significance of the organic series is thus found in its passage towards an eternal order which lies beyond itself. The significance of the eternal order, on the other hand, lies in its character of 'beyondness' or 'otherness' than the organic series in which we are rooted. But we could never know the meaning either of the series or of the eternal order with its 'beyondness,' unless that order were incorporated into our experience and into the series to which we belong. Moreover, while the significance of the eternal order lies in its unchangeable transcendence, our knowledge of this fact is bound up with the increasing incorporation of that transcendent order into the series. For the advancing significance of this incorporation is spread out on a background of contrasted and unchanging transcendence. Finally, whilst the transcendence of the eternal order is unchanging, *the principle of transcendence* flows down from that order with increasing significance into the developing series; as we can see by observing the ascending significance of the transcending principles of unity in the series. For all through the series from the atom upwards the principles of unity in each case transcend the multiplicity of parts which they pervade, whilst the organisation of wholes integrating successions of parts is always inseparable from this transcending factor in the principle of unity. But as the series advances these transcending factors advance in significance; and this is only another way of saying that the increasing incorporation of the eternal order is effected through the inflow and immanence of transcending factors which have increasing significance as the series advances.

On the level of spirit the transcending factors have reached their maximum significance through the principles of unity which control spiritual organisms, individual and social. Now we have seen that on this level there is no longer a comparatively simple plan whereby individual units are subordinated, by combination with entities on their own level, under a wider principle of unity. For on the level of spirit two principles of unity appear as *foci* in one system, namely, the individual and social principles proper to the level of spirit. Now the new factor which appears here is not simply the fact of tension between these two principles; for tension between analogous principles of unity appears all through the series. Darwin's law of natural selection was concerned with the mode of tension which exists on the biological level as between individuals in a species and as between one species and another. On the level of spirit, however, the incorporation of the eternal order into the direct experience of the individual introduces a *transformation of the mode of tension.* The character of this transformation has already been expressed in two different ways by saying (*a*) that the eternal order now passes into the foreground, and (*b*) that two principles of unity now exist side by side on that level as two *foci* in one system. Up to the level of spirit we see one principle of unity passing on into another in a single line of succession. On the level of spirit, however, we see two principles of unity not in a line of succession, but in mutual interaction. We have reached the final term of the series on this level. Consequently, there is no mere passage from one principle of unity to another in serial form. For the series can go no further. What we have instead is a new principle of tension by mutual interaction of principles of unity on the same level; and the mode of interaction is one which is determined by direct experience of, and communion with, the eternal order. What then is this new mode of tension?

The structure of mind has at all levels of its existence social as well as individual factors and tendencies. But below the level of spirit the social tendencies of living organisms do not pass outside the self-regarding aspect of individuality and its orbit. For there the social and individual factors are enchained to one another in certain fixed tensions and co-ordinations under racial laws of being. But on the level of spirit a new principle of self-transcendence appears. The social structure of mind is subsumed under the new principle of individual self-transcendence, so that mind on the level of spirit has no longer social significance unless it conforms to the rhythm of self-transcending individuality. Below the level of spirit the immanence of the eternal order secures the co-ordination of the individual with the social organism under laws to which the individual conforms of necessity, and in ways which the individual has no power of determining. But on the level of spirit such co-ordination is effected through the individual's capacity for self-transcendence; and this self-transcendence is effected through response to apprehensions of the eternal order. Now self-transcendence in response to apprehensions of the eternal order may properly be called self-determination. For there are ultimately only two modes of determination in the organic series. In the first place there is that kind of determination which we may call routine, the flow of events or the passage of nature. In this form of determination at its ideal limit there is no content, no individuality, no principle of unity. This may be called negative determination. But positive determination takes effect through the ascending principles of unity with advancing significance of individuality. This is the only kind of determination which has organic significance. It consists in the dominance of principles of unity over routines of succession. As we ascend to the level of spirit there is positive determination through the dominance of the individual organism over all its routines of events on all levels within its structure. But it is only on the level of spirit that this mode becomes self-determination through the principle of self-transcendence. For here the dominance of individuality over its routines of events in positive determination can never be achieved within the self-regarding orbit of individual activity. On the level of spirit positive determination, leading towards developing harmony of the individual self, is achieved only through the communion of the individual with the eternal order. Now it is of the essence of such communion with the eternal order (*a*) that in proportion to its realisation it carries the individual beyond the orbit of self-regarding and self-harmonising activities; and (*b*) that it is only by such self-transcending passage into the eternal order that the system of self-regarding and self-harmonising activities can fulfil its function of self-determination. There is no self-determination in the full meaning of the word unless all the routines of succession are taken up into the rhythm proper to the individual as a whole. But the rhythm proper to the individual as a whole is a self-transcending rhythm, in which the individual conforms to standards of reference beyond himself. Now the activity by which the individual conforms through apprehension and response to standards of reference in the eternal order is an activity of the whole self and therefore self-determination. Purely self-regarding actions express particular functions of individual life, and react to the pressure of particular routines of habit comprehended under such particular functions. But the essence of individuality is not to be found in this or that function but in activities of the whole; and the activities of the whole in this case are those which apprehend and respond to the meanings of the universe as a whole in its *nisus* towards the eternal order. Thus the essence of individuality on the level of spirit is to be found in a self-transcendence which is self-determined. One expression of this fact is to be found in the social aspect of individuality which binds individuals together in the social organism. Other expressions of the same fact will appear at a later stage. Meanwhile we observe that the correlation of society with its individual members through all stages of social grouping is effected on the level of spirit by means of this principle of self-transcendence which is self-determined. But the principle itself is not exhausted in these mutual correlations of society and the individual on the level of spirit. The full significance of the principle lies not in that mutual relation but in the peculiar relation of this whole bi-focal system to the eternal order, a relation expressed in the principle to which reference is being made, namely, the self-determining principle of self-transcendence.

A metaphysical description of the universe has now been attempted along two main lines. The first of these was concerned with the universe as a developing system of events; the second was concerned with the relation of this system to its eternal background. The description is obviously incomplete. In the opinion of the present writer it could not usefully be carried further without introducing considerations derived from the data of religious experience. Such considerations have not been introduced in these two chapters, because it is essential to the purity and validity of a religious interpretation of the universe that it should be confronted with such a measure of interpretation as can be offered by other fields of knowledge, before attempting its own synthesis.

CHAPTER IV

GOD AND THE UNIVERSE

I

THE last two chapters offered a description of the universe as it appears possible to regard it under present conditions of knowledge without reference to the special data of religious experience. We can now resume our consideration of the problems of theism and the Incarnation which were opened up in the introductory chapter. Given such a view of the universe as we have been considering, what bearing has it for religion? Does it support the religious data which require interpretation in terms of theistic belief? Finally, does the Christian form of theism with its doctrine of the Incarnation throw light upon the special problems and difficulties which are disclosed, when a religious interpretation of the organic universe is undertaken? These are questions to which we must now turn.

The existence of God cannot be demonstrated. But the lines of thought and interpretation which lead up to the Being of God and which support and illuminate the data of religious experience can be very variously arranged according to our interpretation of the universe as a whole. The results of this diversity appear in widely different interpretations of the religious data. The organic conception of the universe, with its background of eternity, is not only fully compatible with a religious interpretation. It appears to be capable of definitely adding force to the argument and of helping to disengage the facts of religion from explanations which have falsely arranged the lines of interpretation. Thus, those systems of thought which have maintained that reality transcending experience cannot be known in experience were powerless to offer an adequate interpretation of the universe, and were therefore incapable of doing justice to those lines of interpretation which lead up to the Being of God. For if the reality of the Absolute, let us say, is never given in its appearances, or given only in a distorted form, then the world of appearances is not representational but misrepresentational; and the Absolute itself dissolves and disappears behind the mists of its misrepresentations. Such forms of scepticism can be safely passed by; for they destroy themselves. The only theory of knowledge which does not lead to scepticism and the bankruptcy of reason is that which asserts the immanence of transcendent reality in experience, so that we know the real world and can trace in its ordered significance a revelation of its eternal background. Thus knowledge yields neither a world of naked facts without spiritual significance nor an Absolute Reality hidden behind delusive appearances. Knowledge yields a world of facts interconnected through principles of unity which charge them with significance and meaning, conducting us into the presence of reality. And if there is One Absolute Reality behind the principles of unity with their meanings, then, whether we call its aspects and manifestations appearances or not, they certainly give us reality. Thus the real world whose plan of development we can trace out to-day embodies in itself the significance of the eternal order, and gives us guiding lines of interpretation by which we can pierce the meaning of that order and find its explanation in God.

One of these guiding lines is concerned with the idea of creation. The organic series of the universe is a series of events and groupings of events. Its arrangement includes two contrasted elements, repetition and novelty. These two are the warp and woof of a relatively stable yet developing universe. The first element is the energy and activity of ceaseless vibrations which constitute the flow of physical events. This sameness of repetition is the neutral material upon which the patterns of the universe are woven. But significance comes from these woven patterns. For here the other element is present, namely, novelty. If there were no sameness, novelty could not be discerned and would have no significance or order. But if there were no novelty in the universe, there would again be no significance in sheer repetition. Supposing we could discern such a world, we should not discern its energy and activity. For activity is only discerned through change and through entry of the new upon a field of repetition. Now the organic series of the universe proceeds through continuous arrivals or entries of the new upon a field of repetitive energy. Such a process is what we can understand creative activity to be. We are not concerned to demonstrate the truth of the religious doctrine that the world is created by God; we can, however, ask in what direction this process of creative activity points. We may properly call it creative quite apart from the existence of a creator simply on the ground of the advent of the new. What *emerges* must mean what was there before in the process or situation. Thus such a phrase as 'emergence of the new' employed in a previous chapter was only provisional. The new cannot properly speaking emerge out of an existing situation. It may appear as thus emerging; but it must enter from beyond. In the case of the organic series new factors are continually entering into the situation. They are not derived from the repetitive series of events. From whence then do the new factors come? These new factors are manifested in the form of, or by means of, principles of unity which transcend the routines of bare succession in increasing measure. The new factors themselves flow in from the transcending background of the series of events through the transcending principles of unity. But this background we have found to be none other than the eternal order which is immanent with advancing significance in the series. The new factors, therefore, which give meaning to the idea of creative activity, enter the developing series of events from its background in the eternal order. What cannot emerge out of the process of events in the series enters into that series from beyond it, that is from the eternal order. Thus, whilst a bare succession of events points to an activity, the creativeness of the activity which we discern in the universe through the entry of the new is a creativeness which we must trace to the eternal order.

If now we assume that the creative activity, of which the organic universe is the developing product, flows from the eternal order, there are then two different lines of interpretation which are alike excluded. (1) For first, starting from the unchangeable stability of the eternal order, which is always in contrast to our concrete experience, we may refuse to differentiate between the modes of its incorporation into the series in view of this contrast. Then the advance of the series through ascending modes of incorporation ceases to be significant and directive. The series as a whole is tainted with mutability which is the negation of eternity. Consequently the entry of the new has no positive value, as it leads to increase of concreteness, whereas the perfection of the eternal order is found in its contrast to concrete developing activity. Thus the whole series comes to be regarded as a delusive system of appearances. This line of interpretation is characteristic of oriental thought and has appeared in the West in some forms of sceptical idealism. As it ends by denying reality to all our experience it is intolerable to reason; and we must seek the truth elsewhere. (2) Secondly, we may fix attention on the fact that the eternal order has significance for us through its concrete actualisation in the cosmic series by creative activity. The developing actualisation of order, meaning and significance in the organic series will then be the thing which matters. The forms, principles and standards of the eternal order will thus be regarded as arising out of the series and ascending towards a cumulative goal. Thus, because the series rises towards such an order, the order itself is regarded as the product of time in a single line of ascent with the series from which it 'emerges.' But this line of interpretation confuses the eternal order with its actualisation in the series and throws ultimate meanings into the future, so that our present experience of abiding and unchanging transcendence is ignored.[1] But it is this unchanging character of the eternal order which is implicit in all recognition of ultimate standards. We find the presence of creative activity in the developing time-series, precisely because in the new factors which enter that series in succession we can trace order, meaning and significance transcending all detailed events and groupings of events in the series. Thus against the first line of interpretation we know the unchanging transcendence of the eternal order through the creative activity which proceeds from it. For its significance becomes increasingly unfolded by this creative activity through incorporation into an actual development which shares in the reality of the eternal order. As against the second line of interpretation, the advancing significance of the developing process which rises towards an ultimate goal through man depends upon the entry of factors recognised as not proceeding from the process, factors which are unchanged by the process and yet actualised in it.

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[1] This criticism is directed towards the position of Professor S. Alexander and evolutionary monism of similar types.

These two lines of interpretation, then, separate sharply two aspects which must be brought together. The source of this developing universe must be capable of explaining its ascending order. This means that if there is creative activity incorporating itself into the cosmic series then the meaning of that creative activity will be discerned most clearly at the upper end of the series. But the series advances in cumulative ascent towards increasingly concrete and comprehensive wholes. The source of such creative activity will then be a Being who embraces all the significance of His creation, whose actuality transcends in concreteness and comprehensiveness all that is to be found in the developing series of His creatures. God is thus Absolute Actuality, not in process of realisation but in concrete unchangeable reality. But then He cannot be *simply* the goal of a developing series. He must embrace in Himself that eternal order which, with its transcending forms, principles and standards, is independent of the cosmic series. The more completely that order is incorporated into the series the more concrete it appears. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that in itself it is other than concrete. For, in the first place; we can apprehend the eternal order only through its actualisation as developing concreteness in the series. But in that very apprehension we discern it to be the transcending ground of concreteness in the series. Now if we attach (as we do) increasing significance to increasing concreteness, it is impossible to see how such concreteness arises out of abstraction. Secondly, the concreteness of the ascending series increases through the entry of the new. This advent of the new we have traced not to the repetitive succession of events, but to the transcending principles of unity which supervene upon them; and these transcending principles are the gateways of the eternal order into the series. Consequently all concreteness in the series has the appearance of flowing in from the eternal order. That order must therefore be itself concrete. Thirdly, the appearance of abstraction in the eternal order is due to the fact that we apprehend it through the multiplicity of the cosmic series. The unity of the eternal order is thus broken up in our apprehension into a number of aspects. Now concreteness is apprehended as a unity through a unity of experience. Thus, for example, we apprehend physical objects in their unity through perception in a unity of duration.[1] But we apprehend the eternal order through a number of forms, principles and standards; that is to say, we apprehend it as refracted in a number of aspects. Accordingly these aspects have the appearance of abstraction which achieve concreteness by incorporation into the series. The appearance of abstraction is therefore found on analysis to be due to the all-embracing comprehensiveness of the eternal order. It follows then that whatever lines of interpretation can be found leading to God or the Absolute Being, as in some sense identical with the eternal order, are supported by considerations which suggest that such a Being would be Concrete Actuality in its absolute form.

There are thus good grounds for believing (*a*) that the cosmic series depends upon the eternal order through creative activity and (*b*) that the eternal order from which this creative activity proceeds is itself unchanging all-embracing concreteness. These are not strictly arguments for believing in God. But they are arguments for concluding, in the first place, that the universe as we know it fits readily into a religious interpretation; and, secondly, that if adequate grounds for a religious interpretation are to be found in the data of religious experience, then some form of theism which holds God to be Concrete Actuality will be the interpretation most compatible with what we know of the universe as a whole.[1] There is, however, one further point upon which the idea of creative activity needs to be cleared up at this stage. In the preceding argument this idea has been taken to mean a characteristic of the universe as known to-day, which points to a spiritual but not necessarily to a religious interpretation of the universe, to the dominance of an eternal order, although not necessarily to the God of religion. This creative activity was described as weaving patterns of the new upon a groundwork of repetitive energy; and it was suggested that we recognise creative activity through the entry of the new. As thus described, creative activity might mean no more than the imposition of forms and principles from the eternal order upon a groundwork which was not derived from that order. This would be in line with a dualistic conception of creation, common enough in the ancient world, of which the classic type is to be found mythologically expressed in Plato's *Timæus*. This explanation of creative activity, however, would be inadequate to interpret our knowledge of the cosmic series as dependent upon the eternal order. For the arrangement of the cosmic series as a developing system was found to depend upon the interaction of two elements, namely, repetition and novelty. But if the entry of the new alone is attributed to creative activity flowing from the eternal order, then the groundwork of the cosmic series in repetitive energy falls outside the connexion of the series with the eternal order. But the significance of the series for reason is found in its connexion with the eternal order through the advancing entry of the new. If, however, the repetitive energy at the base of the series is not a product of creative activity as here defined, then it represents an aspect of the series which is intractable to reason. It does not, however, suggest such irrationality. For at every stage of the series, with its advancing significance for reason, repetitive energy conforms to the ascending rhythms of the new. But an element in the structure of the universe which habitually conforms to the creative activity of the eternal order, and yet has no significance apart from the dominance of that order, must be presumed to be itself the product of such creative activity. Moreover, it is only upon this assumption that we can really hold the cosmic series to be dependent upon the eternal order. The grounds for believing in this dependence have been set forth already with such insistence that it does not appear necessary to argue the point further here. Arguments, then, which suggest the dependence of the cosmic series upon the eternal order through creative activity are arguments applying not only to the entry of the new, but also to the repetitive energy with which the new is incorporated.

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[1] See above, p. 40.

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[1] For this application of the term 'concrete' to God see further Additional Note C, pp. 467, 468 below.

II

A religious interpretation of the universe arises from the facts of religious experience, and in the first instance from no other source. Our apprehensions of ultimate standards of reference for knowledge and conduct do not in themselves yield a religious interpretation. They conduct us to an eternal order, but not (of themselves) to the God of religion. They are, however, compatible with a religious interpretation and may support such an interpretation powerfully. Religious experience has its own roots in human nature and its own history in the life of man. Broadly speaking, it stands on the same general footing as other forms of experience, and must be tested on parallel lines. The individual does not begin his life-story with intuitive recognition of God any more than he begins with definite intuitions of the eternal order and its standards of reference. All is at first in potentiality. Religious experience is generated through the interactions of the individual with society and the external world. It develops side by side with other cultural factors, arising like these from the most exiguous and rudimentary beginnings and developing through an endless variety of strange embodiments and fancies. In its earliest stages it appears as a deep-rooted emotional attitude not to this or that factor in environment but to the background of environment as a whole. This emotional attitude, with the apprehension and response which it implies, is quite distinct from those rudimentary recognitions of the eternal order whose responses are embodied in primitive arts and crafts and in tribal taboos. It is not to be confused with reactions to this or that aspect of nature or of tribal life. It is a recognition of powers and forces at work in the background of nature and society having a mysterious dominating effect upon tribal and individual life as a whole. These powers at work in the background of environment are apprehended as beings possessing concrete individuality, analogous to that of individuals in the tribe or social group; beings therefore in affinity with the tribe and its members, but also in confused association with natural objects which form part of the familiar framework of tribal life in its animate and inanimate surroundings. These earliest forms of religious experience arise in and through a whole range of concrete situations, and issue in definite ritual activities which are the concrete embodiments of response. But the religious attitude and its embodiments are at this stage intermingled with many other associations, not necessarily religious, which are drawn into its orbit. Indeed the religious attitude and its reactions become a connecting thread upon which are strung promiscuously a whole range of primitive activities, rites, customs and taboos with their mythological explanations. As experience widens religion becomes the essential background of all new forms of activity and organisation in man's concrete reactions to nature and society, and consequently tends to clothe itself in these new forms and to assimilate to itself these wider ranges of experience. But through all these associations and transformations it remains distinct in itself, as an attitude of the human spirit towards powers or beings present behind all environment of the external world and greater than the social group and its members.

The emotional attitude of man towards his gods contains two contrasted elements. On one side it is awe, an awareness of power, majesty, superiority in the objects of his apprehension. On the other side it is fascination, attraction, recognition of friendliness and protective help, desire for communion with the gods. Both of these emotional attitudes find expression in rite and myth and in tribal relations with the god. Together they make up the complex attitude of religion, an attitude of dependence upon superior powers in the universe, to whom homage is due, but who none the less enter into most intimate relations with their worshippers.

Now in this double aspect of religion as at once awe-inspiring and familiar, mysterious and yet fascinating, we can discern a general similarity between religious experience and those other forms of experience on the level of spirit which have in this work been called communion with the eternal order. In both there is concrete experience of a reality transcending the individual and his range of activity, yet directly given and present in the experience of the individual. In both there is somewhat which is other than and beyond the individual, other than and beyond natural phenomena and the social group, yet accessible to the individual in his experience through the mediation of nature and the social organism. In both cases this mysterious reality stands above man both in his individuality and in his social group, commanding his allegiance, yet eliciting desire and drawing man forward to fuller activities of apprehension and response.

Man's early apprehensions of God and the eternal order do not attain to unity and order, just because they begin and end in the concrete. Both in the history of social groups and in the individual life-story apprehension and response correspond to the multiplicity and diversity of the external world and of individual experience. Recognition of the unity and order in the eternal background is a slow process, and so also is harmonisation of individual response to that order. Now on the level of spirit the highest and most concrete modes of experienced activity with which man is familiar are all to be found within the orbit of the social organism in the interchanges and mutual reactions of the social life. Communion and community with other members of the tribe in social relationships is therefore the natural type in accordance with which all experiences of the eternal order and of religion are interpreted and understood. Religion, in particular, means communion with individual beings analogous to those of the social group. And since apprehension and response correspond to the multiplicity which lies on the surface of the external world, there are inevitably many such individual objects of religious attachment. Polytheism corresponds to that stage of culture in which multiplicity of apprehension and response has not yet been co-ordinated. Life is still embodied in a number of diverse and only partially connected routines of habit, ritual and custom, each of which was originally built up out of particular experiences. Apprehension is concrete, poetic, symbolical; and the beginnings of rationalisation are embodied in a number of diverse and sometimes mutually inconsistent mythological explanations. Aspects and elements of the eternal order, dimly discerned in the sequences of nature and in the facts of tribal life, are hypostatised and incorporated into the concrete symbolism of rite and mythology.

Now the main lines of human advance in history moved from this primitive stage to co-ordinated experience; from a multiplicity of detailed apprehensions and responses, corresponding to the surface impressions of the external world and to the narrow ranges of social organisation, to unified apprehension of the eternal order and of the reality which it reveals to us. This process may be called *rationalisation*. Its antecedents are mainly two, namely, increased mastery over, and power of manipulating, the external world, and wider ranges of social organisation and of social inter-communication. Increased mastery over material environment and wider knowledge of the social organism lead to new co-ordinations of individual experience and to advancing individual apprehensions of the eternal order with its unifying forms and principles. This process in turn makes for the refinement of religious experience with its range of apprehension, emotion and response. These various elements gathered force in wide movements of advance, culminating in the great civilisations of the ancient world and their spiritual achievements during the epoch which had reached its maturity about the period of the rise of Christianity. Now in this movement towards rationalisation religion took part along with other cultural activities of man. The results were embodied in a series of achievements which included the rise of all the great rationalised systems of religion as well as the ancient systems of science, philosophy, law and government, together with corresponding artistic and literary creations. But the manner in which religion contributed to these movements differed profoundly in different parts of the world. Along two of the three main lines of advance, namely in India and in the Græco-Roman civilisation, religion did not keep pace with other advancing apprehensions of the eternal order. Only in Judaism, and in the group of religious movements connected with it, did religion remain at the centre of the rationalising process. Thus a number of different interpretations of ultimate reality arose, all more or less rationalised; but each derived from concentration upon one avenue of experience, to which other lines of experience could be assimilated only in subordination to that main line. Of the three main lines of interpretation the distinctions are clear. Indian philosophy in its discovery of ultimate unity turned its back upon the multiplicities of the external world and of individual experience, denying to these all positive value. European thought discovered the forms, principles and standards of the eternal order, not as an undifferentiated unity but under various aspects which meet in the eternal order. It learnt to penetrate through the multiplicities of the experienced world to these aspects of the eternal order, and again to find the aspects of the eternal order in the experienced world. Thus eastern thought is world-renouncing in its affirmation of absolute reality transcending this world; whereas western thought became world-affirming in its insistence that the aspects and forms of absolute reality are immanent in the concrete multiplicity of this world and actualised through that multiplicity. But in both of these lines of rationalisation the distinctive contribution of religious experience tends to be excluded from the final synthesis. For the unity of ultimate reality, and of the eternal order in which it is manifested, is reached at the expense of concrete individuality. Now the concrete individuality of ultimate Being, in the order of reality which lies behind our world, is the proper object of religion ; and the religious impulse is directed towards this ultimate concreteness in its apprehensions and responses. For religion the ultimate reality is not *primarily* unity or absoluteness or an eternal order, but God in His concrete individuality, with whom our concrete individualities have direct affinity and relations, analogous to the concrete relations of individuals in the social organism. But there is also side by side with this analogy a great contrast, which indicates a parallel between religion and the other great cultural activities on the level of spirit. In social relationships on the level of spirit, the concrete relations between individuals are sustained by the self-transcending principle which constitutes the social aspect of individuality. But, in discussing the social function of this principle, we have already noticed that the principle is not exhausted in the relations of the individual with the social organism.[1] The self-transcending principle of individuality has a reserve of potentialities corresponding to the transcendent background of the social organism in the eternal order. Now, whereas in other cultural activities the self-transcending principle is directed towards communion with aspects of the eternal order, in religion it is directed towards communion with God, who is the concrete reality of that eternal order and who is recognised in religious experience as the transcendent background of the social organism in the form of concrete individuality. Thus, whilst there is an analogy between religious experience and the interchange of relations in the social organism, there is also a contrast ; because the concrete individuality with whom there is communion in religious experience is not on the level of the human social organism and its members. He is apprehended as transcendent reality, concrete and individual yet other and beyond, in the background of the social organism and its members, dominating it through the tension of concrete relations; just as in the other forms of cultural activity which make connexions with the eternal order there is dominance of that order over experience through the immanent tensions of its aspects, forms and principles.

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[1] Pp. 80, 81 above.

The third main line of rationalisation in the ancient world was the rationalisation of religion which took place in the history of the Hebrew people. Here the development was throughout a development of religious experience to which all other cultural activities were subordinated. God as concrete individuality was the reality experienced through growing apprehension and response in the twofold emotional attitude of awe and fascination. Now it is important to observe that, whilst this religious development was in contrast to the other cultural developments of the ancient world through the fact that the object of religious experience is God in His concrete individuality, yet just as much as those other lines of development its advance lay through a rationalisation of experience. Hebrew religion differed as strongly as possible from oriental philosophy in that it was a world-affirming rationalisation. God was conceived as present in and revealed through nature, society and history. In this world-affirming attitude Hebrew religion was much nearer to European thought. Moreover the contrast sometimes made between a Hebrew doctrine of transcendence and a Greek doctrine of immanence is very misleading. Nothing could be more transcendent over sense-experience than Plato's world of ideas or more transcendent over nature than Aristotle's First Mover; whereas the Old Testament at its highest flights in the prophetical and poetical books is full of the doctrine of divine immanence in nature and in man. The correct distinction between Greek and Hebrew thought is that in the former case Ultimate Reality is conceived in terms of Mind and its ideas, whereas in Hebrew thought God is conceived in terms of Will and its concrete actions.

The religious experience of communion with the gods was everywhere a means of access to the will of the gods. Divine favour and help must be procured, divine wrath averted. This could be achieved only by learning the wishes of the gods and then taking steps to conform to those wishes. In the religious interpretation of the world all events in nature and all events in tribal life which cannot be clearly traced to normal human agency are attributed to divine agency. Moreover the normal activities of man and his social group are ultimately controlled by divine agency. In other words the religious interpretation of the world expresses the dependence of the world upon God in terms of the self-determining activity of God as concrete individuality. In primitive religion, broadly speaking, the will of the gods is arbitrary, capricious and largely irrational in its manifestations. This crude situation reflects the disconnected states of a primitive experience which has not yet reached co-ordination. Hebrew religion emerged out of a Semitic background in which religion had this capricious character. But from its early beginnings Hebrew religion appears to have possessed an ethical trend which gave promise of higher things, as soon as the horizons of experience were enlarged. This is what in effect took place. Hebrew religion begins in the worship of a Semitic tribal deity. There is a covenant relation between Yahweh and Israel, under which tribal life and its immediate environment in nature are controlled by the will of Yahweh. Development proceeds, as elsewhere, along lines which reflect and incorporate the facts of natural environment and the stages of social organisation, such as the material hopes and fears of an agricultural community and the political interests of a people achieving national unity and taking its place amongst the surrounding nations. Now the dangers to all forms of primitive religion developing in the ancient world under such conditions were mainly two, namely: (1) the danger of religious experience and its genuine emotions becoming tainted with sensual extravagance; and (2) the danger of the national covenant with its god becoming weakened and merged under the pressure of political tendencies towards religious syncretism. In either case the emotional attitudes proper to religion, with their transcendent factors, would have become diluted with other elements in experience and would thus tend to lose their special qualities and significance. These dangers were averted in the history of Israel after prolonged struggles between the conflicting elements. The situation was saved by the prophetic interpretation of the will of Yahweh in terms of ethical righteousness. The ethical element in the primitive conception of Yahweh's covenant with Israel received increasing emphasis with every enlargement of the horizon of national experience. The rationalisation of Hebrew religion was achieved in the first instance through an advancing incorporation of ethical factors into religious experience.

A second stage followed closely upon the first. It has already been seen that primitive Hebrew religion like its neighbours attributed to Israel's God a divine agency over the events and affairs of national life and over its immediate environment in nature. Thus agricultural prosperity and military victory were alike attributed to the agency of the national God. This simple and parochial view of divine activity was in danger of collapse with the advent of great military empires like Assyria upon the scene of events; for the gods of Assyria appeared to be more powerful than the God of Israel. But here again the ethical factor in Hebrew religion found a solution of the problem. The gods of the surrounding nations are inferior to Israel's God. For Israel's God is righteous and they are not. Yahweh is faithful to His covenant and cannot fail to achieve His righteous purpose for Israel. That was the religious interpretation of the situation. But the significance of this interpretation was not solely religious. It was equally an ethical interpretation derived from the ethical factors which had become incorporated into Israel's religion. Thus in the crisis religious faith was stabilised by a deep-rooted ethical confidence. The significance of this phase of Hebrew development extends far beyond the immediate situation out of which it arose. It was an illustration, on the field of history, of permanent cross-connexions between religion and the other forms of experience by which man has community or communion with the eternal order. We have already found important analogies between the characteristics of religious experience and the characteristics of these other modes of contact with the eternal order. The development of Hebrew religion provides a concrete embodiment in history of this natural community between religion and the other transcendent elements in human experience. Thus the belief that Yahweh is righteous generated the conviction that He is superior to the gods of the surrounding nations. When once this point was reached the final conclusion was not far off and must inevitably follow. Yahweh is superior to the other gods because He is the only righteous God; and gods which are not righteous are not worthy to be called gods at all. Yahweh is the God of the whole earth. He is not only the sole God whom Israel may worship; He is the only God and there are no others.

When this point had been reached, the most important rationalisation had already been effected. Yahweh is no longer the divine agent within a restricted sphere of national life and its immediate natural environment. He is the sole divine agent, the Creator of heaven and earth, the Ruler of all the nations, who holds in His hand this material world and the course of human history. Other rationalisations followed concerning the purpose of God in history, the destiny and vocation of Israel, the value and significance of the individual, the ethical problems of human life, and so forth. But all these were, as they always must be, corollaries of that primary rationalisation which achieved the unity of a religious interpretation of the universe in terms of monotheistic belief.

III

In previous chapters it has been argued that our apprehension of the eternal order depends upon the fact of a developing incorporation of that order into the successions of events in space-time through an ascending cosmic series. This is true not only of the details of the series but still more of the series as a whole. For whilst forms and aspects of the eternal order can be discerned in particular objects or in cross-sections of the series, it is only in the series as an advancing process that we can discern the tendencies and directions towards which the incorporation of the eternal order as a whole is moving.

Apprehension of the eternal order is apprehension of form, order, unity and wholeness spanning the multiplicity of events and gathering their routines into lines of direction which are again incorporated into more comprehensive lines of direction in the upward path of the series. The meaning of the cosmic series is to be sought in the incorporation of the eternal order; and the meaning of this incorporation is to be sought again in the direction of its movement. The apprehension of this direction as a whole has again three phases or aspects, each of which is indispensable to the total apprehension. First there is the apprehension of detailed structure. Each organism is a typical instance of the whole movement of the organic series. Its life-story is a key to the concrete structure of the whole movement of incorporation. But the higher an organism stands in the series, the more fully does it provide a key to the movement of the whole series. From this fact the other two phases of apprehension follow. For secondly, as the life-story of an organism is understood through its unity in space-time, so the story of the universe as a whole can be understood only through its unity. Now the unity of the universe as a whole is not simply a unity of system and arrangement, but also a unity of direction and developing movement. Consequently the second stage of apprehension consists in understanding the comprehension of all life-stories as built up into the story of the universe as a whole. And as the life-story of each organism is understood through apprehending the larger ends which it subserves in the series, so the story of the universe can be understood only through apprehending the direction in which it is moving. This can be inferred from the order of its ascending development and leads us into the final stage of apprehension. For thirdly, apprehension of the universe as a whole in its movement of direction carries us to the upper end of the series. We cannot hope to understand the meaning of the universe as a whole, unless we apprehend the lines of direction which appear on the level of spirit in the human life-story. But the human life-story written large is history. So the meaning of the incorporation of the eternal order into the cosmic series as a whole will be withheld from us, unless we have some key to the unity of history. But the unity of the cosmic series as a whole depends upon the incorporation of the eternal order into its successions of events. Consequently the unity of history (which is the extension of the cosmic series on the level of spirit) must depend upon an incorporation of the eternal order into the process of history.

Now the foundations of this way of apprehension were firmly laid for European thought in Greek science and philosophy. In the work of Aristotle especially the investigation was carried as far as perhaps was possible within the limits of existing knowledge. But the investigation did not include the third phase of apprehension referred to above, the phase which is concerned with the unity of history. For the importance of the time-series and therefore of history is a comparatively modern idea in scientific thought. The background of the ancient scheme is a fixed drama of recurring processes. The parts have their places in the scheme; and the scheme is built up in apprehension by detailed study of the parts. The scheme presents unity and arrangement. It includes the important concepts of actuality, as the energising of process towards ends, and of Absolute Thought from which the whole process flows out and to which it returns. But the scheme does not include the idea of a directive movement advancing through incorporation of eternity into time with a developing plan which gives unity to history. Thus there is no incorporation of actuality into history. But what was lacking in the Greek interpretation of the universe was contributed by the religious interpretation which was the product of Hebrew religion. Here the process of apprehension began at a different point. It began in the domain of human history interpreted on a religious background. But here also the interpretation was built up from part to whole. Tribal life with its immediate environment of events, interpreted in terms of a religious covenant, was the unit of experience in the first instance. The implications of the ethical factor in this experience provided the type upon which wider interpretations were framed, interpretations first of national history, then of international events, and finally of the universe as a whole. The interpretation was from first to last historical. It moved from concrete facts and events to the unities of history, and only through the developing unity of history to a theistic interpretation of the universe.

The religious experience of Israel provided them with a clue to the march of events in their national life and in an ever widening context of influence playing upon that national life. Through their religious interpretation of the march of events they found a growing unity of significance and meaning in their history. One aspect of this unity of significance was expressed in their developing sense of vocation as a people, that is to say their belief that the spiritual destinies of the human race were bound up with and dependent upon their own national rôle in history. Out of this sense of national vocation there developed at a later stage growing convictions as to the value and significance of the individual and as to final transformations of human history in both its social and individual aspects, convictions which carried their horizons altogether beyond the march of events in this world-order. Another aspect of the growing unity of significance disclosed in their interpretation of history is to be seen in the fact that, as this interpretation proceeded, it proved susceptible of a growing incorporation of ethical and rational factors. It assimilated to itself elements and resources drawn from other apprehensions of the eternal order than that of religion. Ethical and rational processes were awakened and assisted by the apprehensions of religious experience ; and their religious experience was enriched and enlarged by the incorporation of these elements. But more fundamental than all these aspects and at the heart of them all was the fact that the Hebrew people interpreted history in terms of divine activity. Their sense of unity in history was derived from their discernment of a purpose of God unfolding itself in that history. All the notable events of their own history and its immediate environment of international politics, together with surrounding and accompanying events in nature, were interpreted to be acts of God by which His purpose was expressed and fulfilled in history. Their own national vocation and the ultimate issues of national and individual destiny were with growing comprehension incorporated into the sphere of this purpose and its fulfilment. Their national memories and traditions were interpreted in terms of this purpose to throw light upon present situations; and so interpreted the past became the ground of expectations and hopes which looked forward to the future. Thus past, present and future were linked together in an interpretation which found its unity in the purpose of God. Further the purpose of God manifesting itself in history was a key to the character of God. Acts and events which are the product of an arbitrary will and shifting purpose can give no clue to the character from which they proceed, and therefore no dependable unity or meaning to the course of events. Therefore all the various aspects which we can detect in Israel's sense of the unity and significance of history run up finally into the fact that within a historical experience they were recipients of a developing revelation of the character and attributes of God. The various aspects of the unity of history corresponding to ideas of developing purpose, national vocation, national and individual value and significance, with the ethical meanings which were incorporated into all these aspects and the concurrent intuitions of rational order in the universe as a whole,—all these may be regarded as so many transcending principles of unity spanning and co-ordinating the march of historical events. These aspects of the unity of history again, regarded as transcending principles of unity, were held together in a unity of apprehension and response in a developing social experience. The content of that experience included apprehension of the eternal order as the concrete actuality of the living God and response to that concrete actuality. The aspects of God's character, which later theology has rationalised under the technical terminology of attributes, were never in the religious experience of Israel apprehended as abstract forms, principles and standards as is the case in the other modes of apprehending the eternal order. These aspects were always regarded as particular manifestations of a concrete individual character, manifestations which were incorporated into the march of events and which gathered those events into a unity of meaning.

This religious interpretation of the unity of history and of the universe, which referred that unity to its ground in the character and attributes of a living creative God, was said to be held together in a developing social experience. But this developing social experience and its interpretation had a historical unity also in respect to the individual interpretations from which it was built up. The Hebrew interpretation of the universe in terms of monotheism was not an eccentric ‘ throw-up ’ due to peculiarities of this or that individual who happened to have a ‘ flair ’ for monotheism. It presents no parallel in this respect to the isolated monotheism of Ikhnaton in Egypt. Its more striking and creative developments were the product of a prolonged tradition of prophetic interpretation and teaching. There was continuity of interpretation from one prophet to another through centuries. And this continuity constituted a tradition, not simply in the sense that elements in the national religion common to all were handed on and repeated ; nor even in the sense that the messages of one or two great prophets were echoed by the voices of their disciples in obedient iteration. There are common elements, of course, and the theme of one prophet is taken up by another. Also a few names can be associated with epoch-making transformations of the tradition. But the whole is a developing interpretation flowing from a multitude of diverse streams of experience, whilst even the minor contributions add new elements to the whole, elements which have the stamp of individual experience upon them.

Within the limits of the Old Testament period and its literature this developing interpretation remains incomplete. Its unity is not that of a finished scheme but of a growing whole. It awaits and requires completion in some transformation which lies in the future. One sign of this incompleteness is seen in the fact that there are a number of different lines of expectation within the pre-Christian literature of Judaism which, although not contradictory, are never brought together into a convincing harmony. None the less there is enough harmony in their interpretation of history for us to be able to select some of its dominating ideas and to bring them together so as to form one picture.

The all-inclusive conception under which these dominating ideas can be gathered together is that of the *kingdom of God*, the emphasis of the phrase falling upon the sovereign rule of God rather than upon the sphere in which it is manifested or exercised. The Jewish interpretations of history converged towards the idea that this kingdom of God, as the manifested rule of God over His creation, is the final goal towards which history is moving and in which history will find its fulfilment. This conception always tended to mean that the climax of history will witness a transformation of its conditions as known in present experience. Under the later influences by which Judaism was moulded during the closing stages of the pre-Christian period increasing emphasis was laid upon the transcendent character of the Kingdom. It belongs to a sphere of existence beyond the present world-order, and will enter the field of history from that transcendent beyond, bringing into being a new order of experience.

IV

The Greek Platonic conception of a transcendent world of eternal ideas as the background of all sense-experience and the Jewish apocalyptic conception of a transcendent kingdom of God as the goal of history seem at first sight to stand in such strong contrast that no amount of interpretation could ever bring them together. Each, however, makes the universe dependent upon a spiritual and transcendent Reality, the one primarily in terms of intellect and thought, the other primarily in terms of will and activity. These two aspects of spiritual existence meet, however, in the concrete experience of man and most clearly in our ethical experience. If then we consider some aspects of that experience, we may find an analogy which will indicate how these two modes of interpreting the universe can and must be brought together. The analogy, if it serves, will be in no way accidental; for its fitness arises out of the principles of interpretation implicit in previous stages of the argument. Man is the focus of history, and human history is built up out of units of human experience in their concrete actualisation as individual life-stories. But man is also in principle a summation of the cosmic series, a microcosm into which all its levels are gathered up, a gateway through which the whole cosmic system of physical events passes up into the process of history on the level of spirit. Again man, the meeting-point of physical nature and of spiritual history, is also in his concrete individuality a centre of experiences in which there are immanent apprehensions of the eternal order. The life-story of human individuality is therefore in principle three things together: a summation of the cosmic series to the level of spirit, a typical unit of the historical process on that level, and a centre of experience in which series and process are interpreted in relation to the sustaining unities of an eternal order of reality. We have seen that by a creative activity proceeding from the eternal order patterns of meaning and significance are woven upon a ground of repetitive energy in the events of space-time. This is the starting-point of that twofoldness of the cosmic series which comes to its highest terms in thought and action or apprehension and response on the level of spirit. Now at each level in the series organisms exhibit this twofoldness in a manner which is characteristic of that level. Every organism is a concrete activity whose unity has meaning derived from the background of the eternal order. Thus there is both activity on the one hand, and unity, wholeness and meaning in the activity on the other. But the activity of an organism is a twofold activity of receiving influences and of reacting to those influences. Moreover, in the ascending series of organisms activity does not remain at the level of repetitive energy, but becomes compounded of routines of energy gathered up into unity of meaning. Thus the higher the organism is in the series the more does its activity become a curve of development possessing unity, meaning and significance. Thus the ascending series of organisms passes from the ceaseless change without significance which is the mark of repetitive energy towards activity which partakes in the unchangeable significance of the eternal order. Below the level of spirit these curves of activity are not self-determining and appear to pass back into the wider activity of the series. On the level of spirit, on the other hand, the activity of spiritual organisms is capable of self-determination in the direction of the eternal order. Below the level of spirit activity does not move towards pure actuality, but returns into cosmic forms of activity. But the significance of man lies in his capacity for movement towards pure actuality. This movement is a self-transcending movement effected by self-determination. This is what we mean by saying that human conduct has ethical significance. It is self-determining response to apprehensions of the eternal order and not merely reaction to influences of an external environment. Its apprehension and response are mediated through external environment. But they are apprehension and response and not merely susceptibility and reaction; because man is capable of recognising the immanence of the eternal order both in himself and in his environment, and because he is capable of self-determination towards that order so recognised. Again, this self-determination towards the eternal order is self-transcending because the eternal order is recognised as transcendent; and so man's spiritual activity is directed outwards towards concrete expression and in particular towards realisation in the spiritual interactions of the social organism.

Now this spiritual activity proper to man passes through an ascending curve. It begins in the possibilities of undeveloped capacity. But in so far as its development is that which is proper to the level of spirit, it is in process of becoming co-ordinated activity in passage towards pure actuality. Thus the conduct of the child is capricious and changeable because the activity of its life-story is undeveloped. Arrest of ethical development means an arrest of co-ordination in activity. Ethical progress is that increasing co-ordination of activity which we call development of character. Development of character again means increasing transcendence over routines of habit through harmonisation of conflicting routines by self-determination towards the eternal order. Thus development of character is activity in movement towards the eternal order by self-determination. In this movement there is growing stability, inner coherence and advancing freedom from the dominance of the succession of events in space-time. Such advancing freedom, however, does not mean indifference to the flow of events, but increasing capacity to win significance out of events or to find significance in them. Thus development of character means stabilisation of response towards the eternal order. Developing character participates with increasing measure in the unchangeableness of the eternal order. But as incorporated into character through ethical advance this participated unchangeableness is not static. It is moving with ascending freedom towards transcendence over all static routines. It is activity moving towards pure actuality.

But there is another aspect of developing character. Stabilisation of response towards the eternal order is the product of advancing apprehensions of the eternal order. As through response character participates in the unchangeableness of the eternal order, so too this response is directed by advancing apprehension of the eternal order; and such advancing apprehension of the eternal order is a participation with increasing measure in the meaning and significance of the eternal order. Such participation again has two aspects. In the first place it is a growing comprehension of the principles and standards of the eternal order as regulative for concrete experience and directive for conduct. This is what men call wisdom, the intellectual excellence of character. But secondly, such growing comprehension of the eternal order, being immanent in character, enhances the significance of the concrete character in which it is immanent. Now character advancing in significance through increasing comprehension of the eternal order does not become merged in that order. It becomes increasingly concrete and individual. For it comprehends the eternal order as regulative for concrete experience and directive for conduct; and by participation in that order its response becomes increasingly self-determining. Self-determination again means a gathering of all the resources of individual life into unified activity which is stamped with individuality more clearly as it is unified. Thus individuality becomes more concrete and distinctive as participation in the eternal order becomes the wisdom of wide comprehension; and as individuality thus develops in concreteness of character its response towards the eternal order becomes stabilised activity participating in the unchangeableness of that order. Thus the more the universal principles and standards of the eternal order with their unchangeable transcendence become immanent in human character, the more concrete and individual its activity becomes. And again the more concrete and individual character becomes the more does its activity take the form of self-transcendence and move towards concrete embodiments of the eternal order in the social organism and its interacting life.

Thus the eternal order, the world of eternal ideas, forms, principles and standards is interlocked with concrete individuality in human experience; and its increasing incorporation into human life would mean the passage of history by transformation into the kingdom of God. For the ascending units and groupings of activity in the cosmic series culminate in human history; where the interacting system of spiritual activities, society and its individual units, is seen to be capable of ascent through advancing transcendence over the events of space-time in the direction of pure actuality. We have analysed this process of ascent in its individual type, the developing character of a spiritual organism. Its actual development, however, is never simply individual. For the individual is the product of a social order and finds his fulfilment in such an order. Intellectual apprehension of the eternal order sets the individual apart in his individuality. But concrete response to that apprehension is primarily ethical, and carries the individual back in his distinctiveness to realise that distinctiveness in the self-transcending interactions of the social organism. Thus in the biblical conception the kingdom of God is the concrete fulfilment of the social processes of history in which both society and its individual members attain their destiny. That destiny is communion with the living God through apprehension of His purpose in history and active response to His sovereign claims. In that Kingdom the community and its members are carried beyond the changes and chances of history into a New Order. Thus the meaning of the organic process of the universe is seen to be a movement of ascending activity towards fulfilment in the pure actuality of God. This activity moves from a bare succession of events through ascending units of concreteness and individuality by increasing incorporations of the eternal order. On the level of spirit, where individuality embraces the eternal order most widely within its comprehension and that order enters most deeply into the direction of individual activity, there that activity becomes most concretely individual and reaches out into communion with pure actuality. These lines of interpretation lead towards the conclusion that God and the eternal order are one. The eternal order is the manifestation of God to human reason not as a concrete whole of actuality but under aspects which correspond to our diverging modes of apprehension. God in His concreteness is apprehended by man in the concreteness of religious experience, through the mutual affinity of the Creator and His creatures. The developing activities of the universe from the lowest to the highest stages are the products of creative action, proceeding from the Absolute Actuality which is God and returning through the ascending series towards its Creator.

ADDITIONAL NOTE A

ACTIVITY AND ACTUALITY

In a recent essay the present writer employed the term *activity* in attempting a modern definition of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. That application of the term is here retracted and the term *actuality* is substituted for it. *Activity* is a term which is beginning to have a new significance for the philosophy of nature. Thus in the new conceptions of matter electrons are apparently regarded as units of energy or activity in the four-dimensional *continuum* of space-time. Such units of activity comprise the primary events of the physical universe; and upon this foundation an *activist* conception of nature is built up. Accordingly in the present work the organic universe is regarded as an ascending series of activities, all organisms being regarded as activities but with advancing significance and concreteness as they embody higher unities derived from the eternal order. Now the whole series of activities is derived from God who is one with the eternal order. It would not be incorrect, therefore, to speak of God as Absolute Activity. When the mediaeval theologians taught that God is *purus actus*, they were making a similar use of the Aristotelian concept of ἐνέργεια or *actuality*. There seems to be no objection in principle to such a use of the word *activity*. On the other hand, in our application of language to the Deity there is something to be said for a balance between analogy and contrast. In the present work there is developed an analogy between finite and absolute *individuality* (see chs. x., xiii. and xiv.). It seems advisable, therefore, to underline the contrast between God and His creatures by employing the term *activity* in reference to creation and the universe of creatures, reserving the term *actuality* for the nature of deity. There is this advantage, that *actuality* already has familiar theological associations, and yet has also, in the history of thought, associations with the order of nature not altogether unlike those which we connect with modern conceptions of *activity* (see also ch. xiv. p. 415). But further, modern conceptions of physical energy do not include the teleological reference which Aristotle gave to ἐνέργεια. Actuality, therefore, has a wider reference than activity and may be held to include it. We cannot surrender teleology; but we can include an activist conception of nature within teleology and refer such a universe to God. The word *actuality* is used with this general reference in the present work. For *purus actus* see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Λ. 5–7, and St. Thomas Aquinas, *summa theol.* i. q. iii. aa. 1, 2. and *summa contra gent.* i. c. xvi.

CHAPTER V

GOD AND MAN IN THE ETERNAL ORDER

PRECEDING chapters have been pursuing lines of interpretation, which lead up to a theistic view of the universe. These lines of interpretation are not finished arguments; for upon such a subject no arguments are ever finished. The object of the inquiry thus far has been to indicate a position from which fresh investigations may be undertaken. In the remainder of this work the theistic standpoint in a general sense will be assumed. The question before us now is not: Is theism true? But, what is the nature of the mutual coherence between theism and the Incarnation in Christian belief? This question was stated somewhat differently at the beginning of the last chapter: 'Does the Christian form of theism with its doctrine of the Incarnation throw light upon the special problems and difficulties which are disclosed, when a religious interpretation of the organic universe is undertaken?'[1] Thus there are two questions of immediate importance: (1) First there are in a religious or theistic interpretation of the universe certain features which must appear insoluble difficulties in a philosophy of theism detached from Christianity; difficulties, however, for which the doctrine of the Incarnation offers a solution. This will lead on to the further question (2) as to how the doctrine of the Incarnation can be stated in relation to the organic conception of the universe adopted here. For the present we shall be occupied with the first question.

I

The distinctive feature of theism is the contrast which it sets up between God and the universe, between the

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[1] See p. 82.

Creator and the creatures. Oriental pantheism denies the reality of one of the two terms, and so God is all. Western monism tries to bring the two terms into union by making both aspects of one reality or process. Either the universe is the Absolute in its aspect of development, or God is evolving through a process which has deity for its goal. Theism alone maintains a radical contrast and difference between God and the world. Herein lies both its glory and its difficulty. As long as there is genuine religious experience remaining, the religious attitude will never give up its treasured truth that God is the eternal and unchanging Creator, who utterly transcends the changing drama of this present world and all that it contains. The essence of religion is bound up with the duality of Creator and creature. If that is dissolved, worship ceases to have meaning ; and the spirit of man cries out for satisfaction of his impulse to worship. But then, on the other hand, reason also cries out in protest against all ultimate dualism left unresolved. And religion and reason are incurable allies ; for both are rooted in human nature. This then is the fundamental problem of theism. If God and creation are in utter contrast, how can that contrast be resolved into unity ? Moreover, the dualism which theism affirms is not unqualified. If there is a contrast between God and His creatures, there is also affinity. Without this qualification the grounds of theistic belief would be cut away. Religious faith and worship presuppose an affinity between God and man, by which man may recognise his Creator and enter into communion with Him. This affinity points towards ultimate unity ; and in the absence of any clear manifestation of such an ultimate unity, theism is precariously situated. These are some of the difficulties with which theism is confronted. They must be fairly faced, if we are to appreciate the value of the solution which Christianity offers.

Between God and creation there is both contrast and affinity. How can the contrast be resolved and the affinity vindicated ? The first form which the difficulty takes arises out of the organic conception of the universe. The cosmic series is a process in which there is no final resting-place. Each level of the series passes on by transformation into the next level. At each stage relative stability is secured by the gathering up of parts into wholes through transcending principles of unity which balance and control the growing complexity of parts. But the harmonies attained by this method on successive levels are never complete. They pass through a curve of development which leads on to the next stage. All is in transition. All harmonies are incomplete in themselves, though adequate to their place in the series. Thus the series as a whole, by the very nature of its structure, is an unfinished series. Every stage requires another beyond it, into which it can pass by transformation. The logic of the series, however, moves on in unbroken continuity until the level of spirit is reached. Here we come to a last term in which the series appears to end. But here also the series is unfinished; for man, the last term in the series, is not a finished product. Psychology and history both point to this conclusion. Psychology knows nothing of a perfectly harmonised human nature. Nothing of the kind exists in our experience. In this respect man belongs to the cosmic series and is marked with the same limitations. In his case the principle of individual harmonisation is profoundly different from any which precedes it in the series. But in this particular respect, which is characteristic of the series as a whole, man stands within the series and shares its unfinished character. This is true of all men. Amid all the immense varieties and contrasts of human nature, in this respect all are on the same footing. Character is always in the making, whether the degree of harmonisation actually achieved be great or small. The tension between the self-determining whole and its functional parts always remains. Man is always activity in passage through balancing conditions towards further unification. A similar state of things appears in the social organism on the wider field of history. On that field we see continuous strivings after social harmony and stability at every level of culture from the simplest to the most complex, and from the smallest family group to the widest international schemes. Amidst all this variety, with every degree of success or failure in achievement, there is no final achievement. Man's search for harmony in his external relations is as unfinished as his pursuit of interior stability. Moreover, the advance from primitive conditions of society to a complex civilisation, whilst it brings great advances in knowledge and experience, power of organisation and mastery over external environment, together with many refinements of social life, notwithstanding all these gains, does not bring the social organism any nearer to conditions of permanently secure stability and harmony. For these accumulations of knowledge, experience and power bring in their train an immense development of individuality. Development of individuality, again, contains the promise of richer and more varied combinations of social life. But it also brings greater tensions between individual variations and the possibility of more intense forms of friction between social groups, and again between manifestations of organised power and the developing consciousness of individual value. Thus, while history shows development from simpler to more complex forms in the social organism, it displays no constant curve towards increasing harmonisation. Still less does it give promise in itself of any final stage of social harmony.

Indeed the question arises whether harmony of developing processes, quite apart from the possibility of its attainment, can rightly be regarded as a final goal for the cosmic series. It is certainly a general law of the series that organisms strive towards harmony and stability. But the goal of the series does not appear to be any particular form of harmony set up within its own processes. In fact there appears to be another complementary law that if any organism or species attains to conditions of equilibrium beyond a certain pitch, then the conditions of advance are actually endangered and in some cases altogether lost. Development requires a certain tension between the organisms or units of activity and their environment, as well as between wholes and their parts.[1] Stress, strain and struggle accompany the advancing movement of the series at every stage. Equilibrium brings stagnation; and stagnation spells death. The relative harmonies and stabilities of the series are always sufficiently unstable for the activity of the series as a whole to pass beyond them to new conditions where new forms of harmony are set up. These facts require that a qualification should be introduced into an earlier description of the psychological conditions under which spiritual organisms are developed.[1] It was there stated that development of individual organisms of spirit can either move upward through advancing harmonisation of all parts and levels within the whole along that path of development which is proper to the level of spirit; or again that such organisms can move downward through one-sided and partial developments which lead into narrowing paths of routine, and even further towards ruin and disintegration. There are, however, many intermediate situations of relative stabilisation and harmony which qualify this black and white contrast. Violent disintegration of psychological harmony is the extreme case, perhaps abnormal. Average humanity neither descends to this abnormal disintegration nor rises to the higher levels of rich and stable character. There are many degrees and types of mediocre stability; and there is also stagnation in the living death of complacency, where the *nisus* towards true self-determination and the tensions set up by spiritual aspirations no longer stir the soul towards higher harmonies. Such a state of spiritual stagnation is attributed by Dante to souls in the *Inferno*.[2] Similarly history shows mediocre forms of social stability and periods of comparative stagnation, where a superficial harmony is achieved which spells death to higher aspirations of the spirit. In these counterfeit forms of stabilisation harmony becomes an end in itself; whereas it has been pointed out in the earlier context that the true line of development 'carries the individual beyond the orbit of self-regarding and self-harmonising activities.'[3] What is true of the individual is also true in a somewhat different sense of society. It will always be the business of certain people, in virtue of their function in the social group, to be occupied with the maintenance of social harmony and stability. But society as a whole has higher and more important ends than engrossment in its own self-preservation and in planning a balance of forces and influences. Such engrossment would in the long run defeat itself. For in the social organism as in the individual there is a principle of self-transcendence.

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[1] Two aspects of the same situation. For the influence of environment plays upon the organism through its parts and levels.

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[1] See above, ch. iii. § ii.

[2] On this point see some remarks by P. H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, pp. 197–201.

[3] P. 80 above.

These facts about human nature and about history point to the conclusion that there can be no final term to the cosmic series within its own order. Within the series its processes present themselves as an endless succession of shifting patterns, advancing in type yet never wholly emancipated from the repetitive succession which supplies the groundwork of the whole series. On his organic side man reproduces this endless succession. In that respect at least he is as unfinished as the series itself. Whilst historically he is the last term, metaphysically he cannot be the final term in respect of his organic connexion with the series. All levels of the series are gathered up into him. But this organic summation of the series in man does not make him the true consummation of creation. There is, however, in man the principle of self-transcendence by which he has contact with the eternal order. It is this principle in spiritual organisms which clearly reveals the inadequacy of harmony within its own processes as a final goal of the series. It remains therefore to consider whether man's community with the eternal order through self-transcendence constitutes him a fitting goal of the series, a position for which he is not qualified by his organic summation of the series. For according to all analogy there should be some new principle of unity present at this highest level, taking control of the situation and raising the series of creaturely events on to a pathway which leads towards the Creator.

II

Community with the eternal order through self-transcendence is indeed a new principle at work upon the situation, which distinguishes man from all that lies behind and below him in the series. Man possesses reason and capacity for moral choice, capacity for apprehending the eternal order and responding to it with recognition of its significance. But these facts do not in themselves provide a solution of the problem of incompleteness in the organic series or in man as the summation of that series. On the contrary they render the problem more acute. For the intuitions of reason put man *en rapport* with an order of reality lying beyond the series from which he takes his origin and in which he is rooted. Thus the very law or principle of being which fixes man's place in the series at its highest level, namely the law of self-transcendence on the level of spirit, the law which constitutes all that is significant of man and most native to man in his place in the series—this very law, in our experience, makes man a stranger in the place of his origin. This world is man's home; yet he cannot be at home in it. For into his earthly environment there flow intimations of an eternal order which lies beyond it. He perceives beauty of colour, shape and sound. But his apprehension of these is fragmentary. Their embodiment is often inadequate; and even if it were otherwise, they cannot be continuously enjoyed. For experience is shot through with other elements and with changing moods which obscure appreciation and thwart continuous possession. There is an ebb and flow in the rhythm of life which hinders the even flow of apprehensions directed towards the eternal order. There is also the multiplicity of experience which balks concentration of attention and breaks up that wholeness of appreciation for which we crave. And if all these obstacles are in some measure overcome, there remains in appreciation itself a sense of the more which lies beyond and which has escaped us. Again, if we turn from appreciation of beauty to scientific knowledge the same evidence of incompleteness appears in our experience. Our curiosity and interest are aroused by the variety and complexity of the world around. We apprehend order, meaning and significance everywhere, and we are driven forward with a craving to learn and to understand. Reality unfolds itself to our enquiring minds as a fascinating system of connexions, patterns, arrangements, sequences of movement, grades of significance. Avenues of exploration open up, trains of analysis are pursued, theories are tested, knowledge is accumulated. Here, too, there are those factors in experience which hinder continuity and wholeness of attainment. And besides more general hindrances already enumerated there are the narrow range of our sense-perception, the poverty of our imaginations and the inadequacy of words to express thought. Then again the method of analysis leads to an endless multiplicity of facts for which no synthesis is adequate; and the constant accumulation of new facts leads to new forms of knowledge and fresh interpretations of fact, which render the old forms and interpretations inadequate or even obsolete. Thus all knowledge is symbolical and inadequate in its expression of what is apprehended; and again all knowledge is partial, fragmentary and provisional in its interpretations of the reality which confronts it. There is always a beyond in knowledge, not only more facts to be known, but new meanings to be found in the accumulations of facts which are known. Man's search for truth is endless. Yet he cannot abandon the search. For there is a hunger and thirst of the human spirit after truth, to which no limit can be set.

Yet these are not the most acute forms of non-attainment in human experience. There are others of a more concrete character which force themselves upon the attention of all men, irrespective of their standards of culture or degrees of intellectual attainment. All men acknowledge goodness when they see its manifestation in human character; and no man can live a human life without setting before himself some standard of conduct which commands his allegiance. Yet no man attains to the standards which he inwardly acknowledges; and no man can turn his back upon the good which he recognises without some pangs of remorse. It is in the sphere of conduct that the principle of self-transcendence becomes clearest in its manifestations. The claims of goodness, in the measure in which they evoke response, carry a man further and further away from the narrow circles of self-interest, worldly prudence and utility, with their comfortable and cautious schemes of self-harmonisation and restricted group-loyalties. The psychological tendencies towards the attainment of harmony are not indeed suspended or abrogated; they undergo transformation. In the moral life the process towards harmony is carried beyond the self-regarding aspect of individuality. This is profoundly true of all response to the eternal order. But its manifestation is clearest in the moral sphere, because the response to ethical standards has the most direct and concrete embodiments in the social order. The tendency of organisms to seek adjustment with environment and its influences by harmonious reaction continues to fulfil itself on the level of spirit. But the process is transformed, because the environment is transformed. Through the concrete situations of his environment man recognises the claims and influences of the moral order. The harmony which he seeks in those situations is conformity to the claims of goodness; and those claims are endless. Consequently the process of self-adjustment in the moral life is one which has no limits. It has already been shown in a previous connexion that stabilisation of character is a process which may advance continually, although it never attains perfection in our experience. But this advancing stability of character, however far it is carried, does not bring a man nearer to attainment of his ethical ideals. The goal recedes as we approach it; and those who have advanced furthest along that path are precisely those who are most conscious of non-attainment. For every stage of the ascent brings fresh vistas of achievement into view. The good man disclaims personal attainment of virtue as the wise man or the scholar disclaims attainment of knowledge. It is only their counterfeits, the prig and the pedant, who think that they have attained.

Now these experiences of non-attainment in activity directed towards the eternal order cannot be reduced to a significance which falls wholly within the processes of the cosmic series, as though they were only a further instance of imperfectly harmonised processes within that series. The transcendence of the eternal order in all our experience of it precludes this interpretation. But on the other hand non-attainment in respect of the eternal order does not fall wholly outside the series. For man the centre of such experiences is organic with the series. Consequently our experience of non-attainment in respect of the eternal order enters into and colours all our experience of organic connexions with the series. In other words, our experience of imperfectly adjusted relations with environment in the series and of internal disharmony in our individual organic life [1] is actually rendered more acute by our non-attainment in respect of the eternal order. For our environment with its pressure of influences is the mixed environment proper to the level of spirit. The claims and influences of the eternal order, with the tensions which they set up, have become incorporated into the other environment of organic processes. All the disharmonies of our organic relations are thus transformed into the embodiments of deeper and more intense disharmonies. This cross-connexion between the cosmic series and the eternal order in respect of non-attainment, having its focus in man, is the reverse side of a truth laid down earlier that all self-harmonisation of spiritual organisms is attained only through passage into the eternal order.[2] It also follows from the earlier statement that apprehension and response directed towards the eternal order are always mediated through external environment.[3] Two worlds are interlocked in the life of man; and as our earthly life is fulfilled in the eternal order, so our failure to attain the goods of the eternal order turns the instabilities and insecurities of the earthly life into tragedies of failure. Thus the unfinished character of our earthly experience becomes the medium through which evil is manifested. Non-attainment of pleasure, happiness, satisfaction in the purely psychological meaning of such words is simply an aspect of the instability which characterises the whole cosmic series in its unfinished character. Moreover, as creatures of the organic series we are limited in our equipment for apprehending the eternal order. Thus large parts of our non-attainment in respect of that order appear to be inevitable. But there are other aspects of non-attainment of which this cannot be said. Communion with the eternal order is realised through due response to apprehensions of that order. The bitterness of non-attainment arises from failure to respond to apprehensions of the eternal order. Our experience of evil is, therefore, primarily ethical. It has its roots in failure to respond to the claims of the good upon us. But the sting of such failure colours the whole experience; and thus ethical failure casts the shadow of evil over all forms of non-attainment. For in the last resort, as the eternal order is interlocked with the organic conditions of our life, so also the different aspects of the eternal order are themselves interwoven in our experience. Thus the problem of evil arises. It has its groundwork in the instabilities and disharmonies of the cosmic series and its manifestation in our ethical experience of non-attainment. But the unity of experience impels us to trace the reflection of its shadow not only in our whole experience of non-attainment, but also in the unstable and discordant factors of the cosmic series as a whole. The problem of evil is primarily ethical; but it has its cosmic aspects.

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[1] Cp. note on p. 114.

[2] See p. 62.

[3] See pp. 57–59.

Now if we translate these considerations into terms of theistic belief, they mean that man is a creature who cannot span the gulf which lies between himself and his Creator. The instabilities and disharmonies of this world can be overcome only by its passage from space-time into eternity, that is by the return of its restless movement into the unchangeable peace and harmony which exist in God alone. But man is a creature who cannot effect this passage in himself. Yet it cannot be effected otherwise; since passage of the cosmic series into the eternal order can be made only through spiritual organisms, aware of the significance of that order and capable of entering into communion with it through apprehension and response.

The tragedy of creation is not the fact of creation, nor the existence of creaturely limitations. For the unfinished character of the cosmic series is evil only if it cannot attain finality in God. Man is at the only point in the series where the bridge to such finality can be made. We cannot say that his non-attainment with respect to the eternal order would spell cosmic disaster if it were due to inherent limitations of creatureliness. For there are other aspects of man's creatureliness through which this difficulty might be overcome, as will appear later. Evil then manifests itself in our experience, not as an essential factor in the universe or in the limiting conditions of human life, but as failure of response to the eternal order within the limits of creaturehood on the level of spirit. It is a failure which frustrates the tendencies of the cosmic series as a whole in its ascent towards eternity, and which therefore casts its shadow upon the whole order of creation. In the concrete language of religion the evil of non-attainment lies in a weakening of the bonds of communion between God and man through a withholding of the worship which is due from the creature to the Creator. Man in his capacity for self-determination is capable of a response which, while it has many aspects, is in its concrete fullness the response of spirit to Spirit; a return of all that has been received to Him who gave; an adoring acknowledgment of the Creator, in which all the good of creation passes up through self-determined and self-transcending oblation to Him from whom it has proceeded. This is the form in which the movement of this world-order must come to its goal. The frustration of this final transformation is the essence of evil. The arrest of this movement in our present experience is due to man's estrangement from God, the underlying cause of all his miseries, the root of his discontents. Thus evil is neither an illusion of finite experience, nor an inevitable concomitant of finite creaturehood, but a withholding of creation from its movement towards God.

III

The facts of non-attainment in human experience have now been reviewed. In particular, our experience of ethical failure as a manifestation of evil and the religious interpretation of this failure with its evil consequences in terms of estrangement from God are factors which point towards a frustration of creation's fulfilment in God. But by consequence the facts of non-attainment as a whole point away from any solution of the dualism which is involved in a theistic interpretation of the universe. We seem to be left with the two terms, God and the universe, God and creation. No way of drawing the two terms together appears; and the theist is beset once more by the alternative solutions, whose attraction lies in their resolution of the two terms into one with some appearance of satisfying reason. None the less, there still remain all those elements in experience which are slurred over in these explanations and which support the theistic interpretation. To these elements, therefore, we must turn again in search of some alternative path.

The starting point of our investigation must be in that view of knowledge which has previously been referred to as closely bound up with the organic conception of the universe.[1] Trustworthy knowledge of reality is possible, because of a peculiar correspondence between the knower and the object of his perceptions. One way in which this fact has already been stated may here be recalled.

> 'All the physical objects which we perceive in the world around us have a certain kind of unity, in that they persist as wholes, despite the general flow of events which is the passage of nature. If there were no such persistence of objects we could never perceive them. The natural world around us is in a perpetual state of flux. Its procession of events is so swift and their details so minute as to elude for ever the net of human perception. Yet we perceive objects which endure and so transcend the flow of events. We perceive them as enduring within a duration of time. Thus both the objects themselves and our perception of them transcend the succession of events in space-time. We perceive objects whose identity persists or endures through what may be called a duration of time, that is time experienced as a unity corresponding to the unity of the object.' [2]

This passage has been transcribed in full from its context in a previous chapter because of its importance for what follows in the present argument. In our perception of a physical object there is unity in the act of perception corresponding to the unity of mind (Kant's unity of apperception). But there is also unity of the physical object persisting in a duration of time through its transcending principle of unity. Each of these unities transcends the flow of events; and there is also a peculiar correspondence between these two unities, which makes knowledge possible. Now the modes of unity manifested in objects differ; and our knowledge of the organic universe is built up through our capacity to recognise these differences. In other words, the 'sensed content' [3] of our perceptions, out of which knowledge is built up, differs in accordance with the difference of objects. Thus, not a representation of the object, but the object itself in its unity is 'given' in perception to the receptivity of the knower's mind. There follows, of course, a cognitive process, whereby the meaning and significance of the object are built up in the mind. But the whole of this process is dominated by the 'sensed content' given in the unities of perception.[1] It is the object in its unity, thus given to perception, which determines the character of the knowledge which follows. The object, further, may be apprehended in a number of different aspects either by a number of perceiving minds or by the same mind at different times and in a variety of situations. But in each of these aspects the unity of the object is present; and each is determined by that unity. Thus when we apprehend an object in one of its aspects, we still apprehend the reality of the object, but not the whole of its significance, except indeed by inference from previous experience. Thus knowledge is determined by the object, which is at one and the same time present in the mind as 'sensed content' and present in its spatial situation in the events of the external world.[2] Thus it is present in the mind through *immanence* of its unity in the unity of perception. But the object thus present in the mind is given as something other than the mind, *transcending* the mind. If it is a *physical object* it is given as situated spatially in the external world beyond the mind in which it is also present. There are other objects besides *physical objects*. But all such objects are mediated to our minds in one way or another through the external world. In the case of *scientific objects* (*e.g.* electrons) the mediation is effected through an analysis of physical objects,[3] whilst objects of the eternal order are mediated to our apprehension in a manner already described in an earlier chapter.[4] Thus the object is always given to mind as both immanent in experience through perception and at the same time transcendent over experience as a form of reality existing in independence of our minds.

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[1] See above, pp. 31–35.

[2] Quoted from ch. ii. § iii. p. 40 above; and see the note *ad loc.*

[3] I follow Dr. J. E. Turner in the use of this phrase; see *A Theory of Direct Realism*, passim.

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[1] There is much to be said for the view that a judgment is already implicit in every perception.

[2] Or, as A. N. Whitehead puts it, 'present in A with the mode of location in B.' *Science and the Modern World*, p. 103 (1st ed.).

[3] For the various meanings of the word *object* as defined in this context and as employed elsewhere in this work, see Additional Note C, *Objects and Events.*

[4] See ch. iii. § i. pp. 57, 58.

But the forms of reality given to us in knowledge are immensely varied ; and this variety arranges itself to our minds in an ordered scheme, whose connexions we have traced in the organic series of the universe and in the aspects of the eternal order. But since knowledge is determined by its objects, it follows that there will be a progression of knowledge corresponding to the ascending cosmic series and to the advancing incorporation of the eternal order into the series. This is exactly what we find to be the case. Not only the content of knowledge but also the form and characteristics of the knowing process are determined by the character of its objects. The facts become clear as we combine the preceding analysis of knowledge with the conception of the universe built up in previous chapters.

We have seen that what is given in knowledge is the unity of the object perceived. Knowledge of parts is given in the unity of perception only under this co-ordinating factor of unity which constitutes the wholeness of the object. Thus what determines the content of knowledge is the unity of the object. But in the organic universe physical objects are arranged in an ascending series because there are different modes of unity in such objects. These different modes of unity have been called transcending principles of unity ; because their distinctiveness in each case lies in the particular mode in which the physical object or organism through its principle of unity transcends succession in space-time. The significance of each object in the series depends upon the mode in which its principle of unity transcends its parts and successions. Now this significance of the object is conveyed over in knowledge to the mind of the knower. Thus the content of knowledge is determined in each case by the significance of the object, which again is constituted by its transcending principle of unity. It is in this way that we know the meaning of an object. Its significance is implicit in the sensed content of perception and is reproduced in the subsequent intellectual construction. But the significance of objects thus known is present or immanent in the objects through their transcending principles of unity; and there is an ascending series of such principles. Consequently the meanings of objects arrange themselves to our minds in an order corresponding to the ascending series. It is thus that we are impelled to pass beyond special studies to apprehend the advancing significance of the universe as a whole. Thus not only is the content of knowledge determined by the character of objects; but the advancing significance of objects determines an advancing progression of knowledge.

We have next to discover what is the law of this progression in knowledge. The law clearly conforms itself to the arrangement of objects in an ascending series, through the law of progression which is manifested in the arrangement of their transcending principles of unity. Now we have found the law of progression in principles of unity to be constituted by the advancing transcendence of these principles of unity over the parts and successions of events in organic wholes. This law of progression again has been stated in another way by saying that there is an advancing immanence of the eternal order in the cosmic series. The law of progression in knowledge must then be determined by the advancing immanence of the eternal order in the series. Now we have seen that knowledge is possible because there is a correspondence between the unity of the object and the unity of perception in the mind of the knower. But, on the other hand, objects become increasingly complex as we advance up the series. We might expect, therefore, that there would also be an advancing complexity of knowledge. There is a sense in which this is emphatically true. To know a friend's character our knowledge has to include a great deal more than is involved in knowing the difference between two inanimate things, say a billiard ball and a tennis ball. The whole process of knowledge then becomes more subtle as the progression advances. But there is a reverse aspect of the matter. For whilst objects become increasingly complex, this complexity is controlled by the transcending principle of unity in the object. Thus, however complex objects become, there is always a principle of unity in the object, by which this complexity is transcended; and thus the unity of perception is still confronted with the unity of the object no matter how far we advance up the scale. Mind, therefore, is not left behind in the progression of knowledge. Its ascending unities of perception keep step with the ascending unities of objects in the series.

But this is not all. The essence of an object as given to knowledge lies in its significance ; and there is an advancing significance of objects in accordance with the advancing immanence of the eternal order in the series. For (as we have already seen) 'whilst the transcendence of the eternal order is unchanging, the principle of transcendence flows down from that order with increasing significance into the developing series.'[1] But 'increasing' or 'advancing significance' is a significance increasing for the mind of the knower. That is precisely what the words mean. Again, increasing significance for the mind of the knower must mean that the object is more immanent in the mind of the knower. For it obviously does *not* mean that the object's significance is derived from the mind of the knower. We know the object as transcending our minds and yet as significant for our minds. Its significance is in the object and in our minds. And when the object is 'more significant' for us, the meaning is that there is more of the object in our minds in quality and unity of significance. That is to say, the more significant the object is, the more it penetrates our minds. Now this is clearly an effect of the advancing immanence of the eternal order in the series. We cannot have direct sense-experience of the passage of nature in the flow of the simplest events. All our knowledge of physical objects is dependent upon the immanence in them of forms and principles of the eternal order. The more, then, the eternal order is immanent in objects, the more we shall know, the more they will mean to us. Thus the progression of knowledge does not merely keep step with the ascending series ; it advances upon it. The higher the principle of unity embodied in an object, the more affinity does its meaning have with our minds. A beautiful object impresses itself upon the mind more deeply than a commonplace object. For by its community with the eternal order the mind has special affinity with beauty. But a more direct illustration of the present argument may be chosen.

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[1] See p. 77 above.

We can understand the feelings of an animal, say its hunger or thirst, because we share with it the characteristic of being a living organism ; whereas we have no such understanding of the vibrations in an atom. The law of progression in knowledge, then, is this : the more fully objects embody the transcendent eternal order the more immanent can the significance of such objects become in our minds. We can know the organic universe and its parts only through the immanence of the eternal order in it. For what is most native to our minds is that eternal order.[1]

Thus in the case of scientific knowledge the bare discrete facts or events disclosed in analysis are not intelligible to us in their bare discreteness. As such they lie outside the mind. What gives them meaning for us is the order immanent in their succession or the laws of their interaction in a system of events. For the mind has affinity with order and arrangement ; and the mental background of scientific analysis is an intuitive assent of reason to order and its connexions. Thus the analysis is directed by a search for arrangements and laws which will satisfy reason's demands for order and unity, a search which does not reach its goal until a synthesis of order and unity has been attained. Thus discrete events in themselves lie outside the mind. But the forms and principles of the eternal order bind events together into concrete wholes which we can understand. Now the concreteness of wholes advances through the ascending series. So too, therefore, does the progression of knowledge advance in concreteness. So that our most concrete knowledge in respect of the cosmic series is our knowledge of man; the knowledge which depends upon sympathetic insight and fellow-feeling, or, in other words, upon that mutual interpenetration of spiritual organisms in society which arises from their common possession of community with the eternal order under conditions which are proper to the level of spirit. Now as the cosmic series is apprehended in its significance as a whole through its advance towards concreteness on the level of spirit, so too must the progression of knowledge be understood. In that progression we have an advancing apprehension of the eternal order through the medium of the external world, rising towards concreteness as the eternal order comes to the foreground of the picture. Thus as spiritual organisms we apprehend, through the directive movement of the universe to the level of spirit, an ascending revelation of reality. The term *revelation* is peculiarly appropriate to describe the quality of this experience, a quality which is implicit in all knowledge but which becomes increasingly prominent as the progression of knowledge advances.

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[1] The two illustrations given above belong to *different orders of revelation* (see ch. vi.) ; but they both illustrate the conclusion of the argument : 'the more fully objects embody the transcendent eternal order the more immanent can the significance of such objects become in our minds.' The second illustration is concerned directly with graded principles of unity in the series. The first illustration is concerned with an aspect of the eternal order (beauty) which spans the series as a whole. On this see further below, pp. 142–144.

IV

Through the medium of our environment in the external world and in the social organism we apprehend a richly varied revelation or disclosure of reality: the reality of beauty and its forms, order and its principles of unity and significance, goodness and its standards of reference. This order of reality presents its unchanging and ultimate character to us under a number of different aspects, and through richly varied manifestations embodied in this ever-changing universe and in its endlessly developing concrete situations. What we thus apprehend is not determined by our apprehensions nor moulded by our minds. It is given to our minds, and unfolds itself to them in the measure of their receptivity. It is given as reality which always transcends our understanding yet enters into our understanding. Neither its existence nor its quality is affected by the processes of our minds. Yet by these mental processes it may be welcomed and assimilated until it penetrates our spiritual existence. Thus the realities of the eternal order, which so far transcend our capacities of apprehension and response, none the less by that very fact set up in us a *nisus* of activity directed towards that order. For eternity which is ever beyond us is also at the roots of our being.

The ultimate standards of the eternal order are the ground of all particular meanings and values which we find in the concrete world of our environment. Yet those ultimate standards are also at the root of all our processes of apprehension and response. Intuitions of beauty, truth, goodness and the like are the primary intuitions of reason: intuitions behind which we cannot go and which lie at the foundation of our existence as spiritual organisms. These intuitions underlie the essential activity of life on the level of spirit, the activity which is self-determining and self-transcending. Thus eternity is at the base of our concrete individuality, and yet drives us forth beyond that individuality, in pursuit of eternity in an order of reality which is other than ourselves. Thus we go forth as pilgrims on an endless search for truth which we never fully attain. Yet in the measure in which we attain to the truth, we find it to be that which is nearest and most familiar to our spirits. For reason cannot rest unless it attains to truth. Yet whatever measure of truth it attains to has this double character: that on the one hand there is always a mystery of truth infinitely beyond, an unexplored country; and that on the other hand truth as an ultimate ideal or standard of reference was all along infinitely near and intimate. For it was not only the object of search, but also the ground of all the seeking; that which was with us before we set out on the search, that which drove us forth to seek. There is then a reverse side to non-attainment. That to which we never attain is utterly near to us. We should never set out to find it unless this were so. For the infinity of truth is not the negative infinity of quantity. *That* infinity lies at the base of the cosmic series and is at the furthest remove from concreteness, whereas the infinity of truth belongs to the eternal order, whose creative activity we have found to embrace the repetitive energy at the base of the series. Thus, just as the eternal order embraces both the negative infinity and repetitive energy at the base of the cosmic series, and also the transcending principles of unity by which the series advances to the level of spirit; so finally on that highest level we find the positive infinity of truth and of other standards in the eternal order embracing both the highest flights of the human spirit in its ascent towards eternity and also the roots of that activity which lie at its base in primary intuitions of reason.

What has been said of truth applies equally to the other ultimate standards of the eternal order and determines the character of all our higher experiences—those experiences which are most distinctive of our life as spiritual beings. It is so with the moral life and its pursuit of goodness. What is most significant about human conduct is not the attainment of high moral character nor again our failure to attain. What is significant is that we should strive at all after a goodness which always lies beyond us, and which always lies beyond the mere processes of self-harmonisation. What is significant about history and the social organism is not the ceaseless movements towards harmony nor the measure in which they attain or fail to attain such harmony. The significance of all these facts lies in this, that in them we see man stricken with a divine discontent, thirsting for the goods of an eternal order; because the eternal good of that order is recognised, welcomed and worshipped in his inmost heart.

These considerations concerning our experience of the eternal order show a definite affinity between its main characteristics and those which we have found to mark experiences of the more directly religious type. As in the case of religion, so here the eternal order presents a twofold aspect, 'as at once awe-inspiring and familiar, mysterious and yet fascinating.'[1] The spiritual organism of man reaches out towards the infinite paths of eternity, because he belongs to eternity and finds in it his true home. In the measure in which he pursues the pathway towards eternity he finds it to be both awe-inspiring and fascinating. Our apprehension of the eternal order shows us standards of reality which inspire awe, because they will not bend in adaptation to our changeable moods, and because we must bend before their unchangeableness. Communion with the eternal order calls for sincerity and gravity in our response to that order, sincerity and gravity which involve severe mental discipline. The cold detachment with which science pursues its tasks is one manifestation of these qualities. The severe simplicity and purity of great works of art make similar demands upon the mind. This awe-inspiring severity of the eternal order is blended with grandeur, richness, variety, depth, unity, whose total effect upon the spirit of man is majestic and mysterious, yet enthralling and captivating. By such revelations the mind is held in a tension which both purifies and at the same time satisfies. To turn to a more concrete instance, those who enjoy the friendship of a person of high and noble character have the same sort of experience. There is a severity of aims, a purity of motives, and, on occasion, a sternness of attitude which inspire awe and which quell and restrain all vulgar familiarities. Yet there are also simplicity and directness, sympathy and graciousness, which win affectionate response, and which build up corresponding sentiments of sympathy and regard in others. In such an experience there are always elements in our friend's character which remain inscrutable, which perhaps even repel. Yet the total effect is one which impels us to overcome these difficulties. There is always more to know, more to understand, more to appreciate. If we could actually read a man's character ' like a book,' as the saying is, so that there was no more to know, then the fascination of friendship would be dissipated. Here, too, there are always fresh fields to explore ; and the mysteries of human individuality which seem to set men apart from one another in solitary distinctness are the very conditions which provide the salt of human friendship. This illustration indicates the way in which men are bound together in the social organism through communion with the eternal order. What goes deepest in human experience is man's affinity with the infinite transcendence of eternity ; and it is in the common sharing of these deepest experiences that the true nexus of the social organism lies. Thus more significant than our non-attainment in respect of the eternal order is the fact that our very strainings towards this unattained goal provide, not only the deepest satisfactions of individual life, but also the foundations of society and the factors which underlie the unity and significance of history.

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[1] See above, p. 91.

These facts do not eliminate the contrasted facts of non-attainment, nor do they in themselves make the problem of evil less terrible than it is. They do not provide a remedy for the unfinished character of the universe, nor for the moral failure of man. They do, however, assure us that, despite all creaturely limitations and all failure of response, the nexus which binds the universe to the eternal order remains secure; that the bonds which unite the human spirit to eternity still remain the dominating factors of our existence. The revelation thus granted to man does not solve the difficulties with which theistic belief is faced. But in its incompleteness this revelation suggests the possibility of a solution, whilst considerations urged in the last chapter suggest that such a solution is to be sought in the sphere of religious experience. The bonds which unite reason to the eternal order and to its standard of reference are principles of unity of a more intimate and significant kind than any of those transcending principles of unity which we have found immanent in the organic series below the level of spirit. In so far as man lives by these principles of unity on the level of spirit, he is on the way to attaining the true ends of his being. His true home is in the eternal order; and that order in its concrete actuality is God. Moreover, religious experience bears witness to a religious revelation, which claims to exhibit the bonds of unity between God and man unfolded in advancing completeness upon the field of history. Apart from this further revelation the claims of theism will always hang in the air, devoid of full reality. The principles of unity explored in this chapter are aspects of man's affinity with God and have therefore religious significance. But the directly religious experience of this affinity stands on its own ground and requires separate consideration.

CHAPTER VI

GOD AND MAN IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

IF the Incarnation provides an answer to the difficulties of theism, the Incarnation in turn becomes intelligible only in the light of its terminal concepts, God and man. All questions and problems concerning the Incarnation itself run back ultimately to the meanings which are given to these two terms. Most of all this doctrine depends upon the conception of God which is implicit in the Bible and in the religious revelation which it records.

I

The revelation of God recorded in the Bible has many cross-connexions with the revelations of the eternal order in human experience which we have already considered. It has also, of course, similarities and affinities with a wider religious revelation which has been part of man's inheritance all the world over. Out of that wider revelation it took its rise. But it followed a course of its own which became ever more distinctive, until it found its fulfilment in Christ and His Church. This revelation came through the medium of historical experience, passing through preparatory cycles, and coming to its climax in a supreme event and a single life-story with its consequences. This historical experience as it developed gave rise to an interpretation of history in terms of transcending principles of unity which were held together in a unity of apprehension and response. The content of that experience was the unfolding character of the living God. Thus under all the immense varieties of historical experience recorded in the Bible, and through all the stages of its development, we can trace with growing clearness the transcending unity of a concrete whole. Whilst Israel reached an apprehension of unity in their history through their continuous experience of the living God, *we* can trace this continuity and unity in their experience of God through all the stages of their history and the diverse elements of their literature. If this is true of the Old Testament, it is even more emphatically the case with the New Testament. For there the revelation is compressed into a brief span of time and a few years of concentrated experience. The astonishingly varied literature of the New Testament finds its unity in the supreme revelation of God there recorded and interpreted as apprehended in a concrete experience.

To understand the course of religious revelation as it enters into the present argument two points already considered must be kept in mind : (1) first, that religion as it enters into history is a mode of concrete experience which finds its nearest analogy in the relationships of the social organism ; (2) secondly, that all the higher forms of experience on the level of spirit begin in concrete apprehensions through the external world. But as the aspects of the eternal order are incorporated into spiritual experience, the activities of spirit become more inclusive of the eternal order, and yet at the same time more distinctively individualised in their response to that order. An obvious corollary of these two points follows, which has an important place in biblical religion—namely (3) that activities of spirit which in this way pass into highly individualised forms do not necessarily become individualistic. For individuality is essentially social, and its activities always tend to pass back into social forms. We can discern these three stages of a developing spiritual experience in the religious revelation of the Bible. For, in the first place, primitive Hebrew religion is naïvely expressed through the crude analogies of tribal and national experience and through highly anthropomorphic imagery. Next it passes through ethical and rational developments which lead to increasing emphasis upon individual values. Thirdly, all these developments are reincorporated into elaborate social forms such as the post-exilic law, priesthood and temple worship; and over these again hover the expectations of a divine kingdom with its messianic and apocalyptic associations. Finally, all these stages are gathered up by transformation into a New Order which includes them all and carries them through their fulfilment into a new cycle of developments in the Christian religion.

In the earliest phase of this development God is regarded as a concrete activity, in the background of concrete social life. He is like individual men but more powerful. He is the tribal hero and warrior, the presiding genius, the national king. He controls the social organism and its environment. He arouses emotions of awe and fear. But He is friendly as well as powerful, He is the great kinsman, the saviour of the tribes, the father of Israel His first-born. He is separate and yet intimate, holy and yet kindly. As this powerful and friendly activity embraces and penetrates all environment, so the religious impulse towards community with this Being underlies all social and individual experiences. Other forms of primitive cultural activity do not originate in the religious impulse. But since religion is essentially concrete experience, it is difficult to see how it can ever have been entirely dissociated from the other apprehensions of the eternal order,[1] however primitive and undeveloped these must have been. Religion expresses itself through association with all other activities of the human spirit, because it underlies them all and because its proper object is Actuality comprehending and embracing all aspects of reality towards which those other activities are directed. Religion was therefore never pre-rational or without ethical significance. Its primitive form was neither non-rational nor unethical; rather it shared the undeveloped character of higher activities of spirit at that stage. Because primitive Hebrew religion had this undeveloped character, its object has been defined as an activity rather than the Actuality which is apprehended and worshipped in monotheistic religion. In the next phase of development the religious apprehension of God moved from the stage of activity towards that of Actuality. The holiness and power of Yahweh came to be regarded first as ethical and supreme and then as universal in scope and ultimate in significance. Now as the horizons of religious experience expanded by advancing incorporation of the eternal order and its aspects, the resulting conception of God developed in two directions. On the one hand the transcendent, external, cosmic aspects of God's Being and character were rationalised in the direction of Absolute Actuality to the fullest extent possible within the limits of the Hebrew mind and its pictorial thought-forms. On the other hand this process did not move away from concreteness, because all aspects of the eternal order were represented in the rationalisation (although not all aspects to the same extent; for the ethical aspect of rationalisation always predominated). Accordingly the heightening of ethical attributes to the point where they attained universal significance involved in the second place a refinement and deepening of the familiar and friendly elements in religion. Thus on the one hand the tribal warrior-god of Deborah's Song became transformed into the righteous arbiter of nations of whom Amos prophesied. On the other hand the presiding genius of local shrines and domestic festivities, so often degraded into a master of sensual revellings, was displaced and at the same time transformed, in the tender pleadings of Hosea, into the God of pure lovingkindness who drew Israel 'with cords of a man, with bands of love.' In the centuries which followed these two prophets the double theme, whose two aspects they present thus separately, was enriched and filled out in this direction and in that with varying emphasis and gathering volume. Isaiah apprehends ethical holiness with the rapture of religious worship. His 'Holy One of Israel,' who rules the nations and is separate from sinners, is yet reigning in Sion's temple, where the glory of His Presence is accessible to prophetic vision. For Jeremiah and Ezekiel God is the Divine Lover, and Israel is His bride; yet He is also the God of the whole earth, who searches and cleanses the hearts of individual sinners. For the psalmists God is omnipresent Creator; yet the souls of men thirst for Him and hang upon Him.

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[1] As Dr. Otto appears to think. See *The Idea of the Holy*. This seems to be largely due to his Kantian restriction of terms, *e.g.* his definition of the 'rational' (ch. i. and end of ch. viii.).

The theme is endless in its applications and bewildering in its variety of detail. The more universal, transcendent and absolute in contrast to His creatures the character of God becomes, the more intimately does He penetrate nature, mould history, and above all sway and commune with the hearts of individual men. The two aspects of the theme do not counteract, but rather intensify one another in mutual enhancement of significance. The theme is precisely analogous in form to that which we discovered in man's relations with the aspects of the eternal order. But in the context of a religious experience, into which these aspects have been woven, the theme becomes vastly richer and more moving.

As in the eternal order, so also in religious experience the two contrasted aspects of transcendence and immanence, majesty and friendliness, interact and interpenetrate for their mutual enhancement. But this advancing interpenetration is also accompanied by increase of tension. Now tension is an important factor which is present with advancing significance throughout the organic series to the level of spirit and in the relations of man to the eternal order. In all organic wholes there is tension between the principle of unity immanent in the whole and the parts and successions which belong to the whole. One aspect of this tension is the incompleteness of harmony at all levels, which makes for the resolution of tensions through transformation to a higher level. But an alternative route for resolution of tension is by degeneration of the organism to a lower level or to a 'backwater' from the main line of advance, where a lower type of harmony is effected; or again by dissolution and disintegration of elements to the lowest levels in the series. Now as the organic series advances resolution of tension becomes more complex; and increase of tension can only be resolved by more profound incorporations of the eternal order. Thus on the level of spirit the development of complex civilisations involves such increase of tensions between the social organism and its individual members on the one hand and its subordinate social groups on the other, that degeneration sets in unless the tension can be adequately met by more profound incorporations of the eternal order. Thus degeneration, disharmony and non-attainment are aspects under which tension remains unresolved in the advancing series. They are aspects of the unfinished character of the series on its various levels. Through the experience of ethical non-attainment we apprehend these forms of unresolved tension as stages in the manifestation of the problem of evil. But the ultimate significance of evil is recognised in the religious experience of estrangement from God. Here, however, we must distinguish. For tension itself is not a form of evil. Evil is manifested in an arrest of the movement towards resolution of tension by transformation towards higher forms of harmony. It is because the experience of ethical non-attainment includes an element of this character, namely arrest and frustration of man's passage towards the eternal order, that this experience mediates in a peculiar degree man's awareness of evil. Now in religion there is experience of tension between God and man. Religion includes emotions of awe, dependence and abasement in which the contrast between the Creator and His creatures is apprehended and felt. This religious tension of contrast and separation finds its adequate resolution in the other aspect of religion, namely through apprehensions of friendliness, lovingkindness and graciousness of the Creator towards His creatures. The graciousness of God is apprehended and felt in emotional fascination; thus it evokes desire, which passes into the religious responses of worship, creaturely self-oblation and communion of spirit with Spirit. Thus the tension of contrast is resolved by passage into the harmony of communion with God.

Now in religious experience evil is manifested under the form of sin, that is a state of estrangement from God in which creaturely response has been arrested and communion of man with God has been frustrated. Thus the tension of contrast between Creator and creature remains unresolved. It is important to notice, however, that resolution of tension here does not mean dissolution or disappearance of the contrast; for that would spell disaster to religion. In the religious experiences of worship and communion with God the tension of contrast between God and His creatures remains; but it is taken up into an embracing harmony in which all the deepest religious emotions find their fulfilment and satisfaction. The sense of sin, on the other hand, is the sense of contrast bereft of encompassing harmony, through the arrest and frustration of the movement towards resolution of tension in communion with God. The experience of sinfulness (developed as it was developed in the rationalisation of Hebrew religion) includes the experience of ethical non-attainment. But it is in itself a much wider and deeper experience which includes much more. Ethical attainment means fulfilment of self-harmonisation through self-determination towards the eternal order. The sting of ethical non-attainment therefore lies in failure of self-harmonisation, even though that self-harmonisation can only be achieved by a self-transcending passage towards the good of the eternal order. Religious attainment, on the other hand, means the acknowledgment of creaturely dependence in worship, the adoring recognition of God in His majesty and lovingkindness. Consequently the sting of religious non-attainment through estrangement from God in sin does not lie primarily in any failure of self-achievement nor in the disharmonies of the soul within itself. The sting lies in the frustration of worshipful approach to God, an arrest of the movement by which all creaturely limitation and dependence finds its fulfilment in adoration of the Creator.

II

The Old Testament shows us a developing revelation of God in the contrasted aspects of majesty and intimacy, holiness and lovingkindness. Concurrently it shows us a corresponding revelation of man's state as one of creaturely dependence, which finds its highest satisfaction in worship and communion with God. It also shows that, whilst the contrast between God and man is heightened and accentuated as horizons widen and ethical rationalisation deepens, on the other hand the tension of the contrast continues to be resolved, because the heightened attributes of transcendence are continuously balanced by a corresponding enhancement of the contrasted attributes of intimacy and lovingkindness.

But, as we have seen, a balancing of contrasted aspects is a very inadequate description of the glowing religious experience which prophets and psalmists describe. The deepening whole of experience resolves its tension of contrast in two ways. For, in the first place, as the aspect of transcendence is heightened, the aspect of nearness and intimacy penetrates more profoundly into the human spirit and thus develops religious experience in its individual aspect. Secondly, within that deepening experience the contrasted aspects of deity are fused together in a growing richness of harmony.[1] Thus contrast and intimacy, distance and nearness, the double feeling of being a pilgrim in a strange land and of being deeply at home in that strange land, these are the foci of religious experience, which are never resolved by disappearance of either factor. For as religion advances they interpenetrate more profoundly. But to these contrasts and their 'togetherness' we have now to add the complications introduced into religious experience by the fact of sin. To the contrast between Creator and creature there is added the contrast between God and the sinner, between our craving for fellowship with God and our actual estrangement from Him by the state of sin.

Now it would be fatally easy to find an interpretation of religion which appeared to put the Incarnation at the centre of the picture; but which nevertheless failed to bring that fact into sufficiently vital relation with the invading fact of sin. There are so many lines in the universe, in human experience and in history pointing towards the Incarnation or something like it, that it is all the more important to be sure that we introduce every factor and give it its full weight. As the argument of this book advances towards the Incarnation we cannot afford to overlook those aspects of religion which are most concerned with sin, the religious form of the problem of evil, and with the way of its solution disclosed to religious experience. Thus a good many factors in the argument require reconsideration, if this question is to receive adequate treatment.

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[1] Cp. the illustration from Isaiah's experience, above, p. 137. Other illustrations of this point are to be found in Psalm 139 and in the climax to the Book of Job.

Now in preceding stages of the argument repeated emphasis has been laid upon elements or factors of tension and contrast and of advance towards harmony through conditions of tension and contrast. We have found these considerations important in interpreting alike the organic universe, man's relations with the eternal order and his religious experience. We now have to bring all such considerations to bear upon the concept of revelation in the context of human sin. We start from the fact that succession and multiplicity are spanned by principles of unity in the cosmic series, and that these principles of unity resolve tensions of contrasted elements by holding the tensions in a harmony which preserves the contrasts. Concurrent with the whole series we find also the contrast of the knower and the object of knowledge; and these are held together in a unity which combines knowledge on the side of the knower with a revelation of reality to the knower from the side of the object. We have seen further that as we ascend the series there is a progression of knowledge on the side of the knower, because there is an advancing revelation of reality as significance in the series approaches the level of spirit. The law of the progression is that, as the principles of unity in the series become more transcendent over routines of succession and therefore reveal more in the unity of their objects to the knower, so by that very fact they penetrate the mind of the knower more profoundly; and his understanding of what they reveal becomes in turn more intimate. As entities of the series approach the level of spirit upon which the knower stands, the content of their revelation is more akin to his own mental life. Consequently, whereas on lower levels entities of the series are simply instruments through which revelations of the eternal order are focused, at higher levels organisms approximate to the rôle of agents contributing something of their own to the revelation of the eternal order which they mediate. In the social organism on the level of spirit this process of approximation is completed. The objects of knowledge here stand on the same level as the knower. Both the knower and the object of his knowledge are spiritual organisms, whose principles of unity and whose community with the eternal order are parallel and reciprocal in function and approximately so in capacity. Consequently there is a mutual reciprocity of knowledge and of revelations of reality to knowledge. Both the partners in this relationship are alike subjects of knowledge and agents or bearers of revelations from the eternal order. Consequently there is mutual understanding, sympathetic insight, human fellow-feeling; and these are the foundations of social relationships in human life.

In *the progression of revelation* which we have been considering and in its corresponding progression of knowledge the objects of knowledge contribute more and more actively to the penetrative power of revelation which is inserting itself into the mind of the knower. The objects of knowledge are instruments of revelation. They are instrumental to revelations of the eternal order. They are also units of activity in the ascending scale of activity which constitutes the developing series of the universe. Consequently as instruments of revelation they embody the creative activity of the eternal order in ascending concreteness. The unchangeable significance of the eternal order is thus always revealed to us embodied in concrete activity. There is, therefore, an active revelation of unchangeable eternity; a revelation whose activity becomes increasingly individualised in the ascending concreteness of the developing series, up to the point where spiritual organisms become individual agents of creative revelation in their self-determining activity. Thus man becomes an agent of revelation through apprehension of the eternal order and through response to that order, a response which embodies the revelations of that order in its creative activity. Now man as a spiritual organism is aware of the eternal order in its universal significance and is individually self-determined in his communion with that order. It follows that on the level of spirit we have a new order of revelation which takes its rise at the summit of the cosmic series; but which is distinct from that *progression of revelation* which we discern in and through the series. For all the way up the series the eternal order in its unchangeable significance is in the background. But it is man who, having his roots in the series, is the first among the ascending units of the series to become aware of this eternal background. He alone therefore among organisms is aware of revelations of the eternal order mediated through the universe. He is aware of these revelations in a number of different ways. First, he apprehends the eternal order embodied in particular objects in *intensity* of quality and significance. Thus he apprehends revelations of beauty. Secondly, he apprehends the eternal order in ever-widening groups of objects with their underlying routines of events in *extensity* of range and connexion. Thus he apprehends revelations of order and meaning in the form of scientific truth. Thirdly, he apprehends the eternal order in a *directive movement* embodied as concrete activity in spiritual organisms in the social order. Thus he apprehends the spiritual significance of the social organism and its members and the character of the response which that significance demands. Thus he apprehends revelations of goodness. This second order of revelation is wider than the first and includes it.[1] In what follows it will be called *the infinite order of revelation.* It is shared by spiritual organisms in a community of spiritual life which is the bond of fellowship in the social organism. Now in the progression of revelation to the level of spirit we found revelation embodied in units of activity which rise in concreteness and individuality up to the level of spirit, where finally these units of activity are themselves individual self-determining agents of revelation in its creative activity. Agents of revelation they are; and in that aspect revelations of creative activity in spiritual organisms provide our highest analogy in the universe for the characteristics of *religious revelation.* The aspect in question is the aspect of concreteness and individuality. For, as we have seen, in the progression of the series the highest embodiment of revelation as concrete activity is found in the case of spiritual organisms, whose concrete activity has attained the individuality of the self-determining agent. But God is absolute Actuality, the ground of all concrete units of activity in the series. He is also the concrete Actuality of that eternal order, whose revelations are embodied in ascending units of concrete activity up to the level of individual agency. Accordingly God is the Absolute Agent of revelation, the creative source from whom flow all revelations of the eternal order embodied in units of concrete activity. Now in religious revelation God is not only the ultimate Agent of revelation (as He is in all revelations of the eternal order on a religious interpretation of the universe). In religious experience He is also apprehended as the living God, revealing Himself in His concreteness and individuality. But our analogy for this kind of revelation is that which we find mediated through spiritual organisms at the highest stage in the progression of revelation, where the tension of contrast between knower and object of knowledge has been resolved by transformation into the harmony of reciprocal understanding and intimacy in the interactions of spirit and spirit. Consequently in religious revelation we have (1) the most concrete form of revelation, and (2) the most actively penetrating and intimate kind of revelation ; and all this, again, because here (3) the Agent of revelation and the content of revelation are indivisibly one as God and the eternal order are one. Now the most important point here is the *activity* of revelation from the side of the Revealer. He who reveals Himself to religious experience is neither an instrument of revelation nor even a secondary agent of revelation. He is Himself the content which is revealed, the revealing Agent and the creative ground of those creaturely spirits to whom His revelation comes. The penetrating activity of such a revelation must be in principle the most intensive and transforming of all forms which revelation can take. Further it transcends, in principle, the effective activity of all that has here been called the progression of revelation, in the measure in which the concrete actuality of the Creator transcends the mediate activity of His creatures. But the qualifying phrase ‘ in principle ’ has been introduced, because whilst religious revelation always possesses this concrete intensity of activity, it has its own progressive development through advancing incorporation of the eternal order by rationalisation. Its highest degree of concrete intensive activity will therefore belong to the climax of such a progressive revelation.[1]

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[1] See pp. 127, 128 and note, where the first illustration belongs to the *infinite order*, the second to the *progression*, of revelation.

Thus we have interpreted the significance of religious revelation upon the analogy of the progression of revelation mediated through the ascending series of objects in the cosmic series. We found its nearest analogy at the summit of that progression in the reciprocal activities of revelation which are attained in the social life of man. Now we have to carry the analysis further by bringing to bear on religious experience another aspect of revelation to which reference has been made. Three kinds of revelation have been referred to in this chapter: (1) the *progression of revelation* through the cosmic series; (2) the *infinite order of revelation*; and (3) *religious revelation.* The second of these must now be related to the third. Religious revelation will then have been surveyed in its full context, both of the cosmic series, and of the eternal order with their characteristic modes of revelation.

On the level of spirit we have seen that the progression of revelation reaches its climax in reciprocal revelations of the eternal order between spiritual organisms. But this maximum form of revelation in the progression of the series shows great variety and difference in the measure and degrees of its attainment in the endlessly varied types and levels of human nature. Men vary in the measure in which they embody and convey revelations of the eternal order to their fellow-men. But all these variations are within a common conditioning factor, namely that the standards of the eternal order which are revealed on the level of spirit are themselves infinite in their reference. On the level of spirit the double progression of revelation and knowledge is launched out of a serial progress into an infinite order. When the progression reaches its highest point, then infinity begins and spiritual non-attainment makes its appearance. In the spiritual life of man every embodiment of revelations from the eternal order in concrete activity is inadequate.[1] In like manner all apprehension of such revelations and all response thereto by self-determining activity of spirit in the social organism is also inadequate. The contents of revelation in the eternal order are always other than, beyond, unexhausted by, their instruments, agents and recipients. They are infinite in respect of our attainment. Yet as they transcend utterly, so they are supremely near and native to our spirits in accordance with the law disclosed in the progression of knowledge. But as that progression has now been launched out of a serial progress into an infinite order, so its law undergoes transformation in that order. What is both infinite in its beyondness and yet lies at the roots of our spiritual life is not this or that concrete embodiment of the eternal order with its relative significance as an entity in the series, but rather those ultimate standards of the eternal order by which the significance of all such revelations is finally tested and determined. If we recognise a beautiful object or a person of noble character for what they are, their significance as embodiments of beauty and goodness can penetrate deeply into our minds, because the standards of beauty and goodness which determine their significance are aspects or modes of eternity which lie at the roots of our own spiritual being. This means that all embodied revelations of the eternal order flow from and depend upon an infinite and absolute reality which embraces and supports our finiteness and relativity. Now this *infinite order of revelation* includes within itself the *progression of revelation,* since its infinite standards underlie and determine the advancing progression of revelation and knowledge. So we must now take the step of acknowledging that in all our experience of the standards in this infinite order, the tension in which they hold us (the tension of infinite transcendence and infinite penetration and nearness) is in its essence the tension of Absolute Actuality with the concrete finite activities which are its creatures. A classic description of the character of this tension is given in Francis Thompson's poem *The Hound of Heaven.* In its concrete form that experience is religious. There are magnificent descriptions of the same kind, but spoken as from the divine side, in the pages of Old Testament prophecy, notably perhaps in Hosea, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. But tension of the same general type honeycombs, on its more intense side, man's experience of the eternal order and of its standards of reference. Creative activity flows down from the eternal order in the form of revelations ; and these revelations lead us further and further towards the standards of infinity which they reveal. Yet that same creative activity of the eternal order underlies all our apprehensions of eternity and all our responses towards its infinity of demand. That is the reason why we can never allow our experience of non-attainment to be the last word about the meaning of life. The creative activity of the eternal order constrains us to believe that the possibility and promise of attainment, towards which it impels us, is more fundamental than our present experience of non-attainment. But if this promise is to find fulfilment, our apparently endless pilgrimage must undergo transformation into some mode of experience more concrete than the pursuit of standards which always elude our grasp. We have the evidence of this in other aspects of that very experience which seems endless. For as knowledge advances in comprehension, variety and proportion it partakes increasingly in the character of concrete wholeness, as it is assimilated to the developing wholeness of our concrete activity. The ultimate goal of knowledge is not acquaintance with an infinite multiplicity of detail, but rather wisdom, a vision of reality in its wholeness and concreteness. Such wisdom is an attribute of character and has ethical significance. Thus we feel that the essence of all genuine advances towards the standards of the eternal order lies not in the details of attainment, but in the responsive activity of striving towards the goal.

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[1] *Progressive revelation*, in the well understood sense, applied to a historical development of religion, must not be confused with the special meaning given above to a *progression of revelation* in the context of the cosmic series.

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[1] On the other hand, for a qualification see below, p. 152 and note.

Thus those creaturely limitations which prevent attainment do not matter, provided that response within those limitations is adequate. Now this proviso falls under the ethical standard of the good ; and the essential point in our experience of ethical non-attainment is that *we do not make the adequate response which is possible* within our limitations. Non-attainment in this experience is ethical failure, a positive evil. Now apprehensions of goodness in the eternal order show us that ethical evil ‘ ought ’ not to be, because response might have been otherwise. In this way the standard of goodness assures us that the promise of attainment was not a delusion. That promise corresponds to reality in the eternal order ; and the evil of ethical failure is a violation of that order which cannot however undermine its unchangeable existence and security. Nevertheless this revelation of contrast between what is and what ought to be, whilst it reassures us of the fact that goodness is more ultimate than evil, does nothing to better our actual situation. It does not resolve the acute tension of an unrelieved contrast. On the contrary, it makes clear the fact that ethical non-attainment constitutes estrangement from the good of the eternal order. Thus there is in this situation no promise of transformation from endless non-attainment to an advancing concrete wholeness of experience. For adequate ethical response is crucial to the attainment of that concrete wholeness which we call character. ‘ The responsive activity of striving towards the goal ’ is essential to genuine advance. But the striving is inadequate. The response is not made.

Now there is a sense in which this failure appears to be inevitable. For attainment of character is attainment of self-harmonisation through self-determining activity directed towards the good which transcends the orbit of self-harmonising activities. Thus if self-determining response towards the good fails, there is no attainment of character. Now within the resources of self-harmonising activity there is no remedy for this situation. Ethical response for the sake of winning character and for no other end is bound to defeat itself. We do not attain character in this way. While the concreteness of developing character underlies and supports other activities directed towards the eternal order, this underlying character cannot support itself. It ought to be developed by adequate response to the good. But if we pursue character in that direct way not only do we actually fail, but we are bound to fail. The pursuit of character is not the ultimate form in which the concrete activity of the human spirit can realise itself. There is another form of activity more concrete and more ultimate, that is to say religion. Ethical activity in and for itself is always directed towards self-harmonisation. It therefore defeats itself because it leads back from the eternal order into finite creaturehood. The ultimate object of concrete human activity is not goodness but God, not our own achievement but adoring worshipful recognition of God's absolute actuality.

III

Thus religious revelation, although it is distinct from the other modes of revelation referred to in this chapter and cannot supersede them, is none the less more inclusive in its nature than either of the other two. As the progression of revelation through the series is taken up by transformation into the infinite order of revelation, so this in turn can be taken up into religious revelation. This is the process which we actually see at work in the historical records of Hebrew religion. In the first two kinds of revelation we see revelation of reality advancing in significance through ascending forms of concrete activity until in man's experience it attains infinite significance and points him upwards towards Absolute Actuality. In religion, on the other hand, we discern revelation descending directly from Absolute Actuality into the concrete activity of human experience. But within that concrete activity of experience it has its own historical process, the progressive revelation which we recognise in the biblical story. In this historical process the revelation of Absolute Actuality, which entered in through the lowly doors of primitive religion, passed to its goal in Christianity through its incorporation of the other modes of revelation. This view of religious revelation, as a process by its nature inclusive and assimilative, indicates the only reliable test by which the truth of religion can be examined. In this sense Christianity offers itself to mankind as the one universal and final religion, which in fulfilling Judaism became capable of including within itself the truth and value of all other forms of revelation, religious or otherwise.

We must now return to the main issue of this chapter, namely, the activity of religious revelation towards man in his sinful estrangement. In the course of this inquiry into revelation every path followed has led sooner or later to the fact that revelation must be interpreted in terms of activity. In this concept of *activity* we have one of the key words of human thought to-day.[1] The organic conception of the universe is an interpretation, in terms of units of energy and activity, required by the present state of organised scientific knowledge. Thus revelation through the organic series comes to us in terms of ascending concrete activity. In man's experience of the eternal order we may seem to move away from concrete activity into abstraction. But the analysis of that experience which has been made above has always led us back into concrete activity.[2] For all revelation as it converges upon man reaches its fulfilment by incorporation into concrete human activity. We have seen, in conclusion, that in man's experience of the eternal order revelation passes through the limitations of knowledge to a deeper level of concreteness in the activity of developing character and its response to the good; and again that through man's ethical failure to respond to the good he can find no adequate fulfilment within himself of this perpetual tendency of revelation to incorporate itself into concrete human activity. The solution is found in religion. For God is the concrete actuality who is both agent and content of all revelation. Religious revelation, then, makes explicit, what is implicit in all revelational activity, that God reveals Himself to man in the concrete activity of history and of the human life-story, in order that this concrete activity of man's spiritual existence may pass beyond itself and its own achievements and attainments and may find its end in pure actuality, in the surrender of creaturehood to the embrace of the Creator. The activity of revelation is thus seen to be the corollary of creation, the bond which draws the creature forward to the Creator. Revelation is therefore not simply a drama of the eternal order unfolding itself to man's gaze for his delectation. It is the activity of God drawing man to the security of his true end in God. But the fact of sin, man's estrangement from God, endangers the whole issue of man's creaturely state. Revelation is grounded upon, and arises out of, God's relation of creative activity to the universe and to man. But sin endangers the whole issue of creation by arresting the movement of man towards his Creator. When therefore God reveals Himself to man's religious experience under the conditions of estrangement set up by sin, the whole activity of such a religious revelation takes on the form of a redemptive or saving process. Redemption is the undoing of the state of sin, the restoration of the movement of creation towards God, the recovery of that movement from its arrest. In a sinful world, therefore, religious revelation becomes a revelation of redemptive or saving activity; not only disclosing to man the character of God and the nature of his bond with Him, but also showing that character as divine activity laying hold of man in his need and restoring him to his true end in God. Thus, in the record of Hebrew religion, God came to be recognised by Israel historically as the Creator of heaven and earth through their experience of His saving acts in their history. The Creator was revealed through His saving activity. As their religion assimilated to itself deeper ethical factors, this salvation, which was at first concerned with material prosperity and national victory, became increasingly ethical in content. Through captivity they learned that it meant something more than national security. It was the product of divine righteousness and must in some way fulfil the ethical purpose of Israel's God. Its consummation was conceived in terms of a divine kingdom which would be the visible incorporation of divine sovereignty and holiness and the fulfilment of God's righteous will for man.

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[1] See Additional Note A., p. 109.

[2] See pp. 58, 59; 106–109; and 148.

Now we have seen that all forms of revelation are mediated through a concrete environment, and this mediation takes place through principles of unity which have a selective power over the succession of events. That is to say, the objects through which revelation is mediated are wholes selected by the transcending principles of unity. The objects which mediate revelation are, in one sense, adequate embodiments of what they reveal.[1] But they rise in adequacy as instruments of revelation until they pass over on the level of spirit into self-determining agents of revelation. But these are inadequate to the infinite order of revelation; and thus, when the activity of religious revelation enters upon the scene, there is a movement in history, a progressive revelation, in which the instruments and agents of revelation develop from lower to higher forms. But man is not only an agent of revelation. He is also a subject of knowledge and a spiritual organism in communion with the eternal order through apprehension of its revelations and response thereto. Thus in religious experience revelation with its selective system of mediation through instruments and agents is the objective side of man's communion with God. On the subjective side there is man's capacity for receiving revelation and responding to it. Further, because man is capable of spiritual apprehension and response, he is also capable of mediating revelation not as an instrument but as an agent. The development of historical revelation as we see it in the biblical records depended upon both these sets of facts. Through his capacity for spiritual apprehension primitive man everywhere interpreted things and persons of his immediate environment as mediating to him a religious revelation. The crudeness of the earliest systems of mediation is a crudeness of interpretation, not a delusion in apprehension. It would be nothing but an anthropological fallacy to conclude that imperfect interpretation of environment undercuts the validity of apprehensions reached through that environment. That would be a form of the sceptical theory of knowledge which divides appearances from reality and makes appearances delusions which hide reality; whereas they are aspects of reality, in which reality really appears. Nevertheless religious revelation could only advance from lower to higher stages by a development of man's capacities for spiritual apprehension and response. This was effected in the ancient world through incorporations of the eternal order into man's spiritual apprehension in that widespread process of rationalisation to which reference was made in a previous chapter. In the case of Hebrew religion, religious apprehension kept pace with other apprehensions of the eternal order and remained at the centre of the developing system of spiritual apprehension in a degree to which there is no adequate parallel elsewhere.

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[1] Otherwise there would be no revelation. On the other hand, the limits of the revelation given are the measure of the inadequacy of the instrument.

Under this developing system of religious apprehension, the system of religious mediation developed too. The instruments and agents of revelation became more adequate to convey its contents ; and thus revelation itself became more adequate. Now we have seen that this religious revelation came to man in his experience of sinful estrangement in the form of redemptive activity. Thus in the advancing system of mediation the instruments and agents of revelation were instruments and agents of God's redemptive activity towards sinful Israel. In this way we approach the institutions of religion and the special forms under which they were developed in Israel's history. It would be beyond the scope of the present work to enter the wide field of comparative religion, in which these matters are studied to-day in their immense mass of detail ; as it would certainly be beyond the author's qualifications to deal with so large a subject. We must keep to the main track which leads to the Incarnation. The instruments and agents of religious mediation in primitive religion have two aspects and to some extent fall into two classes. These two aspects correspond broadly to apprehension and response, the two modes in which man has communion with the eternal order. There is both apprehension of reality revealed and also response to that reality. Thus objects with religious significance may be either objects in which some religious revelation has been discerned or objects with which some religious act must be done. Commonly, of course, the two objects are in fact one. Jacob lays his head upon a stone, receives a religious revelation as he dreams, and promptly performs a religious rite upon the stone. Similarly the agents of mediation may be distinguished. Tribal life has its chiefs and leaders. It has also its religious experts. These are commonly of two types. There are those who acquire a reputation for receiving religious revelations. These are the soothsayers, diviners and oracle-mongers, ultimately the seers and prophets. But there are also the natural leaders of the tribe in its various forms of communal activity, its chiefs and kings, its magicians and men of outstanding intellect. These are qualified by their communal authority and eminence to perform tribal acts of religious significance. Thus come medicine-men, priests and priest-kings. In the system of sacrificial cultus all these factors are combined and blended. Through religious objects the will of the god is divined ; and again man's impulse towards worship is expressed through religious offerings in kind. Thus the ancient system of cultus arises with its sacrifices and priesthood, its sacred objects and its expert interpreters, its ritual traditions and their mythological explanations. Now in Hebrew religion the advancing apprehension of revelation in an ethically rationalised form was pre-eminently due to the prophets. Under their influence cultus and institutions underwent a series of reformations and transformations, which purged them of those elements which were most alien to ethical monotheism. But the system itself remained, with all its archaic associations and ancient forms. Thus priesthood and prophecy were in tension and contrast, like two rival traditions with diverging tendencies. Yet each had its part to play ; and their mutual reactions made for the proportion of truth. Prophecy without priesthood would have become a system of enlightenment without adequate embodiment of response in worship, which is the consummation of religion. Priesthood without prophecy would have remained, unpurified by ethical and rational factors, until it inevitably fell into decay before other and more alien forms of rationalisation.

The sacrificial cultus of the Torah in its developed state embodied in concrete response the fundamental emotional factors of religion. These emotional factors, as we have seen, are awe and abasement before divine majesty and a fascination which evokes desire for union with divine friendliness. To these we can now add a third element which depends upon these two main factors—namely, the sense of estrangement which is the recognition of sinfulness. The sacrificial system provided an embodied response for the religious impulse in its threefold desire to pay homage to the divine majesty, to draw near to the divine friendship, and to be purified from the defilement of sin. Now both the values and the dangers of this system were bound up with its stereotyped character and unchanging hallowed associations. For worship requires comparatively fixed instrumental forms in which its fundamental emotions can find a familiar security for their embodied response. Prophecy, on the other hand, stood for a developing apprehension of revelation, and for an ethical response to the redemptive activity of divine purpose embodied, through concrete but ever-changing situations, in the march of events in history. For prophecy, therefore, the response of man's whole being to the Creator could not be confined within the specialised channels of ritual embodiment. The archaic forms of ritual response could not be regarded as satisfactory even within their own sphere ; for they became fixed before the higher movement of rationalisation had set in. But there are other spheres of human response which have religious significance in the whole context of human life. Thus prophecy tended to throw up idealised pictures embodying these other aspects of Israel's response to the redemptive activity of God. Moreover, the tendency of rationalisation to emphasise individual values and individual experiences, such as those of the prophets themselves, frequently threw these idealised pictures into an individual form. Thus it was inevitable that prophecy should emphasise the rôle of the agent as mediator of revelation and redemption through ethical apprehension and response, rather than the ancient system of instrumental embodiments which were so characteristic of the cultus. The typical pictures in the prophetic scheme of mediation were accordingly those of the righteous king and the prophetic servant of the Lord. Behind all such pictures, however, lay a profound conviction that Israel as a people was the true agent of divine mediation, the recipient of revelation, admitted to share the divine counsels and called to co-operate with the divine activity of redemptive righteousness, which reaches out towards the ends of the earth.

Now as the advancing revelation became ever more transcendent and universal in its scope and more penetrative of individual experience in its intensity, the little community of post-exilic Judaism became more clearly inadequate in its capacity to respond to this prophetic scheme of mediation. Two courses lay open. One alternative would be to concentrate upon the fixed routine of response embodied in the Torah, which from early times included important ethical elements as well as the ritual cultus. The other possible course would be to look beyond this world-order for a divinely given fulfilment of redemption whose mediation would be effected under a transformation of mundane conditions. The former point of view is reflected in the prudential type of wisdom literature and became characteristic of the Sadducean party. It suited the fortunate and those of more complacent temperament. But its mundane outlook could not so easily satisfy the unfortunate and the discontented, for whom the horizons of this world provided but a beggarly fulfilment of prophetic hopes and anticipations. For them religion came to have an otherworldly reference, of which the most typical expression is to be found in the apocalyptic writings. The two points of view were, however, to a large extent combined in the practice and expectations of popular religion. The old national expectations, fanned into flame by the experiences of the Maccabean wars, remained unquenched, and encouraged men to look for a divine intervention of saving activity which would be embodied in an earthly kingdom. Accordingly the embodied response of the Law and the unfulfilled prophetic anticipations issued in alternating moods of mundane complacency and disappointed and baffled expectation. Thus the tension of contrast between transcendent holiness and power on the one hand and man's yearning for the mercies of God on the other hand, resolved for a time in the prophetic experience of redemptive activity moving downwards to man in gracious lovingkindness, remained still unresolved for the Jewish people as a whole. It awaited a new and more perfect mediation, through which the graciousness of God, adequately embodied, would take hold of man in his sinful weakness and lift up his response to its fulfilment under the transformed conditions of a God-given Kingdom of grace.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEW CREATION

I

IN previous chapters an interpretation of the universe has been given in terms of activity advancing through ascending concrete forms until concrete activity attains that degree of individuality which is manifested on the level of spirit. Through this ascending series of activities a progression of revelation is given to the human mind, and is mediated by selective principles of unity in the concrete series of embodied activities. This mediation ascends in adequacy from less to more, from the instrumentality of objects to the self-determining individuality of agents on the level of spirit. Here we have three things to bear in mind: (1) The ascending series of organisms, interpreted as concrete activities; (2) the advancing progression of revelation with its developing contrasts of transcendence and immanence as experienced in knowledge; and (3) the advancing adequacy of mediation through the organic series from physical objects to the self-determining agents on the level of spirit. This advancing progression of the organic universe, of the revelation which it conveys, and of the mediation through which that revelation is given, rises to a point where in all its aspects it is focused in and upon man. At that point the progression passes by transformation into an infinite order of which man has experience. In that experience the tension of contrast between transcendence and immanence stretches out into the infinite and absolute, and points upwards towards Absolute Actuality. With man we stand at the summit of the ascending series, where the progression of the universe and of its modes of revelation and mediation can apparently advance no further. The refraction of the eternal order through aspects, forms, principles and standards makes apprehension of its revelation to be always inadequate through the finiteness of the system of mediation and through the limiting conditions on the side of the knower both in respect of apprehension and of response. The tension of this situation is, however, relieved in some measure by a spiritual progression in the life of man as his life-story develops in communion with the eternal order. For in the spiritual movement of that life-story apprehension of the eternal order, which begins by reaching out towards infinity in accumulations of knowledge, ends by returning into concreteness through the advancing assimilation of knowledge to character in that wholeness of concrete vision which men call wisdom. Thus the tension of non-attainment passes over into the sphere of ethical response. But as man is inadequate to apprehend and to mediate revelations of the good, so also his response to standards of goodness is inadequate. Now within the limits of man's ethical experience there is no adequate resolution of the tensions set up by ethical non-attainment. Consequently, although the infinite order of revelation returns into concrete activity in ethical response, yet its circuit of activity cannot be completed within finite concrete activity. Thus once more transformation is necessary. An infinite order of revelation cannot come to rest in the finite creature man. The resolution of this tension must be sought in religious experience, where worship brings man home to his Creator.

Thus we pass to religious revelation as embodied in the historical experience recorded in the literature of the Hebrew people. Here we find revelation passing through a progression in history which offers a distinct analogy to the general course of revelation in other contexts. For here, too, there is an advancing revelation with its developing system of mediation, rising to a level where the infinity of God's being and character is apprehended by the prophetic agents of revelation through incorporation of the eternal order in its ultimate and absolute quality into the form of religious experience. And whereas in other forms of man's communion with the eternal order the ever-extending infinitude of knowledge passes back into concrete activity through assimilation to character in concrete wholeness of vision, so here the infinite aspects of the eternal order are assimilated to the concrete actuality of God. But the other modes of revelation are transformed in their assimilation to the concreteness of religious experience. For here man is not primarily in communion with aspects of the eternal order but with the living God, apprehended first as a superior concrete activity and finally in prophetic experience as Absolute Actuality. So again in the infinite order of revelation man's experience of non-attainment is partially overcome by two factors in the situation, namely, (1) in that more significant than non-attainment is the abiding nearness and intimacy of eternal reality to man's spirit when the infinity of its standards is most unattainable; and (2) in that the endless progression of knowledge passes over into concrete wholeness of vision by assimilation to character through ethical response. So, in analogy with all this, in the prophetic experience of religion there are two similar factors by which the tension of contrast between the Creator and His creatures was partially overcome. For in the first place, in the advancing revelation of God's character under contrasted aspects of majesty and friendliness the tension of contrast between these aspects was resolved by their fusion within the prophetic experience into a deepening harmony, whose richness was enhanced by the inclusion of contrast within harmony. And secondly, the tension set up in religious experience by the sense of estrangement from God was partially resolved in two ways. For, on the one hand, the prophetic revelation of God was a revelation of redemptive activity. Thus, as the advancing knowledge of God in His infinite holiness and power arose in the concreteness of religious experience and under the inadequacy of man's sense of weakness and estrangement, so it was ever apprehended through the concrete events of history and interpreted in terms of saving activity and redemptive righteousness descending to meet man's need. And, on the other hand, the embodied response of ritual worship included within its scheme of mediation sacrificial offerings and processes for cleansing the defilement of sin.

Thus the revelation of the Creator to the creature returned to concreteness in the prophetic hopes and anticipations of a divine kingdom embodying an adequate mediation of redemptive activity towards man; whilst the prophetic experience of communion with God in its individual aspect deepened and sharpened the sense of Israel's vocation to a point where it was thrown into anticipatory pictures of individualised fulfilment such as that of the servant of the Lord. But underlying the whole prophetic revelation of redemptive activity with its anticipatory pictures of an adequate mediation of redemption was the primitive conception of a covenant relation between Israel's God and His worshippers. The apprehension of this covenant relation had its religious response embodied all along in the ritual cultus, which gave expression to the primary emotional reactions of religion through the instrumental mediation of sacred objects and sacrificial offerings, including provisions which concerned man's sense of estrangement through sin. Now just as the prophetic anticipations of redemptive mediation tended to become individualised in form, so the general effect of the prophetic revelation in emphasising individual values had its reactions also upon the ritual cultus. It was seen clearly that a system of religious response mediated through the instrumentality of objects in the sacrificial system could not be effective apart from the ethical response of the individual worshipper. On the other hand, the vocation of Israel was seen to be realised to some extent in the righteous, godly man who figures so prominently in the psalter, in the stories of Maccabean martyrs, and in the deeper elements of the wisdom books. Thus Israel was the recognised agent of revelation and redemption; and the Law was the official medium both of revelation and of Israel's response to God. But this scheme of mediation was manifestly inadequate; and this fact is reflected in various aspects of Jewish literature at the close of its pre-Christian development. The Law embodied revelation in the form of standards of obligation which required individual ethical response. As the course of revelation moralised the conditions of communion with God embodied in the cultus, the ethical response which such worship demanded ceased to be adequate. When the infinite order of revelation was incorporated into religion, Israel was faced with the problem of ethical non-attainment, with which that order terminates; only now that problem was intensified by its incorporation into a religious form. The Law contained too many obsolete and archaic elements for its system of mediation to be capable of moralisation in the radical way which rationalised revelation demanded. Its inadequacy, however, was most fundamental not here but at the point of its highest attainment. Religious revelation, rationalised in the form of standards of obligation embodied in institutions, fails to reach its religious end just in so far as it is moralised. For the religious response of the worshipper cannot receive adequate ethical embodiment. Thus the tension of contrast between the majesty of the Creator and the worshipper's craving for the intimacy of religious communion is once more left unresolved, because the ethical problem of non-attainment is not adequately provided for in the system of mediation. The mediation of the Law was inadequate because it left the ethical response of the individual inadequately embodied; and thus the tension of contrast between the majesty of God and the sinful estrangement of man remained.

The moralisation of revelation in the form of law, with its counterpart of ethical non-attainment, had its complement in the apocalyptic transformation of prophetic hopes. The Law emphasised the transcendent holiness of God rather than His gracious lovingkindness towards Israel. So the apocalyptic version of redemptive activity, embodied in a divine kingdom, emphasised the transcendent otherness of the kingdom and its coming manifestation rather than its gracious nearness and present power within the heart of man. As under the Law men fell back upon a routine of external response, so in the apocalyptic imagery they looked for a manifestation of divine power through external catastrophes of history. The prophets looked for a transformation of this present world-order by the gracious activity of God through the agency of a purified Israel responding to that gracious activity. In the apocalyptic scheme this world-order is beyond redemption and no human response can avail.

Thus the emphasis is laid wholly upon the transcendent power of God and His inscrutable decrees by which this present world-order will pass away and a radically new world will take its place. Similarly, whereas in the prophetic visions redemptive activity was embodied in individualised pictures, such as that of the servant of the Lord, representing Israel's true ethical response, the corresponding picture in the apocalyptic imagery is that of the Son of Man, a symbol of Israel in the first instance, but ultimately a being from another world brought on to the stage of human history by a catastrophic manifestation of divine power rather than by an ethical transformation of Israel after the flesh.[1] Thus the rabbinic and apocalyptic forms into which Judaism passed, strangely contrasted as they may appear, represented in different but complementary ways the failure of Judaism to attain an interior harmony, in which the necessary contrasts of an ultimate revelation could be held together. But this failure has its own value as a prelude to Christianity. Failure to attain harmonisation is a necessary condition of passage to further transformation. That is a general law of the cosmic series, which fulfils itself on the level of human history and in the sphere of historical religion as elsewhere. For historical religion, like man himself, is rooted in the cosmic series, and conforms to the laws which determine its successions of events.

II

As we approach the central theme of the Incarnation through the records of its revelation embodied and interpreted in the New Testament, it will be useful to recall some sentences which gathered up an earlier stage of the argument. The passage referred to runs as follows :

> The more the universal principles and standards of the eternal order with their unchangeable transcendence become immanent in human character, the more concrete and individual its activity becomes. And again the more concrete and individual character becomes the more does its activity take the form of

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[1] The distinction here drawn refers to the use of the phrase in the Book of Daniel, on the one hand, and its quite different use in the later apocalypses.

> self-transcendence and move towards concrete embodiments of the eternal order in the social organism and its interacting life. Thus the eternal order, the world of eternal ideas, forms, principles and standards is interlocked with concrete individuality in human experience; and its increasing incorporation into human life would mean the passage of history by transformation into the kingdom of God.[1]

This is indeed true. The ideas contained in the quotation attach significance to the prophetic expectations of Israel and provide a line of approach to the revelation in Christ. As an interpretation of the events recorded in the Christian gospels, however, such ideas would be both misleading and inadequate. For the synoptic gospels do not record an increasing incorporation of the eternal order into human life. What they record is not simply the continuation of all the lines of approach which we have been considering until they intersect in the figure of Jesus Christ. For the lines of approach which we have considered, whilst they require such a fulfilment as the gospels record, could not in themselves by increasing approximation have reached that fulfilment. For we have found all these lines of advance in turn leading us up to a point where they can in themselves go no further. The various aspects of revelation conveyed to us in the universe, in man and in the history of religion, all in turn seem to come to a dead end in man himself, his unfinished character, his non-attainment, his experiences of ethical failure and sinful estrangement. Yet all in turn point to such a solution as is set forth in the New Testament. What is recorded there gathers into itself all converging lines which precede; but not by a further stage of transformation within the resources of history and its processes as thus far conceived. Jesus Christ is not the product of history in its cumulative development. He stands within its succession; but He entered it from beyond. He justified the extravagance of apocalyptic dreams and came to meet man's need from beyond all human resources. He was not simply the highest response of man to God, the highest agent of redemptive activity. In Him the absolute actuality of God was incorporated into the historical process.

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[1] Ch. iv. § iv. p. 108 above.

Such at least has been the verdict of historical Christianity; and the justification of this verdict must be sought in the facts of Christian experience. Now we have to remember that the gospels were written from within the atmosphere of early Christian experience. They are at once a record of the impression which Christ made upon His first disciples and also in various degrees an interpretation of what that impression signified within the sphere of early Christian experience. Now, if this is true, it follows that we cannot sharply separate the synoptic gospels from the rest of the New Testament; nor can we proceed by the simple method of isolating the earliest strata of tradition and paying attention to nothing else. This is not a plea for ignoring the patient work of historical criticism; but a recognition of the fact that the stratification of documents and stages of interpretation which that criticism discloses should be examined as a whole and not piecemeal. The New Testament is the literature of a religious experience. It is this which gives it unity. Its parts yield up their distinctive contribution to history within the context of that whole and, we may add, within the wider context of Jewish and Gentile backgrounds of experience. The context indeed is wider still. For the gospel cannot be isolated from those wider aspects of revelation of which an interpretation has already been given in the present work. In short, the context of Jesus Christ is all that we can know of God and man from all sources of revelation and through all channels of experience. The problem of interpretation here has its analogy in considerations which have already occupied us in the present work.[1] For all interpretation of the universe as a whole begins in scientific analysis of detailed structure and finds there a key to the concrete structure of the whole. But the key to the wider whole is found in the unity which pervades detailed structure; and it is only through discerning such unities stage by stage that we can grasp the movement of the whole. Now the New Testament as a literature records a whole of religious experience in process of development, from its earliest apprehensions of a Human Life in detailed events, through stages of impression and interpretation which constitute its directive movement in history. Within the limits of the New Testament the original data of experience undergo a series of transformations from primary impressions through growing experiences to advancing interpretations. The mere fact of transformation tells us no more than that we are dealing with historical experience. For history inevitably means change, movement and transformation, precisely because history conforms to that passage of events through forms of concrete activity which is the essence of a developing universe. The significance of this movement of transformation will therefore be discerned in the unities which underlie its detailed structure. That significance must be sought in the answer to the question, as to whether the unities which are discerned in the stages of transformation can be seen to fit together in a way which gives significant unity to the organic whole of experience under consideration.

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[1] *E.g.* cp. the passage above on pp. 98–100, ch. iv. § iii.

The systematic application of this method to the organic whole of experience reflected in the New Testament would carry us far beyond the scope of the present work. We have been approaching the Incarnation through the avenues of its terminal concepts: first, the organic universe and its connexions with the eternal order; secondly, God and man as revealed to religious experience in history and interpreted in the light of other lines of revelation. We must keep to these avenues of approach through terminal concepts as we enter the field of the New Testament and Christian experience. Now if we survey the whole field of the New Testament as a literature of experience, there are three unities which can be discerned above all others as giving coherence to the whole. (1) The first of these unities consists in the fact that this experience radiates round our Lord. It is above all else Christo-centric. This is the ultimate fact upon which the interpretation of the Incarnation must depend. But within this dominating fact there are two others. (2) In the New Testament our Lord mediates a new revelation of God and of His redeeming action; and (3) in that revelation there is involved throughout a corresponding revelation of human nature, of man in his eternal significance as the object of God's love.

Now if we confine our attention in the first place to the teaching of our Lord as contained in the earliest documentary strata, ‘ Q ’ and Mark, together with such Lucan parables (*e.g.* Luke xv.) and Lucan and Matthean sayings (*e.g.* Matt. xi. 28–30) as bear in themselves the strongest marks of authenticity, then in this cycle of teaching we are confronted with a revelation which has an absolute and final character in itself ; a revelation mediated under conditions which both fulfil and transcend the prophetic mediatorial expectations of the Old Testament.[1] All the three unities which give coherence to the organic whole of experience in the New Testament are here present. The Father of whom our Lord spoke stands in an absolute and impartial relation to all men. The transcendent aspect of God is thus implicitly heightened by this universality of relationship to man as man. On the other hand, individual men and women, as such, are set in concentrated rays of light as objects of particular providence, intimate care and unfailing love, objects towards whom the redeeming activity of God is directed as to treasures of infinite worth. Thus the gracious aspect of God is revealed in terms as ultimate as human words can convey. The kingdom of God, its character and claims, are set forth as utterly transcendent over human life, yet in tension with it. It lies beyond this world-order ; yet its content of heavenly treasure is interior and native to man’s heart and need. Thus its apocalyptic form is transmuted by its interior richness of content. Its ethical claim upon man is absolute, and is stated in the form of—what was always the essence of the Law—the ultimate duties of love to God and man. Yet its claim upon ethical response transcends rabbinic legalism and all ethical codes. For it has both the universality and the interior penetration which belong to the eternal order. Thus the revelation of the Kingdom as the sphere of God’s relations with man is a revelation of a new order of reality, in which the ethical aspects of the eternal order are finally incorporated into a religious form. But this Kingdom is also incorporated into history. It is not simply proclaimed in expectation and promise. It is present in fulfilment; for it is a present reality to the mind of Jesus. The secrets of the Kingdom are His. He knows its treasure and possesses it. Its reality is beyond time and change, beyond historical succession. Yet it is embodied in Him who knows it thus. The Kingdom is His kingdom; for He is able to promise it with assurance to His little flock.

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[1] If recent theories about St. Luke’s Gospel prove to be well grounded, the first draft of that gospel may eventually be placed on a level with Q and Mark; see B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, ch. viii., and V. Taylor, *Behind the Third Gospel.*

Thus if we follow criticism as far as it can take us, we are confronted in the gospels with an absolute revelation of which Jesus is the adequate mediator. It follows then that the revelation in His teaching cannot be separated from the Lord's life and death. Once again, if we follow the synoptic outline of that story, keeping to the main facts about which critical judgment is clearest, we must hold that the disciples were right in recognising Jesus to be the Messianic Head of the Kingdom, in whom Israel's expectations reached their climax and fulfilment. This was the starting-point of all their interpretations of His Person. But, once more, we must recognise that in the experienced events, from which these interpretations took their rise, there was embodied a revelation going beyond all current expectations and in sharp conflict with accepted traditions. For in the life and death which the disciples witnessed there was a fusion of majesty and lowliness, of righteousness and meekness, of messianic authority and patient suffering, which constituted a new revelation carrying its own authentication. This revelation would, none the less, have been an intolerably difficult riddle apart from the resurrection experiences which assured them that its tension of contrasts had been resolved in the harmony of an ultimate victory. With that tension so resolved the disciples could look back, and inevitably interpret the life, death and resurrection as an embodiment and manifestation of the Kingdom set forth in the teaching. In so far as the synoptic gospels provide an interpretation as well as a record, this is the interpretation to which they point. The contrasts which are fused together in the gospel teaching of the Kingdom and its message constitute a new order of reality whose secret is possessed by the mind of Jesus. These contrasts reappear embodied in the events of the gospel story and in the Person of the Messiah. In the Messiah and His life-story the Kingdom is concretely embodied with its double revelation of God and man. That life-story issued in experiences which gave assurance that the Kingdom thus historically embodied in its Messiah had proved victorious over the limiting conditions of human existence.

III

The death of Jesus was followed by the experiences of the resurrection and of Holy Spirit bestowed. It was through the medium of these experiences that the succeeding interpretation took shape; and the New Testament as a literature is the product of these experiences and of the interpretations which they determined. We must return then to the experience as a whole and to the unities which it exhibits. Judaism had looked for a new world-order. The apostolic community were conscious of having passed into a New Order which fulfilled those expectations. The God of Israel had revealed Himself anew in saving action embodied in Jesus the Messiah; and a new Israel had come into being through a messianic outpouring of Holy Spirit. The outlook of this new Israel might be summed up in the Pauline sentence: 'the old things are passed away: behold they are become new.'[1] The outlook of the first Christians was determined by their experience of the New. Their minds were fixed upon the new fact which was Jesus the Christ, the new outpouring of Holy Spirit which was bestowed by Him, the new community in which the Spirit's gifts were manifested, the new power which the Spirit gave, the new way of life which opened out before the disciples of Jesus, the new wisdom by which they might understand the eternal purpose of God and co-operate in its fulfilment, the new covenant in which they shared through the baptism of the Spirit and the common meal of the Eucharist, above all the new *κοινωνία* or fellowship with God and with one another in which they now participated.

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[1] Or 'new things are come to pass.'

These are characteristic features of Christianity as it is reflected in the New Testament. Such new experiences, and the outlook which they involved, developed a new world-view which was eventually formulated by St. Paul in his doctrine of the *new creation*. This doctrine became distinctive of New Testament Christianity. It had its roots in the experience of the Spirit. For in the fellowship of the Spirit there was experienced a new creative activity of God. The experience of this new creative activity was the distinctive feature of the new life. It was shared in the fellowship of the new community; but it penetrated to the innermost recesses of individual life. In the apostolic letters the fellowship of the Spirit occupies a position corresponding to that of the kingdom of God in the synoptic gospels. But the two conceptions are not in opposition to one another. They meet in the figure of the exalted Christ. In the synoptic gospels the Kingdom is already embodied in the Christ and promised to His disciples. They are already entering into possession of it. It is appointed unto them, and they are to see it coming with power. In the epistles the Kingdom and its activities have passed over into the New Order embodied in the fellowship of the Spirit. For the fellowship of the Spirit is referred to the exalted Christ as to its author, who is also the focus of its present experience. The Christian life is life in the Spirit; but it is also life in Christ. 'If any man be in Christ he is a new creature (there is a new creation).' 'I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me.' 'Christ in you the hope of glory.' These are characteristic utterances of the new experience. Thus life in the Spirit is not simply an experience of immanent Spirit. It is not simply a mystical experience of crowning intimacy and interpenetration of man's spirit by the Divine Spirit, an experience of God's indwelling nearness, an interior communing of God and man in the inner life. All this is indeed included; but it is included within a relationship to the historical Christ. The distinctively Christian experience has this double character. It is an experience referred to an indwelling Spirit as to its creative ground. But the object of this experience is the indwelling Christ, who is one with the

Christ of history. The Christ of Christian experience is both indwelling, intimate, present to the heart, and also transcendent over experience as the exalted living Head of the Church. He has entered history as the embodied activity of the Kingdom; and that embodied activity is continued on one side in the Christian experience of the indwelling Christ. But in that same experience, as one of its permanent characteristics, is a reference beyond itself to the activity of the kingdom of God continuously embodied in the exalted Christ. In this double reference of Christian experience to the indwelling Christ and to the historical Christ, exalted and transcendent, there is implicit a solution of all the problems of contrast and non-attainment which we have encountered in man's experience of the eternal order and in the facts of religious experience as exemplified in Judaism.

In order to make this point clear it will be necessary to examine the organic whole of New Testament experience in certain important aspects which have not yet received in this chapter the attention which is due to them. It has been remarked that the kingdom of God as embodied in the words and life of Christ was a manifestation of the redeeming activity of God. This view of Christ's coming was quite fundamental in apostolic thought. 'For this cause was the Son of God manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil.' 'Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.' These are typical utterances. The double reference of Christian experience was accordingly occupied with this fundamental conception. Christ has indeed brought a new revelation of God—'the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.' But God is supremely revealed in His saving action. He is revealed in Christ, because Christ saves us from sin. In the teachings and actions of the historical Jesus there had been proclaimed a moving declaration of God's free forgiveness for sinners. The parable of the prodigal son had been translated into action with the words 'Thy sins are forgiven thee.' The synoptic gospels make it clear that Christ had a mission to forgive sins and that He gave His life a ransom for sinners. His blood was shed for the remission of sins.

How much of this may be interpretation by the evangelists, as distinct from the sanction of Christ's own words, we need not here inquire. It is irrelevant to the present investigation. For we are here concerned with the organic whole of experience within which the gospels were written.[1] Now in the Pauline epistles the new experience of life in the Spirit is everywhere associated with justification or reconciliation with God effected through Christ. The theme is so constant in St. Paul's thought that two illustrations will suffice. In 2 Cor. v. 14–21 the saying already quoted, 'If any man be in Christ, there is a new creation; . . . new things are come to pass,' is inserted into the middle of a passage upon the saving death of Christ; and the words in question are immediately followed by the passage: 'all things are of God who reconciled us to Himself through Christ . . . God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, not reckoning their trespasses to them.' Here we have the double reference of experience. To be 'in Christ' is the new creative experience attributed elsewhere to the Spirit or to the Spirit of Christ. This experience is referred, in the passage under consideration, to the reconciliation with God effected through the death of Christ. Again in Rom. v. 1–11 the theme is the justification and reconciliation of sinners to God through the death of Christ. Here a description of the new life of faith, hope, joy and access to God, attributed in the context to the mediatorial work of Christ, concludes with the words: 'For the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given to us.' Such passages could be multiplied indefinitely. They have their counterpart in the apostolic preaching of which we have glimpses in the Acts. Here the baptism of the Spirit is 'unto remission of sins in the name of Jesus Christ.' The general impression of the New Testament as a whole confirms the view that this deep-rooted experience of salvation from sin was a fundamental feature of life in the Spirit and was at the same time habitually referred to the historical Christ and His death as its ground and cause.

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[1] We cannot *prove* that Mark x. 45 contains *ipsissima verba* of Christ. The probability that He deliberately invested His death with sacrificial significance stands very high. But ultimately we cannot get behind early Christian interpretation; and in weighing the value of an interpretation we have to ask: what is the character and quality of the experience from which it arose?

In our Lord's preaching of the Kingdom a new righteousness had been proclaimed, which heightened the standards of ethical duty and made them seem impossible of fulfilment. At times the disciples exclaimed in despairing perplexity: 'Who then can be saved?' Yet the standard of righteousness was never lowered. St. Matthew's Gospel contains the *logion*: 'I say unto you that except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.'[1] Men had never been able to fulfil the righteousness of the law. But now their interpretations of that law were shown to be inadequate, and at the same time a new and higher righteousness was not only taught but also embodied in the life of Jesus. Thus a new revelation of the righteousness of God had been given, which laid upon man's ethical response a far more exacting demand than ever before. We have seen, however, that the kingdom of God had another aspect. Both in the teaching and in the life of our Lord crowned by the death there was a new revelation of God's gracious love for sinners. But if the gospel be regarded simply as an ethical revelation, matters are still in no better case. For the love of God to man is to be reproduced in man's ethical response. Righteousness is to consist in whole-hearted love to God and to our neighbour. Man's response is to be as God's love: 'Ye shall therefore be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.' If it be answered that God's love in Christ moves man to righteousness, that is certainly true. 'The love of Christ constraineth us.' But the problem lies deeper. For man is estranged from God and cannot repent and return to righteousness. Moreover, even though God's love move him to repentance and a righteous life, the repentance is inadequate and cannot efface the fact of past estrangement. Further, the ensuing righteousness will also be inadequate; for the repentant sinner can never fulfil the new righteousness revealed by Christ. Thus a solution of the problem within the limits of its purely ethical aspect is impossible. But the ethical aspect is transcended, when it is recognised that the solution lies in the saving activity of God's love. God's love for sinners can bring man to something more than ethical fulfilment. It can bring man back into fellowship with God. It can restore man to his true state of communion with God, within which all ethical conditions are at once transcended and carried towards their fulfilment.

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[1] Matt. v. 20.

Now it is the persistent theme of the apostolic writings that the new experience of life in the Spirit has its roots in a restoration of man from the sinful state of estrangement to a new state of fellowship with God. Neophytes enter the new community through a baptism unto remission of sins. In the new life they have access to God. All the characteristic emotional attitudes of Christian experience, faith, hope, joy, peace and the rest, flow from this fact. The new status is attributed to the gracious activity of God, the love of God 'shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given to us.' The revelation of messianic righteousness sharpened the problem of man's non-attainment. Yet that very fact of non-attainment, accentuated in its religious form as estrangement from God, was the actual ground for the necessity of the gospel. For St. Paul it was the condition which called forth a divine work of sovereign grace and love, whereby we have 'put on Christ' in 'the new man which is being renewed after the image of Him that created him.' In this great renewal it is the experience of forgiveness or reconciliation with God which is the most deeply self-evidencing fact of the Christian life. We cannot purge the memory of its hidden shames nor cleanse the tarnished conscience nor break through the bondage of enslaving habit. We cannot efface the past. But God can and does so, as every Christian penitent knows. There cannot be a more radical experience of renewal than this. In the New Testament it is constantly shown to be the basis of Christian worship and of Christian living. We can well understand why; for it is the inner renewal of the bonds which unite the soul to its Maker.

The new experience of forgiveness, justification, peace with God, reconciliation, access to the Father, reiterated in such variety of expression—this new experience is referred constantly, as we have seen, to the saving activity of the historical Jesus and in particular to a mysterious efficacy of His death. Here again it is necessary to consider the New Testament as a whole, if we are to arrive at a just estimate. The insistence upon the efficacy of Christ's death and its central position in the apostolic scheme of interpretation have their counterpart in the passion narratives of the gospels. The immense proportion of space given to those narratives in comparison with the length of the gospels is a familar fact. It cannot be accidental. The narratives clearly have a religious interest quite beyond the importance of many of the details when taken as incidents in themselves. There is interpretation implicit in the narratives, implicit by way of suggestion. The pictorial form of the narratives conveys certain firm impressions. And perhaps the impression which stands out most clearly is that of a deep contrast between the central figure and all the other human figures in the story. This contrast appears to be quite deliberately drawn by all four evangelists. Doubtless they have in this faithfully reproduced the impression made upon eye-witnesses. But it was an impression which lodged itself deeply in the mind of the early Christian community as a whole. Thus it passed back into the written gospels. The contrast here depicted gathers up into itself all the contrasts of the teaching and of the life as the gospels record them. But here the emphasis seems to fall particularly upon the most acute aspect of those contrasts, the aspect which is concerned with sin. It is a familiar theme of preachers that the passion was a revelation of human sin as well as a revelation of divine holiness and love. The theme is soundly chosen ; for it appears clearly to have been present in the minds of the evangelists themselves. The passion story regarded thus is an arraignment of the human race. In the fourth gospel the theme is explicitly formulated, and the earlier chapters of the book are arranged with this in view. But in the synoptic gospels also this aspect of the passion is the inevitable climax of the Kingdom and its message. A revelation of righteousness has been given utterly transcending men's expectation and far surpassing their powers of ethical attainment. The best of them cannot embrace it whole-heartedly, the majority are antagonised. Thus the ethical tension set up by the righteousness of the Kingdom reached its full concrete expression upon Calvary.

The reverberation of this aspect of the passion through Christian experience is seen in an altogether new attitude towards sin in those parts of the New Testament which are occupied with an interpretation of that experience. St. Paul seems to find a grim satisfaction in piling up descriptions of man's sinful state apart from the gospel. And whereas the sins of men were always 'without excuse' because they were not left without some knowledge of God, now 'a wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.'[1] In St. John's Gospel the whole revelation given in Christ is regarded as setting in motion a drama of judgment upon human sin. Its issue is to be a conviction of the world in respect 'of sin, of righteousness and of judgment.'[2] The first epistle of St. John, which sings the praises of God's love, has for the reverse side of its theme the gravity of human sin. Thus as an ethical literature the New Testament sets the gulf of contrast between God and man wider than ever; and the ground of the contrast is the ethical revelation of God mediated through Christ and mediated most fully in the events of Calvary. But it is precisely here in those same events of Calvary that the ethical problem finds its solution. For 'God commended His own love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.' The revelation of God in Christ is a revelation of 'wrath' and 'judgment' against sin; but still more is it a revelation of redemptive righteousness, that is to say a showing forth of God's righteousness in its power to save from sin and to make righteous.[3] The manifestation of God's righteousness in Christ, particularly in the events of Calvary, has thus a double character. It is at once for judgment upon sin and for salvation from sin. It carries the tension of contrast between God and sinful man to its furthest point; and it also resolves that tension in a new harmony of salvation from sin. It brings man into the two great emotional attitudes of religion at their deepest levels:

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[1] Rom. i. 18 ff. [2] John xvi. 8. [3] Rom. v. 8; i. 18; iii. 25, 26.

creature-consciousness and penitence on the one hand in the presence of divine holiness; believing joy, worshipful surrender, peace attained, on the other hand, in the presence of gracious saving love. These two aspects of Christ's saving activity and their penetration into Christian experience are fused together in one whole. But the second aspect is the wider of the two; for it ultimately takes the first up into itself. In the Christian experience of the cross and its saving effects awe and penitence do not pass away before love, joy and peace. They are taken up into thankful, worshipful love and penitent joy. And the love which evokes these emotional attitudes manifests in its gracious activity towards sinners the majesty and holiness of God. Thus the ethical revelation of God in Christ is transmuted into a religious revelation of saving grace; and the ethical response of man to that revelation is taken up by saving grace into the orbit of religion, where it is transformed into worship and communion of man's spirit with its Maker.

IV

The new life in the Spirit is rooted in the experience of the cross, that is to say the atoning activity of Christ and its saving effects. In this experience the two emotional attitudes of religion are fused in a new harmony which preserves both in their fullness. Now this twofold emotional attitude, in the Christian experience of salvation through the cross, corresponds to the double reference to Christ which was noted as characteristic of life in the Spirit. It was remarked that the distinctively Christian experience is

> referred to an indwelling Spirit as its creative ground. But the object of the experience is the indwelling Christ, who is one with the Christ of history. The Christ of Christian experience is both indwelling . . . and also transcendent over experience as the exalted living Head of the Church.[1]

Now analysis of this experience of Christ will show that there are several different elements which require to be distinguished and made explicit. It will be well to start with what lies nearest to ourselves. 'If any man be in

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[1] Pp. 170, 171 above.

Christ there is a new creation. Old things are passed away: new things are come to pass.' The New Testament has a number of different ways of describing what this means. There is, in the first place, the fact of a new kind of life experienced, a New Order manifested in the new community and experienced as a new power by the individual. This is attributed to the creative activity of Holy Spirit, variously described.[1] Thus, for example, St. Paul says, 'The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus set me free from the law of sin and of death.'[2]

The early Christians attributed the New Order to a messianic outpouring of Holy Spirit in fulfilment of prophetic expectations and in accordance, as they believed, with an explicit promise of Christ Himself. The creative activity of the Spirit in its rich variety of manifestations is described by St. Paul with much detail;[3] and the connexion of the Spirit with Christ's promise and gift, of which particulars are given in the Lucan books, is expanded into more systematic form in the Paraclete passages of the Johannine discourses. In St. Paul's treatment of the Spirit's relation to Christ there are obscurities.[4] Sometimes they seem to be regarded as interchangeable in Christian experience. But where there is some attempt to systematise and the systematisation becomes comparatively clear, it seems correct to say that the Spirit is regarded as the creative source of the new life and its endowments; whereas Christ is both object of experience and content of the new life.[5] Thus, in the exultant cry: 'I am crucified with Christ; but it is no longer I that live; but Christ liveth in me,'[6] it seems a not inapt description to say that Christ is the *content* of the new life. There is an identification of the life of the Christian with the life of Christ. Yet this identification is not absorption. This is made clear by the next sentence where it is St. Paul's own life which is lived, and lived in an attitude of dependence upon the historical Christ of Calvary. Thus in the Christo-centric life Christ is not only content of the new life, but also *object* of experience. For it is the Christ of history who enters in and becomes the content of the new life. There is, therefore, identity with distinction. The identity carries intimacy to the deepest level for which the religious mystic yearns. Thus the mystical element in religion finds a Christo-centric fulfilment in Christianity. Yet a distinction is maintained which bars the way to pantheistic absorption and keeps the Christian mystic rooted in history. Through history, as we shall see, it carries him to the transcendent aspects of religion.

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[1] The meaning of the references to 'Spirit' is often obscure; *e.g.* in Rom. viii. it is by no means clear sometimes as to whether the reference is to the Spirit of God or to the spirit of man.

[2] Rom. viii. 2.

[3] Especially in 1 Cor. xii.–xiv.

[4] Cp. also on this page n. 1.

[5] As in 1 Cor. xii.–xiv. on the one hand, and in Rom. v. and vi. on the other. See further ch. xii. of the present work and Additional Note D, pp. 469 ff.

[6] Gal. ii. 20.

But first we must follow up the theme of identity. Its most systematic exposition by St. Paul is in Rom. vi. Here the cry of exultation which appeared in the epistle to the Galatians [1] is expanded to its full meaning. The new life in the Spirit has Christ for its content. This is dramatically expressed by the identification of the Christian with Christ's death, burial and resurrection. The identification is regarded as having been effected in baptism; and the ritual of baptism becomes a symbol of the permanent law of the Christian life. There is a perpetual dying of the 'old man' and growth of the 'new man' in Christ Jesus.[2] The identification which is applied to the individual life of the baptised in this chapter has its background provided in the preceding chapters. At the beginning of chapter v. the argument that sinners are reconciled to God through the death of Christ is summed up. We have a new access to God through Christ; and a New Order has been inaugurated of which Christ is the Head, as Adam was in the rabbinic thought of St. Paul the head of the old order.[3] The new community traced its origin to Christ's death and resurrection. The passage of the individual into this new community, and into a share in its experience of the New Order, is effected through baptism. Elsewhere emphasis is laid upon the identity of the new community with its exalted Head.[1] In the death and resurrection of Christ the Kingdom was triumphantly manifested and the New Israel came into being. The principles of the Kingdom embodied in the death and resurrection continue to be embodied in the new community and its members. We recall the prophetic doctrine that the Kingdom must be embodied in a purified Israel. This embodiment has now taken place in the Messiah, and passes from Him into the new Israel and its individual members. Once again the thought of the epistles must be brought into relation to the theme of the synoptic gospels. There entry into the Kingdom is through change of heart and conversion (becoming as little children). But the Kingdom which the Messiah preached was embodied in His life, supremely tested and manifested in His death, and triumphantly established in a New Order through His resurrection and exaltation. Consequently entry into the Kingdom is now effected through identification with the Messiah and through entry into the new messianic community. These are both effected in baptism, which has for its ethical counterpart a change of heart and mind. The ethical conditions of entry into the Kingdom are reproduced in the ethical content which for St. Paul is always inseparable from the baptised life. Thus the doctrine of Rom. vi. (and other passages), that the Christian is identified with the life, death and resurrection of Christ by baptism into the new community, is the Pauline counterpart of the synoptic theme of entry into the Kingdom with its ethical conditions. In St. John's Gospel there is a further transformation in the discourse with Nicodemus, where Pauline and synoptic forms of thought are combined. Here entry into the Kingdom is by a new birth (cp. the little child of Matt. xviii. with John iii. 4); and the new birth is through the baptism of the Spirit into the new community. Here we have a number of interpretations of the same theme, passing through several stages of development. Yet there is a unity of experience underlying all variation and development. The Kingdom embodied in its Messiah has passed into the new community, the fellowship of the Spirit. The reality of the Kingdom, with all its ethical implications, is possessed in the new life of the Spirit through an identity of the Christ with His members. That identification means that the reality of the Kingdom embodied in the messianic life-story and its crowning events is reproduced in the life-story of the baptised. The content of the Christian life-story is Christ—' Christ in you the hope of glory.' Conversely, to be a Christian is to be ' in Christ,' to be taken up into His messianic life-story; to be taken up into that which has been once for all embodied in history, but which is now translated into the eternal order of reality where the Kingdom exists in power, fulfilled in its messianic Head.[1]

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[1] See above; cp. also Gal. vi. 14 and 2 Cor. iv. 10–12.

[2] Cp. Eph. iv. 22–24, and for the whole scheme of identification and its ethical consequences cp. Col. ii. 20–iii. 11.

[3] For the relation of St. Paul's thought on such matters to contemporary speculation see further ch. xi. p. 294, n. 1. Cp. also N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, pp. 118 ff.

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[1] Especially in Ephesians.

In the Pauline theme of a mystical union or identification between Christ and His members we see reflected an essential feature of the Christian religion, namely that ethical transformation takes place through and within a religious experience of the indwelling Christ. The ethical significance of this transforming experience is a matter for further consideration. Meanwhile it must be insisted once again that the facts which St. Paul was explaining in Rom. vi. and similar passages are not to be reduced to a doctrine of *imitatio Christi*. St. Paul is not simply telling us to imitate Christ. He says that vigorously, when he intends to do so.[2] Nor is he formulating a general theory of the spiritual or mystical life, which tends to conform to the type set up by Christ, because that is the best exemplar. He is asserting that the content of the Christian life is identically one with that life which was lived through in the historical events of the gospel, the life which issued in Calvary and which has now been gathered up into that Kingdom of eternal reality whose historical embodiment it was on earth. Moreover, the explanation of Christian experience which is set forth in Rom. vi. has a central place in the Pauline scheme of interpretation. It is foreshadowed in the passionate utterance of Gal. ii. 20 and is present in the statements of Gal. vi. 14 and 2 Cor. iv. 10 ff. It is developed more fully in Col. ii. 20–iii. 11, and in yet other aspects in Ephesians, where the identity of Christ and the new community is

[1] Cp. Eph. ii. 6.

[2] *E.g.* in Phil. ii. 5.

emphasised. In Eph. iv. 13 the goal of the new life in its corporate aspect is described in language which recalls the double reference of Gal. ii. 20. There the indwelling Christ is identified with the individual life, and at the same time distinction is introduced. For the individual is said to live in an attitude of dependence (ἐν πίστει) which is directed towards the historical Christ of Calvary. Similarly in Eph. iv. 13 the goal of the new community is twofold. On the one hand there is distinction. We are to attain 'unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God.' On the other hand there is identity; for we are to attain 'unto a perfect (a full-grown, R.V.) man,[1] unto a measure of maturity (stature) which belongs to the fulness of Christ.' Here again, therefore, we find both identity and distinction

Thus through the creative activity of Holy Spirit there is penetration of Christian experience by the life of Christ, and reproduction, as content within the new community and its members, of the embodied activity of the Kingdom manifested in the life, death and resurrection of Christ. But as in our experience of the eternal order the nearness and intimacy of its standards to our spirits are fused with utter transcendence and beyondness, so that what lies at the roots of our spiritual life is recognised in its very penetration to those roots to lie utterly beyond us in an immutable order which commands our allegiance; so it is also in the double reference of Christo-centric experience. Christian experience as unfolded in the New Testament finds its principle of unity in Christ. All advance is in some measure a reproduction of what is in Him. But this concrete reproduction in man of Christ as indwelling principle of unity is also referred to Christ as the historical and 'meta-historical' figure, who embodies the transcendent reality of the Kingdom and who is therefore utterly transcendent over all our experience. Now, as in our experience of the eternal order so here, our recognition of Christ as adequate mediator of the Kingdom in its transcendent reality and redeeming activity is a recognition which is bound up with the penetration of Christian experience by the indwelling

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[1] Cp. 'the new man' of other passages.

Christ in the new life of the Spirit. In the synoptic gospels we see the disciples baffled by the mysteries of the Kingdom, yet struggling to understand and being gradually initiated. Yet the initiation is always fragmentary and incomplete until the coming of the Spirit and their consequent entry into the full experience of the New Order.

Within the New Order the experience of identification with the indwelling Christ has its counterpart in an attitude of dependence upon Christ as transcendent object of experience and as historical mediator of the New Order. As the inner content of the new life in the Spirit unfolded itself, so interpretation of the historical and exalted Christ developed. The two processes are two sides of one organic whole of development which has its unity in the double reference of Christo-centric experience. As the organic whole of experience developed in its double reference, there emerged into clearer manifestation an absolute quality in the experience both on its inner and on its outer sides. The absolute quality of this experience is comparable to that which is felt in man's experience of the eternal order; and again it is in line with that developing depth, reality and richness of content which emerged in the prophetic experience of the Old Testament through advancing incorporations of the eternal order. This is the direction, therefore, in which we must look for an explanation of the developing doctrine of Christ's Person which takes place within the literature of the New Testament. That development proceeded from the side of an advancing interpretation of Christ's activity as adequate mediator of reconciliation between God and man. That reconciliation, in turn, lay at the root of the whole experience of mystical union with Christ in the life of the Spirit. It was the gateway to that experience of advancing life in Christ through the creative activity of Holy Spirit. The early Christian leaders found it terrible to contemplate any breach in the state of reconciliation. Some of them apparently found it hard to consider the possibility of such a breach through serious sin after baptism; or to find a remedy for such a case.[1] Yet for all that the reconciliation, with its adequate mediator, was an ultimate fact of experience. 'If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, and He is a propitiation for our sins.' 'If we confess our sins, He is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.' [1]

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[1] Cp. Heb. vi. 4–8 and 1 John v. 16*b*. For a detailed review of the evidence see O. D. Watkins, *A History of Penance*, vol. i.

As the reconciliation with God, experienced and enjoyed in Christ, lay at the root of the whole experience of new life in the Spirit, and had a correspondingly absolute quality; so also that reconciliation on its outer side, as a work effected by the historical redeeming action of Christ, was regarded as possessing a similar finality and completeness. It was this which determined St. Paul's refusal to compromise for a moment with the rival claims of the Law, regarded as a system of mediation. The obsoleteness of that scheme of mediation and the completeness and finality of Christ's mediatorial action provide the theme which is systematically worked out in the Epistle to the Hebrews. On the other hand, Christ as the adequate mediator of reconciliation and redemption is regarded as fulfilling all the anticipatory pictures and inadequate schemes of mediation which the Old Testament had provided. All the old instruments and agents of mediation are the shadows, of which He is the reality. In His lifetime our Lord had been acknowledged as the Davidic Messiah, the Head of the Kingdom which He proclaimed and embodied. He took to Himself the apocalyptic title 'Son of Man' and declared that the Son of Man must suffer. Early Christian writers, in any case, started from the belief that this was so. For them the suffering Messiah had become the exalted Son of Man in heaven. But He was also the righteous servant whose soul becomes or makes a guilt-offering for sin.[2] The application of this passage to our Lord has such a prominent place in the New Testament interpretation of His messianic mediation, and the point is so familiar, that it is unnecessary to particularise. Its reference to the guilt-offering probably had weighty influence in determining the Christian view that the whole sacrificial cultus had its fulfilment in Christ.[1] Thus He is also the Paschal Lamb of a new deliverance and the High Priest of a new and unchangeable dispensation. At each point where the old order offers an anticipatory suggestion, that suggestion is taken up, heightened and transformed to provide language through which the mediator of the New Order can be interpreted. In the Epistle to the Hebrews a new turn is given to that interpretation. There the whole Christian scheme of mediation is set upon a Platonic background. It is suggested that Christ and His mediatorial action belong to an eternal order of reality, whose passing shadows appeared by anticipation in the Old Testament dispensation.

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[1] 1 John ii. 1, 2; i. 9.

[2] Is. liii. 10. How far back the messianic application of this passage goes in primitive Christianity is still a debated question. Cp. F. C. Burkitt, *Christian Beginnings*, pp. 35–41, following *The Beginnings of Christianity*, eds. Foakes Jackson and K. Lake, vol. i. p. 383. For a different opinion see A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, Appended Note II., pp. 238 ff.

Further details of this aspect of New Testament interpretation are familiar in the literature which deals with the doctrine of the Atonement. The development of the interpretation has here been followed to a point where its bearing upon Christology becomes explicit; and the roots of the whole development have been traced back into the heart of an experience which reveals itself to analysis as an organic whole.

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[1] But the coincidence of the passion with the passover must have had a similar effect, whatever view be taken of the events at the Last Supper.

CHAPTER VIII

GOD AND MAN IN CHRIST. THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE

I

IN the preceding chapter the New Testament was treated as the literature of a religious experience. An analysis of early Christian experience, as it is reflected in that literature, was undertaken in respect of certain of its aspects. The object of the analysis was to trace back to its roots in experience the New Testament interpretation of Christ, as mediator of a revelation and its redeeming activity. The analysis disclosed certain characteristics of that experience which suggest that it must be regarded as an organic whole, whose wealth of content can be shown to exhibit a significant coherence. In particular the unity of content was traced to the Christo-centric character of the experience. The special character of the experience as a developing whole was found to have its principle of unity in Christ; and the double reference of that experience to Christ as at once indwelling and yet transcendent over the inner life was found to be in line with man's twofold experience of the eternal order. Historically these two ultimate forms of experience are linked together through the development of religious experience to the level of Hebrew monotheism by advancing incorporations of the eternal order into religion. We have now to explore further along these lines of thought; and in this undertaking it will be well to recall as a point of departure a conclusion reached in an earlier chapter:

> The bonds which unite reason to the eternal order and to its standards of reference are principles of unity of a more intimate and significant kind than any of those transcending principles of unity which we have found immanent in the organic series

below the level of spirit. In so far as man lives by these principles of unity on the level of spirit, he is on the way to attaining the true ends of his being. His true home is in the eternal order; and that order in its concrete actuality is God. Moreover, religious experience bears witness to a religious revelation, which claims to exhibit the bonds of unity between God and man unfolded in advancing completeness upon the field of history.[1]

It was remarked in the last chapter that one of the three fundamental unities which can be discerned in the New Testament, considered as a literature of experience, consists in the fact that there is given in that experience, taken as a whole, a new revelation of human nature, of man in his eternal significance as the object of God's love.[2] In the synoptic gospels this has two sides, corresponding to the two aspects of the Kingdom. There is first a revelation concerning the true content of human life, its character and conduct, and concerning its true relation to God. Secondly, there is a revelation of the value and significance of human beings in God's sight, as objects of divine love, and that irrespective of their actual character and conduct. Both aspects are embodied alike in our Lord's teaching and in His life and death. It is not possible to think of the two altogether apart from one another. For the eternal worth and significance of human life in God's sight is the ground of the exacting claims which the Kingdom makes upon man's response to its standards. Again, the revelation concerning the true content of human life discloses the endless possibilities of human destiny; whilst the whole realisation of that content is grounded upon man's relation of creaturely dependence and filial trust towards the Father. Thus the value of human life is made to consist not in actual attainment nor in opportunities of attainment, but in the possibilities set up by creation, and in a universal relationship of sonship wherein all alike are objects of God's love and care. This revelation set forth in our Lord's teaching was embodied in His life and death. His works of mercy were without respect of persons; and His intercourse with individual men and women showed a regard for the inherent dignity of human nature, irrespective of those facts and conditions which set men apart on different levels according to human standards of attainment. On the other hand, He never lowered the ethical claims of the Kingdom in His appeal for human response ; whilst in His whole life and death He embodied that content of human life, in respect of character and conduct, which the standards of the Kingdom required. But beyond the ethical claims of the Kingdom He also embodied man's true relation to the Father, the relation of filial trust, dependence and response. The stories of the Baptism and Temptation reveal Him as One who embodies the true response of Israel's sonship to God, a response which carries Him through to the last cry of Calvary. But in all this He stands alone and in contrast to others. They are to come to Him for refreshment which He can give. He speaks to a sinful generation ; and the revelation of what true humanity is included a revelation of what men actually are in their weakness, sinfulness and need of salvation.

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[1] See above, ch. v. § iv. p. 133.

[2] See above, p. 166.

Now if we return to a consideration of the New Testament as a whole in its attitude towards human nature, we find that the revelation of man in the reality of the Kingdom, as embodied in the words and works of Christ, passed over into the experience of the new community in the life of the Spirit. The experience of the Spirit brought a new accession of power to human weakness, a new relationship of access to God, an immense enlargement of men's horizons as to the possibilities of human nature, a new sense of human worth and dignity in the fellowship of the new community, new hopes of attainment in respect to the ethical standards of the Kingdom, and finally a new attitude of aversion from sin as the negation and contradiction of the New Order. In short the experience of life in the Spirit constitutes a revelation of a new humanity, which is referred to the creative activity of Holy Spirit as its ground. The content of the new humanity is referred to Christ in the twofold reference of Christo-centric experience. The revelation of the new humanity has been embodied once for all in Christ. As object of experience the new humanity is found in Him and referred to Him. It is so found and referred to Him, because its content is in process of reproduction in the new community and in its individual members.

Conversely, the new life which is being realised in Christian experience is recognised to be one with the new humanity of Christ, because its embodiment in the new community is traced to the events of His death and resurrection ; because it has its foundations in the reconciliation with God which those events effected ; and because the new life is moulded by reference to the standards of the Kingdom embodied in the historical Christ.

It has been said that the foundation of this new life was the reconciliation with God effected by Christ. In the experience of this reconciliation the tension of contrasts between God and man was resolved in a new harmony. That harmony was the starting-point of the new life. But the new life also moved towards a harmony which should be its ultimate goal. This aspect of Christian experience now requires fuller consideration. Human life has its roots in an experience of community with the eternal order, an experience which sets up in man a *nisus* towards fulfilment through striving towards the goods and standards of that order. This experience of the eternal order is twofold. On the one hand there is an intimate harmony between the human spirit and the standards of the eternal order, by which man's spiritual life and activity are inseparable from recognition of those standards and of their penetrating significance and inescapable kinship with the deepest elements in our being. On the other hand this experience of intimate community with the eternal order sets up a *nisus* towards fulfilment, which sets the human spirit in activity of striving towards communion with that order and attainment of its goods and standards. Thus the initial harmony whereby man has intimate community with the eternal order is the ground of a movement leading towards a more ultimate harmony. This movement towards communion with the eternal order provides the principle of unity whereby individual self-harmonisation is realised in self-determining self-transcendence. This subject has been considered in some of its aspects in an earlier chapter. In that context the social significance of this whole topic of communion with the eternal order through self-transcendence was discussed ; and non-attainment of harmonisation in both the individual and social spheres was found to be a form of the problem of evil. In an analysis of religious experience as exemplified in the Old Testament this same group of questions reappeared. There the twofoldness of man's experience of the eternal order was seen to be taken up into man's religious experience of God. Moreover, just as ethical non-attainment sets up an acute tension in man's intimate recognition of the eternal order and its standards, so, as religious experience advanced by incorporations of the eternal order, the sense of sinful estrangement from God was seen to constitute an ever-deepening problem of biblical religion, cutting across man's recognition of God and arresting the movement of the creature towards his Creator.

Now in the Christian experience of reconciliation with God through Christ the estrangement caused by sin has once more been broken down. A new harmony of God and man has been set up through the mediation of Christ. A new communion with God, and by consequence with man, has been established. The New Testament contains glowing descriptions of this new harmony in its double reference of 'at-onement,' as between God and man on the one hand and between man and man on the other.[1] But, as in the case of our experience of the eternal order, initial harmony of affinity sets up a *nisus* towards fulfilment in a more ultimate harmony, so it is in religious experience. The ultimate harmony of God and man in concrete social form was the goal towards which prophetic and apocalyptic expectation had looked in anticipatory pictures of the kingdom of God. But in Christ the Kingdom has been embodied; and through reconciliation with God in Christ the new harmony of the Kingdom—a harmony of God with man and of man with man—is already possessed and enjoyed as a present reality of Christian experience. It is possessed as a present reality in the *κοινωνία* of Holy Spirit; 'for the kingdom of God is righteousness and peace and joy in Holy Spirit.'[2] But this present reality of Christian experience is an initial harmony like that which is the ground of our communion with the eternal order.

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[1] Cp. especially Eph. ii. 11–22; Col. iii. 10, 11; Heb. xii. 18–24.

[2] Rom. xiv. 17.

The messianic righteousness, peace and joy have been imparted and are possessed here and now; but not as they shall be. For *this* experience is the starting-point of a new *nisus* towards fulfilment. It is the foretaste or ἀρραβών of the Spirit of which the New Testament speaks.[1] It is incorporation into the New Order, but not full realisation of that order. It is a transformation of religious status which includes within itself the beginnings of ethical transformation; but it is neither ethical attainment nor religious fulfilment. It is the starting-point of a movement which leads towards both in a more ultimate harmony.

In the apocalyptic atmosphere of the New Testament and of early Christian experience the tension between promise and fulfilment is carried to a white heat of expectation. The arrival of the Kingdom in the Person of its Messiah is to be followed swiftly by the winding up of the old order and the final manifestation of the Kingdom in the *parousia* of the Son of Man. The New Order as first experienced is a brief prelude to the end and to the establishment of a new heaven and a new earth. The ultimate harmony is imminent and hardly to be distinguished from the present experience of the New Order. In this attitude of mind there was immense inspiration and also danger of extravagance, disillusionment and reaction. But there was compensation in the profoundly ethical character of the Kingdom, as revealed in Christ's words and embodied in His life-story. As the experience of the New Order developed, this deeply ethical character of the revelation in Christ became increasingly prominent in the interpretation of that revelation and in the literature which it produced.[2]

II

Consequently, all the ethical conditions of the Kingdom are incorporated into the New Order. Ethical harmonisation and attainment remain to be realised. But the tension of ethical non-attainment has been resolved in the new harmony of reconciliation with God. The ethical problem of the old order is transcended in a new religious experience. So now the process of ethical harmonisation is taken up into the development of religious experience which flows from the new harmony of reconciliation with God in Christ. Now since the new harmony is initial and provides the starting-point of ethical transformation, but not its fulfilment, it follows that the old order remains within the experience of the new. We have indeed 'put off the old man and put on the new man.'[1] But this transition from the old to the new, although effected once for all by incorporation into the New Order through baptism, is not an abrupt breach with the past. The past has been taken up by transformation into the present reality of the New Order. But it remains within that present. So St. Paul writes to baptised Christians: 'Be ye transformed by the renewal of the mind.'[2] The new creation takes the place of the old order. But there is no sharp discontinuity. Transformation here follows the general law of transformation which pervades the organic universe. Here as there no violent displacement takes place. Each stage is incorporated into that which lies next beyond it and is thereby transformed in function and significance. At every stage in the creative process there is an entry of the new; and the new does not displace the old, but rather carries it forward to fulfilment. So it is also with the new creation in Christ. Everywhere there is continuity and yet transformation. Each mode and stage of revelation is, as we have seen, taken up into one more adequate. Finally, the Old Testament and its message are taken up into the New Testament, law and prophecy into the teaching and life-story of the Messiah, Israel into the Church, the old order into the new. The fulfilment of the old order takes place in the creative fact which is the coming of the New Order. Transformation means the taking of the old into the new.

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[1] Cp. Eph. i. 14.

[2] This is true not only of the New Testament, but also of the literature of sub-apostolic and ante-Nicene Christianity generally, where gnostic antinomianism and pagan licence are constantly held up to scorn.

But it means something more besides. We have seen that the upward movement of the cosmic series is on one side due to the fact that at any given stage harmony is never completely attained. There is always a provisional harmony of whole and parts through the transcending principles of unity. But this is always in passage through resolution of tensions to some more ultimate harmony which is reached by transformation. So also on the level of spirit. Various forms of non-attainment are resolved by passage into the concrete development of character; and when this fails ethical non-attainment can and does find the resolution of its problem in religious experience. So again, the failure of the Old Testament dispensation to provide adequate mediation for the revelation of redemptive activity and for its appropriate response was resolved by the passage of that dispensation into the New Order of the gospel. At each stage, therefore, the forward movement is determined by non-attainment of harmony in the previous stage. In the apocalyptic background of early Jewish-Christian thought this non-attainment of harmony is conceived on a universal cosmic scale. The old order is wasting away. 'The world passeth away and the lust thereof.' There is to be a winding up of the age. 'Heaven and earth shall pass away.' The old order is passing and the new order remains. 'My words shall not pass away.' 'He that doeth the will of God abideth for ever.'[1] But further, the old order and the new are in conflict with one another. In this respect there is a profound ethico-religious dualism in the New Testament outlook, of which the cross is the symbol. Transformation from the old order to the new takes place through tension and conflict. The various stages under which evil is manifested in the universe find their climax here. In the physical structure of the universe we are told that there is not only advance but also 'the reverse process of dissolution with degradation of higher entities to lower,' and that 'both processes—ascending and descending—are abundantly illustrated in all provinces within the kingdom of nature.'[2] We have found the same or similar processes at work on the level of spirit—developments side-tracked, pseudo-harmonisation of character, or worse forms of disintegration. In the context of religious experience these facts of arrested and frustrated spiritual development, with all the disorder and disharmony which ensue, become the materials of the state of sinful estrangement, whose significance lies in an arrest of the movement of the creature towards the Creator.

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[1] Col. iii. 9, 10.

[2] Rom. xii. 2.

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[1] 1 John ii. 17; Matt. xxiv. 3; Luke xxi. 33.

[2] C. Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p. 3.

Accordingly in the New Testament the sinful state is described as a state of disorder and spiritual disease tending towards spiritual death. The disharmonies of this state on the level of spirit involve ethical conflict, which in religious experience becomes a religious conflict between lower and higher principles. 'The flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary the one to the other.'[1] In a number of passages in the synoptic gospels our Lord proclaims the fact of this conflict and the way of its resolution. The law of self-preservation defeats itself unless it is carried up to a level where it passes beyond itself into what seems to be its opposite, but is in fact its fulfilment.[2] All lower satisfactions must be sacrificed, if need be, to the highest. The goods of this world-order must be renounced for the sake of the eternal goods of the Kingdom. 'Treasure in heaven' is the only treasure which is not subject to corruption; and the treasure of the Kingdom is one with the goods of the eternal order. The true harmony of a spiritual organism is not attained through this or that routine of succession representing a part only within the organic whole. The harmony of the spirit is not attained on lower levels which have been taken up on to the level of spirit. It is attained by passage beyond these lower levels to that which lies above them. The harmony of the spirit is attained in that self-determining activity which expresses the wholeness of spirit, and which transcends all levels taken up into spirit. But this self-determining activity is self-transcending. For the harmony of a spiritual organism is not attained within itself, but beyond itself in the eternal order. In the context of our Lord's words about losing the soul in order to find it there occurs the saying: 'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow Me.'[3] If these words are *ipsissima verba* of Christ they indicate a conviction that the activity of the Kingdom embodied in Himself and His disciples would make them spiritual outlaws from the present world-order. If, on the other hand, the words are an early Christian interpretation of the saying which follows, they represent a profound insight into the meaning of the crucifixion. In any case, the event of the crucifixion embodied in an ultimate form in history the spiritual conflict or tension between the old order and the new, between the present world-order and the Kingdom of God, which determines the ethico-religious dualism of New Testament experience.[1]

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[1] Gal. v. 17; cp. Rom. viii.

[2] Luke ix. 24, 25, and parallels.

[3] Luke ix. 23; cp. Mark viii. 34 and Matt. xvi. 24.

This dualism appears in various forms. The conflict is set between Christ and antichrist, between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdoms of this world, between light and darkness, between God and the world, between God and Satan. The more mythological forms in which the conflict was conceived dominated the mind of the Church for many centuries and underlay interpretations of Christ's redeeming activity for a thousand years. But the conflict which had its ultimate historical embodiment at Calvary passed over into the new experience of the Spirit, as the old order was taken up into the new. In the interpretation of that experience the new creation is represented as reversing the decay and degeneration which had overtaken the first creation. The new creation is a remaking and renewing of that which was otherwise passing into decay. Transformation in the New Order involves what the New Testament writers call redemption. And so we give ' thanks unto the Father who delivered us out of the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love ; in whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of sins.' [2] We observe here that redemption is made synonymous with forgiveness of sins. For in that reconciliation the new messianic righteousness is already imparted. This is the catastrophic or apocalyptic aspect of redemption. Present experience of the New Order includes implicitly all that is to follow. Yet the accomplished fact of translation into the Kingdom is consistent with the prayer 'Thy kingdom come.' Redemption is also a process, wherein the old order, having been taken up into the new, is there being refashioned into conformity with that New Order.

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[1] Cp. the interpretation of the crucifixion in terms of conflict with spiritual powers : Col. ii. 15 ; Heb. ii. 14, 15 ; John xvi. 11 ; cp. *ibid.* xiv. 30 and 1 John iii. 8.

[2] Col. i. 12–14.

According to St. Paul we have 'put off the old man with his deeds and have put on the new (τὸν νέον) which is in process of being renewed (ἀνακαινούμενον) unto knowledge according to the image of Him that created him.'[1] The theme of this saying had been fully worked out already in the argument of Rom. v.–viii. The earlier part of that argument has already received some consideration in the present work. But chapter viii. introduces new features of great importance concerning the redemption or remaking of the old order by transformation within the new life, and concerning the movement of the new life towards its ultimate harmony. In the thought of St. Paul the true life of man is life 'according to spirit' or 'in spirit.' But in man there is an inner conflict between flesh and spirit. In this conflict man in his state of sinful estrangement is helpless by himself (ch. vii.). He walks 'according to flesh' and is 'in flesh.' He does not and cannot attain to the life 'in spirit.' The higher principle 'spirit' is thus in a state of submergence or arrested development. But St. Paul tells his readers that if the Spirit of God dwells in them they are 'in spirit.' And the Spirit of God is the Spirit of Christ. Those therefore who are 'in Christ' (viii. 1) or have Christ in them (viii. 10) have 'the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus' to reinforce the principle of spirit in their inner life. In other words, in the new experience of life in the Spirit, or in Christ, there is 'no condemnation' because a new process of liberation or harmonisation has been set up. Whereas in Col. i. St. Paul states that redemption and forgiveness are the same thing, he here states the other side of the truth.[2] The state of 'no condemnation,' that is reconciliation with God, is identical with the setting in motion of a new process of ethical liberation from 'the law of sin and death.' The working of that deadly law is graphically described in chapter vii. Release from it comes by the introduction of a new and stronger law, 'the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus'—that is to say, the creative activity of Holy Spirit. In the New Order the ethical dualism of flesh and spirit is in process of being overcome by the activity of Holy Spirit, elsewhere described interchangeably as the Spirit of God, the Spirit of holiness, the Spirit of Christ.

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[1] Col. iii. 9, 10.

[2] Cp. Rom. viii. 23, where 'redemption' is an ultimate harmony contrasted with a preliminary possession of the Spirit.

In the Old Testament the Spirit of God is the creative energy of God in action, the source of life and order in nature and of prophetic inspiration in man's religious experience. In the New Testament this Spirit of God is poured out afresh in the new messianic dispensation of God's manifested holiness. The activity of God's Spirit in New Testament experience is pre-eminently the activity of the new creation, whereby in the new state of reconciliation man is liberated from a condition of ethical frustration and is carried forward towards the true goal of human nature, the ultimate harmony which is redemption completed. For man in himself is essentially incomplete, an unfinished organism, who cannot attain an autonomous harmony of self-adjustment. There is in man a principle of spirit which never can achieve its own destiny. This we have seen elsewhere constitutes the essential fact about man, as he stands at the head of the organic universe reaching out towards eternity. There is no such thing as a complete harmony of man in himself, either as an individual or in the cross-connexions of individuals within the social order. The New Testament testifies to an experience wherein all problems of ethical non-attainment are in process of solution under the transformation effected in the Christian dispensation. Our experience of the eternal order shows that harmony can be effected only by a self-transcendence which carries man utterly beyond himself; and yet that same transcendence of self must be effected by an activity which expresses the whole self and which is therefore self-determining. This paradox is the rock upon which all ethical systems are ultimately wrecked unless they are such as can be taken up into religion, where their truths receive fulfilment under transformed conditions.

Psychology, history and ethics combine to show the unfinished character of man and his incapacity for achieving a harmony of self-completed development. Yet our experience of the eternal order indicates that this cannot be the last word about human nature. The course of religious revelation intensified the problem of man's incapacity, but also pointed to a solution in the saving activity of God's love. The New Testament reaffirms the unfinished character of man, and that within the New Order as well as outside it. Notwithstanding the new harmony of reconciliation and the confidence with which it is regarded as including all that follows, the constant moral exhortations of the epistles and the general descriptions of the new life, taken together, show that in the New Order the new humanity is in process towards an ultimate fulfilment not yet attained. For example, in Col. iii. 10 the language used suggests that the new life begins in immaturity and is in process of becoming the genuinely new by transformation.[1] The New Testament, then, describes a new order of experience in which the incompleteness of man is completed in God. The solution of man's unfinished character is found in a religious process. The solution is a religious solution, because (1) the process is grounded in an initial harmony which is the product of God's redeeming action in Christ; (2) it moves towards an ultimate harmony, wherein Christ is both content and goal of the movement; and (3) both the initial harmony and the movement towards ultimate harmony are attributed to the creative activity of Holy Spirit, that is to the holy energy of God's Spirit bestowed through Christ.

III

The facts which have now been set forth about Christian experience, as described in the New Testament, amply explain the trinitarian formula of 2 Cor. xiii. and the further developments towards trinitarian doctrine in the New Testament, particularly in St. John's Gospel. But it would be premature at the present stage of investigation to undertake a discussion of that doctrine. Clearly the new facts of Christian experience had implicit in them a new revelation of God; and already within the period of apostolic experience the Old Testament revelation of monotheism was undergoing transformation in a trinitarian direction. As early, for example, as the writing of 1 Corinthians, the Holy Spirit is hypostatised by St. Paul.[1] It is difficult, however, to say precisely what this meant to the writer, in view of the tendency to hypostatisation of divine attributes and activities which was characteristic of the later Jewish literature. Elsewhere St. Paul's language about the Spirit is more obscure. We see, then, in his writings a tendency, which becomes explicit only much later in St. John's Gospel. We cannot safely say more than that. The Christological side of the developing interpretation is much clearer and more pronounced, both in St. Paul's epistles and elsewhere in the New Testament. But the older method of determining these questions by ransacking texts for dogmatic formulas is a peculiarly barren occupation. By this method it is only too probable that a series of later dogmatic interpretations will be read into the texts. As interpretations of the New Testament outlook, taken as a whole, these later dogmatic interpretations may well be entirely justifiable in their own sphere. But it is fatally unhistorical to read them back into the thought of St. Paul and his contemporaries. Dogmatic development conforms to certain general laws which characterise the development of human thought throughout history. From the general culture and intellectual traditions of its period it acquires a certain terminology; and this terminology is slowly and laboriously moulded and shaped, until its detailed meanings and systematic arrangement become comparatively stable and fixed. All this is a work of centuries; and the final result is the product of long interactions between thought-forms and language on the one hand and religious experience and its interpretations on the other. Now all great traditions in human thought are the rationalised interpretation and expression of elements in human experience which have a permanent value and significance because they are genuine experiences of reality. Thus systematic thought is a slow organic growth of interpretation and of its developing embodied expression. We cannot therefore take the embodied expression of thought which lies at the end of such a development and force it back into the minds of the earliest exponents of the experience. If, however, a dogmatic development is justifiable, it is so because, as an embodied expression (within the limits of human language and thought-forms), it rightly interprets religious experience,—experience essentially one with the original experience from which the whole interpretation started. The embodied expression of thought is a matter of slow organic growth. Behind it lie varied processes of interpretation and their interactions. Behind and beneath these again lie the essential experiences. These last are the most important factors in the whole development. For the whole embodied expression has true significance only in so far as it is expressing genuine and valuable experiences of reality, which have a permanent and significant place in human life.

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[1] τὸν νέον τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον.

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[1] 1 Cor. xii. 11.

It follows that, in the development of Christian thought, what is most permanent and unchanging is the experience which underlies all interpretations and their expression. It is true that there is an ebb and flow of experience through the centuries; that the mode in which religious experience is possessed by individuals varies; and that persons of marked individuality and great depth of experience, with power to interpret such experience, succeed in moulding the experience of others through the force of their interpretations. All this is true, and goes far to account for the rise and fall of great systems of thought. But it is also true that such individual contributions arise out of a common background of experience. Accordingly, while there is varying emphasis upon different elements in experience through the centuries, and while there are even rival interpretations which appear to be mutually incompatible, all this again is possible just because there remains a great *residuum* of experience, itself a common possession, which has shown itself to have a high degree of permanence because it is genuine experience of reality. When therefore we seek to understand the religious experience which is expressed in the literature of the New Testament, there are two meanings which can be given to the word 'understand.' Criticism of the literature, of its language and of its environment, can show us approximately what the thought-forms expressed in that language may have meant for the writers, their readers and their contemporaries. Thus we can come to understand the interpretations offered in the New Testament just in so far as the thought-forms and language, in which they are embodied, are illuminated for us by such critical methods. But the full meaning of those interpretations depends upon the organic unity of experience which underlies them. Now the intelligibility of an experience depends upon our capacity for sharing that experience. If there is nothing in our own experience answering to what underlies New Testament interpretations, then our understanding of those interpretations will be formal and external. On the other hand community of religious experience with the New Testament writers will not render their interpretations adequately intelligible apart from critical knowledge of the forms and processes in which those interpretations received embodied expression.

One of the greatest needs of to-day is a combination of these two modes of analysing New Testament thought with a view to understanding the experience which it expresses. Unfortunately it is a combination which requires such a variety of qualifications that the task may well seem altogether too formidable. On the side of the unity of experience, alone, we cannot confine our attention solely to the permanent elements in Christian experience, which we share with the early Christian community. The significance of that experience depends precisely upon its distinctive character, which sets it apart from other religions and from other forms of human experience. We may, then, share the experience; but how can we express or elucidate our understanding of it if it stands apart by itself? The answer is that we can only seek for such analogies as are available in human experience as a whole, in the hope that they may throw some light upon the subject. Such analogies may at least point to lines of interpretation which move in the right direction. If the Christian revelation is what it claims to be, the crowning revelation of God to man, all other aspects of revelation must be in some sense included within it. Consequently the experience in which it is given will include implicitly all other significant forms of human experience within its orbit. Because this is so, an interpretation of the universe and of human life as a whole provides necessary prolegomena to the analysis of Christian experience.[1]

In the interpretation which follows there are three things, which are characteristic of New Testament experience, to be borne in mind. The first two comprise the twofold reference of Christian experience to Christ (1) as *transcendent object* of experience, (2) as *indwelling content* of experience. The third point is the *creative activity* of the Spirit which underlies this experience of Christ.

Now in the interpretation of the universe and man set forth in preceding chapters revelation was traced through stages beginning in the structure of the organic series. In the first stage of revelation, that is the *progression of revelation* through the series, analysis showed a series of ascending activities in which three factors were distinguished. Thus there is first a groundwork of repetitive energy which underlies the whole movement of the series in all its stages, the bare activity of a passage of events in nature. But secondly, patterns are woven upon this repetitive energy by the entry of the new incorporating forms of the eternal order. Thus cosmic activity is diversified into the plurality and variety of natural objects through the immanence of principles of unity, which pervade the successions and groupings of events and constitute them into wholes of concrete activity. The ascending order of the series is determined by these principles of unity, which thus determine the progression of revelation in the series. But, thirdly, in the revelation of order and significance thus conveyed we discern two aspects. (*a*) On the one hand in the series of physical objects or organisms we apprehend a revelation of order and significance which transcends these objects themselves. For the objects are apprehended as embodying forms and principles of the eternal order which have a universal reference. (*b*) But on the other hand these objects are instruments in which this revelation of the eternal order is mediated, through the immanence of the forms and principles of unity in the objects. Thus there are three aspects of the series and of the progression discerned therein, which are found in conjunction in any single physical object or organism, each unit being in this respect typical of the whole series. We may summarise the three aspects thus: (1) the repetitive energy which is the groundwork of succession underlying the series and its units; (2) the transcendent forms and principles which incorporate the new from the eternal order; (3) the immanence of these forms and principles in physical objects which thus constitute instruments of their mediation.

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[1] Cp. the statement concerning revelation in ch. x. § ii. (2) on pp. 259, 260 below.

The series culminates in the spiritual organism, man; and man is able to apprehend in knowledge the order and significance of the series, as constituting a revelation of the eternal order. With man the receptivity of organisms and their reaction to environment passes by transformation to the level of apprehension and response towards the eternal order; that order being apprehended as concretely embodied in environment, and man's response to that order being embodied in the concrete activity of his own organism in its interactions with environment. Thus we pass to *the infinite order of revelation*, where man recognises his community with the eternal order and is aware of himself in self-transcending activity towards that order. Within that infinite order of revelation there is included the progression of revelation discerned in the cosmic series and given to man's knowledge as an order with advancing significance. This ordered revelation of the universe given to knowledge is included within man's total apprehension of the eternal order. But all apprehension involves response; and so within knowledge there is responsive receptivity to revelation apprehended. This responsive receptivity corresponds in quality to the degree in which the revelation penetrates the knower. This brings us to the main characteristics of that infinite order of revelation which is given to man through his community with the eternal order.

As in the first stage of revelation already considered so here there are three aspects to be distinguished in man's experience of the eternal order. (1) Underlying all forms and principles of unity recognised as transcendent and yet mediated through the universe, man apprehends the ultimate standards of the eternal order. Any given beauty of colour, shape or sound is referred to an ultimate standard of beauty. Any given connexion of order, meaning or significance is referred to an ultimate standard of truth; and so on. These standards utterly transcend man's capacity of apprehension and response. He is always seeking them, yet they are always beyond him. (2) None the less they are intimately near to him and lie at the roots of his spiritual life. The more their 'beyondness' is disclosed the more native to his spirit they are felt to be. This explains why, in the progression of knowledge referred to in the last paragraph, receptivity in knowledge corresponds in quality to the degree in which revelation penetrates the knower. For this penetration in turn corresponds to the transcendent forms and principles of the eternal order, incorporated into the objects of knowledge. The more significant the transcending principle of unity in an object, the more it penetrates the knower; and as responsive receptivity corresponds in degree to quality of penetration, so quality of penetration is determined by the degree in which the transcendent 'otherness' of the eternal order is incorporated into the object. This, however, carries us over into the third aspect of this stage of penetration. (3) For as in the progression of revelation through the organic series the forms and principles of the eternal order are woven upon a groundwork of repetitive energy in the embodied activities, that is in the physical objects through which the revelation is mediated; so in the case of the infinite order of revelation which we are now considering, the principle of embodiment continues. For, on the one hand, in knowledge, the aspects of the eternal order which are ever beyond us and yet native to our spirits are apprehended always through the embodiment of their forms, principles and standards in concrete environment. On the other hand in conduct we are carried beyond responsive receptivity into responsive activity; and this means that, whilst the standards of conduct are always beyond us, our response to them cannot reach its full measure until it is embodied in concrete activity. In this response which fulfils its course through embodiment in concrete activity we must observe that the response depends upon both the two characteristics of the eternal order and its standards referred to above.[1] For on the one hand the response is response to standards which command our allegiance precisely because as transcendent standards they are ultimate in their reference. On the other hand these standards do not simply command our allegiance with authority. They also draw and attract us, setting up a *nisus* of responsive activity, because they are so near to us that we cannot escape them. They are the very groundwork of our spiritual life, setting up in our spirits a creative activity of response. There is also the same double reference of the eternal order and its standards to our apprehension of those standards through their embodiment in concrete environment. On the one hand they enlist our responsive receptivity because they transcend all their concrete embodiments in environment. For the objects in which they are embodied hold us in tension of receptivity, just because those objects embody forms and principles of the eternal order which run up into the ultimate transcendent standards. On the other hand, again, we are held in this tension of receptivity, which constitutes apprehension from the side of the knower, because the embodied revelation penetrates our minds ; and underlying this factor of penetration is the nearness of the ultimate standards to our spirits. The forms of beauty and principles of truth penetrate our minds through their embodiment in our environment, because the ultimate standards of beauty and truth are the very groundwork of our minds in respect of the responsive receptivities of aesthetic contemplation and intellectual apprehension. The aspects of the infinite order of revelation which have now been considered may be summarised as follows : (i) The ultimate standards of the eternal order which are always beyond us. (ii) The nearness of these standards to the roots of spiritual life. (iii) The embodiment of these standards in concrete activity with twofold reference to their transcendence and nearness. The two aspects of the eternal order (i) and (ii) meet in (iii) concrete embodiment; and this embodiment is different in the two stages of man's communion with the eternal order, namely, apprehension and response. Consequently the third aspect (iii) is the most complex of the three. In the case of apprehension the route of embodied mediation is from the transcendence of the eternal order, recognised in concrete environment, to penetration of the knower's mind with the significance of the revelation; and this is possible because the standards of the eternal order underlie the knower's apprehension and hold his mind in the tension of responsive receptivity. But by this same fact, namely underlying nearness of the eternal standards, there is set up in man a *nisus* towards those standards in their transcendence. Consequently, in the case of response, the route of embodied mediation is in the reverse order, namely, from the underlying nearness of the standards, recognised in revelation's penetration of the mind, to a responsive activity wherein there is a striving towards the transcendence of the eternal standards. In this response there is a striving to embody, as content of concrete activity, those standards which, in their transcendence over experience, are yet given to experience as forms and principles embodied in objects of experience.

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[1] In (1) and (2) of this paragraph.

In *religious revelation* the reality of the eternal order is apprehended as a superior activity which evokes a twofold emotional attitude corresponding to the twofoldness which we experience in our attitude to the eternal order. The Bible records a progression of this revelation to a stage where the superior activity of Israel's God is recognised in such ultimate terms that we are confronted in prophetic experience with a revelation of Absolute Actuality. Communion with the eternal order has now been incorporated into communion with the concrete actuality of that order. Within the religious context the main aspects of revelation in its other stages are here gathered up and transformed in a new concrete whole of experience. The general tendency of the whole biblical revelation is towards fusion of the contrasted aspects of God in deeper harmonies of revelation, experience and response. The various aspects of the revelation are gathered up in the conception of the kingdom of God, which is the sphere of God's manifested redeeming activity and of Israel's true response to that activity. The anticipation of the Kingdom moves towards individual embodiment of God's transcendent claims and redeeming activity on the one hand, and of Israel's true response on the other hand. There is also an anticipation that the creative energy of Holy Spirit must be poured out in the manifestation of the Kingdom and must accompany Israel's true response to God's redeeming activity.

IV

The fulfilment of religious revelation in Christ brings into much clearer light the cross-connexions of religion with our experience of the eternal order and of revelation in all its stages. All through the stages of revelation up to experience of the New Order in Christ there is a general persistence of certain aspects through all transformations. There is a definite continuity of structure in the character of revelation, in the modes of its mediation, and in the processes by which it passes into experience and evokes response. Thus there is an organic whole of human experience which is implicit in all its aspects, and which is gathered up into religious fulfilment in the organic whole of experience reflected in the New Testament. All the aspects of experience and of its implications which we have been considering provide analogies to New Testament experience. But this is the case because they are something more than illuminating analogies. They are lines which converge towards the Christian experience of Christ and which find their centre of fulfilment there.

Let us select first the idea of creative activity. At the base of the physical universe is repetitive energy without which there could be, so far as we can see, no order or continuity in nature. Reasons were given for referring this energy to the creative activity of the eternal order, because upon the groundwork of this energy patterns of the new are woven by creative activity of the eternal order.[1] This physical energy referred to creative activity underlies the ascending cosmic series; and at the summit of the series it underlies man on the side of his organic relation to the series. But here on the level of spirit a new form of energy appears which may be called spiritual activity. This energy of spirit cannot be analysed into successions of events, although such successions are taken up into it. It is itself the crowning entry of the new on to the groundwork of physical energy in the series. This activity of spirit is referred to a new manifestation of creative activity flowing from the eternal order. For at the roots of the human spirit and its activity is the underlying nearness of the eternal order, which is the groundwork of man's community with that order; which makes possible the penetration of his mind by its revelations; and which impels man to communion with that order through responsive receptivity and activity. Thirdly, in religion man as spiritual activity recognises his own dependence upon creative activity experienced in its concreteness as superior activity of Spirit. In the Old Testament Israel recognised an activity of God's Spirit which takes hold of the spirit of man, inspires him to receive revelations and empowers him to co-operate with the saving activity of God. Ultimately a special activity of Holy Spirit becomes an indispensable accompaniment of the Kingdom in its manifestations,[1] whilst a universal creative energy of Spirit is discerned in the universe and referred to the power, word and wisdom of a sovereign Creator.[2] On the theistic view of reality, which is assumed at this stage of the argument, the eternal order and God as Absolute Actuality are one. Consequently the physical energy of the universe and the spiritual activity of man are referred to the creative activity of God, an activity which in the Old Testament revelation is called Holy Spirit. In the New Testament the arrival of the Kingdom and of its redeeming activity is accompanied by a new creative activity of Holy Spirit; just as the entry of the eternal order on the level of spirit at the summit of the cosmic series was accompanied by a new creative activity of that order underlying man's spiritual activity. Thus the creative activity of God's Spirit underlies the physical energy of the universe and the spiritual activity of man. From this creative activity flows that weaving of new patterns which is the organic development of the universe and that spiritual activity of man which is the highest of those patterns. The same creative activity underlies man's penetration by the eternal order, enabling him to apprehend its revelations and inspiring him to respond to its standards. In the context of religion it inspires man to apprehend revelations of God and to co-operate with the redeeming activity of His Kingdom by response to its claims. Finally all these stages of creative activity are crowned in the New Testament by a new creation which overshadows the old creation. The activity of the Spirit is now concentrated within the new redemptive order of experience in the new community. The old order of creation, incomplete, inadequate and wasting away, is taken up to be redeemed and transformed in the new creation.

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[1] See above, pp. 83–89.

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[1] Cp. Is. xi. 2; xxxii. 15; lxi. 1; Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 27; xxxvii. 14.

[2] Ps. civ. 30; Ezek. ii. 2; Wisdom i. 7; vii. 22; viii. 1; xii. 1.

The series of creative activities underlie ascending forms of energy and activity, which have their culmination in the New Order and in its experience of a new creative activity of the Spirit. But the New Order has Christ for its transcendent object of experience, its indwelling content of experience, and its ultimate goal of experience. In all of these respects the New Order takes up into itself the structure and directive movement of the organic universe, of man's community with the eternal order, and of religion in its historical development. The creative activity of the Spirit in the New Order is not a general activity of spirit. It is the specific activity of the Spirit of Christ. The Spirit is referred to the promise and gift of Christ. The new experience of the Spirit is referred interchangeably to the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ and to the indwelling of Christ. The goal of the Spirit's new creative activity is to bring men to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ. The cosmic aspects of the New Order in this connexion were fully grasped by St. Paul. The renewal of man involves the renewal of creation. The redemption of creation is included in the scope of that movement wherein the Spirit brings man to ultimate harmony in

Christ.[1] In the light of these facts of Christian experience and of its Pauline interpretation the relation of creative activity to the structure of the universe and to the stages of human experience becomes significant. At each stage there are two aspects of creative activity. In the organic universe creative activity of the eternal order flows down by incorporation of transcendent forms and principles into an ascending series of physical objects. Yet the patterns of these objects are woven upon a groundwork of repetitive energy with its successions of events. Consequently, the groundwork being receptive of the new which comes by creative activity, this creative activity must be conceived as flowing down in the transcendent forms and principles of the new and at the same time as constituting the underlying ground of the organic universe. But the same double aspect of creative activity appears in man's experience of the eternal order. The spiritual activity of man, in communion with the eternal order, is dependent upon its transcendent standards. Those standards in their 'beyondness' hold man in tension of apprehension and response, command the allegiance of his spirit, and determine the course of his true spiritual activity. But they also underlie the roots of his spirit and set up in him a *nisus* towards eternity. The spiritual activity of man finds in the creative activity of the eternal order both its transcendent source and its underlying ground. In the religious experience of the Old Testament the Spirit comes upon the agents of revelation and of redemptive activity as a gift of God and is to be poured out from on high in the coming manifestation of the Kingdom. Yet the Spirit of God also underlies the order of creation and the inner life of man.[2] But behind these occasional references lie the much wider facts of religious experience, the contrasted aspects of God and of man's dependence upon God, and the incorporation of the twofold creative activity of the eternal order into this experience in Hebrew monotheism. Finally, in the New Testament the new creative activity of the Spirit, which is the underlying ground of the new experience, is referred to Christ as its transcendent source, and at the same time

[1] See the whole argument of Rom. viii.

[2] Cp. Ps. li. 11; cxxxix. 7; and see also p. 208, n. 2, above.

brings the new experience of Christ into the inner life of man.[1]

We must now trace the continuity of structure which culminates in the Christo-centric aspects of Christian experience. The creative activity of the eternal order, as transcendent source and underlying ground, weaves patterns of the new in an ascending series of activities. Here there is an advancing incorporation of the eternal order as immanent content embodied in the ascending series of activities, rising to the level of spirit and reaching its proximate goal in man, where the embodied content of the eternal order is in the form of self-determining individuality. In man's experience of communion with the eternal order the embodiment of that order as content of man's spiritual life has the two aspects of apprehension and response. In man's apprehension of the eternal order the route of embodiment is from the transcendent standards, through concrete environment embodying their revelations, to penetration of the knower's mind. Thus the eternal order is recognised in objects of experience transcending the mind, and at the same time as content of experience penetrating the mind. In man's response to the eternal order the route of embodiment is from within outwards; from penetration of the mind by the eternal order as content of experience to embodiment of that order and its transcendent standards in responsive activity. Thus the first route of embodiment passes from the creative activity of the transcendent standards to those standards as underlying ground of penetration; while the second route of embodiment passes from this underlying activity of the eternal order through responsive activity towards embodied fulfilment of that order. But the proximate goal of this process is embodiment of the eternal order as content of human character and conduct; and the inadequacy of this embodiment of content requires that man's experience of the eternal order should be taken up by transformation into religious experience. The Old Testament shows that, when so taken up into religious experience, the eternal order and its revelations of reality tend to pass into the form of the kingdom of God and its redeeming activity as transcendent object of experience. In prophetic experience the transcendent revelation of God and of His redeeming activity becomes present content of experience; and the adequate embodiment of the Kingdom as object of experience is confidently expected. The goal of the Old Testament religion is embodiment of the kingdom of God. But Israel and the Law alike are inadequate to mediate the embodiment of the Kingdom's redemptive activity and the due response to that activity. In the New Testament the transcendent reality of the Kingdom and its redemptive activity are adequately embodied in Christ. In the New Order of Christian experience the redeeming activity of the Kingdom in Christ becomes transcendent object of experience. But Christ as transcendent object of experience is also present as indwelling content of experience through the underlying creative activity of the Spirit. Thus the eternal standards of the Kingdom pass to their embodiment in the historical and exalted Christ; and then in the new harmony of the Spirit they pass on to penetrate man's spirit as content through the indwelling of Christ. This route of embodiment has its corresponding sequel in the responsive movement of the new humanity towards its goal. Christ is the content of that movement; for the new humanity of the new community and its members is constituted in Him. He is, finally, the adequate goal of the movement towards which mankind in the New Order, and the whole structure of creation in man, move to their fulfilment. The first route of embodiment starts from the Absolute Actuality of God and, through the adequate mediation of the historical Christ, passes to penetration of man's spirit through the indwelling and underlying activity of Holy Spirit. The second route of embodiment starts from this new creative activity of the Spirit. This activity, which lies at the roots of man's spirit, sets up in him a *nisus* towards God as revealed in Christ, who is the embodiment of the Kingdom and its standards. This responsive movement has for its content the indwelling Christ who is 'being formed in' us and who in us is 'the hope of glory.'[1] Thus 'the new man is being renewed according to the image of Him who created him.'[2] And the goal of this movement is the cosmic Christ who fulfils and sums up in Himself the universe, man and history.[1]

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[1] See further ch. xii.

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[1] Gal. iv. 19; Col. i. 27.

[2] Col. iii. 10; cp. Rom. viii. 29.

The conclusion of this analysis of the New Testament as a literature of experience is, in the first place, that the experience there portrayed is an organic whole, containing its own unities of structure and determining its own lines of interpretation. But secondly, on analysis, the structure of this experience is found to be continuous with the general structure of human experience, both in its stages and as a whole, including man's experience of the universe and of history, of the eternal order and of religion. Thirdly, while continuous in structure with all these forms of experience, it is found to include them all implicitly, in the sense that they are all taken up by transformation in respect of both form and content into the New Order of experience which is centred in Christ. Finally, the detailed significance of this last statement requires the doctrine of the Incarnation for its adequate explanation. For first the organic universe, man and history are products of the creative activity of the eternal order, which moves towards embodiment in concrete activity. But none of these embodiments are adequate; while their ascending movement of direction requires fulfilment in the concrete activities of man and of history. For religious experience adequately rationalised the eternal order is one with the actuality of God, and the true goal of history is the kingdom of God, which embodies the eternal order in history. In the New Testament the eternal order passes over into the kingdom of God; and the kingdom of God is adequately embodied in Christ and realised in the New Order. But the eternal order is one with the actuality of God. Consequently Christ, as the embodiment of the kingdom of God, which brings the eternal order to adequate incorporation in history, is Himself the actuality of God embodied and incorporated into history. Thus He is also the goal of the organic universe, of man and of history, and sums them up in Himself. For the eternal order provides the principles of unity which determine the directive movement of the organic universe, of man and of history. But these principles of unity, while adequate in their totality to determine the directive movement of the cosmic process, are not adequate to provide a goal in which that process can come to rest. The process passes beyond each of them; and the self-determining activity of man, which is the highest of these principles in the series, is by its very nature self-transcending and therefore incapable of providing a last term to the process. But if Christ is the adequate embodiment of the kingdom of God, He embraces within Himself the eternal order and all its principles of unity. He is therefore the adequate goal of history, and takes up the universe and man into Himself. These truths are expressed in the more developed Christological interpretations of St. Paul and St. John. If Christ is the goal of the universe, of man and of history, He must be their creative source and ground. If He is the Head of the new creation, He must be the Author of the first creation. If He embodies adequately the kingdom of God, He must be identified with the eternal order which is one with God.

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[1] Col. i. 15–20; Eph. i. 10; iv. 13. Cp. the previous note.

ADDITIONAL NOTE B

Forms, Principles and Standards

This threefold phrase occurs frequently in the pages of the present work. It serves to discriminate the *aspects* through which the eternal order is refracted to us in its stages of revelation. The phrase has more than one possible application. For example, *forms* suggest aesthetic experience of one sort or another. So, too, *principles* suggest order and arrangement which can be subjected to intellectual analysis. Thus we refer to principles of scientific knowledge or of correct conduct. But conduct involves something more than formal rules, if it is to escape the tyranny of legalism. This 'something more' is conveyed by *standards* which determine the ideals of life and the direction in which human life is to move. Thus the whole phrase *forms, principles and standards* sums up the differentiation of the eternal order into the three aspects, beauty, truth and goodness, which together comprise 'the infinite order of revelation.' This application of the phrase is outlined above on p. 144. But there is another possible application. Knowledge and conduct, apprehension and response, are both alike based upon sense-experience. Principles of knowledge and action, and standards of conduct, are not apprehended in the abstract. Their significance is revealed to us through the medium of the external world, and through our interactions with that world in sense-experience. All our communion with the eternal order in actual fact is mediated to us through the channels of sense-experience. The outward *forms* of the external world are thus the starting-points of our spiritual experiences.[1] The whole fabric of our communion with the eternal order and the whole development of religion are built up from that foundation. Thus comes the primacy of experience over all rationalisations, or of 'aesthetic experience' over 'cognitive and conceptive experience.' The last phrase is taken from a paragraph of A. N. Whitehead's *Religion in the Making*, with which the present writer finds himself in close agreement. 'The metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds the foundations of the world in the aesthetic experience, rather than—as with Kant—in the cognitive and conceptive experience. All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of the aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God' (*op. cit.* pp. 104, 105).

But in his third *Critique* Kant himself came back to 'aesthetic experience.' There he taught that such experience issues in two different kinds of judgment, the first 'aesthetical' and the second 'teleological.' The former refers to 'the beautiful'; the latter is occupied with 'judging of internal purposiveness in organized beings.' Cp. note 2 on p. 31 of the present work. In the text illustrations of these two kinds of judgment are given on pp. 127, 128 (and compare the note *ad loc.*). The first of these has reference to 'the infinite order of revelation,' the second to 'the progression of revelation' in the series. The organic interpretation of nature takes place in this latter field. The traditional teleology has been subjected to two doses of criticism and reconstruction in the modern era. The first of these is represented by Kant in his first and third *Critiques*. The second has been applied in two phases, represented respectively by Bergson and Whitehead. *L'Évolution Créatrice* provides no permanent resting-place. Its construction is not equal to its criticism. It rejects 'radical finalism,' but acknowledges its inability to break away from finalism altogether (see especially *op. cit.* ch. i.). It does not profess to cover the ground. It may be regarded as a plea for concepts adequate to the biological sciences. With Whitehead criticism is succeeded by a reconstruction, which can be summarised in his own words: 'In the process of analysing the character of nature in itself, we find that the emergence of organisms depends on a selective activity which is akin to purpose' (*Science and the Modern World*, 1st ed., pp. 157, 158).

In the present work it is maintained that sensible forms conduct us to organic wholes in which we discern principles of unity. In the next stage we move on from detailed structure to principles of order in the universe as a whole, and so finally to the directive movement of the series (cp. the three stages described above on pp. 98–100). But for the *direction of life* we require standards. Apprehension passes into response. The eternal order makes demands upon its citizens, who recognise their true place as subjects in its realm. Now the response to the eternal order pertains to conduct. So ethical non-attainment is the ultimate clash with the standards of reference in that order. On the other hand the eternal order as one whole commands our allegiance. So we refer 'forms' to an ultimate standard of beauty and 'principles' of knowledge to an ultimate standard of truth (cp. the language used in the text on pp. 146–148 and 204–206). So the *aspects* refracted to our apprehension become *standards* claiming our response.

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[1] With 'outward forms' or 'sensible forms' cp. A. N. Whitehead's term 'sense-objects,' on which see further Additional Note C, p. 456 below.

PART II

THE INCARNATION AND CHRISTIAN THEISM

CHAPTER IX

THE INCARNATION AND ORGANIC CONCEPTIONS

I

IN the preceding chapters a religious interpretation of the organic universe has been undertaken, which sought to show the grounds of Christian theism in successive stages of experience reaching their climax in the distinctive religious experience embodied in the New Testament. These stages of experience correspond broadly to four domains or spheres which have been called respectively the organic or cosmic series, the eternal order, the kingdom of God, and the new order of life in the Spirit. In the line of thought which surveyed these stages of experience with the successive revelations of reality which they mediate two conclusions were reached. The first of these was that the problems and difficulties which emerged at each of the earlier stages passed over to receive their proximate solution in each case in the next stage beyond. The second conclusion was that, while each stage of experience exhibits its own typical organic unity and coherence, there is a definite continuity of structure which runs through all the stages and binds them together. These two conclusions, when brought together, were represented as involving a third and final conclusion. This conclusion is that the stages of experience embodied in the New Testament stand in such relation to the rest of human experience as to warrant the conviction that the historical Person Jesus Christ is to be identified with that Absolute Actuality which we call God, the ground of all stages of our experience and the source of all revelations of reality which they mediate to us.

Some of the questions raised at the beginning of chapter v have been occupying our attention. But one of these questions still remains to be considered, the question, namely, 'as to how the doctrine of the Incarnation can be stated in relation to the organic conception of the universe adopted here.'[1] This question must now be brought into the course of the argument. It will be well, however, to bear in mind the limitations which the subject imposes. There is no possible way of *demonstrating* that an interpretation of successive stages of experience, built up round certain principles, requires the historic doctrine of the Incarnation as its necessary culmination. In this respect that doctrine stands on the same footing as the theist's belief in God. In both cases there will always be alternative explanations of the facts. All that can be reasonably attempted in either case is to state the substance of the belief in terms which cohere with the whole scheme of interpretation adopted, and to rely upon such a positive statement to make plain that the ground occupied by alternative explanations is adequately accounted for in *this* explanation without the difficulties and disadvantages which accompany those alternatives.

In the interpretation of the universe here adopted, the tendencies and characteristics manifested in the cosmic series represent a movement whereby there is advancing incorporation of divine activity into the developing organism of creation. We have seen further that this movement is not and cannot be completed on the level proper to the human organism as we know it in the series. For the cosmic series, of which man is the last term known to us, bears an unfinished character; and the human organism itself, whether in its individual or in its social form, is an unfinished product. No adequate end for the series can be found within itself; for its unfinished last term points beyond itself to some principle of unification transcending the series as we know it and belonging to another order of reality. There are here two fundamental principles which determine the characteristics of the created universe and the mode of its relation to, and dependence upon, the absolute actuality of God. In Aristotelian language God is both the efficient cause and the final cause of the world. God is both the ground and originator of the series of created activities which we call creatures, and also the end towards which the whole series moves forward and upward until it returns to rest in the eternity from which it proceeded. Now this double dependence of creation upon God is unfolded in a succession of stages. Besides the underlying activity of creative energy there is a series of incorporations of creative activity at successive levels up to the level where man appears. On that level again a new type of affinity between creation and God appears in spiritual organisms; and corresponding to this new type of affinity there is a new mode of creative activity to which the name of revelation has been given. In the sphere of religious experience again revelation passes over into the form of redeeming activity. The Incarnation came as the climax of this ascending curve of movement, whereby the creative activity of God has been incorporated into time and history. In particular there are two aspects in this movement of incorporation, in respect of which the Incarnation provides the climax of the whole movement. These two aspects are on the one hand universality, and on the other hand concrete individuality. The phases through which these two aspects pass, in their combination through creative activity, mark a pattern of directive movement in the passage of that creative activity towards its climax in the Incarnation.

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[1] See p. 111 above.

At the base of the cosmic series a kind of abstractive universality is dominant, and the aspect of concreteness is at a minimum. From this limit the series rises through stages of advance. The law of advance is that the forms and principles of universality are incorporated with increasing richness into concrete activities whose proximate goal is individuality on the level of spirit. On that level the combination of the two principles undergoes a new transformation. For here concrete individuality is no longer a bare instrument of creative activity and its universality. It has become a self-determining agent co-operating purposively with principles and standards of universality through apprehension of, and response to, revelations of creative activity. Concrete individuality has thus passed into a new cycle of development, where it can attain the higher concreteness of spiritual character through co-operation with the universality of the eternal order. In principle it has affinity with all aspects of that order. Consequently here, whilst concrete individuality has entered a domain of endless significance, its nexus with universality is in principle all-embracing. The structure of universality is built into man's spirit, and through the gateways of that structure all the rich splendour of eternity may flow. Again, from the other side concrete individuality has here become the co-operative organ of eternity's movement of incorporation. But, on the other hand, we must be on our guard against that theory of divine immanence which makes individuality a mere sieve or channel through which eternity flows ; a point where universal spirit is focused, but without ultimate significance in itself. The significance of individuality is ultimate ; so that the more deeply the structure of universality is incorporated into it, the more richly does the principle of individuality become actualised. Thus we gain light on the ultimate characteristics of reality and are prepared for its fuller disclosure in the sphere of religious experience. The conception of God implicit in the biblical revelation shows us that the two aspects of creative activity flow from one source, in which they are not two but one Absolute Reality. God is the true 'concrete universal,' from whose self-revelation we can dimly discern that universality is in its essence utterly concrete ; and that there is in the principle of concrete individuality nothing to hinder us from believing it to be, in its ultimate form, one with universality.

This conception of God stands between its two great rivals, (1) the conception of an impersonal Absolute, in which universality is ultimate and concrete individuality has no significance, and (2) the conception which in this way or in that identifies God with the developing universe. Each of these rival conceptions takes one aspect in the double pattern of creative activity to govern its whole interpretation. The theistic conception implicit in the biblical revelation finds an eternal significance in concrete developing individuality and in the historical process of the universe to which that developing concreteness belongs, precisely because these are interlaced with eternity and with its universality. This interpretation of the concrete developing in time requires for its background the belief that God is the eternally concrete Reality, in whom the principles or aspects of universality and of individuality are one. But how can man have assurance that this is the true interpretation of God and of His creation? For as we have seen in earlier chapters there are elements in our experience which are hostile to this interpretation; and in consequence there are ever near at hand attitudes of mind which lead to alternative interpretations. The Incarnation is the divine answer to this situation. If we regard it for the moment simply as a revelation, and if we fix attention solely on the form of that revelation as distinguished from its rich spiritual content, then the Incarnation embodies an assurance that both God and the universe of His creation are such as theistic belief declares them to be. For the doctrine of the Incarnation declares that Jesus Christ is Absolute Actuality incorporated into history in the form of concrete individuality. In the language of theology Jesus Christ is very God and very man. He possesses the whole 'nature' of God and the whole 'nature' of man. In respect of His Godhead He possesses the transcendent universality which is proper to deity. He possesses it in the mode which, on the theistic view of God, is proper to deity, namely, as utterly one with concrete individuality. This identity of universality and concrete individuality is what is meant by the phrase 'Absolute Actuality.' In the traditional language of theology He is a Divine Person possessing all the attributes of the Godhead. But He is also very man, 'the man Christ Jesus.' In respect of His manhood He stands in the succession of history in the form of concrete individuality organically united to the human race and so to the whole organism of creation. But this is true in a sense peculiar to Himself and precisely determined by His Godhead. The further particularisation of these points and of the language in which they can be given detailed expression will require fuller consideration. The immediate point of importance is that the Incarnation was possible precisely because the theistic conception of God is true, that is to say, because the principles or aspects of universality and of concrete individuality are one in God. Conversely, the conviction that the doctrine of the Incarnation is required to explain adequately the Christian experience of Christ, as embodied in the New Testament and in the Church, is a conviction which also supports the theistic conception of God. Thus the Christian conception of God springs from a historical revelation given in the stages of religious experience which are recorded in the Bible. This historical experience and the conceptions arising from it have been the main support of theism in human thought; and among these supporting conceptions the doctrine of the Incarnation has been pre-eminent. The conclusion is that the theistic interpretation of the universe and the doctrine of the Incarnation mutually cohere within a larger whole of interpretation to which they both belong; and that this ultimate interpretation, which may be called Christian theism, rests not upon this or that domain of experience, but upon all the stages and levels of experience which have been the material of the present inquiry, and which are interlocked in continuity of structure.

II

The Incarnation, however, is something very much more than a revelation assuring us of certain truths concerning God and the universe. Christ is not only the truth, but also the way and the life. In the sphere of religious experience revelation passes into the form of redeeming activity; and the Incarnation is essentially the redeeming activity of God opening up the true way of life for man. The Incarnation is not primarily a theoretical answer to the intellectual problems involved in theistic belief, although it includes such an answer implicitly. It illuminates the mind, because it liberates the whole spirit of man. It vindicates the Creator to reason by restoring the Creator's handiwork, and by re-establishing the movement of creation towards its goal in God. Thus creation is taken up into redemption and the created organism is taken up into union with Christ, who is its Creator-Redeemer. The manner of this union is the point which must now be considered. We are confronted with the question to which the whole course of the argument has been leading: how can the doctrine of the Incarnation be stated in relation to the organic conception of the universe? We must recall to mind some of the materials for an answer to this question which were set forth at earlier stages of the present work.

If the question is to be answered we must seek for clues in the general structure of the organic universe. Now there are, broadly speaking, two aspects of the organic series from which we may hope for guidance. These are (1) the mode of ascent or transformation from one level to another in the upward movement of the series, and (2) the nexus of the series with the eternal order through transcending principles of unity. On the one hand the series passes from one level to another by transformation; and on the other hand each transformation is effected through the entry of a new principle of unity into the series at that point. In each new level which appears all the previous levels are representatively taken up and included; so that at the summit of the series man is in some sense a microcosm of the whole, including within himself all levels of the series. The series is thus taken up in man on to the level of spirit. But it does not reach its end in man, because he shares the unfinished character of the series. Now if the Incarnation brings creation to its true end in God, this must mean that the cosmic series is gathered up into the human organism of Jesus Christ; so that in Him it attains its destiny through the 'taking of the manhood into God,' the *assumptio humanitatis* to which the *quicunque vult* refers in its definition of the Incarnation. As the series is taken up into the human organism, so in Christ the human organism is taken up on to the 'level' of deity. The idea of the 'deification' of man in Christ was one of the great themes of patristic thought.[1] But this idea must be carefully distinguished from that type of Christology which is commonly designated as 'adoptionism.' The phrase in the *quicunque vult* requires to be balanced by other phrases such as *incarnatio* and ἐνανθρώπησις. 'The Word was God . . . and the Word was made flesh.' 'Very God of very God . . . came down from heaven and was incarnate.' If we are to do justice to the language of St. John's Gospel and of the Nicene Creed, attention must be paid to the second aspect of the organic series referred to above, namely, the nexus of the series with the eternal order through transcending principles of unity. The status of any organism in the series is determined by that principle of unity which is its *highest law of being*. In a complex organism there are as many laws of being as there are levels of the series included in that particular organic whole. But one only of such laws is that organism's highest law of being, namely, that principle of unity which transcends all levels and parts in the organism, because it is the principle of the whole. Now the organic series is marked by an ascending sequence of such transcending principles of unity; and these in turn mark an advancing curve of creative activity whose law of progression is that the principle of transcendence flows down from the eternal order with increasing significance into the developing series. Every organism, then, is a product of creative activity incorporating itself into the series; and the status of each organism is determined by the mode of incorporation which is characteristic of its own level in the series. Moreover, at each new level creative activity gathers up organic structures and systems from lower levels and transforms them into the materials of a new and higher organism.

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[1] Cp. the well-known words of St. Athanasius upon this topic: *Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεωποιηθῶμεν* (*De Incarnatione*, ch. 54; *PG* xxv. 192 B.). But the idea is a familiar one from St. Irenaeus onwards.

Returning then to the Incarnation, we are bound to assume that, if the doctrine is to be made intelligible, these principles which we can discern in the structure of the organic universe *must have a bearing upon it.* The difficulty and importance of the subject require us to move with the utmost care and reverence. Yet reverence itself requires us to use such light as we possess, remembering always the inadequacy of human thoughts and words to the explication of so high a mystery. First then it must be remembered that, whilst the Incarnation is in line with the ascending curve of creative activity, it is not simply a continuation of that curve. The Christ whom Christians worship as God is not a product of creative activity, any more than He is the product of emergent evolution or of an Idea or Spirit immanent in a developing universe. There are great differences philosophically between the various current systems of thought to which allusion is here made. But, so far as religious interests are concerned, they all alike fall outside the orbit of Christian experience as analysed in chapter vii. of this work. For that experience points to a new creation; and this new creation, as described in the New Testament, is not simply the projection and continuation of the curve of ascent which marks the pathway of creative activity in its incorporation into the organic series. On the contrary, it is the renovation and restoration of that organic series. We must distinguish here between (*a*) the ascending movement of creative activity and (*b*) the movement of the series towards its end in God. The former appears in the passage of the series from one level to another up to the level of spirit. At that point the series comes in view of its end; since man recognises that his true end lies beyond the series in the eternal order and in God. But the movement of the series towards its end is balked by non-attainment. The problem of non-attainment in man's experience is in no sense solved by the passage of creative activity, first into the form of revelation, and then finally into the form of redemptive activity which characterised the Old Testament dispensation. These transformations provided a preparation for the solution of the problem by making man aware of intolerable dislocations in his experience, and yet disposing him to hope for a solution which lay beyond his own resources. This means that on the level of the human organism the modes of creative activity, which in its successive stages of experience that level represents, could do no more. The passage of creative activity by 'steps and degrees'[1] into a stream of concrete activities which were its own products could not bring that stream forward to its end in God, because the incorporation of creative activity was in all its stages only partial and fragmentary. Such incomplete incorporations of creative activity could not bridge the contrast between God and His creatures. The return of creation to God must be across a bridge adequate to that contrast. But there is no middle term between God and man, a term which is neither one nor the other. An incorporation, however, not of creative activity but of that Absolute Actuality from which all creative activity proceeds—this and this alone would bridge the contrast, dissolve the tensions of that contrast, and carry creation over to what by analogy we may call the level of deity.

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[1] The phrase is Hooker's; see *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. i. ch. vi. § 1.

It will thus be seen that between the new creation and the old creation there is both analogy and contrast. Upon this double fact we must rely in any attempt to define the relation of the Incarnation to the organic series. Each stage in the incorporation of creative activity produced a new level of the series. But the Eternal Word is very God. His self-incorporation into the organic series does not, therefore, constitute a new level *of the old series*. For He is eternally on the level of deity. If we say that He is to be identified with the eternal order, we shall be in line with the fully developed thought of Christian Platonism concerning the Logos-Creator, who embraces in Himself the whole order of Platonic Ideas.[1] No new level of the organic series appears.[2] This is the contrast between the old creation and the new. At each level of the old creation a new principle appears in the time series. But these new principles flow down from eternity into time. The eternal order, however, is the treasury of the new. The new elements which appear in fragmentary and partial form in our temporal experience exist, not in fragments but in a wholeness of simultaneity, in that order which belongs to the level of deity, the mode of existence proper to the Eternal Word. To speak thus of a ' level of deity ' is to strain the language of analogy severely. But this difficulty is not peculiar to explanations of Christian doctrine. It is involved in every attempt to give a reasoned account of religion. The phrase is used here precisely because the relation of the Incarnation to the organic conception of the universe, if defined at all, must be defined in language appropriate to that conception. Even the severe disciplines of scientific and philosophic thought cannot ride off in independence of the imagination and its pictorial thought-forms derived from sensible experience. Now in describing the nexus of the cosmic series with the eternal order two such imaginative thought-forms have been repeatedly used. The eternal order and its creative activity have been described as *flowing down* into the series; and again the series has been described as *ascending* towards the eternal order. Similarly Christian theology is content to speak of the Son of God ' coming down from heaven ' and becoming man, and on the other hand of ' a taking up of manhood ' into God. Following this use of language, then, we may say that the Incarnation was an incorporation of Absolute Actuality into history and of the eternal order in its wholeness into the time-series. But on the other hand we must also say that it means the taking up of the human organism on to the level of deity. If it be asked ' How can these things be ? ' it is pertinent to reply: how can eternity insert itself into a serial succession of events at all ? But it undoubtedly does so; since we ourselves stand in and belong to the serial successions of space and time, and yet we also have experience of eternal realities. In all our experience succession is shot through and through with eternity. To the question: how can the Eternal Word possibly express His absolute mode of being in and through a completely human organism ? we must raise the prior question: how can there possibly be a human organism at all, framed as it is by incorporation of eternity into succession ? And behind this lies the more ultimate question: how can there be a succession in which patterns are woven by continual entry of the new on to a field of repetitive energy? In so far as we are here face to face with difficulties of the imagination, the Incarnation does not introduce fresh difficulties which are not already implicit in the idea of creation.

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[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, *summa theol.*, i. qq. xv., xxxiv. a. 3., xliv. a. 3. For the κόσμος νοητός see also W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. ii. pp. 37 ff., 74. Cp. also P. H. Wicksteed, *The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy*, pp. 333 ff., and Hastings, *E.R.E.*, art. 'Neo-Platonism.' For Platonism in Aquinas cp. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas*, p. 1, 'the subject-matter on which they work is deeply imbued with Platonism.' This thesis is worked out in the succeeding chapters of the last-mentioned work.

[2] A new organic process, however, may be said to flow from the Incarnation. On this subject see further ch. xv. below.

Holding fast, then, to the double principle of analogy and contrast between the two orders of creation and incarnation, we must next inquire: what conclusions concerning the Incarnation may be drawn from such a statement in terms of the organic conception? Here we must recall a fundamental principle of that conception. 'At each new level creative activity gathers up organic structures and systems from lower levels and transforms them into the materials of a new and higher organism.'[1] In the more detailed exposition of this principle it was shown that transformation from one level to another does not destroy or eliminate the law of being which characterised the lower level.[2] Thus the electrons in a living organism are the genuine electrons of physics and chemistry; but in the living organism their routes of activity conform to the 'patterns' of movement characterising the whole which we call a living organism. The 'rhythm' of an organism on a higher level dominates the patterns of movement on that level; and these patterns of movement are the moulds or channels into which routines of succession belonging to lower levels must pass. Now in any complex organism the rhythm of the whole, which controls all patterns of movement and routines of succession in that whole, is a rhythm expressing the highest law of being in the organism. This highest law of being determines the status of the organism, and is the expression of that transcending principle of unity which flows down from the eternal order. Here we must differentiate between two distinct concepts, namely, the organism and its organs. The latter are parts of the whole, which conform to its rhythm and subserve its highest law of being. Thus in the case of man, who is a spiritual organism, mind may be called an organ of spirit. Here the whole structure of mind, which man shares with animals, and which on its own level is the subject-matter of psychological analysis, is none the less built into a whole which belongs to the level of spirit. Thus the structure of mind, with its law of being expressing itself in tendencies towards psychological harmonisation, is an organ subserving the higher law of spirit. The structure and tendencies of mind become the instrument through which the community of a spiritual organism with the eternal order is organically expressed. The relations of organ and organism are thus reciprocal. The organ provides organic structure through which the highest law of being in the organism is concretely expressed; and the dependence of the organ upon a larger whole makes possible the fulfilment of that organ's tendencies upon a higher level.

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[1] See above, p. 226.

[2] Ch. ii., especially pp. 36–40.

Now every organism expresses and embodies the creative activity of the eternal order; and again, this nexus of all organisms with the eternal order means that their function fulfils itself by transience into the series as a whole and into its directive movement, which is *en passage* through man towards the eternal order. Consequently the relation of all organisms to the eternal order is parallel to that of an organ to the organic whole, whose highest law of being it subserves. Thus the whole hierarchy of organisms is dependent upon the eternal order in the same way. The whole organic series is an organ through which the creative activity of the eternal order expresses itself concretely; and conversely all the tendencies and laws of being in the organic series find their fulfilment by passage through man towards the eternal order.

But the organic universe is an inadequate organ of the eternal order. For in the first place its dependence upon the eternal order is through many principles of unity which require to be gathered up into subordination to some final principle. And secondly, the highest principles of unity to be found in it, namely, those proper to spiritual organisms, are only partial and fragmentary incorporations of creative activity. They can express the creative activity of the eternal order only in partial and inadequate ways. Finally, any possible solution of this problem on the level of created spiritual organisms is nullified by those aspects of non-attainment on that level which arrest and balk the movement of creation towards its Creator. 'The eternal order provides the principles of unity which determine the directive movement of the organic universe, of man and of history. But these principles of unity, while adequate in their totality to determine the directive movement of the cosmic process, are not adequate to provide a goal in which that process can come to rest.'[1] In the new creation these inadequacies are overcome. For here the eternal order in its wholeness is incorporated. *Absolute Actuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word becomes the principle of unity in a human organism.* That very fact constitutes the human organism of Jesus Christ a new creation, the adequate organ for His self-expression, that is for the expression of deity.

III

The definition of the Incarnation embodied in the italicised sentence of the last paragraph inevitably requires further development. In other words, we here enter upon the delicate subject of terminology, about which some general remarks were made in the introductory chapter.[2] There are also two other important subjects which press for consideration at this stage—namely, the relation of this conception of the Incarnation (1) to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and (2) to redeemed humanity in the New Order. These two subjects must, however, be postponed until the application of organic terminology to the doctrine of the Incarnation has been considered in fuller detail.[3]

One of the most acute problems of theology to-day is the problem of exact terminology in the sphere of doctrine. But the problem as here envisaged must be carefully delimited. It has nothing to do with altering the language of the creeds. It may well be the case that the ages of 'creed-making' are past for ever. If so there are many and weighty reasons for profound thankfulness. But the question does not arise in the discussion which is here undertaken. The present inquiry was prefaced with a statement of the 'conviction that the actual course of Christological development was in its main lines of advance through the conciliar definitions the true and defensible development of primitive Christian thought.'[1] The question of terminology, however, may be raised in a humbler form. Given the doctrine of the Incarnation as stated in the creeds and conciliar definitions, how can we define that doctrine for our own thought in such a way as to bring it into relation with the texture of modern conceptions about the character of the world in which we live?

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[1] See above, pp. 213, 214.

[2] See above, pp. 9–16.

[3] They are resumed in chs. xi.–xv.

It will be convenient to approach the subject with a glance at an ancient controversy and at some of its modern reverberations. Nestorius was condemned at the Council of Ephesus on the ground that he destroyed the unity of the Incarnation by teaching that there are two Sons, one divine and the other human, united in the Incarnate Lord. Nestorius vigorously denied the charge, and later hailed the Tome of Leo as a statement of his own faith. The recent discovery of Nestorius' apology and some of his sermons has reopened the whole question as to whether Nestorius was a heretic. Professor Bethune-Baker of Cambridge published a volume maintaining the orthodoxy of Nestorius.[2] Later, Professor Loofs of Halle published some lectures on the same subject.[3] In this work Dr. Loofs welcomed the teaching of Nestorius on the ground that he taught a form of adoptionism which was in line with an earlier tradition. Nestorius taught that two natures, two substances and two *prosôpa* were united in one *prosôpon*. But according to Loofs '*prosôpon*' did not mean 'person' but 'the external undivided appearance';[4] and in his third lecture the Professor argues that with this use of the word Nestorius did not teach a substantial union of the two *prosôpa*. A third interpretation, mediating between the two Professors, is offered by Mr. Leonard Hodgson,[5] who maintains that Nestorius intended to teach a metaphysical union; but that the solution offered is artificial. Loofs' view of *prosôpon* is correct. But the union of

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[1] See above, ch. i. pp. 5, 6.

[2] *Nestorius and his Teaching* (1908).

[3] *Nestorius and his Place in the History of Christian Doctrine* (1914). The lectures were delivered in English before the University of London in 1913.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 76–7.

[5] *Nestorius. The Bazaar of Heracleides* (1925; Eds. Driver and Hodgson), Appendix IV., 'The Metaphysic of Nestorius,' reprinted from *J.T.S.* vol. xix. No. 73.

prosôpa described by Nestorius could not be a real one, when judged by his own use of metaphysical terms. This interpretation is interesting. But more important is what lies behind the whole controversy. The impression left upon the mind of the present writer by the *Book of Heracleides* is that Nestorius tended to think of Godhead and manhood as entities which could be treated as though they existed on the same level, and could be conceived as coming together on that level. Whether this impression be correct or not, however, the lesson to be drawn is sufficiently plain. The ultimate question to ask about a Christology, whether ancient or modern, is no question of technicalities. It is the question whether God and man are thought of in ways which are worthy of Christian faith and adequate to Christian experience.[1] Mr. Hodgson, in the valuable article referred to above, suggests that the theologians of the fifth century inherited conceptions of God and man which made it exceedingly difficult for them to do justice to their own faith and experience. 'It is the conception of the complete and eternal antithesis between Godhead and manhood which prevents any satisfactory solution of the problem; but neither Nestorius nor any of his contemporary theologians would ever have thought of questioning the truth of this conception.'[2] Nevertheless the Church decided to follow Cyril of Alexandria in breaking through this obstacle by holding fast to essential implications of Christian experience at the price of abandoning such logical consistency in terminology as the conceptions of that age seemed to require.

Now it is often suggested that modern ways of thought make it difficult to accept the theology of the councils. It seems worth while, therefore, to point out that modern ways of thought are actually easing the problem and making it less acute. We do not divide up a human being into *hypostasis* and nature. But on the other hand we do not hold the *comparatively speaking* static view of nature which was common to the ancient world. According to that view everything in nature had a fixed part to play like the actors in a Greek drama,[1] whereas according to the modern view nature as a whole (and everything in nature) is *en passage* from one stage to another. There is no pigeon-holing of compartments. An electron may play its part on a number of different levels because there is transformation from one level to another. Again, one of the great gains of modern psychology is the concept of mind, with its functions, as a developing whole, continually in process towards some new stage, but never a finished article. The activist conception of nature, the multigrade conception of evolution, and the recognition that organic development is unfinished, all of these are finally crowned by a widespread recognition among different schools of philosophy that this unfinished process of development passes up into an experience of values, which must at least be accepted with 'natural piety.'[2]

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[1] In other words the terminology employed is of less importance than the terminal concepts which that terminology is employed to embody. On this see ch. i. pp. 9–14 above.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 419.

Thus whilst the two-nature doctrine was formulated at Chalcedon in defiance of current categories of thought, we have to-day quite different categories which do not suggest the old difficulties and which in certain respects definitely support the rationality of the Chalcedonian doctrine. According to ancient thought a nature (φύσις) was a mere *congerie* of attributes which could not exist apart from its *hypostasis*, that is to say its underlying individual substance.[3] For this conception of separate entities, each locked into its own nature and substance by the fixity of species and elements, science has now substituted the conception of a single organic universe, whose very atoms are all organically interrelated through fields of influence. Moreover, organic interrelation is not limited to the lateral continuity of physical entities. For by transformation there is passage from one level to another. Thus on metaphysical grounds we are under no temptation to essay the impossible task of finding an absolute unity as between two closed metaphysical entities which are by definition for ever set apart from one another. But on the other hand we must indulge in no delusive dreams as to the help which a new metaphysical equipment can give. Above all, it cannot provide a religious content for the terminal concepts of the Incarnation, God and man. It was the religious content of these two concepts derived from the biblical revelation which played the really decisive part in the ancient controversies. It has often been pointed out how sparingly St. Athanasius used the metaphysical pass-word of Nicaea (ὁμοούσιος). He was much more interested in the revelation of God's love, which gives to the New Testament its power over human hearts. But if the content of that revelation has universal significance for mankind, it must inevitably tend 'to bring into captivity every thought unto the obedience of Christ.' It must bring the domain of reason into the kingdom of God. The argument, that because Greek metaphysics have passed away, therefore the doctrines which the Church clothed in the garb of that metaphysical system have ceased to be significant, is a glaring *non sequitur*. Conceptual thought changes; but the gospel remains, and the significance of Christ for Christian experience as One who is to be worshipped remains. The decisive factor in Christology is not a problem of metaphysics, but the answer which we give to the question: ought Jesus Christ to be worshipped with the worship which the creature owes to the Creator? The elimination of metaphysics will not save the purity of the gospel from contamination if the answer given to this question is out of harmony with the experience of Christ recorded in the New Testament. Moreover, a mere elimination of metaphysics may actually leave us a prey to unjustifiable mythology. It appears to the present writer that this is the dilemma in which Professor Loofs has involved himself in his recent work *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* He there argues with great cogency against the theory 'that the life of Jesus was a purely human one.'[1] He believes that 'Christ becomes a revelation of God for us,'[2] and he approves the belief that 'God dwelt so perfectly in Jesus through his

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[1] Cp. A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, pp. 11, 12. The statement in the text is guarded by the qualifying phrase in italics.

[2] See above, p. 31.

[3] Even after the Council of Alexandria (362) there appears to have been great diversity in the use of ὑπόστασις. But this does not affect the broad distinction between ancient and modern ways of thought indicated in the text.

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[1] *Op. cit.* ch. iv.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 208.

Spirit, as had never been the case before, and never will be till the end of all time.'[1] His final conclusion is that 'the historical Jesus is the same as the Christ of faith, *i.e.* the Christ who was a man, but also the beginner of a new mankind, and the Christ in whose face we behold the glory of God, our Saviour and our Lord.'[2] At about the time when this book was published, Loofs delivered his lectures on Nestorius in London. On the last page of those lectures he asserts of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation that 'the first beginnings of this doctrine are made by nothing other than the introduction of popular mythological views into the Christian theology.'[3] But it appears more reasonable to hold that Loofs himself has fallen a victim to mythological views. For he offers us a Christ who is utterly unique, who is the focus of religious faith from age to age, in whom we behold the glory of God, of whom it can be said that such convictions justify 'our finding God in Christ when we pray to him.' If such a being is not very God, but shares our humanity, then how does his status differ from that of ancient demi-gods? All other heroes of our race stand apart from ordinary men, separated by their greatness. Of this one, however, Dr. Loofs appears prepared to accept all the Pauline language about his dwelling in human hearts. But a being who shares our humanity, yet contradicts the normal characteristics of humanity in certain respects, a being about whom we can have no clear assurance as to his metaphysical status, but who none the less must be accepted as a unique mediator between God and man—to put religious trust in such a being, what else is this but to return to mythological ideas? Such are the dilemmas of a Christology which dispenses with metaphysics.

Let us now see what further help we can get from the organic conception of the universe. The humanity of the Incarnate Lord is not a static metaphysical entity, but a spiritual organism. We have not to search, as some have supposed, for a central core which must be abstracted to make room for the eternal Logos. All the principles of unity which exist in any other human organism exist also in Him. But whereas in created human beings the highest law of being is that transcending principle of unity which is proper to a human organism on the level of spirit and which flows down from the creative activity of the eternal order, *this is not the highest law of being in the Incarnate Lord.* The highest law of being in His case is the law of being proper to deity. There is no abrogation of other laws of being. In His organism are all the laws of being which exist in each of us. But even the highest of these, that which constitutes Him 'the man Christ Jesus,' is not the highest law of His Being. *It is not, therefore, that principle of unity which determines His status.* His human organism has the creaturely status which is proper to humanity, just as the constituent parts and elements in our complex organisms each have their proper status in the cosmic series, notwithstanding their being built into a spiritual organism. The human body is not less physical because it is taken up into a spiritual organism and has become an organ of spirit. Neither is the human organism less human because it is taken up into union with the eternal Logos and has become the organ of His deity. Just the reverse. Each level of the series reaches its cosmic fulfilment by passage towards the eternal order. The human organism attains its full self-determination through self-transcendence by communion with the eternal order. An interpretation of the universe which combines the organic conception of development with a recognition of the eternal order and its absolute standards as both the background and the goal of that development is an interpretation which can effectually lay the ghost of an autonomous humanity. When to that interpretation there is added the religious conception of man as a dependent creature who can find his fulfilment only in the bosom of his Creator, then we can see the monstrous image of a humanity self-completed and self-sufficing being smitten and broken in pieces by a stone cut out without hands. In its place there appears the kingdom of the true Son of Man, a kingdom in which all the unfinished and fragmentary treasures of this world-order are gathered up into the wholeness of a new creation.

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 238. [2] *Ibid.* p. 240. [3] *Nestorius*, p. 130.

IV

This organic conception of the Incarnation involves the following further consequences with respect to terminology. The Incarnate Lord became organic to the universe and to man through His Incarnation. But He is not Himself an organism; for He does not belong to the organic series. Rather does the organic series belong to Him. He possesses a spiritual organism which is the organ of His self-expression in the sphere of the new creation. In His Person that spiritual organism is taken up into union with Absolute Actuality and thus a new bond is forged between creation and its Creator. This conception of a new bond between God and His creatures in the sphere of the new creation is implicit in all the descriptions of the New Order in the apostolic writings. But as we have seen, the new harmony there experienced, having Christ as its centre of reference, has on the one hand the exalted Lord as its transcendent ground, that is the transcendent object to which it is referred, and on the other hand the indwelling Christ as both content and end of its directive movement. The new creation has therefore two principal aspects. In the first place it has its foundation in the new bond set up between God and creation in the Person of Christ. Secondly, springing from that foundation is a new creative process of development in the sphere of the new humanity. In chapters vii. and viii. these two aspects were analysed as we find them in the experience of the New Order of life in the Spirit. But the same twofoldness appears in the historical life-story of the Incarnate Lord Himself. Thus there are two main aspects of the doctrine of the Incarnation. There is the aspect which is concerned with the actual union of God and man in One Person. Here the important question is as to the mode in which the two terms of the union are conceived as being brought together, and as to a fitting terminology in which that mode of union can be expressed. But upon that aspect of the doctrine follows another. This second aspect is concerned with the question of our Lord's human organism in its historical development through a genuinely human life-story. It was this aspect of the Incarnation to which the school of Antioch rightly attached such high importance, including Nestorius himself, as his sermons show us.[1] After the condemnation of Nestorius the labours of that school were regarded with suspicion and their contributions were neglected. It has been the great achievement of the historico-critical movement during the past century to bring back to recognition this vital aspect of the Incarnation. We must be thankful for accumulations of knowledge which have brought this aspect of the Incarnation into the foreground of the picture, and which in many ways compel us to face the mystery of the doctrine more squarely with its contrasted aspects in full view. We cannot hope to obtain a detailed and adequate understanding of that Human Life which is set apart from all others and whose secret springs are known to God alone. Yet we dare not be content with a vague acknowledgment of values whose ultimate meaning is never to be formulated. If ‘ the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ ’ has been given to us, that light must surely shine for reverent faith upon the fundamental aspects of the Incarnation. Guiding principles must be available, if we look for them in the right way. We must hold fast to the fundamental rule of all true thought about God, the double rule of analogy and contrast, to which our own religious experience continually points us.

The subject to which ancient thought seems chiefly to have addressed itself in considering our Lord's human life was the subject of His human growth as at once real and yet morally perfect. This was the special theme of the Antiochenes. On the other hand, modern discussion has fastened upon the problem of our Lord's human knowledge and its relation to the divine omniscience. But it is dangerous to isolate these problems sharply from one another. Moreover, when the modern approach has been narrowed down to attempting something like an analysis of our Lord's human or messianic consciousness, a wrong turn seems to have been taken. From an inquiry conducted on such a restricted basis we can hardly expect reliable results. Broad guiding lines rather than detailed understanding are what we may rightly look for. Now the principles of interpretation adopted in the present work suggest one such guiding line which may carry us some distance. The whole argument of this book has been occupied with the question of the relation of eternity to the time process. This question raises the problem of *the relation of perfection to development.* The confession that our Lord is at once ‘ Perfect God and Perfect Man ’ gives immediate relevance to this problem. If perfect manhood is the organ through which perfect Godhead manifests itself, what meaning should we attach to the idea of perfection in a developing human life ? Now it is clear that the idea has a possible meaning. Perfection and development are not simply contradictory conceptions. For ‘ the theistic conception implicit in the biblical revelation finds an eternal significance in concrete developing individuality and in the historical process of the universe to which that developing concreteness belongs.’ [1] It follows from this that perfection can be manifested in development, or, in other words, that there can be such a thing as a perfect development or a developing perfection. There is therefore nothing impossible in the idea of a perfect human life, a life in which perfection is concretely embodied and manifested in a development, a life in which each stage of development embodies the kind of perfection which is proper to that stage. The principle that eternity can be concretely embodied in the historical process involves the corollary that in a developing universe there are different kinds of perfection. This conception of perfection as incorporated into development is at bottom identical with the conception of eternity incorporated into time. It is by means of this idea that the organic conception of the universe can be subsumed under a theistic interpretation. Now clearly different kinds of perfection in a developing universe must correspond to different degrees in the incorporation of eternity into time, that is of the eternal order into the cosmic series. If there is a genuine incorporation of the eternal order at each level of the series, then there will be a certain kind of perfection manifested at each of those levels. Each level has an inherent significance derived from the eternal order. Its kind of perfection is therefore *constituted* by the transcending principle of unity which constitutes that level of the series. But secondly, the inherent significance of a level in the series, whilst constituted by its principle of unity, is *manifested* in its directive movement. For, as we have seen, the eternal order is not only the ground of the series but also the end towards which it moves.[1] Eternity is manifested in temporal processes; and a particular kind of perfection is manifested in a development, through the route of that development being directed towards a more ultimate kind of perfection. From this it follows, thirdly, that a particular kind of perfection in the series is *actualised* through its tendency towards transformation into a more ultimate or inclusive kind of perfection. This is so because organic transformation is really transitive. There is no discontinuity. Atoms do actually pass up from their own level into living bodies, where their mode of activity conforms to the rhythm of a higher mode of activity. Perfection is cumulative, one stage of perfection being incorporated into the next and so into those beyond. By transformation entities do not lose their own mode of activity, in which a particular perfection of the eternal order is manifested. On the other hand, that mode of activity receives enhanced value through its process being gathered up into a higher and more comprehensive mode of activity. Thus the perfection manifested in the spiritual organism of man includes within itself all the perfections proper to the other levels of the series. This is so because the human organism gathers into itself, in principle, all the incorporations of the eternal order which have preceded it in the series.

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[1] Cp. the account of some of these sermons given by Professor Bethune-Baker in the volume to which reference has already been made.

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[1] See above, pp. 222, 223.

Now when we pass on to consider the kind of perfection which can be embodied in a developing human organism, as the characteristic perfection of that organism, the principles of perfection distinguished in the last paragraph by the words *constituted*, *manifested* and *actualised* are principles which continue to operate. For in the first place the kind of perfection for which we may look, as characteristically human, is the perfection of a spiritual development, a perfection proper to spirit through its capacity for rational and self-determined communion with the eternal order. It is the kind of perfection which is constituted by that relation of created spirit to the eternal order which is proper to man, the relation of recognition and submissive co-operation, of apprehension and response. Now in the case of all organisms their relation to the eternal order has two aspects. The principle of unity as a transcending principle refers back to the eternal order as the transcendent background of the organism; and, on the other hand, as the organism's unifying principle it controls the embodiment of the eternal order's creative activity in the organism. So, too, in the case of man. The principle of unity which constitutes individuality on the level of spirit is the principle of self-determining self-transcendence, which has two aspects. On the one hand, the human spirit recognises and acknowledges the standards of the eternal order as the transcendent background of its spiritual existence to which all its concrete activity must be referred. On the other hand, this apprehension of the eternal order passes into embodied response to that order. The principle of unity in man which constitutes his spiritual individuality, not only refers him to the transcendent standards of the eternal order, but also controls his response to that order embodied in concrete activity; and both apprehension and response are possible because the creative activity of the eternal order is so incorporated into man's spirit that it lies at the roots of his spiritual existence. It follows that the kind of perfection which is characteristic for spiritual organisms so constituted, having the double framework of apprehension and response, falls under two aspects, namely, knowledge and conduct. Human perfection in its development can therefore take the form of perfect receptivity towards, and assimilation of, revelations from the eternal order, and again of perfect response to those revelations embodied in the conduct of life. But the inherent significance of this twofold perfection of development must be manifested in its directive movement; and the route of this movement on the level of spiritual organisms is in the direction of developing wholeness of character. For we have seen in an earlier chapter that in our apprehensions of the eternal order the pursuit of knowledge reaches out by accumulation towards the infinity of the eternal order. Yet the directive movement of spirit is not balked by the creaturely limitations which set a term to knowledge; for that movement passes back into concrete wholeness of vision.[1] Thus its proximate goal is wisdom, which is an element in the perfection of character. Developing wholeness of vision is the type of perfection proper to the human organism on the side of knowledge. Similarly developing wholeness of response to that vision is the type of perfection proper to man on the side of conduct. A perfect human organism, developing from stage to stage of perfection, would not manifest this perfection with a ready-made equipment of knowledge and of excellences and powers corresponding to such knowledge. A perfect development could not be launched upon its path with such an equipment as would make development unnecessary and impossible. Limitation in knowledge is compatible with growth in wisdom. Such growth has, moreover, no necessary connexion with ethical non-attainment. For a perfection of ethical development depends, not on the extent of man's knowledge or experience, but upon wholeness of response to the total vision of truth which is given to him at each stage of his growth. In the same way ethical development does not have to wait for perfection until it has attained to mature habits of thought and life. It may have perfection at every stage, if by its constant wholeness of response it is steadily moving in the direction of a mature wholeness of character to which such habits belong. Thus the human kind of perfection will be manifested in a movement towards mature wholeness of character. But such a perfection could not be actualised in such a movement without further transformation. For we have already seen that

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[1] See above, pp. 220, 221, on Aristotelian causes.

> while the concreteness of developing character underlies and supports other activities directed towards the eternal order, this underlying character cannot support itself. . . . The pursuit of character is not the ultimate form in which concrete activity of the human spirit can realise itself. . . . The ultimate object of concrete human activity is not goodness but God, not our own achievement but adoring worshipful recognition of God's absolute actuality.[2]

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[1] Ch. vi. See next note.

[2] See above, ch. vi. § ii. pp. 149, 150.

Thus the ultimate form of human perfection must be the perfect communion of the created spirit with its Creator. In a perfect human life, therefore, we should look for perfectly developing wholeness of vision and of response to that vision gathered up and actualised in the form of unbroken communion with God. The developing wholeness of vision, when turned towards concrete human activity, would be manifested as wisdom, the intellectual excellence of character. But in itself it would be more than that. It would be contemplation of the glory of God. So, too, the developing wholeness of response would be manifested in its relation to human activity as an unswerving movement towards mature wholeness of character (a movement in which the perfection of development proper to each stage would be adequately embodied in that stage). But again in itself the response would be more than that. It would be the uttermost surrender and oblation of the creature to the glory of the Creator.

This then is, in form, the kind of human perfection which we may rightly look for in the historical human life-story of Jesus Christ. And this, surely, is approximately and in outline the kind of perfection which the fragmentary records of the synoptic gospels indicate. Something of this kind is the form and outline of what we there see. No attempt, however, has been made, or will be made, in this work to put into words the rich content of what is there portrayed. Modern attempts to draw out the content of the gospel picture doubtless have real value. But they must always be disappointing in their beggarly inadequacy to do justice to the reality. For that reality we must turn again and again to the gospels. They yield up their treasure to the human heart according to the measure of our need. But words are feeble instruments for declaring what that treasure is. There are, however, two other aspects of this subject upon which something further must be said, in order that it may be brought into the full context of the doctrine of the Incarnation in the argument of the present work. It was said that in the Incarnate Lord the human organism was taken up on to the level of deity. The question arises as to whether this fact is indicated in the gospel picture; and if so, as to how it is indicated. Secondly, the Incarnation is the divine remedy for human sin. The effect of this central fact upon our Lord's human life-story must be taken into account. The perfect manhood of Christ is not the embodiment of some theoretical picture of human perfection. If the doctrine of the Incarnation is true, then the gospels will show us that perfection in the context of deity. They will also show its relation to sinful humanity.

V

Now if we reflect upon the life and teaching of our Lord, bearing in mind what has been written in the preceding paragraphs about the kind of human perfection for which we may rightly look, then in certain broad aspects that life and teaching correspond to such a conception of perfect manhood. But there are other aspects which cannot be made to fit into the outlines of that conception. Thus we get an impression of a truly human life of flesh and blood; of a human mind expressing thoughts which have a profound relevance to the interests, needs and problems of men and women; of human sympathy, insight and fellow-feeling. There is also human emotion, human sorrow and disappointment, human conflict and trial. At point after point down to the cry of dereliction on the cross the picture is human through and through. Yet none the less through that intensely human medium there is conveyed something else transcending all analogies which human experience can offer, and presenting a complete contrast to the kind of human perfection which we have been considering. There is not only analogy but also contrast with all that is characteristic of human experience, and contrast with all that appears to lie within the possibilities of human experience. It is not simply a contrast with our present experience of ethical non-attainment and of sinful estrangement from God. For those are frustrations of man's true development which can, to some extent, be abstracted in thought when we try to form a picture of human perfection. The contrast with which we are faced in the gospels is not simply the contrast of a sinless man with sinners. The contrast in question has already been indicated in an earlier context, where the revelation of God conveyed in our Lord's teaching was under consideration. It was there pointed out that in that teaching

> the revelation of the Kingdom as the sphere of God's relations with man is a revelation of a new order of reality in which the ethical aspects of the eternal order are finally incorporated into a religious form. But this Kingdom is also incorporated into history. It is not simply proclaimed in expectation and promise. It is present in fulfilment ; for it is a present reality to the mind of Jesus. The secrets of the Kingdom are His. He knows its treasure and possesses it. Its reality is beyond time and change, beyond historical succession. Yet it is embodied in Him who knows it thus. The Kingdom is His kingdom ; for He is able to promise it with assurance to His little flock.[1]

This estimate does not depend upon any one particular saying. It is the estimate which must inevitably be made upon that irreducible minimum of teaching which historical criticism authenticates when taken as a whole. The contrast here between our Lord's experience and any conceivable human experience which analogies might suggest is an absolute contrast. But it is the character of the contrast which demands our particular attention. In man's experience of community with the eternal order, in all its forms, there is a peculiar tension which belongs to the whole fabric of his spiritual life. He recognises that order and its claims, because something within him claims affinity with its standards and with its eternal goods. But our approach to that eternal order is always the approach of those who are partly strangers within its gates, although strangers who long to be at home in that country and who in our best and most serious moods know that we can be content with no other home than that which is there offered to us. Its spiritual goods are ever offered to us ; and the best that is in us yearns for possession. But in our earthly pilgrimage we have to wait patiently in the enjoyment of a very partial possession. We have not attained to our inheritance. Its fullness utterly eludes our grasp. Even this is a serious understatement. We are able to grasp no more than small fragments of that inheritance. In contrast to all this our Lord speaks not as a stranger or a neophyte within the gates of the Kingdom, but as One familiar with its whole territory. He speaks of that transcendent order as One who knows it from within with a familiar intimacy. He speaks with the confident assurance of One who possesses the key which unlocks all its mysteries. Without effort and in the clear language of One who is master of His subject He speaks about ultimate characteristics of reality, the character of God, the significance of man, that divine ordering of the world which we call providence, the true laws of human life, the secrets of character. The revelation of the kingdom of God which He conveys bears within itself its own marks of authenticity. It is a revelation which proceeds from most certain knowledge. The things of which He speaks are His own possession. He is not simply a citizen of the Kingdom, giving allegiance to it. He is its King who, possessing its secret treasures, can convey them to others. 'I appoint unto you a kingdom as My Father appointed unto Me' (Luke xxii. 29, 30; cp. Matt. xix. 28). 'Come unto Me . . . and I will refresh you. . . . For I am meek and lowly in heart and ye shall find rest unto your souls' (Matt. xi. 28, 29).

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[1] See above, ch. vii. § ii. pp. 167, 168.

The utterance last quoted puts into words the most profound contrast of all, a contrast so sharp that it seems on any surface view as if it must contain a contradiction. This is the contrast of authority and meekness. Our Lord speaks habitually as One who so possesses the secret treasures of the Kingdom that He can bestow them upon all who come to Him. Yet He also knows and reveals the absolute claims of the Kingdom upon man's submission; and *He identifies Himself both with the transcendent authority of the Kingdom and with the submission which men must make to its claims.* This is the point at which the conception of perfect humanity on the level of deity becomes, perhaps, most luminous. Our Lord identifies Himself with the true attitude of man towards the Divine Will. 'I am meek and lowly in heart.' This attitude of creaturely surrender which He embodies in His human life is to be the law of all true human life. 'Take My yoke upon you and learn of Me.' He makes Himself one with all men in this. Yet even so, in that very self-identification with man's true response to God, He is aware of Himself as possessing that attitude in a most final way. His meek and lowly response is so truly what man's response ought to be, that His human response becomes the medium through which He can convey to men that peace of the Kingdom which He possesses in His own right. His submission to the Kingdom is the means through which His absolute possession of the Kingdom is transmitted with authority, to be partly shared by His disciples. If we translate this back into terms of the eternal order and of organic conceptions we may say that we are in tension with the eternal order because, although in communion with that order, we stand beneath it and must enter it from without as pilgrims and strangers. Our status is on that level where the organic series passes over into the eternal order from beneath it, and where the tension of contrasts cannot be overcome. The Incarnate Lord has taken up this position of ours on to a higher plane. With us He stands beneath the transcendent claims of the eternal order by virtue of His possession of a human organism. But, unlike us, He stands within the eternal order in full possession of its standards and ends. Now, as has been argued repeatedly, when a level of the series is taken up by transformation to a higher level, the lower level so taken up retains its own characteristic constitution and its own characteristic manifestation. But whilst retaining its own proper perfection, it is actualised through transformation on to a level of larger perfection. If this fulfilment of one grade of creative activity on the level of another such grade is possible in the organic series, where there are only partial incorporations of the eternal order, how much more possible will it be for the highest grade of creative activity in the series to be fulfilled in the fullness of that eternal order from which all such partial incorporations of creative activity proceed? But the passage from one level to another is effected through the entry of a higher transcending principle of unity, which gathers up the lower stage of perfection to function within the larger sphere proper to that new and higher principle of unity. In the Incarnation we see, not a partial incorporation of this kind, but an incorporation of the eternal order in its wholeness into history. By analogy this must mean the gathering up of the series through the medium of its highest level, man, on to the level of the eternal order in its wholeness. But, just as each principle of unity is both incorporated into the series and yet transcendent over the series (in that it refers back to the eternal order), so it must be also in the Incarnation. The Eternal Word, who is one with the eternal order, became incorporated into the organic series at its highest point. He is, therefore, both incarnate in a human organism and yet transcendent over that human organism. He expresses His deity through the law of human submission to the eternal standards and through a filial human response to the claims of the Divine Will. Yet all this takes place on the level of deity within the vaster domain of His inalienable possession of the Kingdom, which belongs by right to Him as God the Word. But this raises the question: how can deity be expressed and mediated through a creaturely response of human sonship which is the due self-oblation of the creature to the Creator? This question compels us to pass behind the historical, human, messianic sonship of our Lord, as we find it in the synoptic gospels and particularly in the doubly authenticated passage of Luke x. 21 and Matt. xi. 27. That passage as it stands implies precisely the contrast of authority and submission, the contrast already noted in the *logion* which immediately follows it in the Matthean context. But as critical doubts have been raised as to the true reading of this passage,[1] we may be content to say simply that we must pass behind the human sonship of the synoptists to the more mysterious and transcendent sonship of the fourth gospel. That Johannine conception of sonship already contained implicitly the seeds of a doctrine which required Greek metaphysics and the labours of Origen for the elucidation of its meaning. In other words, the question raised, as to the possibility of deity being expressed through a human sonship, inevitably brings us face to face with the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus the implications of our Lord's teaching in the best authenticated strata of the synoptic gospels compel us to face problems concerning the Godhead, for which that doctrine offers a solution. The further consideration of that subject is reserved to later chapters.

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[1] The point has recently been discussed by Dr. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, Appended Note iv. pp. 251–264.

The subject of our Lord's relation to sinful humanity in His incarnate state can be referred to more briefly here; as we are concerned at this point only with the presence of sin as a conditioning factor in the environment which surrounded the Lord's human development. Moreover, it is a subject on which it is hardly possible to say anything which has not been constantly said by theologians and preachers from the Epistle to the Hebrews onwards. 'For we have not a high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin' (Heb. iv. 15). The principle that participation in moral failure and contamination is in no way necessary to the fullest sympathy with the sinful and guilty person is a principle which can be verified by a wide appeal to human experience.[1] The relation of this principle to the preceding argument can be indicated very briefly.

The creative work of God was crowned by a redeeming activity which found its culmination in the Incarnation. That event was the divine answer to human non-attainment and the remedy for man's sinful estrangement from his Creator. In the human organism of Jesus Christ there is a new creation. That organism is, therefore, the medium and focus of His redeeming activity towards sinful humanity. But in taking to Himself that human organism He became organically united to sinful humanity. Thus He took to Himself and made His own the bitterness and shame of man's failure and estrangement. We have seen that all the fellow-feeling and sympathy which form the cement of the social organism depend upon and are derived from the fact of man's community with the eternal order. Thus we are capable of some sympathy with those whose temptations and failures are other than our own, just because we share with them a capacity for eternal things and an unquenchable longing for those eternal goods which both we and they alike are tempted to repudiate. This sympathy is not due to our common failure to attain, but to our common recognition of those eternal goods whose attainment is frustrated by failure. But both we and those for whom we can feel such sympathy stand only upon the threshold of the eternal order; whereas the Incarnate Lord stands with us in our recognition of the claims and standards of the eternal order, yet also above us and within the secret treasure-houses of that order. He therefore knows from within the utmost significance of that order which is violated by our moral failures. He knows from within the loving-kindness of God from which our sins estrange us. Yet in His incarnate state He placed Himself beside us, and in His human life-story He 'lived through' the due response of man to the claims and standards of that order. In so placing Himself beside us He laid Himself open, through His human organism, to all the influences of an environment in which the evils of non-attainment and of sinful estrangement were at work. He took to Himself with His human organism the whole of that environment; and through the medium of that perfect organism He experienced the full force of the alienated activities in that environment. The tension of that conflict was a tension which we can but dimly imagine. It was the tension of holiness, love and eternal beatitude with an organic environment alienated from those eternal realities. It was a tension whose full pressure was experienced in the medium of a genuinely human life.

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[1] The vindication of this truth was perhaps the most important contribution of the late Dr. Moberly's book, *Atonement and Personality*. The truth thus vindicated stands on its own ground and remains unaffected by criticisms of the theory of the Atonement into which it was incorporated.

CHAPTER X

THE INCARNATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY

I

THE doctrine of the Incarnation has now been stated in terms which are designed to show its relation to the organic conception of the universe. The intention behind all the language employed in that statement was the intention to reaffirm, in terminology relevant to modern ways of thought, precisely that doctrine which was slowly formulated in a succession of ecumenical councils. How far that intention has been adequately embodied in the statement must be left to the judgment of the Church. But in that connexion it seems worth while to make one further explanation. The reader will rightly bring this statement to the test of conciliar decisions. But if in so doing he endeavours to take the terms which have been employed in the statement and to equate each of them with some corresponding term employed by fathers or councils, in adopting such a method of equation he will have misconceived the conditions under which the language of one age can be related to that of another and quite different age. If such a method of testing a statement were really possible and reliable, then there would have been nothing gained in making such a statement at all. The two sets of symbolic terms would then, if the statement were correct, be simply interchangeable. This again would mean that ancient terminology was as well adapted *to express the thought of our own age to us* as language which is current coin to-day. If this were true the statement would be valueless in the measure of its success. The method of piecemeal equation between the two sets of terms thus leads to manifest absurdity. This conclusion reminds us of the limitations of terminology as such. Of far greater importance are the fundamental concepts upon which the doctrine of the Incarnation actually rests, namely, the religious concepts of God and man. The value of any statement about the Incarnation must depend upon the answer to the question whether it represents the union between God and man in Christ in a manner which is agreeable to the content of the biblical revelation concerning God and man; and in particular concerning the crowning element in that revelation, namely the mediatorial position of Christ in the structure of New Testament experience. Thus the relation of the statement concerning the Incarnation offered in the last chapter to the Definition of the Council of Chalcedon is not to be sought in a detailed correspondence of terms, but in an identity of religious concepts; concepts which were conveyed to man through revelation and which have been interpreted and evaluated through the medium of religious experience. The relation of one terminology to another is thus indirect. It is a relation mediated through religious concepts which determine the use made of terms available.

Now in bringing a modern statement concerning the Incarnation to the test of conciliar decisions, one way of applying the test is to ask: what is the relation of such a modern statement to the ancient heresies which the conciliar decisions were intended to exclude? The heresies were not excluded because their use of terminology was less scientific or exact than that of orthodox theologians. For some of the most important builders of the orthodox structure did in fact from time to time use loose and unguarded language which, as we can now see, was inadequate material for the structure which they were engaged in building. The heresies were excluded because they embodied, or appeared to embody, conceptions incompatible with the fundamental religious concepts implied in revelation, as interpreted through the medium of Christian experience. By their incompatibility with religious interests they endangered Christian salvation. If therefore the interpretation of the Incarnation offered in the present work is found to involve a repudiation of those heresies which the great conciliar decisions condemned, it will then be possible to say with some confidence that the statement is in line with the theology of the councils, on the ground that it is adapted to support the religious interests which the conciliar decisions were intended to safeguard. Among the ancient heresies which are relevant to modern discussions of the Incarnation two main tendencies of thought can be distinguished as summing up everything of the sort which need be taken into account in the present argument. The tendencies in question are those represented by Adoptionism and Monophysitism. Whatever Nestorius actually believed and taught, the teaching which the Council of Ephesus intended to condemn was the teaching that in Christ there is dual personality without a real metaphysical union. The word Adoptionism is here used broadly to include all variations of this teaching from the Ebionites and the early Monarchians at Rome through Paul of Samosata down to the Spanish Adoptionism which brought to a close the classic age of Christological definition. Similarly, all earlier forms of the docetic heresy, including Apollinarianism itself, came to their final issue and most defensible form in Monophysitism at its best. Between these two tendencies of thought lay the pathway of conciliar orthodoxy. Many of the ancient heresies, as, for example, Arianism, seem to be utterly dead beyond possibility of serious revival. But these two broad tendencies confront us still, although in a wholly changed situation.

II

Adoptionism, understood in this inclusive sense, represents a tendency to find the seat and centre of individual existence in the Incarnate Lord on the human side of the incarnate state. The language which is appropriate to this conception is that which speaks of Christ as a perfect human individual who is filled to the full with divine life and power. His divinity is thought of in terms of moral value and capacity to mediate a supreme revelation of God. In modern phraseology He has ‘ the value of God ’ ; but He has that value on the plane of a human individuality. In the terminology of the present work the Christ so regarded is 'on the level of spirit' in the organic series, although occupying a unique position on that level as the supreme mediator of revelation. For a religion which occupies philosophically the territory of theism, and which moreover claims to be the absolute religion, the difficulties with which this Christology is faced are immense. There are doubtless many ways of stating those difficulties. But for our present purpose it will be sufficient to consider them from the standpoint of the interpretation given in the preceding chapters. The difficulties fall under three heads; but all the three lines of consideration converge upon the failure of this type of Christology to do justice to the Christian conception of God.

(1) The first difficulty arises when we consider the Christian conception of creation. According to that conception this universe is the handiwork of a living creative God and exists for the manifestation of His glory and goodness. In more precise language, creation comes from God and must find its true end in Him. Its glory is that it shall find its goal in its Creator. His glory and goodness can be truly and fully manifested in His creatures only through the return of His gifts to Him in the worship which created spirits can render. The organic conception of the universe underlines this truth. For it shows, in a striking way, the position of man at the highest stage of a continuous upward movement, whose law of direction is the gathering up of all creation stage by stage into more and more inclusive wholes. Thus the significance of the entire movement is focused through man and beyond him. The movement of creation is, in Professor Alexander's phrase, a 'forward' movement with a '*nisus* towards deity.'[1] But reasons have been given in the previous argument for holding that this movement cannot be consummated on the level of our unfinished humanity. The organic series cannot provide its own adequate end. All our experience of the eternal order underlines the truth of this conclusion. It follows, then, that a perfect man could not bring creation to its goal, if by a perfect man we understand

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[1] *Hibbert Journal*, vol. xxv. No. 2 (Jan. 1927), art. 'Theism and Pantheism'; cp. *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. bk. iv.

one whose highest law of being is on the level of the human organism in the series. But this is precisely what the Christ is made out to be, if His divinity is stated, not in terms of a metaphysical status, but in terms of moral value poured into the mould of an individual human existence. Consequently the Adoptionism which is here envisaged does not bring creation to its goal in God. For it does not place God at the crowning point of His creation as its true end. On the contrary, this view finds the crown of creation in a perfect man. For when the concrete individuality of Christ is referred to His human organism, whilst His divinity is expressed in terms of moral union or moral value, one or other of two consequences follows. If this type of Christology is combined with orthodox trinitarianism, then the Person of the divine Son is linked with a human counterpart or double. This form of the doctrine is replaced to-day by one which makes the Trinity economic. In this case the consequence is that God becomes 'adjectival'[1] to a human organism. Creation finds its consummation in a perfect human organism by virtue of a special divine activity present in that organism. Thus we arrive at the position that God, who for biblical theism is essentially concrete individuality, and who by His creative power has incorporated the principle of concrete individuality into the developing universe with advancing significance to the level of spirit, was apparently unable to take the final step towards which this process was leading. By making God adjectival to a perfect human individuality this doctrine makes the crowning manifestation of individuality in creation something other than God. The universality of God's moral attributes is incorporated into a created individual; and thus at the climax of the creative plan and its process the principle of universality is separated from the principle of concrete individuality in God. Thus the whole position of theism is implicitly surrendered. If belief in the concrete individuality of God is still retained it can only be at the price of a sharp separation between the Creator and His creation. The duality of God and creation is not overcome, and theism is made to appear irrational. In effect this kind of Christology is no longer a barrier against monism; for it has ceased to bear witness to concrete individuality in God.[1]

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[1] I borrow this expression from Bishop Temple; see *Christus Veritas*, ch. i. p. 11.

There is another difficulty in this position, when regarded in the light of organic conceptions. By finding the crown of creation in an individual human organism, it has no solution of the problem of the social organism discussed in an earlier chapter.[2] It was there concluded that on the level of spirit there was no absolute subordination of the individual to society. Consequently that level is a bi-focal system which finds its correlation in the eternal order. There is no adequate correlation of the individual and social principles within the organic series on this its highest level. If then creation finds its consummation in an individual human organism, the tension of individual and social principles is not overcome in that consummation. It seems to follow, then, that adoptionist Christology of the type which we are considering is bound to fall back upon an 'atomic'[3] conception of individuality. It must refuse to recognise the organic character of society; it must repudiate the whole principle of the organic conception, for which the evidence is so strong to-day. If the correlation of the individual and social principles is to be sought in the eternal order, then it seems to follow that the Christ, who is the true head of the organic series, must stand above that series on the level of the eternal order. For to that order we refer the standards which control the relations between the individual and society. In the New Testament creation is brought to its goal in God through a new creation. This new creation is manifested in a New Order, where the tension of contrasts between the individual and society is, in principle, already overcome through the *κοινωνία* of the Spirit; because Christ is at once the source of the New Order, the indwelling content of developing individual life, and the goal in which the New Order is to find its completion.

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[1] On this point see the argument of ch. ix. § i. above, pp. 221–224, and further, below, ch. xiv. pp. 388 ff.

[2] See above, ch. iii. §§ iii. and iv. pp. 70–81.

[3] This use of the word has, of course, actually been rendered obsolete by the organic conception of the atom.

(2) The second difficulty arises when we consider the Christian idea of revelation. According to that idea Christianity is the final religion, because there has been given in Christ an absolute revelation to which in principle nothing can be added. This does not mean that there is no other channel of revelation but His life and teaching. Nor does it mean that all revelation is locked up in the historical past. But it *does* mean that in Christ is the clue to the significance of all other forms of revelation. It means that all other lines of revelation, when followed out to their full implications, converge towards Him and find their unity of significance in Him. All the stages and types of revelation which are given in nature, man and history lead up to Him, intersect in Him, and flow forward from Him to a consummation of history which will have its centre in Him. Evidence for this view of revelation has been furnished in previous chapters of the present work. It was there found that all our experiences of revelation are organically interconnected. All stages of such experience were found to be interlocked; and a continuity of structure was found running through the whole sequence. Moreover, the manifestation of the new creation in the New Order of life in the Spirit was found to have a Christo-centric reference, not only in its historical foundation, but also throughout its development and in the goal towards which it moves. Consequently the revelation in Christ spans all stages of history; not by chaining history down to that duration of time which corresponded to the historical life-story of Christ, but by incorporating into a concrete historical development the transcendent goods of the eternal order, which were manifested and embodied once for all in His life-story, and which are now gathered up, in His Person and through His exaltation, into a realm of eternity. All this becomes intelligible if Christ belongs to the level of the eternal order. But if we regard Him as a human individual within the organic series in whom there is a unique manifestation of the eternal order, then we have no ground for supposing that Christianity has the final character which Christians have ever found in it. The difficulty of the type of Christology towards which

this criticism is directed is that it seems to oscillate uncertainly between two positions without belonging to either. For on the one hand, if our Lord was simply a holy and inspired prophet, all our experience of revelation in its various forms as analysed in previous chapters points to the conclusion, not simply that His revelation may not be final, but that we have no right to look for finality in it. For the infinity of the eternal order does not find in man on his own level an adequate medium or agent of revelation. The Christology under consideration, however, places the Christ higher than any other man in a position beyond comparison as the agent of a supreme revelation. But what precisely is claimed for this revelation? If it has an absolute character, this must mean that in principle we have to do here with no partial incorporation of the eternal order, but with an absolute incorporation. If so, then we have no rational ground for placing the bearer of this absolute revelation within the organic series, since all the available evidence from the analogies in human experience prohibits this. Consequently the argument of this book can find no place for the mediator of an absolute revelation, except His metaphysical status be altogether beyond the organic series and on the level of the eternal order. The only alternative open would be to surrender the absolute claim of Christianity; that claim which we have found to be unmistakably present in our Lord's teaching, and which in the new creation passes over into the New Order, where it gives an absolute quality to the whole texture of Christocentric experience. Now it is impossible to separate this absolute quality from the Christian conception of God as revealed in Christ. The New Testament gives a ringing assurance of omnipotent love breaking through all barriers and obstacles and bringing man to his destiny through the saving activity of Christ. 'The gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth.'[1] The revelation of God is given in the form of a redeeming activity which is universal in scope and all-penetrating in power. A Christology which leaves the absolute quality of this saving power in an uncertain position is one which breaks with the Christian conception of God.

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[1] Rom. i. 16.

(3) Thus the third difficulty arises out of the second, when we consider the Christian experience of redemption. For the biblical revelation was given in the form of redeeming activity. The revelation of ethical monotheism in the Old Testament was reached through a historical experience of God's saving activity in the events of Israel's history. The full Christian conception of God arose in an order of experience, which referred its origination to the saving activity of God in the crowning events of Calvary and the resurrection, and which continued to find its power in the saving significance of those events. Man's need of salvation from sin has always been felt to constitute the greatest of all obstacles to, the most cogent of all arguments against, the adequacy of a Christology which does not clearly identify the Redeemer with God. The tension of contrast between the God of religious revelation and the consciousness of sinful estrangement, which that revelation actually accentuates, is a tension which God alone can overcome by the work of His lovingkindness. The absolute holiness and love of God, which were finally revealed in the New Testament, cannot be separated from the redeeming historical action through which that revelation was given. The forgiveness of sins and the creative renewal of human nature, which accompanies and follows upon that forgiveness, are the prerogatives of God. In the New Testament account of Christian experience this forgiveness and renewal are referred to the historical and transcendent Christ as their cause and ground. The absolute quality of that experience (which we know to be renewed from age to age) is there referred to the redeeming activity of Christ. It was especially on the grounds of this experience of justification and reconciliation that Ritschl declared Christ to have for us the value of God. But if He has the value of God on the ground that divine prerogatives are mediated through Him, we are once more back in the old dilemma that there is no half-way position which can be assigned to such a mediator. This conviction that He who mediates deliverance from sin must be very God is in itself what Pascal called a 'reason of the heart.'[1] It stands upon its own ground and

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[1] 'Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point.' *Pensées*, xxiv. 5 (Ed. Havet, Paris, 1852).

will never be eradicated from the Christian heart by any philosophical considerations. None the less, an interpretation of the universe which shows the three spheres of creation, revelation and redemption to be interlocked in our experience through a definite continuity in the structure of that experience is an interpretation which serves to show that the reasons of the heart in this matter are supported by reasons of the intellect. The organic unity of experience confirms our deepest religious convictions.

III

The other tendency of ancient thought which remains to be considered is that which first appeared in the docetic teaching of the gnostic systems; which reappeared in a modified form in the system of Apollinarius[1]; and which was officially expelled from orthodoxy when the Great Church finally broke with Monophysitism. This official expulsion was, however, followed by a good deal of unofficial and peaceful penetration through the influence of such recognised authorities as John of Damascus and Peter Lombard.[2] The saying that 'Eutyches was condemned but Apollinarius was not overcome' holds good not only of much mediaeval Christology but in certain respects of all pre-critical orthodoxy in the later centuries. The modern critical recovery of a more historical portrait of Christ's human life was accompanied by a group of 'kenotic' theories, which sought to solve the problem on too narrow a basis and which were sometimes crudely external in their treatment of the divine attributes.[3] Finally the Lutheran theory of the *communicatio idiomatum* has actually led to a kind of inverted Eutychianism, whereby in a composite divine-human person all that is distinctive of deity is absorbed into a human personality.[1] In the result there is a widespread theological opinion that orthodox Christianity cannot be emancipated from the taint of the Apollinarian error, which attained a form devotionally more popular and attractive in the hands of the Monophysite leaders. The silent penetration of orthodoxy by this point of view after its official expulsion gives considerable plausibility to such a historical verdict. If the justice of this verdict could be made good, then, in view of the difficulties in which the adoptionist Christology leaves us, we should indeed be in evil case. If, however, on the organic interpretation it can be shown that the Apollinarian-Monophysite tendency is a false encumbrance which has no necessary affiliation with orthodox Christology, the issue will to that extent have become clearer. If, further, it appears on this interpretation that the real implications of orthodox Christology and the religious interests which it is concerned to secure are as truly hostile to this tendency in all its forms as they are hostile to its great rival, the adoptionist tendency, then it can hardly remain in doubt that the organic interpretation of the Incarnation comes to the aid of conciliar orthodoxy in this confused issue of modern theological speculation.

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[1] For a detailed account, see *Apollinarianism*, by Canon C. E. Raven (Cambridge, 1923).

[2] The 'peaceful penetration' had, of course, begun much further back. It is discussed by Dorner, *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, div. ii. vol. i. § ii. (E. tr., pp. 120 ff.).

[3] For the kenotic theories, from various standpoints, see the following: C. Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation* (1895). F. J. Hall, *The Kenotic Theory* (1898). F. Weston, *The One Christ* (1907 and 1914). W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (1910), pp. 71–78. H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* (1912), pp. 264–272, 463–490. F. J. Hall, *The Incarnation* (1915), ch. vii. H. M. Relton, *A Study of Christology* (1917), pp. 210–222. W. Temple, *Christus Veritas* (1924), ch. viii. Fuller details of the literature will be found in some of the works here cited.

It will be well to begin by recognising that the Christological tendency which we are here considering has a much wider setting than can appear if we confine our attention to the field of Christological speculation alone. This will be evident if we place the doctrine of the Incarnation upon the background of creation. The tendency which we are to criticise has its roots in the oriental conception of the universe, the conception which casts doubts upon the goodness and reality of this concrete sensible world in which we live. That conception has for its greatest foe the Christian conception of creation, which finds the goodness and glory of the Creator manifested and expressed in the whole order of sensible appearances. For oriental pessimism the sensible world is a delusive obstacle which hides and obscures the vision of Absolute Reality. This theory penetrated widely into western thought, principally through Manichean influences ; and wherever it penetrated it left its devastating doctrine that created things are necessarily a hindrance and not a help to the manifestation of the Creator. In its first contact with Christianity in some of the gnostic systems, this doctrine involved a total denial of the Incarnation. Later on, in various modifications, the tendency showed itself within Christian thought in the view that the entry of the divine into human life must involve in some degree a superseding of the full and free manifestation of what belongs to the domain of the human spirit. Thus we have the strange notion of Apollinarius that the rational principle in man is too wayward and unstable to provide material which the Son of God can use for His self-manifestation in human nature. It has therefore to be superseded. This was to deny the logical implications of the Athanasian doctrine that man was made by God the Word in His own image and could therefore be redeemed by Him. We meet with what is, in principle, the same theory in the more extreme form of Augustinianism. Here the Pelagian theory of an indeterminate and autonomous humanity is countered by the equally false notion that grace overrides and supersedes man's capacity for spiritual freedom. Mediaeval politicians found, or supposed that they found, in the *de civitate dei* sanction for a much wider application of the theory. The supersession of spiritual freedom by grace was applied in the sphere of ecclesiastical politics in the Hildebrandine conception of a papal civilisation which left no room for autonomous spheres of human authority in society. We can see the same notion that redemption supersedes creation in that conception of transubstantiation which is rightly condemned because it 'overthroweth the nature of a sacrament.' The profound difficulty of the problem which appears in all these ramifications is perhaps most evident in the sphere of Christology. The widespread popularity and influence of Monophysitism for centuries suggests that it was contending for an important truth. But the full implications of the Christian doctrine of creation apparently required long ages of experiment before they could be disentangled.

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[1] A departure from the early Lutheran Christology (from Luther to the *Formula of Concord*) which Hooker had under consideration in *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. v. chs. l.–lvii. According to Dorner, Luther sought to give 'equiponderance' to the two natures. See Dorner's *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, div. ii. vol. ii. (E. tr., pp. 53–115). On the connexion of Lutheran Christology with the Monophysite controversy see also a valuable note, *ibid.* div. ii. vol. i. p. 131, n. 2.

The Renaissance inaugurated a new movement for the assertion of legitimate human interests ; and at one point after another the result has appeared in a demarcation of autonomous human spheres. On this vast canvas has been outlined a picture which counters the theory of supersession with a new concept of emancipation. The reactions of history have given to this many-sided movement an orientation which has often made it appear to have for its goal the emancipation of human interests from the influence of religion. By consequence religion too has tended to accept the new tension as a necessary separation into different compartments. Thus revelation and redemption have become canalised ; and religion is tempted to be content if it can express itself in a piety which is divorced from secular interests. But neither the supersession of human interests by religion, nor the emancipation of religion and human interests from one another can be adequate to the facts. The true end of creation is represented adequately by neither movement. Human life is neither simply autonomous and self-completing, nor is it doomed to be frustrated by some higher order of existence. Its destiny is that it should be completed in God. The movement of creation is inadequate to achieve a goal within its own resources. Its steps require direction by the revealing light of a transcendent order which lies beyond it. Its excellences can be attained only through the consecrating action of divine grace. An interpretation of the universe which postulates a movement of creation towards eternity and the completion of that movement by divine economies of revelation and redemption stands in no need of the Christological theory under consideration in this section. But the actual course of human thought in history has, perhaps, made it possible to see this truth more clearly in these latter days. The organic conception of creation, when applied by analogy to the doctrine of the Incarnation, enables us to see more clearly not only that the theory is unnecessary but that it is untrue, as untrue to the interests of religion as it is to the facts of nature.

It is a constant feature of all forms of the tendency under consideration that the constitution of our Lord's human nature is supposed to have been changed in one way or another so that the manhood of the Incarnate Lord is no longer subject to the same cosmic laws as ours. Thus an opinion attributed to disciples of Apollinarius held the Lord's human nature to have come down from heaven and to be of heavenly substance.[1] Again one school of Monophysites held that our Lord's body was essentially incorruptible,[2] whilst Luther and his followers taught that that body acquired the attribute of ubiquity from its union with the Incarnate.[3] On the organic view of creation all theories of such a change are utterly impossible. There can be no difference in organic characteristics as between our Lord's humanity and ours. There can be no superseding of laws or principles of being, there can be no emancipation of His human organism from the divine pattern of creation manifested in other human organisms. Ethical non-attainment and sinful estrangement from God do not belong to that divine pattern of creation. Conscience assures us that they ought not to be; and if conscience misleads us in such a matter, then Christian theism is a delusive system and our problems are insoluble. But if our interpretation of man's experience in respect of the eternal order holds good, then there is no ground for doubting that a perfect humanity would share to the full in the pattern of creation manifested in other human organisms. Spiritual deterioration is not included in that pattern; for God is not the author of evil. But when it is said that the constitution of our Lord's human nature was not changed, this must be understood in the light of the whole previous discussion of the organic series and its laws. Each level of the series is constituted in its principle of unity. But that constitution is not static; for it is manifested in a directive movement which can be actualised only by transformation to a higher level.[1] It belongs to the constitution of each level that it possesses a tendency towards passage beyond itself. It does not inevitably pass to a higher level. But it is capable of such transformation, if it be subsumed under a higher principle of unity. In this transformation, however, nothing is superseded. Every law of being and principle of unity is taken up and conserved on the higher level. Each level is taken up into a larger organic unity. But within that larger unity the lower laws and principles retain their distinctive character. The bearing of this double fact upon Christology is clear. The Monophysites were right in asserting that the human nature is taken up into a unity in which it is included. They were wrong in asserting that the humanity no longer abides by its own law of being, that it is no longer controlled by its own distinctive principle of unity. What they feared, however, was a duplication of concrete individuality in the Christ. In order to avoid that duplication the Council of Chalcedon is held to have done violence to the ordinary use of language required by the metaphysical concepts of the day.[2] But still the Monophysites were not satisfied. No straining of Greek metaphysics could overcome the inadequacy of its terminology. In that terminology 'two natures' might still suggest a duplication of individuality. This, then, is a crucial point. Can the organic conception throw light upon the difficulty?

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[1] Cp. Raven, op. cit. ch. iv. p. 144. The opinion has been wrongly attributed to Apollinarius himself.

[2] The Aphthartodocetists: see Dorner, op. cit. div. ii. vol. i. E. tr., pp. 128–132.

[3] The official Lutheran statement is given in the *Formula Concordiae*, part ii. ch. viii.

IV

In the previous argument of this book it has frequently been pointed out that the upward development of the organic series exhibits a tendency towards an advancing significance of individuality.[3] But on the other hand, however far this tendency advances, it nowhere reaches its goal in the series. This double principle provides the clue which we must follow. The principle of individuality in the lower stages of the organic series is subordinated to cosmic and racial laws of being. But on the level of spirit the principle of individuality is no longer in that subordinate position. For on that level individual organisms have attained to community with the eternal order. The principle of individuality has thus passed into a form where it possesses eternal significance. The principle, however, is still the expression of creative activity in the organic series. Consequently it shares the unfinished character which is stamped upon the whole series. One evidence of this is to be found in the fact that on the level of spirit the series as a whole is not subsumed under the principle of individuality. That principle is correlated with the social principle in a bi-focal system. Their synthesis lies in the eternal order which is above the series. We are no longer therefore in the dilemma which confronted ancient ways of thought on this matter. We are no longer under obligation to express ourselves through a terminology which locked up each entity in the sole company of its own principle of individuality, and which had no way of distinguishing between different degrees in the principle of individuality; a terminology which was not framed to express the distinction between a graded and incomplete embodiment of the principle of individuality in an organic evolution and an absolute expression of that principle in God. From all these limitations of the old terminology organic conceptions set us free. Consequently the whole problem takes an entirely new shape.

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[1] See above, pp. 38–40, 242.

[2] See above, pp. 233, 234.

[3] *E.g.* ch. ii. p. 42 above.

Now on the level of spiritual organisms individuality is constituted in a principle of spiritual self-transcendence which is self-determined by communion with the eternal order. This, the highest form of individuality in the series, is not determined by organic or racial laws of being within the series (as is the case with lower forms of individuality). It is self-determined by communion with the eternal order. There is an interchange of reciprocal activity between the eternal order and the principle of individuality embodied in spiritual organisms. The spiritual activities of apprehension and response which characterise man are the counterpart of activities of revelation from the side of the eternal order.

This reciprocal relation of man with the eternal order has two aspects. On the one hand, it sets man apart from the rest of the organic series in solitary dignity. He alone is rationally self-determining through communion with the eternal order. He alone is not enchained to a relatively passive determination by organic laws. He alone has the capacity to control from within, by his own rational response, routines of habit belonging to the lower organic levels; so that those routines of habit conform to the rhythm of spiritual activity. It is this which constitutes in him a higher degree of concrete individuality than is to be found anywhere else in the series. But all this, which sets him apart and constitutes his greatness and significance in respect to the series, is, on the other hand, due precisely to the fact of his relation to the eternal order. His individuality is constituted in spiritual dependence upon that order and is actualised through this state of dependence. That is the second aspect of man's spiritual status. His greatness consists not simply in an autonomy, but in a relative autonomy which is actualised through dependence upon and response to the eternal order. His greatness is constituted by his capacity for self-transcendence by passage into the eternal order. His significance lies, not in any completeness, but in his capacity for passage beyond his present incompleteness. Individuality in man is not a fully constituted form of individuality. It is on the way towards its fully constituted form. It has not yet attained. One aspect of this fact is to be seen in the tension which exists between the individual and social principles in our present experience. But for our immediate purpose it is more important to notice that on the level of spirit the cosmic tendency towards an advancing significance of individuality has undergone transformation. This transformation is determined by the reciprocal and spiritual relation by which man has the capacity for response to revelations of the eternal order. On the level of spirit the significance of individuality advances, not through a further multigrade progression like that which lies below it in the cosmic series, but through advancing co-operation of spirit on its own level with the eternal order. Thus, whereas in the series incorporation of the eternal order is by successive stages of creative activity, controlling relatively fixed routines of activity in the organisms which belong to each stage, on the level of spirit there can be advancing incorporation of the eternal order within the life-story of each spiritual organism in proportion to the response which that organism makes to revelations of the eternal order.

At this point it will be relevant to recall the argument of previous chapters concerning the development of individuality in spiritual organisms. The argument can be summarised by quoting a few sentences from chapter iv.[1] 'Development of character means increasing transcendence over routines of habit by self-determination towards the eternal order. Thus development of character is activity in movement towards the eternal order. In this movement there is growing stability, inner coherence and advancing freedom.' 'Self-determination means a gathering of all the resources of individual life into unified activity, which is stamped with individuality the more clearly as it is unified. Thus individuality becomes more concrete and distinctive.' Thus the more fully the eternal order is incorporated into a developing human organism, the more stable, concrete and distinctive does human individuality become, and the more nearly does it attain to that self-determination or freedom which is proper to created spirits. The pantheistic doctrine that human individuality has for its goal an absorption into the Absolute is radically opposed by the whole interpretation of individuality adopted in the present work. Yet if we once accept the Monophysite principle that the human organism can acquire divine attributes by suspension or supersession of its own proper laws of being, then not only do we turn our backs upon all analogy which is offered by the organic conception of creation, but (a much more serious matter) we give up the fundamental contrast between God and creation for which theism stands, a contrast which is manifested in all our experience of the eternal order. The fundamental truth that there is no duplication of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is not to be saved by such an interchange of attributes as would destroy the very principle of theism. This desperate remedy really gives up the problem which is to be solved. That problem has two sides to it. Thus far, in this analysis of the principle of individuality, attention has been given to one element only in the problem, namely, the advancing significance of individuality in the organic series and in man's experience of the eternal order. But there is another aspect to be considered, an aspect which is already present in that experience of the eternal order, but which is more fully manifested in the domain of religious experience.

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[1] Section iv.; see above, pp. 106, 107. The quotation is compressed.

The transition from the manifestation of individuality in the organic universe as an uncompleted principle of being (even in its highest form in spiritual organisms) to the divine aspect of individuality, as it exists in God, is a transition which is made when we pass from revelations of the eternal order to the historical revelation of God given in religious experience. In a previous chapter a conception of revelation was put forward which showed it to be multiform but interconnected.[1] The whole development of individuality on the level of spirit has for its background an activity of revelation feeding that advancing individuality from the eternal order. In the historical revelation of the Bible the incorporation of the eternal order into religious experience was found to have for its counterpart the transformation of revelational activity into a historical redeeming activity of the living God. The Bible as a record of religious experience shows us the divine aspect of individuality revealed through the medium of historical redeeming activity. Human individuality cannot find its goal through self-completion by advancing incorporations of the eternal order. For its highest concrete mode of activity must be one which fulfils the fundamental law of self-transcendence, a mode of activity which involves dependence upon Absolute Individuality. This shows us that the eternal order is in its essence concrete. For by dependence upon that order the concreteness of human individuality is developed and nourished. But in religious experience man comes face to face with the pure concreteness of absolute individuality in God. Here, in this experience, there is manifested more completely the significance of man's dependence. It is a dependence of incomplete and partial individuality upon the principle of individuality in its absolute form as it exists in God. The self-transcendence of created individuality finds a partial and relative mode of fulfilment in its activity towards the social organism. But its only adequate object is God. The essence of religion consists in the concrete dependence of incomplete created individuality upon absolute individuality as it exists in God. This dependence is twofold. It is receptive and active, assimilative and responsive. It involves the uttermost oblation of worship, the adoring recognition of the perfection and glory of the Creator. But this active response of worship, which is the crowning activity of created individuality, is a recognition of dependence, and presupposes a divine activity from God's side of the interchange. It is the recognition of the divine activities of creation, revelation and redemption. It presupposes, therefore, a principle of gracious self-giving in the Being of God, a principle which is manifested with advancing significance in those successive spheres of creation, revelation and redemption.

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[1] See above, ch. vi.

Man's capacity for self-transcendence, as it is the highest manifestation of the principle of individuality in the organic series, is also the highest analogy which we can find in our experience for the principle of self-giving in God. The principle of concrete individuality in the organic series, advancing to the level of self-transcendence in man, must indeed be inadequate in its indication as to the character of that self-giving which flows down from the absolute individuality of God and which finds expression in the structure of the universe and in man's experience. Nevertheless we must follow the analogy to its furthest point. The very fact that there is an analogy at all means that the advancing principle of individuality in the organic series and in man is an expression in creation of the Creator's own likeness. The measure of reality belonging to concrete individuality in all its stages and levels of development in creation is a measure of reality conferred by the Creator in His divine self-giving to His creatures. Consequently the manifestations of this self-giving in created reality cannot be treated as unreal without dishonouring the very character of the Creator as manifested in His creation. The Christological tendency under consideration obscures the true glory of the Creator by suggesting that He cannot bring creation to the goal of its advancing principle of individuality without superseding and casting aside the distinctive excellence of its finite concrete reality.

V

We must follow the analogy to its furthest point. That furthest point is to be found, as has been intimated, in the sphere of religious experience. A comparison has been made in this chapter between the Apollinarian-Monophysite tendency in Christology and the extreme Augustinian theory of grace. In both cases the distinctive excellences of human nature are superseded instead of being brought to their consummation. The effect of divine grace upon human nature is always, in the long run, to liberate and enrich whatever is truly human. The qualification is important. There are many facts of Christian history, for example, which tell against the truth of the principle. In detail and in particular cases the principle often seems to fail. 'Our present imperfection'[1] within the Christian order is perhaps the most acute form which the problem of evil takes. The effects of divine grace working in history have to be judged, not by the intractable character of the material upon which it works, but by the broad positive effects which it produces on the widest scale and by its concrete achievements in the face of that intractability to its influences which human nature displays. Just as the facts of non-attainment are not the last word about the universe in view of our positive experience of affinity with the eternal order,[2] so the sins and failures which mar the course of religious history cannot negate man's age-long experience of the transforming power which radiates from the redeeming love of God in Christ.[1] This transforming power is described most vividly in the New Testament. One great effect of the rationalising movements which preceded the first century A.D. had been an enlarged conception of the value and significance of individuality. But what was achieved in those movements was but a dim, meagre anticipation of the Christian revelation concerning the principle of individuality set forth in our Lord's teaching as a fundamental characteristic of the kingdom of God. What was set forth in that teaching passed to its realisation in the New Order of life in the Spirit as a fact of interior present experience. The new creation brought a new experience of spiritual freedom. The fundamental structure of the eternal order was incorporated into the kingdom of God in the historical Christ; and the excellences of the kingdom of God are, in principle, already incorporated into redeemed humanity in the New Order.

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[1] The phrase provided the title and theme of ch. xii. in Moberly's *Atonement and Personality*.

[2] See the argument of ch. v. above.

The apostolic writings have a number of different ways of expressing the transforming effects of grace upon the development of individuality in the New Order. In the first place the outpouring of Holy Spirit upon those who entered the new fellowship is represented as bestowing spiritual gifts and graces, which are added to the natural capacities of a person who has been taken up into the new life. But these new gifts clearly do not override or supersede his natural endowments. They are, moreover, in some cases properly to be understood as a sanctification and consecration of natural dispositions and aptitudes. 'They shall bring the glory and the honour of the nations into it' is the way in which this truth is expressed in the most apocalyptic book of the New Testament.[2] The old order is transformed by being brought to the level of the New Order. The rich materials of human individuality are not set aside but raised to a new level of power where the principle of individuality is recognised, treasured and brought into conformity with a new rhythm of development. There is considerable evidence in favour of the view that, in the first generation after Pentecost, there was a real danger of the gifts of the Spirit being confused with certain abnormal psychic states which accompanied the earliest Christian experience of the Spirit. But St. Paul set his face against this confusion of the psychical with the spiritual; and it was gradually outgrown, to be revived only by the Montanists and by similar revivalist movements in later ages.[1] St. Paul led the main movement of Christian thought away from this morass into a deeper conception of the Spirit's work. At that deeper level St. Paul conceived the work of the Spirit in terms of a radical renewal and transformation of human nature. By entry into the New Order in the fellowship of the Spirit human individuality was re-created in a reconciliation with God through Christ. The principle of spirit in the individual was rescued by this new creation from its submerged state, delivered from the bondage of non-attainment, and set upon a pathway of development in which the ethical conflict of flesh and spirit was in process of solution. Thus the problem of self-harmonisation was in principle solved by the indwelling of Holy Spirit, which ensured the ultimate triumph of the principle of spirit over all lower tendencies and routines of habit in the spiritual organism of man. But the development of individuality in the New Order is something more than an emancipation of man's spirit from sin and its consequences. It is a positive rebuilding of character on larger and more generous lines than any attainment of character which could be possible outside of the Spirit's action in the New Order. New ethical concepts appear in the New Testament; and an altogether new content is put into words of the Greek vocabulary. Charity, humility, sincerity, truthfulness, chastity, patient endurance, joy, hope—all such words acquire a transformed meaning in the *ethos* of the Christian *κοινωνία*. They are all graces, gifts, fruits of the Spirit, products of His creative activity which make the individual a 'new man.' Moreover, all this transformation of character in the individual must be put into a wider context. The apostolic writings know nothing of an individual development which is apart from or outside the new social fellowship, the new community of which Christ is the Head. The ethical transformation of the individual involves a social transformation. In the Body of Christ a new sociological factor has come into existence. The gifts and graces of the Spirit are not simply the crown of individual character. They all have social significance. Thus, for example, such virtues as truthfulness and chastity are urged by New Testament writers, not on the ground that they are what the individual owes to his own dignity, but because untruthfulness and unchastity violate the fellowship of the body of Christ, transgress its fundamental law of ἀγάπη, and grieve the Holy Spirit, who is the bond of unity in the new community.[1]

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[1] Cp. what was said in ch. viii. § ii.

[2] Apoc. xxi. 26.

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[1] Cp. an interesting study of this subject by H. J. Wotherspoon, *The Ministry in the Church in Relation to Prophecy and Spiritual Gifts*, Lecture III. § i. 4–6, pp. 89–97 (Longmans, 1916).

In the new community the tension of the individual and of society has been, in principle, overcome. Christians are still exhorted to 'put off the old man who is perishing according to the lusts of deceit, to be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and to put on the new man.' But 'the new man has been created as God would have him.'[2] The new spiritual and sociological principle is already in operation, the principle which is destined to bring redeemed humanity to its true end. The old order has been taken up into the new. The New Order has been constituted, and is in process of manifestation in a directive movement which will be fully actualised when it attains its goal in Christ. Thus the principle of individuality in creation has been taken up on to a new level; where not only individual harmonisation, but also social harmonisation, 'the peace of the city of God' as Augustine called it, has been brought within the horizon of possibility. The Pauline descriptions of the Church as the body of Christ postulate the entry into history of a new sociological principle, for which we can find no parallel.[3] In the new community the individual and social principles are correlated under a higher principle. There is no trace of a subordination of either of these two principles to the other. That is a political expedient of which New Testament experience stands in no need. The two principles remain in bi-focal relation to one another on one level. There is no supersession of that law which is proper to the level of spiritual organisms. But the level of their actual relations is a new level. This truth is stated in well-known symbolical language in the Epistle to the Ephesians: 'He raised us up with Christ and seated us together with Him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.'[1] The two principles, whose mutual tension cannot be resolved on their own level in the organic series, are correlated in a new synthesis by transformation to the level of the new creation. They meet in the new humanity of Christ. They are subsumed under the principle of individuality as it exists in Him.

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[1] Cp. Eph. iv. 1–4; iv. 25–32; 1 Thess. iv. 3–8.

[2] Eph. iv. 22–24.

[3] The study of Christianity as 'the entry into history of a new sociological principle' is a point to which more attention might well be directed. It is a point which engaged the attention of two modern thinkers occupying detached and quite different standpoints. See Benjamin Kidd, *The Principles of Western Civilisation*, and Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, 2 vols.

Now we have seen that one of the grave difficulties which confronts an adoptionist Christology consists in this, that 'if creation finds its consummation in an individual human organism, the tension of individual and social principles is not overcome in that consummation.'[2] But the relative harmony which the social organism exhibits in history, despite this element of tension, has been traced to the fact that there is a relative correlation of the individual and social organisms through the communion of both with the eternal order.[3] Consequently the synthesis of the two principles in the new humanity of Christ, through a transformation which carries their correlation to a new level, is a synthesis on the level of the eternal order. It is a synthesis which corresponds, not to the partial incorporation of the eternal order on the highest level of the organic series, but to that absolute incorporation of the eternal order in which the Incarnation consists. We must conclude then that the new sociological principle which is postulated in the Pauline description of the body of Christ is nothing less than the principle of individuality as it exists in the Incarnate Lord. It follows, therefore, that the principle

[1] Eph. ii. 6.

[2] See above, p. 258.

[3] See above, ch. iii.

of individuality as it exists in Him is *super-organic.* It belongs to the level of deity.

This conclusion agrees with the definition of the Incarnation reached in the last chapter: *Absolute Actuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word becomes the principle of unity in a human organism.*[1] But this prolonged inquiry (by way of ancient heresies) into the principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord has brought us a good deal further along the road. The earlier discussion of terminology, which occupied the last chapter, was concerned to show that in Christ the human organism is raised to the level of deity. The highest law of being in an organism is that law which, in accordance with the terminology employed in this work, determines the level proper to that organism. It is the law of that principle of unity which constitutes the organism to be what it is in relation both to the series and to the eternal order. In the Incarnate Lord the human organism is constituted in the Eternal Word. He, from whose creative power all principles of unity flow into the organic series, who is Himself the ground and source of all those principles and who embraces them all—He has become organic to the series in a human organism. The meaning of this definition will now become clearer through the previous discussion of the principle of individuality. For the degree of individuality embodied in an organism corresponds to its principle of unity. The successive stages, by which there is an advancing significance of individuality in the series, correspond to the successive principles of unity incorporated into the series. In the ascending series of principles of unity there is an advancing significance of the principle of individuality. The directive movement of the series is towards a full manifestation and actualisation of the principle of individuality. The status of a principle of unity is governed by this fact, and is determined by the degree in which it manifests the principle of individuality. Thus, whilst there are a number of principles of unity corresponding successively to the levels of the series, there is only one principle of individuality (as the term is here employed); and this one principle of individuality is manifested in different stages of approximation to full actualisation through the successive principles of unity. We can now distinguish more precisely the three principal terms which have been employed in this work in the application of organic conceptions. These three terms are (1) *the highest law of being*, (2) *the transcending principle of unity*, (3) *the principle of individuality*. Of these three the first has the most general, the third the most precise reference. (1) The first of these terms has reference to the general fact that in an organic series we recognise different kinds of laws in recognising a stratification of levels and grades. But if there were nothing but the passage of events in nature we could not distinguish such differences. We find this differentiation of laws through our capacity to apprehend distinct objects exhibiting to our minds a wholeness which we can grasp in a single act of perception. In any such object the highest law of being is the law of its wholeness or unity. Consequently (2) the second term employed has reference, not to the general fact of different kinds of laws, but to the more precise fact of organic unity manifested in physical objects. We recognise the multigrade form of an organic evolution in an ascending series of objects; because, corresponding to our capacity for unity of perception, objects manifest a particular unity. This unity is referred to a principle of unity and there is an ascending scale of principles of unity. But once more (3) there is something more in organic evolution than a succession of objects which can be arranged in an ascending order according to their respective principles of unity. Each physical object perceived has the character of a unit of active energy, which passes on by transformation from stage to stage.[1] The word organism, by its implicit reference to the whole organic conception of evolution, seems to express this idea better than the word object, which has reference primarily to the factor of perception. Now the concept of an organism suggests the organic interconnexion of the universe and therefore a principle of unity running through the whole series of interconnected activities. But what gives significance to the series as a developing whole is the principle of its *advance* which is manifested in its directive movement. The ascending series of principles of unity are thus gathered up into a single principle, which is present in them all but with advancing significance from stage to stage. *This single principle immanent in the whole series as its final cause is the principle of individuality.* The series of principles of unity does not go on indefinitely like an infinite mathematical series. On the level of spirit the series is launched into the infinity of the eternal order. But that infinity of the eternal order manifests its essential affinity with the concrete by its return into concrete character in the development of spiritual organisms. The series, then, never passes beyond the principle of individuality. Rather does it move towards the actualisation of that principle in its concrete fullness. The principle, however, is never actualised within the series. For the multiplicity of spiritual organisms is never subsumed under a single higher manifestation of the principle; and the individual spiritual organisms respectively never attain actualisation within their own spheres. They never can so attain, because the principle of individuality in man fulfils a law of self-transcendence; and the highest expression of this law is embodied in religious worship, where the incompleteness of created individuality is confronted with the absolute individuality of the Creator. There in the highest activity of man the created principle of individuality, without loss of its own distinct character, can find its goal in the bosom of Absolute Actuality, in adoring recognition of, and surrender to, its eternal Source and unmoved Cause.

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[1] See above ch. ix., end of § ii.

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[1] For further consideration of this language see Additional Note C, *Objects and Events*.

In worship the spirit of man acknowledges in itself the created likeness of God's actuality. In the created universe all principles of unity pass beyond their own level, and are gathered up and included on higher levels which transcend them. In man this principle of transcendence becomes a principle of *self*-transcendence which is the very likeness of the Creator's eternal self-giving. By this fact we recognise in the advancing principle of individuality in creation a progressive self-giving of the Creator to His creatures. This is the religious significance of that law of the organic series which, in its earlier statement, has been called an advancing incorporation of the eternal order. The advancing significance of individuality in creation registers and manifests the progressive self-giving of the Creator. The whole principle of individuality, in its developing significance in creation, is the manifestation of the graciousness and goodness of the Creator in His self-giving. The principle of individuality is finally actualised in the series through that complete and absolute self-giving of the Creator which we call the Incarnation. Every manifestation of the principle of individuality in created organisms is the product of creative activity, which is the self-giving of the Creator. There are different degrees in the manifestation of this principle; but all alike are incomplete embodiments of creative activity. In man the principle of individuality is a product of creative activity which owes its continuous existence and its individual development to the unceasing grace of the Creator's self-giving. Yet in the stages of this gracious self-giving no gift is recalled. All are gathered up through the cumulative wholes of the organic series to the highest level of that series, where all the stages of creative self-giving are present in the human organism. When, therefore, the process is crowned by the final self-giving of God in the Incarnation, there is no negation of what goes before, no supersession of preceding gifts. The Incarnation is inclusive of all. This absolute self-giving of God gathers up into itself all successive products of creative activity—that activity which flowed down from the same source dispersively into an extended series, but which also gathers up all such products through cumulative wholeness into the spiritual organism of man. The created principle of individuality could by no process of self-development complete itself, either by producing a perfect and fully actualised human individual or by climbing to the throne of absolute individuality as it exists in God. But since the principle of individuality was implanted in the organic series by the Creator's gracious self-giving, and was clearly intended by Him to be completed and yet cannot complete itself, it was most fitting that it should be brought to its true completion by that same activity of gracious self-giving from which it took its rise. If we consider all the facts such a completion as we see in the Incarnation is utterly satisfying to reason.

VI

With these considerations in mind we can proceed to complete our terminology of the Incarnation by introducing the principle of individuality. In the Incarnate Lord the principle of individuality is super-organic and cannot therefore be identified with the principle of unity proper to a human organism in the organic series. In any organism the degree of individuality which it embodies is determined by its transcending principle of unity, which imparts to the organism its status in the series. The principle of unity proper to a human organism in the series determines its degree of individuality, which is the highest degree of individuality in the series, yet still created and incomplete. But the principle of unity which determines the status of the Incarnate Lord is not a partial manifestation of creative activity, but the Eternal Word Himself, who is the source of all creative activity. Consequently the principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is not a created manifestation of the principle of individuality, not a further development of that principle in its organic form. *The principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is Absolute Individuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word.* Now according to this terminology a modern equivalent of the Apollinarian-Monophysite tendency would consist in saying either (1) that the Eternal Word took the place of that principle of unity which was proper to our Lord's human organism in virtue of its organic character, or (2) that the law of being proper to that organic principle of unity was in some way changed in its essential character or superseded or suspended within the life of the Incarnate Lord. But we have no need of any of these interpretations of the incarnate state. For the human organism of the Christ, with its own proper principle of unity and its own law of being, is taken up on to the level of the Eternal Word, who thus becomes its super-organic principle of unity and bestows upon it super-organic and absolute individuality. The human organism of our Lord stands to the Lord who is incarnate in a relation for which our analogy is that of an organ or organic structure to the whole organism which it serves. Consequently the human organism of the Incarnate Lord is taken up on to the level of deity with its own principle of unity. But this its own organic principle of unity is not the principle which determines its degree of individuality. For the individuality is determined by the highest or transcending principle of unity, that is by the principle of the whole ; and the principle of the whole is the Eternal Word Himself from whom all organic principles of unity flow. When an organic structure is taken up into a more complex organism the lower principle of unity proper to that organic structure (with its law of being) is not removed, changed in essential character, superseded or suspended. It does however conform to the rhythm of the higher organism into which it has been gathered. It fulfils its own law of being within the larger whole and in conformity with the patterns of that larger whole. So too, in the Incarnate Lord, the principle of unity proper to His human organism in respect of its organic character is subsumed under the principle of absolute individuality proper to His Godhead. If we may strain the use of organic language somewhat, we might say that the human organism of the Incarnate Lord conforms to the ‘ rhythm ’ of deity.

It follows then that the perfect human organism of Jesus Christ is not less but more truly and profoundly human than ours can ever be. It is not less but more individual. For it conforms to that absolute principle of individuality which is the creative ground of our human organisms and the very fountain from which flows our created and incomplete individuality. So again we have no need for the Monothelite theory. For as God’s grace liberates human free will and conducts man to true spiritual freedom, so still more must that gracious self-giving of God which became absolute in the Incarnation bring the true spiritual freedom of man to perfection and fulfilment in the human organism of Jesus Christ. For that human organism conforms to the rhythm of absolute self-determined self-giving and to the perfect law of love in the eternal Being of God.

We have reached a point in the argument where it becomes urgently necessary to consider more fully and systematically the conception of God which is implied in the doctrine of the Incarnation. The plan of this book has been to bring the philosophy of theism into closer connexion with time and history. The method adopted has been first to show that an organic conception of the universe which gives a new significance and importance to the concept of time is fully compatible with a theistic interpretation; and secondly to show that such a theistic interpretation receives its strongest supports from historical revelation and its final vindication in the doctrine of the Incarnation. This method has involved a wide reference to the conceptions of God implicit in the biblical revelation, and to the organic structure of religious experience as the medium through which revelation receives its dogmatic interpretations. Amongst those dogmatic interpretations we have been explicitly concerned so far only with those which attempted to formulate the doctrine of the Incarnation. The interdependence of Christian theism with the Christian experience of Christ has been treated as the crucial test of theories about the Incarnate Lord. All this has presupposed a Christian view of God drawn from the biblical revelation, but supported by other lines of revelation; all of which lines of revelation, biblical and non-biblical, intersect in the historical figure of the Christ. The rationality of Christian theism has thus been made dependent upon the conception of God which is mediated to us through our experience of the Christ, when that experience is interpreted in the widest context of all domains of experience. But the conception of God which thus makes theism rational requires to be rendered more explicit than has hitherto been actually necessary to the argument. A conception which was mediated historically through Christ can be duly estimated only when we have carefully weighed the implications of the religious experience which has its centre of gravity in Christ. Thus we move through Christ to God.

The implications of that experience are now seen to lead to the doctrine that in Christ there is super-organic individuality, which we recognise to be one with that Absolute Individuality whose likeness is imprinted upon creation and whose absolute character is required by our experience of the eternal order. Moreover the doctrine of the Incarnation in which this conclusion is formulated vindicates a theistic interpretation of the universe by no empty formula, but by showing that creation is brought to its true goal in God. This it does by pointing to the unity of God and creation in Christ, a unity not in theory but in fact. This unity reveals in the Creator a law of gracious self-giving to which all creation refers us, but which so far transcends our understanding that we could never discover it. Yet when this law is revealed in Christ we recognise its truth displayed in the gospels, and find it penetrating our own hearts with convincing power in a daily experience of redeeming love which is greater and more ultimate than all our experience of guilt and of sinful failure.

CHAPTER XI

THE INCARNATION AND GOD. THE STATUS OF THE REDEEMER

I

THE full explication of the Christian doctrine of the Godhead was reached through the conviction that Jesus Christ is very God and yet distinct from the Father whom He came to reveal. For the distinction between the Father and His only-begotten Son early Christian writers relied upon the recorded teaching of our Lord Himself.[1] The conclusion that Jesus Christ is very God was certainly discovered by them in the teaching of scripture. But then Arius believed that he had discovered quite different conclusions implicit in the same treasury of truth. It is no difficult matter to discern behind all the scriptural arguments of St. Athanasius and his successors that texts of scripture are being interpreted through the medium of a religious experience.[2] Christ must be very God because He is the Redeemer through whom we are brought to the Father. Behind all the controversial theology of the fourth century A.D. stands the portrait of the Redeemer outlined by St. Athanasius at the beginning of his career in a treatise which still glows with meaning, because it expresses convictions rooted in a living religious experience.[3] The

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[1] *E.g.* cp. the argument from Scripture in Tertullian's treatise *against Praxeas*, chs. 11–26. The argument, which ransacks scripture for evidence of Christ's sonship, would never have been undertaken if the gospels had not suggested it.

[2] *E.g.* the three *Orations against the Arians* and the *Theological Orations* of St. Gregory of Nazianzus. For the former I have used the edition by W. Bright; for the latter the edition by A. J. Mason in Cambridge Patristic texts.

[3] *contra gentes*, bk. ii., usually cited as *de incarnatione*.

Nicene faith grew from an experience whose earliest formulated expression is to be found in the Pauline epistles. To that source of doctrine we must now turn for the starting-point of a fuller investigation into the Christian conception of the Godhead.

In the last chapter it was pointed out that in the Pauline conception of the body of Christ the position occupied by our Lord as Head of that body was one which required an interpretation of His Person in terms of a super-organic principle of individuality. This view was based not upon disputable interpretations of the so-called Christological texts, but upon the whole character of Christian experience as displayed in the apostolic writings. We have now to re-examine the structure of that experience with a view to reaching clearer determinations as to the character of this principle of individuality which inaugurated a new sociological factor in history. It has already been shown that the apostolic interpretation of Christo-centric experience has two aspects. It is the experience of a *κοινωνία*, a fellowship of the Spirit in one body. The whole structure of the experience is social in its implications; and Christ is enthroned above this new social order as One who transcends and embraces both the new community and its individual members. Thus He transcends the tension of the social and individual principles and re-creates both principles within a new synthesis on the level of His own new humanity. Thus in one of its aspects the new principle is a principle of social harmonisation, whereas in its other aspect it is a principle of individual harmonisation. This aspect of individual harmonisation must now be considered afresh. For within it lies one of the experiential tests which guarantee the rationality and truth of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

In the experience of the new community there is a transformation of individual development; and this transformation is traced to the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ. In Pauline thought there are two distinct ways in which this transformation is conceived. It is the work of the Spirit; and it is also the work of Christ. The transformation is effected by the indwelling activity of the Holy Spirit re-creating in man the principle of spirit, subduing the principle of flesh, and thus resolving the tension of ethical dualism which in its unrelieved condition baffles and thwarts the whole development of man's spiritual life. This activity of the Holy Spirit culminates in positive gifts and graces, by which character is transformed and the individual is enabled to conform to the rhythm of the body of Christ, the larger organic whole to which he belongs. In this conception the emphasis lies upon the transformation of the individual life within a larger whole, and upon the fact that this transformation is effected by a divine activity present in and underlying the whole development. But if we desire to see more clearly what is the peculiar content of this individual development which makes it specifically Christian, then we must have recourse to another group of Pauline conceptions, those which refer the whole transformation to a mystical union of the Christian soul with Christ Himself. The two groups of conceptions are correlated in two ways ; first by the statement that the indwelling Spirit is the Spirit of Christ, and secondly by the fact that the whole transforming activity of the Spirit in the individual life is set within the context of the new community of which Christ is the Head. But the distinctive character of the whole transformation is set forth most clearly in the fact that it has Christ for its centre of gravity in all its aspects. Christ is the inner content of the developing life, the end towards whom it moves, and the transcendent source from whom it springs.

Christ is the inner content of the developing Christian life. In the *locus classicus* (Rom. vi. 1–14) this is interpreted to mean that the law of the new life is a reproduction within the Christian soul of the inner principle of life which was manifested historically once for all in its absolute form in the life, death, burial, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ.[1] In the synoptic gospels we find the beginnings of this symbolical language ascribed to our Lord Himself in the saying about ' taking up the cross.' [2] In the group of sayings of which this *logion* is typical, we come nearest to something like a formula or rule of conduct for the new messianic kingdom in terms of an attitude towards the Messiah. Elsewhere our Lord summarised the new law of life in terms of statements taken from the old law (the so-called summary of the Law).[1] But here in effect He says: 'Let your rule of life be to follow the Messiah in absolute surrender to the claims of the Kingdom.' The claims of the Kingdom were stated in the summary of the Law. But the rule of life in the *logion* about cross-bearing says in effect that the ethical way of the Kingdom is embodied in the Messiah's life-story.[2] The ethical rule of the Kingdom is that a man should respond unreservedly to the claims of the Kingdom. The Messiah exhibited this unreserved submission to the claims of the Kingdom and embodied that submission in the whole response of His life and death. To follow Him in this is to be a true disciple. But in the New Order of life in the Spirit the whole relationship of Master and disciples has been transformed from an outward relationship of those who 'knew Christ after the flesh' to an interior mystical relationship of spiritual identification through the indwelling of Christ in the soul. As in the alternative group of Pauline conceptions the principle of flesh is overcome by the principle of spirit through the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, so in the group of conceptions now under consideration the natural self is crucified, dies and is buried with Christ, to be raised up with Him to a new and transformed life. The rule that 'he who hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal'[3] has now become the fundamental interior principle of individual life in the New Order. The old man is in process of destruction and is being replaced by the new man in Christ Jesus. All this is also described in two ways. Sometimes emphasis is laid upon the fact that the whole change took place once for all in baptism. We are once for all crucified, dead and buried, risen and ascended with Christ. At other times the change is described as a process which is gradually being effected. There is no inconsistency here. For by transformation the new conditions are at once established. Yet the new law which has thus been constituted is manifested in a directive movement which develops towards actualisation. Initial harmony is the starting-point of a development towards an ultimate harmony. The apparent paradox is in effect a fulfilment of the principle of transformation which runs through the whole organic development of the universe. There is in this group of conceptions another twofold principle which has the same appearance of paradox. It is stated most precisely in the crucial saying of St. Paul in which the whole group of conceptions under discussion first emerges in his teaching: 'I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me.'[1] The crucifixion of self involves a passage into new life. In one phrase taken by itself Christ appears to take the place of the Christian self. Yet this statement is immediately followed by another which gives an alternative aspect. 'The life which I now live, I live by the faith of the Son of God.' Christ becomes the content of the new life. Yet He does so by no superseding of created individuality in the Christian soul. For where He becomes content of the new life that created individuality lives on under transformed conditions, risen and ascended with Christ. By receiving Christ for the content of his new life the Christian is raised to a new level of existence, where his created individuality is developed under new conditions of spiritual freedom in the higher concreteness of the New Order. Thus 'the new man' is simultaneously the individual Christian soul moving towards concrete fulfilment and completion of his human individuality in Christ, and also Christ dwelling in that created individual life and being formed within it as increasing content of that life. These two facts are two aspects of one fact, a fact in the presence of which human language breaks down, but which for all that is attested not only by St. Paul but by Christian experience through the centuries.

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[1] Cp. also Gal. ii. 20 ; iv. 19 ; vi. 14 ; 2 Cor. iv. 10–12 ; Col. iii. 1–3 ; Eph. ii. 4–6.

[2] Mark viii. 34 and parallels.

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[1] Mark xii. 29–31 and parallels.

[2] This conclusion would remain unaffected if our Lord's original words were 'deny himself and follow Me,' without the cross-bearing reference; see above, pp. 194, 195. In any case the supreme fulfilment of the rule was embodied in the crucifixion.

[3] John xii. 25.

The fact thus attested is one which conforms to the general law of transformation. It can be so understood if we place the transformed individual life within the larger context of the body of Christ. As a member of that body the individual Christian has been taken up into a larger organic whole of which Christ is the Head. Within that whole he moves towards the completion of his individuality. Here, as elsewhere, there is a close parallel between this group of conceptions and that which stated the conditions of the new life in terms of the Spirit's indwelling activity. The Holy Spirit brings the principle of spirit in man to fulfilment in the body of Christ by endowing him with gifts of grace, which enable him to conform to the rhythm of the New Order manifested in the new community. The self-transcending life according to spirit moves towards completion through communion with the Holy Spirit dwelling in the new community. But this new community is the body of Christ, the organ of His redeeming activity. In this term the two groups of Pauline conceptions are definitely linked together. Some of the leading descriptions of the Spirit's activity are connected expressly with the conception of the new community as the body of Christ.[1] The individual, then, finds the transformation of his individuality constituted and moving towards actualisation within this larger whole, which is the organ of Christ's redeeming activity, the domain of the new humanity. All this is in accordance with organic conceptions. We have no need to attribute to St. Paul any special scientific knowledge. He certainly could not have anticipated modern scientific conceptions. His use of biological metaphors must not be pressed, as though they contained special information on such matters. Nevertheless the metaphor of the body was a peculiarly happy one, in which our own age can find fresh significance in the light of modern organic conceptions. The individual, then, is taken up by transformation into the organism of the new humanity. That new humanity is a new creation constituted in Christ, who is its transcending principle of unity. Within the larger whole the individual Christian is taken up by transformation to conform to its higher rhythm. His individuality is taken up in its incompleteness and carried towards actualisation. There are important points involved here which need to be carefully distinguished. The interpretation of Christian experience which St. Paul offers is not that of a ‘ dispersive incarnation.’ For whereas individual Christians are members of Christ’s body, Christ Himself is the Head of that body. Scientific questions are here quite out of place. We must follow St. Paul’s use of the metaphor as he employs it, without regard to its biological accuracy.[1] What he undoubtedly intended to teach is that Christ stands in a unique relation both to the new community as a whole and to each of its individual members. If, for example, Romans xii. (where the body metaphor is used [2]) does not mean this, then the whole argument of Romans i.–viii. is reduced to ruins. At every point that argument requires the transcendence of Christ over those whom He has redeemed and justified, whose sinful state He has reversed, and in whom severally and individually His human life is incorporated as the interior principle of their transformed lives. The position of the individual Christian in the organism of the new humanity is one of dependence upon a principle of unity belonging to a higher level than that which is proper to man in the organic series. In the New Order he depends upon the super-organic individuality of the Incarnate Lord. Consequently his own created individuality is taken up to that new level where a synthesis is effected between the social and individual principles. Our Lord stands on the level of the eternal order, the level proper to such a synthesis. He does not belong to the organic series. It belongs to Him ; and He is organic to it through His human organism. Thus, whereas He supplies the super-organic principle of individuality to His organism, all human individuals can be taken up into that organism in their incompleteness to be there completed in Him. The relationship which is here indicated is that of the Creator to His creatures. If it be urged that St. Paul had no finished Christology and did not think in terms of Nicene dogma, it must be replied that in raising such a point *we* are thinking in terms of a later age. St. Paul was not, for the most part, consciously elaborating Christological dogmas. He was trying to express the significance of Christ in terms which would do justice to the actual facts of experience. We need not even inquire how far he was conscious of the full implications of his language. It would certainly appear, however, that at the end of his life, when he wrote the Epistle to the Colossians, his thought had developed to a point where he consciously and deliberately assigned to our Lord a position having definite affiliations with the late biblical hypostatisation of Wisdom and with current Alexandrian conceptions of the Logos.

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[1] Gal ii. 20.

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[1] Especially 1 Cor. xii.-xiv. See also Eph. iv. 4, 'one body, one Spirit.'

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[1] For the relation of St. Paul’s teaching concerning the body of Christ to the physiology of his day see R. Birch Hoyle, *The Holy Spirit in St. Paul*, Part II. ch. iv. pp. 230 ff. (ed. 1927), and notes *ad loc.*

[2] Rom. xii. 4, 5 (*ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ*).

II

In certain parts of the New Testament language is used by the writers in which they appear to be consciously feeling after definitions of our Lord's Person, definitions which will assign to Him a cosmic status adequate to their religious experience of His redeeming activity. Such passages are the Christological section in Colossians i., a similar passage in Ephesians i., the opening verses of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the prologue of St. John. In a class by themselves stand the Johannine discourses with their theme of the divine sonship. In another group, which appears to represent St. Paul's earlier thought, are those passages which assign to our Lord the position of a second Adam who is also a heavenly pre-existent being (1 Cor. xv.; Rom. v.; Phil. ii.).[1] In the whole literature from which these passages are specially selected for notice there appear to be two lines of thought developed. The first line develops from the conception of the risen and ascended Jesus, the Son of Man of St. Stephen's vision, the glorified figure of St. Paul's conversion-vision. This conception of our Lord has for its background the apocalyptic figure of the Son of Man and our Lord's appropriation of that title to Himself. This transcendent glorified Christ dominates Pauline thought and stands both above and within that Christo-centric experience which we have been considering. The question arises as to whether, in such passages as 1 Cor. xv., Rom. v. and Phil. ii., St. Paul is either utilising or combating a 'heavenly man' concept of current Jewish speculation. There are possible affiliations with the pictures of the Son of Man in Daniel, Enoch and 4 Esdras; or again with non-Jewish eastern influences.[1] These are matters upon which we cannot safely dogmatise. With such ideas in the air, however, St. Paul formulated a conception of our Lord as the beginning and fountain-head of a new creation. But if previous analysis in this book has been right, St. Paul cannot have derived the religious content of his germinal Christology from such sources. His terminology was moulded by the facts of his religious experience. In that experience our Lord occupied the position of an adequate mediator between God and man, who redeems man from his sinful state, restores him to communion with God, and brings him into a new life in the fellowship of the Spirit. On this side of Pauline thought our Lord is the head of a new race, because He is the transcendent source of Christian experience in the New Order. But there is another line of thought which appears to refer back to our Lord's messianic sonship, regarded as a special relationship to God. The messianic embodiment of Israel's sonship goes back to the Old Testament, partly to the Davidic kingship, partly also to a more general sonship of Israel as God's first-born.[2] The narratives of the Baptism and the Temptation are clearly connected with this sonship.[3] The Q passage on the relation of the Son to the Father

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[1] As to His pre-existence, 1 Cor. xv. 47 agrees with Phil. ii. 6. Cp. also 2 Cor. viii. 9. According to one recent opinion, Philippians was written at Ephesus and must be placed, as to date, 'in close conjunction with 1 Cor.' A. H. McNeile holds that this theory 'has great probability.' See his *Introduction to the New Testament*, pp. 168–172.

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[1] Cp. an article on 'The Heavenly Man,' by Professor J. M. Creed, *J.T.S.* vol. xxvi. No. 102. Professor Creed thinks it conceivable that Persian influence may lie behind Daniel, Enoch, and 4 Esdras. On the other hand he argues that St. Paul's doctrine of Christ as the second Adam had nothing to do with the 'heavenly man' speculations. For the title '4 Esdras' cp. G. H. Box, *The Apocalypse of Ezra*, p. viii.

[2] Cp. Hosea xi. 1 and Deut. viii.

[3] It is now widely recognised that our Lord's awareness of Himself as Son in relation to the Father is fundamental, and far more important than His attitude to current messianic titles. His sonship *became* messianic to His disciples. See Burkitt, *Christian Beginnings*, pp. 22 ff.

(Luke x.; Matt. xi.) shows that our Lord spoke of Himself to His disciples as possessing such a unique sonship. Even if we adopted Harnack's reduced text of that passage, it would still represent our Lord as possessing a special sonship which set Him apart.[1] To these passages we have to add the words of the voice heard in the transfiguration-vision by the disciples. The tradition represented by these synoptic passages must have influenced apostolic thought profoundly, when we consider what immense development the theme of our Lord's sonship received in the fourth gospel. This messianic sonship reappears in the opening verses of the Epistle to the Romans (i. 3, 4). But in chapter viii. 29 of the same epistle it seems to be combined with the other line of thought. Here God's Son is the archetype of the elect, and becomes the first-born among many brethren through their conformity to His image. The elect are here conformed to the image of the messianic Son as to an archetype, who thus stands to them in the relation of first-born. But in Col. i. He is the Image of God, in whom all things were created. He is also the Son of God's love (a phrase which looks like an equivalent for the synoptic 'Beloved Son'),[2] the first-born of all creation and the Head of the Church. Thus He is the messianic head and beginning of the new race. 'Image of God' is a phrase which seems to connect with the idea of sonship, and in itself does not determine the status of that sonship.[3] But here the sonship which can be expressed in the phrase 'Image of God' and also the headship of the human race in the rôle of Redeemer are both alike joined to language which associates the Son with creation. He is both the starting-point and the goal of creation. Language is piled up which makes the Son's significance transcendent over creation both as to its foundation and as to the goal towards which it moves. This cosmic status has now become the background of the redeeming headship of Christ over the new creation. Closely parallel is the position assigned to our Lord in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The argument of the epistle as a whole assigns to our Lord a position as the final mediator of redemption. In contrast to the Old Testament dispensation the mediatorial office and work of Christ are here placed upon the background of a Platonic order of reality. He has ascended into such an abiding order, which is above the changes and chances of this world. In that transcendent order His redeeming activity is gathered up and has permanent significance. This is parallel to the Pauline doctrine that creation finds its goal in Christ, but is stated in a more Platonic form. But the whole argument of the epistle is prefaced by a prologue almost as deliberately worded as that of the fourth gospel. Here the Pauline doctrine of the 'Image of God' is elaborated and connected with the title of sonship. The Son, who is also the Image, is mediator of creation and heir of the ages. His position is above that of angels, who are to worship Him. In the Apocalypse the Lamb of God controls the destinies of history, receives divine honours and shares the throne of God. In the Epistle to the Ephesians[1] the Pauline conception of Christ as transcendent head of the new creation embodied in the *ecclesia* is reproduced. But the most distinctive idea of this epistle is that Christ is the consummator in history of the purpose of God for creation (i. 9, 10; cp. iii. 9–12 and iv. 13–16). The immediate context of this thought is the 'mystery' of the universality of the Messiah's mission bringing Jews and Gentiles together in one community. But clearly the writer's mind sweeps the horizon and sees a new unity in history, the fulfilment of a single divine purpose which finds its historical expression in Christ and which is destined to find its goal in Him. The Christ of Ephesians bestrides history. He *is* the purpose of God in the time-process. Yet He is this as the historical Messiah of Jewish expectation and as the Redeemer in whom Jew and Gentile alike are re-created (ii. 10).

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[1] *The Sayings of Jesus*, Excursus I.

[2] *υἱὸς ἀγαπητός*. Luke iii. 22, Mark ix. 7 and parallels. On the meaning of the title see Professor Cuthbert Turner in *J.T.S.* vol. xxvii. No. 106.

[3] Does the phrase in Phil. ii. 6 (*ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*), represent a first draft of the *εἰκών* language in Col. i.? The emphasis in the context on the note of submissive obedience suggests the idea of sonship. The phrase *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ* is applied to our Lord as early as 2 Cor. iv. 4. For the relation of Philippians to Colossians, see above, p. 293, note. There is no general agreement among scholars as to the meaning of the passage in Phil. ii. For a recent interpretation see A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ* (1926), pp. 133–136.

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[1] I do not venture to pass judgment upon the question of authorship.

In the fourth gospel the two lines of development which we have been considering are both carried a good deal further.[1] They do indeed definitely intersect. For the prologue describes the glory of the Incarnate Logos as that 'of an Only-begotten from a Father' (i. 14) and this note is reiterated in the last verse (i. 18). With this qualification, however, the prologue certainly stands apart from the rest of the gospel, a fact which possibly indicates that it was prefixed as an afterthought.[2] The prologue puts the coping-stone upon the conceptions unfolded in Colossians, Ephesians and Hebrews by expressly introducing a technical word which had philosophical associations for both Greek and Jew. The language throughout indicates that the writer thought of the Logos as 'personal' both before and after He became flesh (note especially the reiteration of the word *αὐτός*). The vicissitudes of Logos-theology in the ante-Nicene period of dogmatic development remind us, indeed, that in the ancient world men passed backwards and forwards from personal to impersonal conceptions of the same object of thought in a way which we find it difficult to understand. Thus it is a plain fact that the language of this prologue did not preclude the experiments in Monarchian theology which came to their climax in the impersonal Logos of Paul of Samosata. For St. John,[3] however, the Logos is a Divine Person who became flesh in the historical figure Jesus Christ. The Logos doctrine, launched on its theological career by the combined influence of Philo and St. John, provided a most important mediating concept for the fusion of Greek, Jewish and Christian thought in the group of problems which concerned the connexion between God and creation; and it brought some of the leading ideas of New Testament Christology to bear upon that stream of speculation. But it could not in itself, as history shows, bear the whole weight of New Testament interpretation concerning the Christ.

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[1] For the theology of St. John's Gospel the following among recent contributions may be cited: E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel* (2nd ed. 1908); P. Gardner, *The Ephesian Gospel* (1915); V. H. Stanton, *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, vol. iii. ch. v.; W. R. Inge, art. 'Logos' in Hastings, *E.R.E.*; J. Estlin Carpenter, *The Johannine Writings*, part ii.; B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, ch. xiii.; A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, Lecture viii.

[2] So Harnack in *Ueber das Verhältniss des Prologs des vierten Evangeliums zum ganzen Werk*. His main conclusion was accepted by V. H. Stanton (*op. cit.*). Cp. J. E. Carpenter, *op. cit.* pp. 333–338, 365. But Scott and Streeter dissent (see *op. cit.*).

[3] It is convenient to use the traditional name. This must not be taken to imply any assumptions as to authorship.

III

In the New Testament the Logos-doctrine of St. John's prologue contains the fullest development of that line of thought which began with Pauline conceptions of Christ as the head of a new race and which then transferred that headship back from the new creation to the first creation. But this line of thought and language *taken by itself*, although ultimately placing the Logos as the creative principle within the Godhead (John i. 1, 2), did not make *explicit* the later trinitarian doctrine of a fellowship of Persons in the Godhead.[1] Now we have seen that Pauline interpretation of Christian experience requires the conception of a superorganic individuality in Jesus Christ. This demand of Christian experience was met more fully and explicitly by two other factors which entered into the development of dogma. Of these one was the Johannine conception of the divine sonship, which, although developed out of the synoptic messianic sonship and placed in the gospel upon that background, does in fact in the Johannine discourses become deeply metaphysical in character.[2] The other factor which met the demand of Christian experience entered upon the scene much later. It was supplied by the theology of Origen. Taking these two factors in order, we turn first to the Johannine doctrine of sonship. The pre-existence of the Son is repeatedly asserted by the evangelist (vi. 62, viii. 58, xvii. 5). Sayings like xvi. 28 must be interpreted in the light of these explicit statements.

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[1] The language of i. 18, however, is more explicit than i. 1, 2, and provides a definite link with the discourses on the divine sonship in the body of the gospel.

[2] An illustration of this is provided by the Jewish comment in John v. 18, 'making Himself equal to God.' On this see further below.

But more significant still is the attitude of the Jewish objectors. When our Lord was accused of blasphemy by the high priest in the synoptic account of the passion, the blasphemy was made to consist in the claim to be the Messiah.[1] That claim, which His judges refused to acknowledge, was in itself regarded as a sufficient ground for the charge of blasphemy. In this representation of the facts the synoptic account rings true to historical probabilities (more particularly the Lucan form of the incident: see note 1 below). Our Lord was not condemned to death for metaphysical statements about His Person. But when the fourth gospel was written the true historical perspective had long since faded away. St. John's Gospel indicates the state of Jewish-Christian controversy at the end of the first century. In the judgment of the fourth evangelist our Lord's status was such that in controversy with Jewish opponents the Church must uphold and defend not simply the messiahship of Jesus, but His equality with God. So the Jews are represented as seeking to kill Him, when He claims such an equality (v. 18; viii. 56–59; x. 29–39). In the last of these passages a somewhat obscure appeal is made to Old Testament usage, an appeal which is in the nature of an *argumentum ad hominem*, and which seems to show a confused reminiscence of the earlier synoptic conception of the messianic sonship. But this does not affect the main sense of the passage with the avowal of verse 30 and the Jewish comment thereon.[2] This passage must be compared with the earlier one in ch. v. (17–30), where the Jewish charge is 'He was calling God His own Father, making Himself equal to God.' Here clearly the title 'Son of God' is supposed to involve equality with God. It has become a metaphysical title. Moreover, in the passage which follows this sentence, a passage which ascribes divine prerogatives and cosmic functions to the Son, we read the conclusive saying 'that all may honour the Son even as they honour the Father.' Words could hardly go further.

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[1] Mark xiv. 61–64; Luke xxii. 66–71. In St. Luke's account the acknowledgment is wrung from our Lord, as it were, against His own desire for reticence. He is well aware that they will not and cannot accept His claim. Does St. Mark's 'ἐγώ εἰμι obscure this by importing the nuance of John viii. 58 (cp. Exod. iii. 14)?

[2] *Vv.* 34–36 look like a much earlier fragment of controversy embedded in the later and more developed Johannine thought.

But the claim to equality with the Father, made by the Johannine Christ, is something more than a bare claim. It is filled out in considerable detail by descriptions of the mutual and reciprocal relations of Father and Son. In this respect the comprehensive section of ch. v. just considered is supplemented by the teaching of chs. xiv. to xvii. But throughout these descriptions and in a more general sense throughout the whole gospel the main subject is not this lofty theme of the Son's relations with the Father, but the relationship in which the Son stands to mankind as the representative of the Father. In this its most characteristic aspect the gospel brings together many different strands of New Testament thought. Thus the allegory of the Vine in ch. xv. embraces all that is included in the phrase *ἐν Χριστῷ* in St. Paul's teaching. It indicates an organic relation between Christ and His people similar to that of the Head to the members of the body. So again if we combine the various conceptions of the Good Shepherd (ch. x.), the Vine (ch. xv.) and the Bread from heaven (ch. vi.), we have a comprehensive parallel to the Pauline doctrine that Christ is the transcendent Head of the body, organically connected with the new community and all its members, and at the same time as interior content of the Christian soul nourishing it with His own life. On the other hand all these ideas are thrown back into the setting of our Lord's historical life-story. And so the great text 'I am the Way and the Truth and the Life' weaves together the synoptic rule that discipleship consists in following the Messiah along the ethical way of the Kingdom (the way which is embodied in the Messiah's own life-story) and the Pauline conception that this way has been incorporated as an interior principle of life in the New Order.[1] Now here we may fairly say that, just as St. Paul and other apostolic writers found it necessary to place all this mediatorial action of Christ towards His people upon a background which assigns cosmic status to the mediator, so St. John places the mutual relations of Christ and His flock upon the background of those mysterious relations between the Father and the Son which we have been considering. In other words, the most theological discourses in St. John are never simply theological in the narrower sense of that word. They are always concerned with the mediatorial functions of the Son in bringing men to the Father. They are not primarily speculations about the Godhead, but rather revelations of Christ's redeeming activity, which require for their background a corresponding revelation concerning the Son's relation to the Godhead. In this respect the fourth gospel does not differ in principle from the other Christological writings of the New Testament. The evangelist differs only in carrying the argument further back and rendering the conclusions more explicit. In both cases we have this consequence to note, that the position of the mediator can be described under two aspects. He stands with His people in His humanity as the first-born of all creation, the Head of the New Order, the great High Priest. He is the Vine which the Father tends as the Husbandman.[1] On the other hand He is all that the great Christological passages have to say upon the other side in respect of His unique relation to God.

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[1] This is elaborated in the context (ch. xiv.), where the theme of the way to God through Christ passes on into the theme of the divine indwelling through the gift of the Paraclete. On this see further below, ch. xii. pp. 346–354.

So in St. John's Gospel an analogy is frequently drawn between the mutual relationship of Christ and His disciples on the one hand and the mutual relations which exist between the Father and the Son on the other hand (see the following passages: vi. 57; x. 14, 15; xv. 9–11; xvii. 6–11; xvii. 16–26; xx. 21. The same idea is also present in xiv. 5–14). Here we must recall what was said above (p. 292) about a 'dispersive incarnation.' St. John's Christology is as incompatible with that theory as St. Paul's. Christ is not a part of the Vine. He is the whole Vine of which we are branches. He is not one of the sheep, but the Shepherd of the whole flock. He is the Bread which feeds all His people and which is offered to all men.

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[1] In the familiar O.T. allegory, Israel is God's vineyard or vine which fails to bring forth fruit unto God (Is. v.; Ezek. xv. and xvii.; cp. Hosea x. and Ps. lxxx. 8 ff.). In John xv. our Lord is the true Vine, *i.e.* the true Israel. He embodies Israel's true response to God.

He not only raises the dead to life (ch. v); He is the Resurrection and the Life (ch. xi.). If in ch. xx. an analogy is drawn between the mission of the disciples and the mission of the Son, this is followed in the same chapter by the adoring worship of St. Thomas with the words 'My Lord and my God.' In such varied ways does the evangelist drive home the same truth as St. Paul. For him too the principle of individuality in Christ is super-organic. The Johannine Christ stands above the new community as its Redeemer and receives its adoring worship. If He dwells in His disciples, it is because He dwells in the Father. The two facts do not stand on the same level. They are related as an effect to its underlying ground or cause. So too the ultimate goal of the fellowship between the disciples is a unity such as that unity which already exists between the Father and the Son (ch. xvii.). They are to be perfected unto such a unity. They are to be 'one in Us' (xvii. 21). Their unity is to be actualised within that higher unity, which is the abiding relationship between the Father and the Son. There is a deep contrast as well as an analogy between the two kinds of unity, that of the disciples in Christ and that of the Son with the Father. The former is an imperfect unity growing towards perfection; and when it attains that perfection it will attain a level which the Son has possessed all along, the level of His unity with the Father. This is the Johannine counterpart of the Pauline doctrine that Christ is the end or goal as well as the content of the Christian life. Here also, as in the Pauline teaching, the end of the individual Christian life is found in a larger whole, a social order over which Christ is transcendent. In the Pauline conception Christ comes organically to His fulfilment in the perfection of the body to the 'measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Ephes. iv. 13).[1] In St. John's thought this perfected social order, which is the goal of history, will be gathered up into that which has all along been its true ground, the absolute fellowship of perfect unity which exists between the Father and the Son (xvii.

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[1] Cp. Eph. i. 23. This epistle is Pauline in thought, whatever be the final verdict as to authorship. The thought of Col. i. 24 is closely akin to that of Eph. i. 23.

20–26). This teaching of ch. xvii. throws light upon that short but pregnant saying in xiv. 23: 'If any man love Me he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come unto him and make Our abode with him.' 'We will come' in this text is in agreement with the words 'Us' and 'We' reiterated in xvii. 21–23. As in v. 23 the Son has equal honour with the Father, so in xiv. 23 the Father and the Son are said to come into fellowship with the disciple in terms which place the Son on the same level as the Father. Thus, just as in ch. xvii. the Christian fellowship of the New Order has for its goal that it should be taken up into the unity of the Father and the Són, so in ch. xiv. the content of the Christ-loving life in the New Order is a fellowship with the Father and the Son. In all of these three passages (chs. v., xiv., xvii.) the Son is placed on the level which belongs to the Father.

IV

From the prologue of St. John's Gospel sprang the Logos-theology of the Church. But one of the most arresting facts in the history of doctrine is the contrast between the richness of Johannine Christology and the, comparatively speaking, meagre thought of Christian writers upon this subject during the second century A.D. If the writer of the gospel intended to enlarge the Church's intellectual horizon and to make room within it for Greek speculative thought by prefixing his prologue, he certainly achieved much in that respect But in one sense he succeeded too easily. For the detached position of the prologue and its special terminology were probably in some measure responsible for the almost exclusive attention which the apologists gave to the Logos-idea in their theological speculations, thus creating a situation which urgently required readjusting to other aspects of truth at the beginning of the third century.[1] Christological development in the New Testament did not reach a synthesis with Greek philosophy. Contact was made through the medium of Philo and similar influences ; but no more than that. Again the prologue, whilst introducing the term Logos, is modelled on Genesis i. It strikes a fundamental note of developed New Testament thought by bringing the new creation into relation with the first creation. But like Genesis it does not clearly move outside the category of time. St. John is content to say that the Logos was ' in the beginning ' with God. On the other hand the Johannine doctrine of the mutual relations of the Father and the Son is a doctrine which demands the concept of an eternal order in which such relationships exist. The real basis for the fusion of Greek and Jewish thought about God, which took place in the later developments of Christian doctrine, lies not so much in the Logos-idea of the prologue as in the transcendent order of abiding relationships exhibited in this evangelist's teaching about the divine sonship.[1] The New Testament records and interprets a revelation of God as love. We know that love through our experience of its redeeming and indwelling power (cp. Rom. v. 5 and the whole theme of 1 John). Divine love is revealed in its redeeming activity. But it is revealed as transcendent over all human life through our experience of its power in the New Order. The Son, who loved us and gave Himself for us, stands above the new community, the law of whose life is ἀγάπη. Since the new law of ἀγάπη flows down into the new community through the Spirit of Christ from the ' Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,' this law of ἀγάπη, revealed in the Messiah's life-story and reproduced by the Spirit as the inner principle of life in the New Order, must be referred back to its transcendent source in the life of God. This is the general direction of thought in the New Testament. It carried apostolic interpretation stage by stage to the conception of a plurality of Persons in God, a conception which becomes fully articulate in St. John's Gospel, particularly in chs. xiv. to xvii. The implicit logic of the development was this : that a principle of individuality, which transcends and spans the complementary individual and social principles as they exist in human experience, must include the essence of both those principles within itself. The fellowship, or *κοινωνία*, of the Spirit in the new community is referred back to a transcendent fellowship of Persons in the life of God. The original revelation of the kingdom of God, attested by the earliest documentary tradition in the synoptic gospels, was incorporated into the apostolic experience of the New Order in the form of a transformed human *κοινωνία* whose inner principle is the *ἀγάπη* of the Spirit of Christ. So also in the fourth gospel, interpretations of our Lord's teaching which we can detect within the synoptic gospels themselves are developed to a point where thought-forms originally synoptic and even dominical in their source have been transformed from a historical to an absolute form. The principal example of this process of development is that with which we have been occupied, the passage from the sonship as it is conceived in the Q narratives of the Baptism and the Temptation to the fully articulate Johannine conception of an absolute sonship belonging to an eternal order. This fully developed Johannine conception is reached through the reaction of apostolic experience upon primitive Christian thought-forms. The whole rich experience of redeeming love and its transforming fellowship is poured back into the conceptual forms of the historical revelation in which that experience had its roots. Those historical thought-forms are then expanded until the absolute reference beyond history to an eternal order becomes explicit. Thus the historical concept of the messianic sonship was transformed into the Johannine concept of a metaphysical sonship.

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[1] Scholars are not agreed as to whether Justin made use of the fourth gospel. But he was converted at Ephesus, and can hardly, therefore, have been uninfluenced by the Johannine theology. See Estlin Carpenter, *op. cit.* p. 203.

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[1] Which, however, crosses the Logos phraseology in i. 14 and 18. See above, pp. 297, 298 and notes *ad loc.*

There are two observations which must be made with regard to this development. The first is that, on the estimate of our Lord's teaching which has formed the basis of exposition in previous chapters, the transition from the primitive concept of sonship in Q to the developed concept of an absolute sonship in St. John was a true and legitimate development. For the Johannine concept does no more than abstract from its original historical context, and state in a more explicit and universal form, an estimate of our

Lord's Person and status which is required by the content of His teaching as given in the earliest tradition.[1] If the Son who acknowledges the claims of His Father's Kingdom in uttermost submission is, notwithstanding, at home with the innermost mysteries of that Kingdom and Master of its treasures, so that He can dispense them to others as His own gifts; if thus He stands within the eternal order, and embodies the Kingdom in His own life-story, then St. John is right in placing His relationship with the Father within a transcendent order, which is on the level of deity. We have always to remember, however, that the weight of this conclusion does not rest *simply* upon our estimate of the synoptic revelation. There is another strand in the evidence, namely the experience of Christ's redeeming activity in the New Order of the Spirit. It was that experience, as we have seen, which drove the apostolic writers to a high Christology. The fourth evangelist brings these two lines of interpretation together and places the result within the dramatic framework of the gospel story retold. But we too have both lines of evidence available for the testing of his doctrine. We stand upon the threshold of the eternal order; and from that standing-ground we cannot but acknowledge the gospel revelation of the kingdom of God and its standards to be utterly beyond our attainment. Yet, on the other hand, in the earliest gospel tradition we find that our Lord was Master of that Kingdom and its standards; and in our experience of the New Order to which we belong we recognise His transcendent redeeming activity, making us citizens of the Kingdom and setting us on the way to the goal of life.

A second observation must be made with regard to the development of interpretation, which reached its culminating point in the Johannine doctrine of an absolute sonship. A development which has reached this point demands philosophical expression. The Johannine differentiation of Persons on the level of deity could not remain stationary. Such a doctrine, if it was to maintain itself in the world of thought at all, could only do so by more precise metaphysical statement and definition. The development of interpretation had been carried as far as Jewish categories of thought could be stretched, even with a considerable infiltration of Platonic atmosphere through the wisdom literature, Philo and similar influences. Before the Council of Nicaea such further statement and definition were almost entirely the work of two men, namely, Tertullian and Origen. But Origen accomplished something more than Tertullian in the sphere of theology proper (*i.e.* the doctrine of God). For the development of theology during that period two things were necessary. The first of these consisted in clear judgments about the meaning of the biblical revelation expressed in equally clear language relevant to the thought of the times. Tertullian accomplished this for the West in his treatise against Praxeas in a manner which was as valuable, in its own way, as the analogous achievement of Origen in the great dogmatic passages of his works.[1] But something else was required for the theology of the future, something of even greater importance, namely, the welding together of the two great traditions of Palestine and Greece, the religious revelation of the Bible and the revelation of the eternal order which we owe to Plato. For this second achievement, with its far-reaching consequences for Christianity, Origen is, humanly speaking, almost solely responsible. Preparatory work had been accomplished by others, but on a lower level of attainment. Whilst they prepared materials, Origen constructed the edifice of Christian Platonism. The evidence for his achievement lies not so much in the detailed superstructure of his scheme as in its ground plan. Parts of the superstructure proved unsuitable or at least of uncertain value. But with the ground plan all who came after him had to reckon, and either to build upon his foundations or to show reasons for thinking other foundations to be truer to the requirements of the gospel. Origen's ground plan is not to be found in a formula, such as that of the *Three Divine Hypostases.* That kind of definition stands parallel to the work of

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[1] See above, chs. vii. and ix., pp. 167, 168 and 246–251.

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[1] The following passages are of special importance: Tertullian, *adversus Praxean*, chs. 2, 7–9, 27; Origen, *de principiis*, bk. i. and bk. iv. ch. 28, to which must be added statements scattered through his other works, especially the *contra Celsum* and the *Commentary on St. John's Gospel.* For fuller details see Additional Note E, pp. 473 ff. below.

Tertullian. The ground plan was something more comprehensive which included such details within itself. What Origen achieved was something larger, the welding together of two great cultural traditions. But, again, this does not adequately express his contribution. Many have essayed the task of giving a philosophical expression to religion. Of such attempts the theological test-question to be asked is: was the purity and strength of the religious message preserved with undiminished force in its new cultural associations?

Now it would be foolish to make extravagant claims for Origen. We miss in him the full Pauline conception of redemption which a lesser man like Irenaeus faithfully reproduced in some important aspects. Nevertheless, when all qualifications have been made, it remains true that Origen gave to the Christian conception of God a philosophical form, and so laid the foundations of a stable, although developing, system of doctrine. What he achieved in this respect might with some justice be called, in the terminology adopted in the present work, a new incorporation of the eternal order into the sphere of religion. The Christian religion was ripe for such a transformation as took place so largely under his guidance. The gospel message had been emancipated from the yoke of Jewish nationalism. The universality of its appeal demanded new forms for its expression in the field of thought as well as of action. For a time the Logos-doctrine provided such a form. But that doctrine, whilst well suited to express the universal and cosmic functions of Christ in creation and revelation, was not really prominent in scripture and did not sufficiently differentiate the experience of the redeemed community. Patripassianism compelled a return to the New Testament language about the Father and the Son. For the cross offers a revelation of God's love through a suffering Saviour, who both shares our human experience and yet is one with the Father, since He was the mediator of the Father's saving love upon Calvary. Tertullian preeminently represents this change of emphasis. The two ideas of a Logos-Creator and a suffering Saviour could be united in a theology of sonship, which emphasised the distinction of Persons in the One Godhead and the distinction of natures in the One Incarnate Lord. Thus here, as before in the New Testament period, theology developed under the demands of soteriology. But Tertullian failed where Origen succeeded. The former had a more objective soteriology[1] but no philosophy of the eternal order. Consequently his conception of God remained, at bottom, too economic and temporal.

V

For Origen also the theology of sonship was primary. But, unlike Tertullian, he carried back its implications into the eternal order with his conception of an eternal generation which is utterly beyond time and sense. Once again, this conception is required by the Johannine doctrine of an absolute sonship. But Origen threw into his statement of the conception the whole vigour and force of his belief in a Platonic order of reality. Thus he made explicit in a reasoned system the logical goal of the whole trend of New Testament thought. One cannot read his statements of this great conception without feeling that he found in his Platonism providential prolegomena to Christianity, and that he enriched the message of the New Testament for future ages by showing once more that the structure of the eternal order belongs to the kingdom of God. For Platonism and the Christianity of the New Testament are at one in their emphasis upon a transcendent order of reality, from which this visible world-order draws its significance. Christianity, however, is vastly more than Platonism could ever be as an answer to human need. For it shows us a revelation of that transcendent order in the form of redeeming activity reaching down to man. Its primary interest is not in philosophical concepts or in bloodless categories, but in the restoration of man to his true home in God.

The third century opened doctrinally with the Monarchian movement in full swing. The theology of divine sonship, of which Tertullian and Origen were the exponents, represented a return to the distinction of Persons emphasised in the New Testament, and most explicitly in St. John's Gospel. This distinction of Persons was summed up most completely in Origen's formula of the Three Divine Hypostases. Armed with this doctrine the eastern Bishops condemned the Adoptionism of Paul.[1] But the tendency of this school of Origenists towards tritheism left them in a quandary of indecision when face to face with Arianism in the next century. The doctrine of the Godhead in the third and fourth centuries presents the appearance of a series of reactions between the contrasted interests of unity and distinction of Persons, between an economic trinitarianism with modalist tendencies and a hypostatic or essential trinitarianism with tritheistic tendencies. From this point of view the Council of Nicaea presents the appearance of western ascendency, backed then and afterwards by eastern support from Athanasius and Marcellus of Ancyra. A more orthodox version of Origenism then asserts itself in the Cappadocian fathers; and finally, the balance is once more redressed in the interests of monotheism by Augustine. If history is no more than a Hegelian succession of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, the theory of the swinging pendulum is no doubt an eminently satisfactory account of the matter. But we must look below tendencies for the real issues. Tertullian's argument for the scriptural distinction of Persons was a reply to modalism. But Tertullian was also the author of the *ὁμοούσιον*. Origen's doctrine of eternal generation required equally the distinction of Persons and their consubstantiality. Again, the Logos terminology could be used in the direction of either tendency. Tertullian used it in a temporal-economic sense.[2] Origen retained the word, and used it frequently in a sense according well with his doctrine of an essential Trinity.[3] In this he was following the usage of his master Clement,[1] who had already rejected the apologists' doctrine of prolation. Again, the mere fact that the doctrine of sonship is more prominent in Scripture than that of the Logos-Creator did not preserve a theology of sonship from Arian interpretation. The whole Arian case started from the assumption that sonship must be temporal. Nevertheless, the theology of sonship was now so far in the ascendency, as a result of third-century developments, that the battlefield chosen by Arius was accepted, and the word Logos was quietly dropped out of the creed of Nicaea and replaced by the word Son. The mind of Athanasius, so largely formed by the Council and its creed, accepted this change. Before Nicaea he wrote of the Logos. After Nicaea he, like everyone else, was occupied with the divine sonship.

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[1] Derived from Irenaeus. His small treatise, *de carne Christi*, is a good example of Tertullian at his best.

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[1] To which Loofs has given the cumbrous title *Monotheist-Dyophysite*, distinguishing it from the more radical Psilanthropist Adoptionism of earlier Monarchians. See an article by W. Telfer reviewing Loofs in *J.T.S.* vol. xxvi. No. 102.

[2] *adversus Praxean*, ch. 6.

[3] *E.g.* cp. *contra Celsum*, bk. vi. chs. 64–69.

What determined the issue in the fourth century was not this question of words but the demands of soteriology. Irenaeus and Athanasius (in his earlier phase) had both linked the Logos terminology to a profoundly objective doctrine of redemption. It was not western ascendency which determined the Christology of Athanasius. That was already settled by his conception of Christ as the Redeemer; and, in so far as his doctrine of redemption was inherited, its previous representatives were to be found in both East and West. The real transition in Athanasius was from the Platonism of his Alexandrian upbringing to the New Testament concentration upon soteriology. That transition had already been effected when he wrote the *de incarnatione*. At Nicaea this soteriological concentration became linked to the necessity of defending the scriptural doctrine of sonship. From then onwards he had two scriptural weapons which he forged into one.[2] Thus he changed the course of Alexandrian theology and showed the way to the defeat of Arianism. Now we have seen that the Johannine doctrine of an absolute sonship came at the end of half a century of apostolic and primitive thought, which had been concentrated upon the

[1] Cp. Clem. Alex. *protrep.* 10: ὁ θεῖος λόγος ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως θεός, ὁ τῷ δεσπότῃ τῶν ὅλων ἐξισώθεις. See the whole passage, Leipzig ed. p. 78, ll. 10–24.

[2] *I.e.* the New Testament soteriology and the New Testament revelation of divine sonship.

Christian experience of redemption from sin in the New Order. It was that experience and its interpretation which lay between the early synoptic and the late Johannine formulation of our Lord's sonship. The conceptions embodied in the Logos-doctrine of St. John's prologue were conceptions belonging to a transitional stage, represented by the search for a cosmic terminology which we see operating in the Epistle to the Colossians. The search for such a terminology came to rest in the Logos-doctrine. But beyond this cosmological speculation lay the more fundamental question of the Redeemer's place in the life of God. The experience of redemption required that the head of the new creation should be the super-organic head of the first creation. But that is only the first stage in the demand of redemptive experience. The content of that experience is the *κοινωνία*, the fellowship of the Spirit whose law is *ἀγάπη*. The transcendent background of this fellowship is an eternal *κοινωνία* in the life of God. Once the status of the Son as transcendent over creation was settled, this truth of an eternal fellowship of Persons in God was seen to be the more ultimate background of redemption. The law of *ἀγάπη* reigns in heaven and only so can be translated to earth. Hence the Johannine doctrine of sonship is in reality the last word of the New Testament upon the doctrine of redemption.

Thus if we consider the history of the doctrine of God in its Christological aspects down to the settlement at Constantinople A.D. 381–382, we can distinguish two main aspects in the movement of thought and two main religious interests. The two aspects of the movement and the two religious interests are all alike to be found in the New Testament. The two aspects of the movement spring from, and have their roots in, the religious experience which the New Testament attests; and the New Testament is the permanent repository of the two religious interests. (1) The first main aspect in the movement of thought is represented by the Logos-doctrine. Its roots in the New Testament are seen in the search for language which would set the mediator of redemption at the head of creation. It was most congenial to those who, like Justin and Clement, regarded Christianity as a revelation of truth in which the Creator Himself set the seal to His own handiwork of creation. The Logos assumed flesh that He might show men the way to God by appealing to the divine spark of light with which all were created. This doctrine emphasises the universality of the gospel and sets it upon the background of creation. (2) But both creation and the gospel presuppose a transcendent order of reality from which they come. So the second main aspect of the movement of thought sets the mediator of creation and redemption within the eternal order. This aspect also had its roots in the New Testament, where Christ is revealed as One who is at home in the transcendent reality of God's Kingdom. Moreover, this aspect also was concerned with a religious interest of New Testament experience. For there the historical Messiah as God's Son is seen to belong to a transcendent order, where He has fellowship with the Father; a fellowship from which all earthly fellowship springs and from which flows the creative principle of fellowship in the New Order of the Spirit.[1] The transition from the first aspect of the movement to the second was effected by the Christian Platonists of Alexandria. For they saw that both creation and revelation required for their background an eternal order of reality. Clement brought the doctrine of the Logos-mediator to its full development, whilst Origen placed the hypostasis of the mediator firmly within the eternal order.

Thus this movement of ante-Nicene thought placed the gospel first upon the background of a cosmic order and secondly upon the background of eternal reality. Thus religion joined hands with reason in a new rationalisation. Its exponents were none of them intellectually men of the front rank, with the exception of Origen; and even he is not commonly classed with the greater lights of antiquity. None the less, the last of the great rationalisations of spiritual experience in the ancient world came as the crown of all the others. For it gave a new interpretation of Ultimate Reality to the world, an interpretation which was destined to claim the kingdom over human interests in the future on a universal scale. But the religious value of this achievement depended upon its adequately representing and mediating the permanent facts of that religious experience from which the movement sprang. We have found the religious interests of the New Testament to be two. (1) The first of these was concerned with doing justice to the Christian experience of redemption from sin in the New Order. The Christian experience is, above all, Christocentric, and is concerned with an adoring worship of One who entered history as the concrete historical mediator of God's redeeming love for sinners. Anything which blurred or destroyed the distinct and concrete reality of the historical Redeemer, who brought a revelation of God's love to man, would be recognised to be contrary to this religious interest. (2) But this religious interest passes inevitably into another. The historical Redeemer is worshipped, because He really does redeem; because He stands above the redeemed community as the transcendent source of their new life in the Spirit. Thus the movement of thought, as it sprang out of religious experience in the New Testament interpretation, was a movement which treasured the historical reality of the Redeemer. But at the same time it sought the status of His Person in a transcendent order of reality and in an eternal fellowship of Persons from which the fellowship of the new community flows. During the period between St. John and Origen the centre of religious interest lay in a battle for the historical reality of the Redeemer. In that battle, fought and won, the prologue of St. John was vindicated in its assertion that the Logos really became flesh. Tertullian is transitional; and with Origen the centre of religious interest has definitely shifted to the eternal status of the Son as a Divine Person. But the permanent relation of Christology to soteriology must always be borne in mind; and this connexion was less clearly emphasised by Clement and Origen than by Irenaeus and Tertullian. For the Alexandrian school Jesus Christ is a Second Eternal Hypostasis who by taking flesh has revealed to us the light and love of the Father which He eternally enjoys. The substance of Origen's doctrine is that a revelation of the eternal order has been given by a mediator who Himself belongs to that eternal order. The emphasis lies upon a revelation of eternity. All this is consistent with the positive message of St. John's Gospel. But the reverse aspect of that gospel is a conflict of light and darkness, issuing in a tremendous judgment upon sin, and requiring the Lamb of God as the victim who taketh away the sin of the world.[1] In short, the theology of the fourth gospel rests upon the apostolic experience of redemption; but its religious terminology is very largely that of illumination or salvation by knowledge of the truth.[2] The Alexandrian theology previous to Athanasius was primarily a theology of illumination, which put the emphasis upon a revelation of the eternal order rather than upon the fact that this revelation is embodied in redeeming activity. In consequence its Platonic affiliations were vital to its integrity. In Origen's successors it was precisely this factor, the emphasis upon an eternal order, which tended to fade away; and thus a breach was made in the system, a breach which Arius exploited. The Arian controversy showed conclusively that the theology of sonship could not be maintained solely by the armoury of the Platonic philosophy. That philosophy had given expression to such a theology, but could not provide its main support, any more than a modern philosophy of theism based upon 'absolute values' or the like can provide to-day the main support for a gospel of the Incarnation. The reason for all this is plain. The only direct authority for the Christian gospel is to be found in the New Testament with the facts and experiences to which it bears witness. All other evidence can be only of an indirect character, not the less vital for that, but dependent for its evidential value upon its use as a guiding and supporting factor in the interpretation of the main evidence. The principal foundation for our faith in the Incarnate Lord must always be the gospel revelation of the Son of God together with the apostolic experience of

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[1] Cp. the two distinct ideas contained respectively in Eph. iii. 14 and in 1 John i. 3, 7.

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[1] John i. 29; cp. xix. 36 and 1 John ii. 1–3.

[2] On the other hand, with its categories of *life* and *resurrection*, the gospel lies behind the so-called Asiatic realism of which Irenaeus was the chief representative.

His redeeming activity. It was that experience which controlled the interpretation of His Person in terms which came to rest in the Johannine conception of His sonship. The theology of sonship rests upon the gospel revelation interpreted through the medium of an experience of redemption. This is the explanation of Athanasius, of his triumph over Arianism, and of the resulting theology of Divine Persons in the Godhead. That theology was strengthened by the adherence of Origen's Cappadocian successors and received a more philosophical form in Augustine's treatise on the Trinity. With Augustine the Logos-theology came into its own once more in an exhaustive inquiry into the analogies which were suggested by his psychology. But amongst these analogies were included those which emphasised a social aspect of the Godhead; and behind such analogies lay the theology of sonship. Thus in its developed western form the doctrine of the Trinity contains both the Logos-theology and the theology of sonship; and the balance is thus maintained between two different types of analogy, psychological and social. But the roots of both lines of thought lie in the New Testament.

CHAPTER XII

THE WORD AND THE SPIRIT: THE MISSION OF THE PARACLETE

I

THE way has now been prepared for a fuller consideration of the Christian conception of the Godhead embodied in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. That doctrine has inevitably been implied in the preceding discussions of Christology. But its separate consideration must now be undertaken if this study of Christian theism in relation to organic conceptions is to be complete. Historically this doctrine was developed in the first place from the side of Christology along lines which have been indicated in the preceding chapter. The doctrine of the Spirit received little attention after the first century until the second half of the fourth century. There is, however, a partial exception to be made in the writings of Tertullian and Origen; and for that exception we have, in Tertullian's case at any rate, to thank the Montanist movement. The comparative silence and even obscurity of writers in the second century is well known. Irenaeus, however, reproduces in his own way, here as elsewhere, some of the leading biblical ideas.[1] Generally speaking, the doctrine of the Spirit had to wait until the relation of the Redeemer to the Godhead had been fully worked out. The distinctively Christian doctrine concerning God was determined by the soteriological interest in the Person of the mediator between God and man. This interest in turn was, as we have seen, determined by the Christo-centric character of Christian experience. The central facts of that experience were concerned with the historical figure Jesus Christ. Interpretation must necessarily concentrate upon those central facts and weigh their meaning, before serious attention could be given to other aspects of the experience. One qualification, however, must be made with regard to the later development of Christian pneumatology. With the New Testament the

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[1] The undeveloped state of ante-Nicene theology with regard to this subject has two main aspects: (1) Certain writers in the second century exhibit a crude tendency to confuse the functions of the pre-existent Logos and the Holy Spirit; *e.g.* Hermas, *Simil.* 5, vi. and 9, i. (*The Apostolic Fathers*, eds. Lightfoot and Harmer, pp. 352, 370); Justin, *apol.* i. 33; Theophilus, *ad. Autol.* ii. 10 (*corp. apol. Christ.*, ed. Otto, tomes i. and viii. 1847–61). Moreover, the term 'spirit' was sometimes used for the divine nature of the Logos. This use is frequent in Tertullian, *e.g. adv. Prax.* chs. xxvi. and xxix. (ed. Oehler, vol. ii. pp. 689–695); see also *Tertullian against Praxeas*, by A. Souter, Introduction and notes *ad loc.* (1919, S.P.C.K.). These facts are not surprising in view of the Stoic

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terminology, according to which an all-pervading *pneuma* produced the *spermatikoi logoi* or fixed types in nature. Cp. Edwyn Bevan, *Later Greek Religion* (1927), p. xv. Another indication of fluid terminology appears in a common identification of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit; *e.g.* Theophilus, *ad Autol.* ii. 15; Irenaeus, *adv. haer.* bk. iv. chs. xiv. and xxxiv. 1, 3, 4 (ed. Harvey, vol. ii., following his numbering of chapters). Origen, however, identified Wisdom with the Logos; cp. *de principiis*, bk. i. ch. 2. In this he was followed generally in the next century, as is clear from the treatment of the text Prov. viii. 22 by both sides in the Arian controversy. (2) Language of a markedly subordinationist character was sometimes used throughout this period. But it is possible to exaggerate the evidence for this, if contrasted tendencies are not kept in mind. A case in point occurs in Justin, *apol.* i. 6 (cp. also *dial. c. Tryph.* ch. 116). Of this example H. B. Swete wrote: 'the passage, if pressed, proves too much,' *On the Early History of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit* (1873), p. 17. In a more recent work Dr. Swete wrote to the same effect, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church* (1912), p. 37. Important passages in the writings of Origen are *de principiis*, bk. i. pref. 4, and bk. i. ch. 3, § 5 (Leipzig ed., band 5, p. 11, with notes *ad loc.* and pp. 55, 56); also *comm. in Johann.* ii. 10 (6) (ed. Brooke, vol. i. pp. 70 ff.). In the first and third of these passages Origen is groping for a terminology, which was afterwards supplied by the doctrine of the Procession of the Spirit. In the second passage he is developing the 'economic' aspect of the doctrine of the Trinity (*operationem specialem describamus*). The whole passage is preserved in the Greek. When we set this passage beside others, in which Origen asserts the equality of the Persons, we have a good illustration of the fact that ante-Nicene subordination belongs largely to the 'economic' level of thought. The history of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit has been investigated by H. B. Swete in a series of works. Of these the two earliest are now out of print. But their substance was incorporated into an article 'Holy Ghost,' in *D.C.B.* vol. iii. (1882). See also the article 'Spirit (Holy)' in *E.R.E.* vol. xi., by R. Birch Hoyle, which supplies a full bibliography. For the biblical aspect of the subject see further below, Additional Note D; and for Origen's teaching, Additional Note E.

Church received the Threefold Name; and from the second century onwards baptism in that Threefold Name was the prevailing practice.[1] This implied a worship of the Trinity, however undeveloped theology might be. Moreover, these facts serve to show how inevitable it was that decisions reached concerning the status of the Son should have their corollaries in men's thought about the Spirit. Sabellianism, the first trinitarian heresy, was condemned because it imperilled the permanent significance of the Redeemer, and was therefore in conflict with the soteriological interest of Christian experience. The Son could not be regarded as a temporary mode of the Godhead. But this conclusion inevitably carried with it a like conclusion concerning the Spirit. Similarly the Nicene development of Christology carried in its train a parallel development of thought concerning the deity of the Holy Spirit. Thus, in spite of the comparative silence and vagueness of ante-Nicene writers on this subject, there are indications that the Christian doctrine of the Godhead was developing as a single whole; and that at points of crisis in that development the position assigned to the Spirit tended to be in the nature of a corollary to the position assigned to the Son. The most barren period is the second century, before Montanism and the Monarchian movement had left their mark upon theology. This is also the period when the Logos theology is dominant; and there may well be something more than an accidental connexion between the two facts. The prologue of St. John is silent about the Holy Spirit, although the parallel with the opening verses of Genesis might well have suggested the reference. The prologue, however, is concerned to place the Incarnation upon a background which assigns a cosmic status to the Incarnate Lord. This passage, as we have seen, represents the last stage in a movement of thought within the New Testament; a movement which was concerned to place the new creation upon the background of the first creation and so to secure the cosmic significance of redemption. The New Testament shows no parallel line of development with regard to the Spirit, if we except

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[1] But Matt. xxviii. 19 seems to show that the practice was apostolic in origin.

Romans viii., where the references to the Spirit in verses 26, 27 occur in a context which develops the cosmic aspect of redemption. But here the connexion of the Spirit with creation is not emphasised. At the beginnings of Christian thought cosmic functions are not assigned to the Holy Spirit. Whereas in the Old Testament the Spirit is God's creative energy actively present in nature, the New Testament transfers the whole activity of the Spirit to the new creation, the sphere of the new community redeemed by Christ.[1] It would be rash to conclude that upon this point the New Testament writers were in conscious and deliberate opposition to the writers of the old covenant, or that their respective standpoints are incompatible. In fact, the germ of the New Testament doctrine of the Spirit is already present in those numerous passages of the Old Testament which connect a special activity of the Spirit with the divinely chosen leaders and prophets of the people of God. Still more clearly can affinity be traced with those 'messianic' passages in the prophets which connect a general outpouring of the Spirit with the restoration of the Davidic kingdom and with its individualised ideal figures.[2] These passages provide an obvious background to the statements concerning the Spirit in the synoptic gospels and in the Acts. The synoptic accounts of our Lord's baptism designate Him to be the messianic recipient of these promised outpourings of the Spirit. The nativity stories refer His human conception and birth to a special creative activity of Holy Spirit. Thus the event of the Incarnation is referred to the action of the Spirit in respect to the origins of our Lord's human life-story. The nativity stories carry the new creation back to the beginning of that life-story and represent that new creation as constituted in our Lord's humanity. The Lucan books represent the Messiah thus endowed as handing on the messianic gift of the Spirit, 'the promise of the Father,' to His disciples. He embodied the Kingdom as the messianic recipient of the Spirit; and His promise of the Kingdom to them was fulfilled as a present reality when the gift of the Spirit was poured out upon them by the ascended Lord. Thus the Spirit of God inaugurated the messianic dispensation and presided over it in its two phases, the human life-story of the Messiah and the new community which derived from Him.

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[1] The point has been well put by Bishop Gore, *The Holy Spirit and the Church*, ch. i.

[2] For references see above, p. 208, n. 1.

In the epistles the New Order of life in the new community is traced to two sources, the indwelling Spirit of God and the ascended Lord. The Spirit comes from God; for the 'love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through Holy Spirit which was given to us.'[1] But the Spirit of God is also the Spirit of Christ; for 'God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts.'[2] In agreement with this the risen Christ in St. Luke says: 'Behold I send the promise of My Father upon you.'[3] Thus the creative activity of Holy Spirit in the new community derives from God through Christ. But elsewhere in the New Testament the new creation is referred back from the new community to Christ. According to one Pauline explanation the new creation is constituted in the humanity of Christ, the second Adam, and passes from Him to the new community, because that community is organically connected with Him as His body. If we ask how the new creation is constituted in Christ as man the New Testament has two different answers. (1) According to the authors of the nativity stories the human life of Christ derives from a special creative activity of Holy Spirit. (2) According to the prologue of St. John the pre-existent Word is incarnate in that life. These two different explanations of the new creation in Christ are not co-ordinated in the New Testament. A problem here confronts us as to the relation of the Spirit of God to the Logos. But the two ideas are not brought together in the New Testament; for, as we have seen, the Holy Spirit is not mentioned in the prologue of St. John, and the nativity stories are silent as to the Logos. In view of these facts it is not altogether surprising that in the second century concentration of thought upon the Logos-theology should be accompanied by some silence and obscurity with regard to the Spirit; and that in Montanism a distinct movement should arise to reassert the doctrine of the Spirit. Be that as it may, it is clear that we must look elsewhere in the New Testament for the connexion between the Spirit and the Incarnate Lord. The problem of the double derivation of the new creation in Christ from the pre-existent Word and from the Holy Spirit is a problem whose answer can be sought only upon a metaphysical level. Such a level is indeed touched by certain parts of the New Testament; but its full arrival was postponed to a later age. Here, however, as in the case of Christology, the New Testament interpretation of experience provided abundant materials upon which later thought could work. It is these materials of New Testament interpretation to which we must now turn.

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[1] Rom. v. 5; cp. also Rom. viii. 11 ff.

[2] Gal. iv. 6.

[3] Luke xxiv. 49.

In previous chapters of this work a somewhat full analysis of New Testament experience and its interpretation has been undertaken; and in the course of that analysis frequent reference has been made to the place occupied by the Holy Spirit in that experience. It is unnecessary to travel over the ground again. But a point has been reached at which certain conclusions may be drawn. It was pointed out that in the Pauline interpretation of that experience there are two alternative ways of describing it. One way is in terms which relate the New Order to Christ as transcendent Head of the body, indwelling content of the individual life, and ultimate goal of both the new community and its individual members. The other way is in terms which refer the New Order to the Spirit of God as its creative cause and indwelling presence. The two conceptions are connected through the doctrine of the body of Christ. Of that body Christ is the Head, and the Spirit is the indwelling presence. Within that body Christ is the content of individual life; but the Spirit which indwells the body and its members is the Spirit of Christ. There is an indwelling of Christ and an indwelling of the Spirit of Christ. Similarly Christians are 'in Christ' and they are also 'in the Spirit.' In Romans viii. we are told that the Spirit 'maketh intercession for the saints' (*v.* 27); and again, a few lines further, that Christ 'maketh intercession for us' (*v.* 34). Does this duplication of parts suggest an identity between Christ and the Spirit? If so, is there any sense in which they can be distinguished? Confronted with this difficulty we may recall the fact that in John xiv. 23 there is a similar duplication of parts in the case of the Father and the Son, who simultaneously come to dwell with the Christian disciple. Clearly there is no easy and simple solution of these mysterious facts. Nor will an apparent identification of 'the Lord' with 'the Spirit' in one passage be sufficient evidence to bear the weight of a complete identification of Christ with the Spirit.[1] For whilst in certain respects there is identification between the two with regard to function, particularly the function of dwelling in the individual Christian, there are also striking contrasts between the respective functions of Christ and of the Spirit in these descriptions of Christian experience. Let us take one example of this difference from that very part of the experience, as interpreted by St. Paul, where the functions appear to approximate most closely. Both Christ and the Spirit dwell in the Christian soul, but not in the same way. Christ is indwelling content of the Christian life. He is being 'formed' in us.[2] The goal of this process is a conformity of the Christian to the likeness of Christ's character. We are to be conformed to His image.[3] Christ is the 'second man from heaven,' and the Christian is the 'new man in Christ' through putting on Christ.[4] Corporately this means that the new community has for its goal 'a perfect man,' 'the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.' St. Paul nowhere says that the Spirit is formed in us, or that we are to be conformed to the image of the Spirit. Again, the whole meaning of Romans vi. would be intolerably obscured if for 'Christ' we substituted the phrase 'the Spirit of Christ' throughout the chapter; and if in chapter viii. of the same epistle or in 1 Cor. xii. we substituted 'Christ' for 'the Spirit' wherever the Holy Spirit appears to be indicated the change would be equally manifest. The indwelling of Christ means always the reproduction in us of the human life of Christ in its essential quality and character by a process which can be compared to impregnation and natural growth. By this process the content of our life comes to be in increasing measure the essential quality, virtue and character of His life. The process has for its goal the fullness of the new humanity of Christ. But this goal is a corporate goal, because the new humanity embraces not only the individual but the new community as a whole. Now this kind of language is never used concerning the Spirit of Christ. The indwelling of the Spirit is described as having a transforming effect upon the human spirit and as quickening our mortal bodies.[1] The indwelling of the Spirit involves the indwelling of Christ; consequently the indwelling of Christ is inseparable from this quickening.[2] But the Spirit is never regarded as the *content* of the quickened life. He is the agent of revelation, who brings the content of truth to the spirit of man; and by consequence we have the mind of Christ.[3] Through His instrumentality a variety of *charismata* are bestowed upon the members of the new community. He is the energising agent who produces these gifts.[4] Other fruits of His activity are the graces which distinguish Christian character.[5] In Ephesians the distinction between the indwelling of Christ and the indwelling of the Spirit is clearly marked in one sentence. The writer prays for his readers 'to the Father' 'that He will grant you according to the riches of His glory to be strengthened with power through His Spirit in the inner man that Christ may dwell through faith in your hearts.'[6] This text exactly agrees with the distinction which has already been drawn out. The bestowal of the Spirit by the Father is to have the effect of strengthening the inner life. The Spirit is the quickening cause; and the indwelling of Christ is the effect of this quickening. Similarly in the Epistle to Titus we are told that 'God saved us through a washing of regeneration and renewal of Holy Spirit which He poured upon us richly through Jesus Christ our Saviour.'[7] Here the Spirit is the gift of God through Christ; and the effect of the gift is regeneration and renewal. Christ is our Saviour by whose grace we are justified;[1] the Spirit is the cause of quickening and renewal. Christ is the objective ground of salvation; the Spirit is the effective cause of the new life in us. Thus the characteristic distinction of language is maintained.

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[1] 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18. On the interpretation of this passage see further Additional Note D, pp. 472, 473 below.

[2] Gal. iv. 19.

[3] Rom. viii. 29.

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 47; Col. iii. 10; cp. Eph. iv. 24 and Rom. xiii. 14.

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[1] Rom. viii. 9–17; cp. *vv.* 26, 27.

[2] Rom. viii. 10.

[3] 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 16.

[4] 1 Cor. xii. 7–11.

[5] Gal. v. 22, 23.

[6] Eph. iii. 14–17.

[7] Titus iii. 5, 6.

The balance of teaching in the apostolic epistles is not favourable, therefore, to the view that the Spirit of Christ is simply to be identified with Christ. There is a marked difference of thought and language about their respective functions. Another indication pointing in the same direction is to be found in a tendency to hypostatise the Spirit. The Spirit, which in Old Testament thought was simply the creative energy of God, is now beginning to be regarded as a personal agency. The instances of this outside the fourth gospel are not frequent. But they must be noted. Thus in one passage St. Paul says: 'the things of God no one (οὐδεὶς) hath known save the Spirit of God.'[2] In the same epistle the apostle says (writing of the *charismata*) that 'all these worketh the one and the same Spirit, dividing to each one severally as He wills' (καθὼς βούλεται).[3] In Romans he writes that 'the Spirit helpeth our infirmities. For we know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with unutterable groanings; but He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, for He intercedeth for the saints according to God.'[4] Here the Spirit intercedes; and the phrase 'the mind of the Spirit' would be a curious one to use if the reference is simply to Christ. In Ephesians the writer says 'grieve not the Holy Spirit of God.'[5] Here again the reference is personal, and 'the Holy Spirit of God' cannot be simply Christ, if we are to judge by the general use of New Testament language. These passages do not show that the Spirit was habitually regarded as personal in the period to which they belong. But they do exhibit a tendency towards hypostatisation, a tendency which became explicit and settled in St. John's Gospel. This brings us to another aspect of the subject.

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[1] Titus iii. 7.

[2] I Cor. ii. 11; cp. also the preceding verse: 'The Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God.'

[3] I Cor. xii. 11.

[4] Rom. viii. 26, 27.

[5] Eph. iv. 30; cp. Isai. lxiii. 10.

The sphere of the Spirit's activity is the new community formed out of Christ's disciples and their converts. The Spirit is closely associated with the body of Christ. 'There is one body and one Spirit';[1] and the body of Christ is the normal sphere in which the Spirit operates. The fellowship of the new community is the fellowship or sharing of the Holy Spirit. In St. Paul's trinitarian benediction fellowship (*κοινωνία*) is the special characteristic associated with the Holy Spirit.[2] The law of the new community is 'to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.'[3] Whereas Christ is the organic Head of the new community, the Spirit is its bond of unity and fellowship. He is the effective cause of that organic unity which it derives from Christ. His function is to generate the inner content of this organic unity by transforming the individual units of the body, and by giving them a social value which transcends the natural friction of the individual and social organisms. Yet in socialising the individual the Spirit does not suppress him. On the contrary, it is part of the very same process that individual character should be more richly endowed with gifts and graces; and these gifts and graces make for both individual fulfilment and social harmony. Thus the indwelling of the Spirit in the new community and its members transcends the tension of individual and social principles. In this respect the indwelling of the Spirit has precisely that super-organic character which we have found it necessary to ascribe to the Incarnate Lord as Head of the body. The Spirit belongs to the level of Christ's super-organic individuality and shares its qualities. The parallelism between Christ and the Spirit in this respect is very complete. To both in different ways there is ascribed creative power which is proper to the level of deity. The general distinction is, that the new creation is referred to Christ as its transcendent source and organic Head, whilst it is referred to the Spirit as its efficient cause and underlying creative activity. The objective form and content of the new organism are derived from Christ. But this form and content enter human material which is fashioned to receive and assimilate them by the transforming power of the Spirit. The form and content cannot enter into spiritually dead and unresponsive material. The Spirit's function is to take the material of the old creation and to transform it into the material of the new creation; to fuse into one whole the ' form ' and ' matter ' of the new creation ; to make the transcendent reality of the Kingdom embodied in Christ to become the inner principle of the New Order embodied in the new community.

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[1] Eph. iv. 14; cp. the alternative image of 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17.

[2] 2 Cor. xiii. 13.

[3] Eph. iv. 3.

II

It appears, then, that the New Testament attributes the new creation manifested in the New Order to two kinds of creative activity, the one transcendent and formative, the other immanent and quickening. Now if we carry back this double activity of the new creation to the Incarnation itself it throws light upon the two different conceptions, which we have found in the gospels, of the Incarnation considered as an event. For the nativity stories on the one hand, and St. John's prologue on the other, offer explanations of Christ's human life-story corresponding precisely to the two forms of creative activity which we have found in the apostolic interpretation of the New Order as embodied in the new community. According to the one explanation the new humanity of Christ was the product of the creative activity of Holy Spirit, working upon the material of the old order derived from the Blessed Virgin. The precise point with which we are here concerned, it should be observed, is not the question of the historical truth of the Virgin Birth, but the conception of a special creative activity of Holy Spirit which the nativity stories embody. That is the only point in those narratives of which we need here take account. In contrast with this conception St. John's prologue offers a conception of the Incarnation corresponding to the formative kind of creative activity. Here the Logos, or Word of God, pre-existent and transcendent over creation, becomes incarnate in a human life-story as its transcending principle of unity. But in the apostolic interpretation of the New Order these two kinds of creative activity are complementary to one another. Does it not follow that they were also complementary to one another in the event of the Incarnation? If this conclusion is justified, it seems to follow that behind the whole historical experience of the new creation recorded and interpreted in the New Testament there lies a more ultimate differentiation of the Word and the Spirit.

In considering an ultimate question of this kind we are under obligation to survey all the evidence available, not only the evidence of New Testament experience and its interpretations, but also all lines of evidence which lead up to that experience and which can be supposed to throw light upon it. It has been a fundamental point in the argument of the present work that different levels and domains of experience are interlocked in continuity of structure, and that the grounds of Christian belief are to be sought upon this wide basis. The revelation of God given in the sphere of New Testament experience can never be corroborated by reason if we restrict our attention to that sphere alone. Consequently, no excuse need be offered for considering once more materials which have accumulated from other domains of experience in the course of this survey. In preceding chapters it was concluded from a survey of the organic series that the series is to be traced to a creative activity which has a twofold character. Enduring objects are the products of pattern supervening upon event. For modern scientific analysis the material universe resolves itself into a system of events. But we know the organic universe not as a neutral system of events but as a varied world of enduring objects, in which at successive levels there are revelations of an eternal order. These revelations are embodied in the enduring objects. Thus, if the eternal order is the background of the system of nature, we are constrained to think of these enduring objects as products of a creative activity which is of two kinds. On the one hand for the system of events with its groundwork of repetitive energy there must be an underlying creative activity. On the other hand, for the enduring objects, whose unity and significance transcend a bare spatio-temporal succession in an immense variety of ways, there must be presupposed an entry of creative activity in the form of transcending principles of unity weaving patterns upon the system of events. But, again, the ordered universe with its ascending series of organisms presupposes a complete correspondence of the two kinds of creative activity. For on the one hand by incorporations of the eternal order patterns are woven in ascending forms of unity upon the system of events. Events of increasing complexity underlie these patterns. But complexity is always controlled by corresponding principles of unity which derive from the creative activity of the eternal order. The result is an ascending series of organisms in which unity and wholeness keep pace with complexity. Similarly, from the other side, the repetitive energy at the base of the series, with its flow of events, is conformable at every stage to the patterns woven by the entry of transcending principles of unity. 'Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, by reason of the plan of the body. The electron blindly runs either within or without the body; but it runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body; that is to say, in accordance with the general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state. But the principle of unification is perfectly general throughout nature and represents no property peculiar to living bodies.'[1] But if the 'blind run' of electrons is conformed, throughout the whole system of nature, to the patterned wholes which characterise the organic series, then that 'blind run' must be attributed to an underlying creative activity, which is in complete correspondence with the supervening creative activity embodied in the organic wholes. Creative activity at the base of the series conforms the flow of physical events to the formative activity of the eternal order which supervenes upon events in the ascending principles of unity.

Thus we can distinguish in the production of the organic series a twofold creative activity; and this offers some analogy to the twofold creative activity manifested in the new creation which the New Testament records. Now when we pass to our experience of communion with the eternal order, we find a further manifestation of the twofold activity of that order. In previous chapters our experience of communion with the eternal order was analysed. That experience was seen to involve on the one hand transcendent forms, principles and standards of the eternal order, and on the other hand man's capacity for apprehension and response in respect of those forms, principles and standards. This was seen in two ways. For, first, to the progression of revelation manifested in the organic series there corresponds a progression of knowledge from the side of the knower. Unity of perception from the side of the knower keeps pace with the ascending series of objects. With increase of complexity in the objects of knowledge there corresponds increase of significance for the knower and increasing penetration of the knower's mind by the object. Thus on the level of spirit, where creative activity passes over into the form of revelation, the twofoldness of that activity continues to be operative. All spiritual apprehension presupposes a revelation of the eternal order to which response can be made. We are capable of apprehending revelations of the eternal order and of conforming our conduct to the standards embodied in those revelations. This rational community of man with the eternal order, and capacity for correspondence thereto, must be attributed to an underlying creative activity of that order upon which our spiritual being is grounded. But, as we have seen, the revelations of the eternal order are infinite, in that its forms, principles and standards always lie beyond our grasp, however far we pursue them. They are embodied in concrete environment for our apprehension, and our response to them is likewise so embodied. Yet in both cases the forms, principles and standards transcend their embodiment. Nevertheless they penetrate to the roots of our spiritual being; and we are so constituted that we cannot but recognise and respond to that very infinity which ever escapes us. The realm of the eternal order is most near and intimate to us when it seems to be most transcendent and beyond. This strange paradox becomes intelligible, if the creative activity which underlies our spiritual being, making us rational creatures, partakes of that very infinity and eternity which we recognise in the transcendent standards of the eternal order.

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[1] A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, ch. v. p. 116 (ed. 1925).

In the course of the preceding argument it was remarked that one of the most striking characteristics of spiritual organisms, a characteristic which distinguishes them sharply from the rest of the organic series, is to be found in their capacity for individual spiritual advance through self-determining co-operation with the eternal order. The ascent of the series as a whole is from one type of organism to another. The spiritual ascent of man occurs primarily within the life-story of the individual. In the series as a whole there is a correspondence of the two kinds of creative activity through patterns supervening upon events and through events being conformed to the rhythm of organic wholes. But on the level of spirit, within the life-story of the individual, there can be a progressive correspondence of man's spirit to revelations of the eternal order. When this takes place, it is because man's created spirit co-operates with the creative activity immanent in the roots of his spiritual being. That creative activity sets up in him a *nisus* towards the eternal order which impels him to respond to its transcendent standards, notwithstanding the infinity of their demand. That underlying creative activity with which man so co-operates for his spiritual advance partakes of the infinity and eternity which we recognise in the transcendent standards of the eternal order. When we pass to the domain of religious experience the structure of man's community with the eternal order receives a new interpretation. But in the sphere of religious revelation the same principles continue to operate. Everywhere in primitive religion the will of the gods is ascertained through the religious expert, that is to say through some person who is supposed to partake of the spirit of the god in a special degree. Peculiar revelations presuppose some special endowment in the recipients of such revelations, enabling them both to receive and to respond to what is made known to them. Upon this background of primitive thought the Hebrew prophets arose. They were regarded as pre-eminently the agents of revelation because they were in a special degree recipients of God's Spirit. But the ideal of the great prophets was that all the Lord's people should be prophets and that He would put His Spirit upon them, or at least that all should be taught of God. In their anticipations of the Kingdom they saw that the full manifestation of God's redeeming activity involved a pouring out of the Spirit upon all flesh. The progressive incorporation of the eternal order into religious revelation was seen to carry with it a corresponding moralising of Israel's response, which could be actualised only by an outpouring of God's Spirit. Now in the Old Testament conception of God the ethical and cosmic aspects of divine activity are united in one concrete revelation. From the ethical supremacy of Yahweh the prophets deduced His sovereignty over creation. So in the developed Hebrew conception of the Spirit there is a cosmological aspect side by side with the conceptions of prophetic inspiration and messianic outpouring. The Spirit of God is the creative activity of God immanent in nature. And these two aspects of creative activity are never far apart in the thought of prophets and psalmists. God is present to man's spirit, because He is present everywhere in nature. So too, in the prophetic anticipations of the messianic kingdom, that kingdom will be manifested under earthly and human conditions. Those conditions however will be transformed, and nature will share in the transformation. But according to a later doctrine there would be a new heaven and a new earth; and the apocalyptic conception of a transcendent kingdom, taking the place of the old order, turned men's hopes away from earth to heaven. Thus it is not surprising that in the New Testament the activity of the Spirit is concentrated upon the new creation. The messianic outpouring of the Spirit completely fills the picture. The world lies in the power of the Evil One and is alienated from God's purpose. The sphere of the Spirit is the New Order. But we must not exaggerate. It is the function of the Spirit in the New Testament to take the materials of the old order and to transform them into the materials of the New Order. That is the consistent teaching of gospels and epistles. This conception, as we have seen, is embodied in the nativity stories. It runs through all the Pauline teaching about the 'old man' and the 'new man.' It reappears in St. John's Gospel in the discourse to Nicodemus. Man, whose natural birth is in the old order, can by a second birth of water and the Spirit enter the kingdom of God, that is the New Order. Moreover the New Testament is emphatically at one with the Old Testament in its doctrine of the Creator, and in asserting the good of creation. There is an ethical and religious tension between the New Order and 'the world.' But this ethical dualism must not be confused with cosmological dualism.

It remains true, then, that in the New Testament the activity of the Spirit in the new creation is not placed directly upon a cosmic background, as is the case with Christology in certain passages of the epistles and pre-eminently in the prologue of St. John. A further explanation of this fact, however, may be found, an explanation which is in itself highly significant. It is given in the Johannine saying: 'He shall glorify Me, for He shall take of Mine and shall declare it unto you.'[1] The Spirit in the New Testament is emphatically the Spirit of Christ; and if He bears witness to Christ, His own authentication is to be found in the fact that He generates the Christo-centric experience in the new community and its members. The cosmic significance of the Spirit ultimately depends upon the cosmic significance of the Incarnate Lord. The Spirit generates in the New Order an experience of redemption which has Christ for its centre of reference. The very structure of that experience which the Spirit generates requires that the interpretation of that experience should be occupied with the significance of the Redeemer. If *His* Person has cosmic significance, then the experience of redemption is securely anchored, and the universality and finality of the gospel are correspondingly assured. Now we have seen that this necessary development of thought was realised in the Logos-theology. Historically that development provided a bridge to the second phase of ancient Christology, which was occupied with the eternal sonship. But there is no adequate parallel to this development, setting the mission of the Spirit upon a cosmic background.[1] Such a development was scarcely possible or, at that stage, necessary. It was scarcely possible, because the very structure of Christian experience demanded that the significance of redemption should be sought and secured in a status, historical, cosmic and ultimately metaphysical, assigned to the Person of the Redeemer. It was not at that stage necessary, because the organic coherence of Christian experience guaranteed that ultimately a status must be assigned to the Spirit comparable to that of the Incarnate Lord. For the Spirit of Christ must be understood in terms congruous with the significance of Christ. Again, it was not possible for the first age of Christianity to explore fully the cosmic significance of the Spirit. For throughout that age until the fourth century the dualistic contrast between the New Order and the secular world-order, as embodied in the Roman Empire, remained a dominating factor of the situation. In a sense the cosmic aspect of the Holy Spirit's activity, adumbrated in the Old Testament, and more adequately recognised after the middle of the fourth century, has never been fully worked out in Christian theology. The tension between the earthly city and the city of God was to some extent mitigated by the mediaeval distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders. That distinction secured a fuller recognition of ' nature ' in subordination to 'grace.' But the two spheres were not adequately co-ordinated. The problem of their mutual relations had not been solved, when the Reformation brought a return to more catastrophic modes of thought.

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[1] John xvi. 14.

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[1] The primitive identification of the Spirit with Wisdom and the teaching of the O.T. secured *some* recognition of the Spirit's activity in creation as early as the second century ; *e.g.* Theophilus, *ad Autol.* i. 5, following Wisdom i. 7, and Irenaeus, *adv. haer*, bk. iv. pref. 3, *et al.*, where Logos and Spirit are ' the hands of God.' Origen, too, notes the mention of the Spirit in Genesis i. But this recognition of the Spirit's cosmic activity was not worked out before the attack upon the deity of the Holy Spirit developed in the later stages of the Arian controversy. The ante-Nicenes were more interested in the Spirit's sanctifying activity. Thus there was a tendency to restrict the sphere of His operation. Tatian is perhaps not representative (Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, pp. 39–41). But Irenaeus gives much more attention to the Spirit's work in the sphere of redemption (*adv. haer.* bk. v. chs. vi. ff.) than to His cosmic function. Origen's important statement (in *de principiis*, bk. i. ch. 3, § 5) grades the Trinity ' economically ' with narrowing spheres of operation. Thus he restricted the sphere of the Spirit's operations to the sanctification of the saints. All this was in accordance with the N.T. emphasis upon the categories of redemption and new creation. See above, pp. 317, 318, note.

The prominence given to conceptions of divine immanence in the course of the nineteenth century gave new significance to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in relation to the order of nature and of human life. The danger now lies in the direction of overlooking the distinctive doctrine of the New Testament, which concentrates the activity of the Holy Spirit within the New Order derived from the Incarnate Lord. The Holy Spirit is neither the spirit of nature nor the spirit of humanity, but the Spirit of Christ. But then the New Testament, in contrast with the pessimism of apocalyptic Judaism, regards the old order as capable of transformation by redemption into the New Order. Consequently the New Testament, for all its concentration upon the New Order, admits by implication the creative activity of the Spirit underlying nature and man. This is, of course, especially true of our Lord's teaching, which regards the kingdom of darkness as a temporary usurpation within the universal sovereignty and providence of God.[1] The apparent exclusiveness of the New Testament has a redemptive purpose, which is universal in its scope. The purpose of the New Order is the restoration of creation to its true route of development whose end is in God.

If then we follow the principle that 'the Spirit of Christ must be understood in terms congruous with the significance of Christ,' this will mean, for the argument of this book, that the Spirit must be understood in terms congruous with the organic conception of the Incarnation. If Christ is the key to the successive domains of experience, which we have found to be interlocked in continuity of structure—if He is the meeting-point of all lines of revelation and the head of the organic series, because He is the incorporation of the eternal order in concrete wholeness into that series in a human organism—then the Spirit of Christ must be referred back from the New Order of New Testament experience to all the other domains of experience which are there gathered up by transformation. In particular the Spirit must be referred back to the eternal order in its relation to the organic series and to man's experience of communion with that order. From this standpoint it may fairly be argued that the double form of creative activity, manifested in the relations of the eternal order to the structure of nature and to the life of man, is something more than an analogy illustrating the differentiation which the biblical revelation makes between the Word and the Spirit. If the eternal order is incorporated into religious revelation, then the twofoldness of that order reappears in the biblical revelation in the form of contrasted aspects of God. Its religious counterparts are the contrasts of transcendence and immanence which are manifested in the contrasted series of divine attributes ; in the transcendent otherness of religious revelation on the one hand, and in the nearness and intimacy of religious inspiration and divine indwelling on the other hand. Lastly, if the Incarnation is the final incorporation of the transcendent eternal order into history in the new organism of Jesus Christ the Word Incarnate, then it will also be true that the underlying activity of the eternal order through all domains of experience is the creative activity of the Holy Spirit. This conclusion was anticipated in the analysis of experience undertaken in a previous chapter.[1] But that analysis was undertaken primarily with a view to estimating the status of our Lord in relation to the organic series and to the eternal order. The bearing of that analysis upon the status of the Holy Spirit has here been recapitulated in the light of the intervening discussions of the Incarnation. We are now in a position to draw the conclusion that the Holy Spirit belongs to the level of the eternal order, that is to say the level of deity. He belongs to that level in a sense comparable to that in which the Incarnate Lord belongs to that level. If the Word is God, then the Holy Spirit is God. The arguments for this conclusion are similar in principle to those which were used in the case of the Incarnate Lord. They are arguments from the character of Christian experience in the New

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[1] This point is worked out in a remarkable book, *Redemption from this World*, by A. G. Hogg.

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[1] Ch. viii. § iv., especially pp. 207–209.

Order as interpreted in the New Testament, from the coherence of that experience in itself, and from its continuity with the other domains of experience. But there is this difference. The conclusions with regard to the status of the Holy Spirit are dependent upon the conclusions concerning the Incarnate Lord. This is necessarily the case, because Christian experience is Christo-centric in structure.

III

'The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.' In what sense are we to understand the familiar words? Assuming that the Holy Spirit 'belongs to the level of deity,' are we to understand by this Name personal or hypostatic existence in a sense comparable to that in which such phrases are referred analogically to the Father and the Son? This question must be faced before we can be in a position to discuss the problem of personality in God in respect of the Trinity as a whole. It may be argued that it is unnecessary to assign to the Holy Spirit the status of a *Person* in the Godhead in the manner required by the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. We speak of the spirit of a people or of a civilisation affecting the world's history; or, again, we speak of the spirit of some great man influencing a community or living on in a tradition. Thus the spirit of Ezekiel may be said to be embodied in post-exilic Judaism and its institutions, or the spirit of Augustine or Calvin is said to be embodied in a theological tradition, in a school of thought, or in a Christian community. Now the first of these illustrations is too vague to provide a parallel. It is really no more than a manner of speech which implicitly recognises the solidarity of society and of social groups. Whatever meaning may legitimately be given to such a phrase as the 'group mind,' it does not necessarily presuppose such an idea as is suggested by the idea of the Spirit of Christ. For whatever meaning we attach to the Spirit, it must be a meaning which refers the Christian community and its members to a relationship with Christ. The Spirit is the Spirit of the Christian community only in a secondary sense, derivative from the more fundamental conception of the Spirit's relation to Christ. The second illustration referred to above is not open to this objection. The spirit of a great man may permeate his disciples or contemporaries and may live on in their descendants. No one man, of course, dominates human society in an absolute sense—that is, in any sense which Christians would consent to place on a level with the spiritual dominion of Christ over the succeeding centuries of human history. But the illustration is not without value; for it draws attention to a capacity in man for spiritual penetration of his fellows and of society as a whole. Thus it suggests an analogy which to some extent illuminates the conception of deity penetrating created humanity ; and this conception has fruitful meanings throughout the whole range of Christian doctrine, meanings which ultimately run up into the doctrine of the Trinity. The analogy has, however, serious limitations, owing to the fact that our Lord is not a single member of the organic series on the level of spirit. He is the head of the organic series and penetrates His body, the new community, from the level of deity. We must attribute to Him super-organic individuality ; and the same attribution must also be made to His Spirit. What such super-organic individuality may be in the Holy Spirit we cannot safely conclude from such a use of illustrations drawn from human capacity for mutual spiritual penetration.[1]

We must attribute to the Holy Spirit super-organic individuality in a sense comparable to that which has been referred to the Incarnate Lord. The whole structure of Christian experience as interpreted in the New Testament requires this. The Holy Spirit does not penetrate the new community or its members on the level of spiritual penetration which belongs to a human individual in his relations with his fellow-men. The Spirit stands in relation to the whole community and to each of its members, in the apostolic interpretation of experience, in a manner which can be ascribed only to deity. The Spirit regenerates, quickens and transforms the individual Christian from within. The experience of this activity of the Spirit is such that it reaches to the roots of a man's being. It is essentially a creative activity, and can be ascribed only to the creative power of God. Further, the Spirit stands to all members of the new community in the same relationship, a relationship which transcends all differences of temperament, natural endowment, or other human differentiation. The Spirit re-creates human individuality, first by establishing the initial harmony of redemptive experience which corresponds to forgiveness of sins and participation in the new life of Christ; secondly, by fashioning the individual into a unit of the social harmony which is proper to the new community. This is a relationship of the Creator to the creature. But again the Spirit stands in super-organic relationship to the whole community. The Spirit is the bond of fellowship in the body of Christ, underlying its unity, relating it as an organic whole to its transcendent Head. We have seen, moreover, that in all these descriptions there is a correspondence between the functions of the Spirit and the functions of Christ, but at the same time a persistent differentiation of the positions assigned to them in Christian experience. When the same region of that experience appears to be assigned to both, their functions in that region of experience are not identical but complementary. Thus Christ is indwelling content of the new life. But the Spirit is the quickening agency generating this content, and that in a distinctive way by producing gifts and graces of character in the regenerated individual. The most inclusive word for that character which the Spirit generates in the individual is *ἀγάπη*. Its social aspect in the body of Christ is *κοινωνία*. But this latter word has a double reference. For the Spirit generates fellowship between Christ on the one hand and His body and its members on the other hand; and again fellowship between the members of the body.[1] So again the love of God is revealed in the historical life-story of Christ; but it is 'poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit.'[2] The differentiation between Christ and the Spirit is also indicated by the fact that the Spirit is frequently called the Spirit of God and sometimes related directly to the Father.[3] The total impression left by all these varied descriptions is that there are two ultimate forms of creative activity operating from the level of deity upon and in Christian experience. They are complementary yet differentiated, interrelated yet distinct.

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[1] The question here raised is discussed more fully in chs. xiii. and xiv.

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[1] Cp. the double reference of *κοινωνία* in 1 John i. 3.

[2] Rom. v. 5.

[3] *E.g.* Rom. viii. 11, 14–17.

Further light upon this subject appears when we consider the stages of experience represented in the literature of the New Testament. If the illustration suggested by examples of individual human influence and spiritual penetration were at all adequate, we might expect its effects to be portrayed in the synoptic gospels. The maximum of such penetration might be expected to have operated when it was reinforced by our Lord's visible presence among His disciples. The influence of His Spirit might be mellowed in them through the brooding reflection of later years. But its most vivid and masterful effects would have operated through His sensible presence. This is not, however, the relation which the synoptic record bears to the later apostolic history. The revelation of God and of His Kingdom in the Galilean ministry and on the last journey to Jerusalem is so overwhelming that the disciples cannot grasp it. They are baffled and blinded by excess of light. In St. Luke's account this bewilderment continues until the eve of the Ascension;[1] whilst in all three synoptists the disciples are so far from responding to the call and challenge of our Lord's earthly teaching and example that they all forsake Him and flee in the hour of His trial. On the other hand, it is the Pentecostal outpouring of the Spirit from the ascended Lord which transforms their hitherto barely responsive minds, and brings to fruition in the New Order of the Spirit the transcendent revelation of the earthly life and teaching. When, however, we turn to the fourth gospel we find a transformation of synoptic material with regard to the actual teaching of our Lord about the Holy Spirit. This transformation of teaching concerning the gift of the Spirit shows us how far beyond the level suggested by the analogy of human influence the New Order of life in the Spirit had carried the Church by the end of the first century. One of the strongest claims of the synoptic gospels to be regarded as containing genuine historical memories is to be found in their comparative silence about the Holy Spirit, and in the undeveloped state of their theological tone in respect to this subject. The Spirit is here the messianic gift looked for in Old Testament days. That gift has been bestowed upon the Messiah Himself. It is a gift which may be had from the Father by those who ask for it ; and as the Father's promised gift it is to be bestowed by the risen Lord. Even the nativity stories treat the activity of Holy Spirit from the Old Testament point of view ; and in St. Luke's case this is at least intended to give the atmosphere of the story in its historical perspective. In St. John's Gospel however, we are confronted with statements about the Spirit which represent an altogether different outlook. The Paraclete passages in that gospel bear, to the teaching of the synoptic tradition concerning the Spirit, a relationship which is closely parallel to the corresponding transformation of the synoptic messianic sonship into the eternal sonship in the same gospel. That topic has already been considered in a preceding chapter of the present work. The crucial Paraclete passages stand apart from the rest of the New Testament on a level of their own, a level which can only be compared with that of the discourses on the divine sonship in the same gospel.

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[1] Acts i.

A parallel has been drawn between the relation of Johannine to synoptic teaching in respect of the Son and in respect of the Spirit. The Johannine use of earlier material in both respects runs parallel. A few general remarks upon this aspect of the subject are necessary. In the first place St. John agrees with the synoptists in making the gift of the Spirit follow after the passion and resurrection of our Lord. According to the plan of the book the first twelve chapters are mainly occupied with a public ministry in Galilee and Judaea. In those chapters, apart from the discourse to Nicodemus, there is, perhaps, only one explicit and open reference to the Spirit, namely, the author's comment upon an utterance of our Lord in the temple.[1] In that comment (vii. 39) the evangelist expressly states his agreement with the synoptic record on this point, namely, that the gift of the Spirit to believers was postponed until after Jesus was

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[1] The reference in iii. 34 is much more vague. On i. 32–34, see below.

'glorified.' Moreover the peculiar phrase 'Spirit was not yet' reflects the synoptic conception of the Spirit as a gift bestowed in time rather than a divine Person. In agreement with this view the risen Lord bestows the gift of the Spirit upon the disciples by breathing upon them and saying, 'Take Holy Spirit' (ch. xx.). Like the synoptists, this evangelist represents our Lord as being practically silent upon this subject in His public ministry to the world. The Spirit is for believers (vii. 39).[1] On the other hand, the subject is referred to on two occasions where our Lord converses with individuals, in whom the story suggests that He discerns incipient believers; namely, in the conversations with Nicodemus and with the woman of Samaria. For the water of life offered as the 'gift of God' in chapter iv., and offered once again publicly in the temple courts (vii. 37, 38), is explained by the evangelist's comment in the latter context to refer to the gift of the Spirit.[2] In addressing Nicodemus, a master in Israel, our Lord is represented as giving a more formal and theological explanation. But in this instance the synoptic teaching about entry into the Kingdom in the spirit of a little child is blended with a later stage of pentecostal experience, which connects entry into the Kingdom with baptism and which associates both of these with the agency of the Spirit. The contrast of the flesh and the Spirit reproduces the Pauline teaching on the same subject in Rom. viii.; whilst that teaching is again developed. For the Pauline conflict between flesh and spirit, as two warring principles in man, is changed into a contrast between a natural birth from the flesh and a heavenly birth from the Spirit, which are respectively presupposed in the two states of 'flesh' and 'spirit.' Finally by a play of words the mysterious character of the new life in those born of the Spirit is emphasised (*v.* 8). In this discourse, synoptic teaching about the Kingdom is transformed into a statement about the New Order of life in the Spirit. Similarly the conception of the Spirit as a gift of new life, symbolised in the utterances of chapters iv. and vii., appears to have been moulded by the experience of the Spirit's quickening power in the New Order.

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[1] So also vi. 63 is addressed to the disciples. The witness of John concerning the baptism of Christ in i. 32–34 may be set beside the comment of vii. 39. It belongs to the author's scheme of manifold 'witness' to the claims of Christ. It is not stated to whom John addressed his witness. If to a mixed audience, it is the only instance of *open teaching* concerning the Spirit in the gospel.

[2] But in neither instance, in the words attributed to our Lord, is the gift openly referred to as the Spirit.

The teaching of St. John in chapters xiv. to xvi. remains to be considered. It is here that we may find a parallel with the development of synoptic material in regard to the divine sonship. We have seen that the Johannine conception of the divine sonship is that of the messianic sonship deepened and developed through the experience of redemption in the New Order until it is transformed into a metaphysical doctrine.[1] Something of the same kind will best explain the Johannine teaching concerning the Paraclete. Here, as before, the deeper teaching is placed within the framework of the gospel story, and its form is partly determined by that setting. In the epistles the Spirit is primarily the agent or activity of the new creation, transforming human material into members of the new organism of which Christ is the Head. But in the final discourses which form the Johannine prelude to the passion and crucifixion everything is conformed to the dramatic situation. Here the conditions are still outwardly those of Christ's earthly ministry. He is not yet the glorified Head of the Church. He is the teacher of a band of disciples making His farewell dispositions before He goes to the Father. The gospel is still predominantly a gospel of illumination. The Light of the world has shone in the darkness; the witness to the truth has been given before the world. The promise of 'another Paraclete' is in keeping with this situation. Disciples need a teacher. He who has been to them the way, the truth and the life is to withdraw; but another teacher will be provided who will come to their assistance and who will guide them into all truth. These ideas are not wholly without precedent in the synoptists. The discourses recorded in Mark xiii. and Matt. x. are occupied with a similar problem. The disciples are to undergo trial and persecution at some future date. When they are brought before governors and kings they are not to be anxious about the witness which they must give. 'But whatsoever is given to you in that hour this speak, for it is not ye who speak but the Holy Spirit' (Mark xiii. 11; cp. Matt. x. 20: 'the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you'). In a Lucan parallel to these passages there is no reference to the Holy Spirit. Instead we read: 'I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to withstand or gainsay' (Luke xxi. 15). It is possible that in this case St. Luke's version stands nearest to the original saying.[1] If that is the case, the other synoptists are reproducing the mind of the Church in a later situation; and experience of the Spirit's guidance under trial in the apostolic age is here reflected back into the teaching of our Lord. Reference to the Acts of the Apostles shows that in that book the Spirit is frequently regarded precisely in this way. The Spirit witnesses to the gospel message with the apostles before the Sanhedrim (Acts v. 17). He directs Philip to speak to the eunuch (viii. 29). He guides apostolic decisions (xv. 28). He directs St. Paul and his companions on their journey (xvi. 6, 7). All this is in line with the Spirit's guidance of prophets in the Old Testament (cp. 1 Kings xxii. 24).[2] But the evidence would seem to show that the divine guidance, which the apostolic community was conscious of receiving in times of crisis and trial, entered into the experience of the New Order in such a way as to strengthen the tendency, already noted in the epistles, towards attributing personal agency to the Holy Spirit. This tendency of thought in the apostolic age, reflected slightly in the synoptic gospels, is crystallised in St. John's Gospel into a definite conception of the Spirit as a third divine Person beside the Father and the Son. The disciples of Christ are to become disciples of the Paraclete. 'He will teach you all things and will bring to your remembrance all things which I have said unto you' (xiv. 26). 'He will bear witness of Me' (xv. 26).[3]

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[1] See above, ch. xi. pp. 298–306.

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[1] For a similar instance of amplification see Matt. xii. 28 (= Luke xi. 20). On the other hand Luke xii. 12 (= Matt. x. 20) has the reference to the Holy Spirit.

[2] Cp. also Apoc. xxii. 17.

[3] The word ἐκεῖνος is used of the Paraclete in each case, as also in xvi. 8. Cp. the use of the same word in i. 18.

The Spirit, who is to be such a personal guide and helper of the disciples, comes to their aid in the face of a hostile world. To the disciples He is to be a Paraclete; to the world He is to be a Judge. 'He when He is come will convict the world concerning sin and concerning righteousness and concerning judgment' (xvi. 8). Here we see the Johannine counterpart of the doctrine that the Spirit operates within the New Order. His relation to the disciples is that of a friendly advocate; but to the hostile world it is that of a judge giving sentence of condemnation. The ethico-religious dualism between the new community and the old order is reflected in the Johannine contrast between the disciples and the world. The disciples have received the truth as it has been revealed in Christ. They are therefore able to receive the Spirit of truth. The world cannot receive the Spirit of truth, because it does not recognise that Spirit (operative in the life of Jesus Christ). The disciples, however, recognise the Spirit; 'for He abides with you and is in you' (xiv. 16, 17).[1] Here the writer seems to contradict his very precise dictum in vii. 39 that 'Spirit was not yet.' But in fact the disciples who have consorted with the Spirit-anointed Messiah[2] may be said to have the Spirit present with them in that sense already. Moreover we cannot exclude the possibility that, even when the evangelist is at pains to maintain a certain historical perspective required by the dramatic framework of the discourses, that perspective does in fact sometimes become merged with characteristics of his present experience in the New Order, over and above the theological content of the discourses themselves. His work is in fact a mosaic of past memories and traditions (whether his own or supplied by other persons). The whole of this is coloured by his present experience of life in the New Order. But, allowing for such facts, the discourses which we are now considering clearly place the coming of the Paraclete in the future. 'If I go not away the Paraclete will not come unto you. But if I depart I will send Him unto you' (xvi. 7). 'When He is come, He will guide you into all the truth' (xvi. 13). The teaching concerning the Paraclete must be regarded as containing the final word of the New Testament concerning the theological significance of the Holy Spirit. But its conclusions are referred back to the teaching of our Lord Himself, and are given in a form which has for its dramatic framework the historical perspective of the synoptic gospels.

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[1] Following the text of WH. If the R.V. text be adopted the difficulty does not arise.

[2] Cp. i. 32–34.

IV

In these passages the Paraclete is described throughout as a Person. It is difficult to see how there can be any doubt about the fact.[1] But the theological status assigned to this Person is to be discerned through an analysis of the language in which He is associated with the other divine Persons, the Father and the Son. His mission is in subordination to the Father and the Son. He is given by the Father (xiv. 16) and proceeds out from the Father (xv. 26). He is sent by the Father in the Son's Name (xiv. 26). But He is also sent by the Son from the Father (xv. 26). He proceeds from the Father as His gift. But He is sent by the Father and the Son, and by each in relation to the other. Thus the Father is the fountain source in the case of the Spirit, as in the case of the Son. But the mission of the Spirit has a twofold derivation; and the relations of the Father and the Son in respect to the Spirit are in some sense reciprocal. This reciprocal relation in respect to the Spirit has for its background the mutual relations of Father and Son, described in so many passages of this gospel. But there is also a mutual relation between the Son and the Spirit. The Spirit is 'another Paraclete' (xiv. 16); and the implication of this phrase would seem to be that in His activity as a Paraclete the Spirit is comparable to the Son. It may well be that the evangelist has in mind a passage in the first Johannine epistle, where the writer declares that 'we have a Paraclete with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, and He is a propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for all the world.'[2] We call to mind the fact that in Rom. viii. the intercession of the

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[1] On this question see some weighty remarks by R. B. Hoyle in the article already cited, p. 795, col. 2 (see above, p. 318, n.).

[2] 1 John ii. 1, 2.

Spirit for Christians is in close juxtaposition to that of Christ Himself. We need not inquire whether the Spirit as Paraclete has a mission as wide in scope as that ascribed to our Lord as Paraclete in 1 John. The emphasis in St. John's Gospel is somewhat different. But, as we have already seen, the concentration of the Spirit within the new community is, elsewhere in the New Testament, the correlative of Christ's redeeming activity, an activity which is universal in scope; whilst the activity of the Spirit brings the materials of the old order under the transforming influence of the New Order. Moreover the office of the Paraclete as judge of the world (xvi. 8–11) must be related to the fact that in this gospel judgment implies an offer of salvation (cp. iii. 16–21).

The mission of the Spirit as 'another Paraclete' is comparable to the mission of the Son. The Spirit is thus an *alter ego* of the Son. When our Lord in the context goes on to say: 'I will not leave you bereaved, I come to you,' the general sense of this and the other Paraclete passages makes it clear that Christ's coming will be effected through the coming of the Paraclete (cp. xvi. 12–15). There is much to be said for the view that this evangelist believed the true *parousia* of the Son after His ascension to have already taken place in the coming of the promised Paraclete to the Church.[1] In any case he believed the mission of the Son to be carried on and rendered effective through the mission of the Paraclete. The revelation brought by the Son was not completed and could not be completed in the days of His earthly life. The disciples were not in a position to receive its completion under the conditions which then obtained (xvi. 12). This does not, however, mean that the revelation of the Son was in principle incomplete. But its completion for the apprehension of the disciples would depend upon the mission of the Spirit. The revelation was once for all given. But its detailed apprehension by the disciples would depend upon the continuous illumination conveyed by the Paraclete. The content of the Paraclete's message *is* the Son, whom He will glorify by continuously taking of the Son's revelation and declaring its meaning to the disciples (xvi. 13–15).

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[1] This, however, is one of those questions upon which the fourth gospel exhibits divergent strands of teaching.

It is the burden of the fourth gospel that a revelation given in time, within the limits of a single life-story, has eternal significance; because in that life-story there is an incarnation of the Word who is also the eternal Son. The teaching about the Paraclete shows how such a revelation, given within a particular duration of history, can have an abiding significance transcending the conditions of space and time within which it was originally given. The continuous interior guidance of the Spirit gives to Christian experience also a quality which transcends the limiting conditions of a historical succession. The eternal order is incorporated into history, not only in an absolute form in the Incarnate Lord, but also in a continuous and abiding form within the historical succession of Christianity; and this second incorporation of the eternal order is due to the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit.

In St. John, chapters xiv. to xvi., the Paraclete is especially regarded as the Spirit of truth, who guides the disciples in the knowledge of the truth revealed in Christ. But in this gospel Christ is the Life as well as the Light of the world. The two ideas alternate and blend throughout the gospel. Accordingly the Spirit is the water of life as well as the teacher of truth; and we should expect to find this second aspect not wholly absent in the last discourses. The idea of the Spirit conveying life is certainly present here, although it is not drawn out so explicitly as is the case with His function of conveying truth. Into the midst of the teaching about the Paraclete is inserted the allegory of the true vine and its branches. As we have already noticed, this is the Johannine counterpart of the Pauline doctrine concerning the body of Christ. The mutual abiding of vine and branches in one another is parallel to the mutual indwelling of head and members in one another in the body of Christ. But in the Pauline doctrine this mutual indwelling is attributed to the presence and activity of the Spirit of Christ. This conception seems to underlie the section of John xiv. which begins and ends with references to the Paraclete, a section almost immediately preceding the allegory of the true vine.[1]

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[1] On the order of these chapters of the gospel see the note at the end of the present chapter.

In this section we find ideas which connect the coming of the Paraclete with the conception embodied in the allegory of the vine. The promise of the Paraclete is followed by the saying 'I will not leave you bereaved, I come to you.' This is repeated again at the end of the section (*v.* 28, 'I go away and I come to you'). Then there follows a pregnant saying which introduces the conception underlying the allegory of the vine: 'Because I live, ye also shall live.' 'A little while and (after My death) the world beholds Me no more, but ye continue to behold Me (after that crisis), for I live and ye shall live. In that day ye shall know . . .' (xiv. 19). Clearly the passage points to the conditions which will prevail after Christ's earthly life has reached its close. The world will see Him no more; for His sensible presence will be withdrawn. But the disciples will continue to behold Him, and in that day their knowledge will be more explicit. This fuller knowledge is afterwards attributed to the mission of the Paraclete (xvi. 12–15), and the promised coming of Christ is also the coming of the Paraclete (xiv. 18; see above). When therefore the Lord says 'Ye continue to behold Me, for I live and ye shall live' He is also referring to the changed conditions which will accompany the coming of the Paraclete. The present tenses possibly mark the final character of the change and its enduring conditions. But the triumphant quality of the words 'I live,' in a discourse which in its dramatic framework is a prelude to the passion and death, seems to look back to the great theme of chapter xi. and forward to the resurrection (ch. xx); whilst the equally emphatic 'and ye shall live' associates the disciples with this triumphant life in a way which anticipates the allegory of the vine. The disciples are linked to the undying life of Christ; and under the changed conditions, adumbrated here, they will share that life in a new way, a way which is more fully explained in the allegory of the vine. One of the qualities of the new life will be a new knowledge. 'In that day ye shall know that I am in My Father and ye in Me and I in you' (xiv. 20). The new life will include a knowledge of mutual indwelling, a knowledge which before the passion the disciples do not possess. This statement is more fully expanded and explained in xiv. 23, a text which provides the theme of the prayer in chapter xvii.

The whole section following *v.* 20 now requires attention. Verses 21–24 state the conditions of the divine indwelling which the disciples are to experience. Knowledge of this indwelling is included in the fuller knowledge which is to accompany the changed conditions referred to above. Two constant characteristics of the discourses must be borne in mind at this point. On the one hand, the discourses represent the disciples in a perspective which the dramatic situation requires. They are the disciples described in the synoptic gospels, learning the way of the Kingdom, and standing within the forecourts of the New Order, but not yet fully initiated into that order. Secondly, that order of experience lies in the future and is to be inaugurated by the coming of the Paraclete. Consequently, on the other hand, whilst the conditions of entry into the New Order are stated in terms of ethical response to the way of the Kingdom, that ethical response will be fully actualised by the coming of the Paraclete. In the section now to be considered (xiv. 21–24) the true ethical response of discipleship is in the foreground, whilst the coming of the Paraclete underlies the context of the whole passage (xiv. 15–31). The section therefore begins with a statement that the true lover of Christ is one who fulfils the ethical conditions of discipleship. He is one who keeps the commandments of Christ. Such commandments are contained in the synoptic summary of the Law in terms of love to God and man. But at an early stage in the last discourses a new commandment has been given, which is a characteristically Johannine transformation of the synoptic summary of the Law in terms of love. 'A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another; even as I loved you that ye also may love one another.' This mutual love for Christ's sake is a test by which the world will know the true disciples of Christ (xiii. 34, 35). The law of true discipleship consists in keeping Christ's commandments, and more especially in loving our fellow disciples for Christ's sake. One who fulfils this ethical condition is a lover of Christ. Consequently such a one will be an object of love to the Father and the Son, and will be a recipient of the Son's self-manifestation. A dramatic question follows, which concentrates attention upon the point that the self-manifestation of the Son is to disciples and not to the world. Had not the Son offered a revelation to the world in His earthly life? Yes, but this public revelation has fallen upon blind eyes. The due apprehension of that revelation, and response to it, is confined to disciples. Discipleship is constituted by due response to Christ's revelation. It consists in loving Christ and in keeping His word, of which loving the brethren for Christ's sake is a fundamental part. If any man fulfils these conditions he will be an object of the Father's love and the promised self-manifestation of the Son will follow. The character of that manifestation is then described. The Father and the Son will come unto him, and will make Their abode with him. The disciple will be taken into fellowship with the Father and the Son. For discipleship is constituted by keeping the Son's words 'and the word which ye hear is not Mine but the Father's which sent Me.' The abiding of the Father and the Son with the disciples is clearly a Johannine parallel to the Pauline indwelling of Christ in the hearts of the members of the new community. The mutual indwelling of the disciples and the Son has already been set forth in *v.* 20, as a fact to be realised in the fuller knowledge which will be given in the coming changed conditions. Thus the condition of entry into the New Order is the ethical response of true discipleship (*vv.* 21–24; cp. *v.* 15). Yet the experience of the New Order is regarded as a certainty of the future ('in that day ye shall know,' *v.* 20) promised by Christ (*v.* 19) and associated with the coming of the Paraclete (*vv.* 16, 26).

The peculiarity of the section just analysed is that it appears to make divine love and the indwelling experience of the New Order dependent upon human love and human ethical response. This is in accordance with the fact that the promise of the New Order is here placed upon the dramatic background of the synoptic story. There, in the synoptic gospels, the Kingdom is a sheer gift of God from a transcendent order. Yet the promise of entry into that Kingdom is made sternly dependent upon a due response to the way of the Kingdom. It is that ethical response which is emphasised in the section of John xiv. under consideration.[1] But there is another side of the truth, emphasised in the allegory of the vine which follows. Here the disciples are already members of the vine. They are 'already clean on account of the word that I have spoken unto you.' The powers of the new age have already begun to work in them ; although the full understanding of what is taking place will come later (xiv. 20). There is a sense in which the mutual abiding of Christ and His disciples in one another has already begun, just as in chapter xiv. the Paraclete already abides with them and is in them (*v.* 17). The writer's experience of the New Order wells up irresistibly and invades the situation, just as the whole of his developed doctrine of the Trinity is thrown back into the teaching of our Lord. But he is justified by the fact that the germ of the New Order was already wrapped up in the new humanity of Christ. Consequently, when the disciples responded to the revelation in Christ, they were responding to the love of God already manifested, and to the new life of Christ in which they were already sharers. We are not, however, primarily concerned with the peculiar nuances of the fourth gospel. The object of this chapter is to inquire into the relations between Christ and His Spirit. The indwelling of Christ (and of the Father) in the New Order is, in chapter xiv., made dependent upon the ethical response of human love, that is on the disciples' response to the revelation of Christ. We have seen that the allegory of the vine suggests the reverse side of the truth. For here the disciple bears fruit because he is already a member of the vine. In other words, his response is due to the divine indwelling. Thus the teaching of chapter xiv. seems to be reversed.

The key to this paradox is to be found in other descriptions of the New Order. A particularly illuminating comment is to be found in the First Epistle of St. John. The passage in question is 1 John iv. 7–21. Here the whole argument of John xiv. 21–24 is reversed ; and yet the characteristic Johannine emphasis upon the new commandment is maintained. In this passage the conditions of true discipleship are seen to be incorporated into the New Order. The new commandment is the ethical law of the New Order. Continuance in the New Order depends upon continuous fulfilment of this law (*v.* 12). This is the truth emphasised in John xiv. 21 ff. But that truth depends upon a greater one. 'We love, because He first loved us' (*v.* 19). 'Love is of God and everyone who loveth is begotten of God and knoweth God.' The human response of love to the brethren is a sign of incorporation into the New Order. For all human love is the product of God's love to man. Love in the full meaning of the word is not human but divine. Its essence was displayed in the mission of the Son for our redemption from sin. The love of the brethren is derived from God's love revealed in His Incarnate Son; and where this love of the brethren is manifested it is a mark of the New Order. For the love of the brethren, the law of the new community, is a consequence as well as an accompaniment of the divine indwelling. Where it appears, there the divine love is made perfect in us (*vv.* 7–12). This important passage concludes with a direct reference to the Holy Spirit, which may be taken as providing a commentary on the similar saying in John xiv. 20. The knowledge of the mutual indwelling of God and man in Christ, which will be attained 'in that day' according to the gospel, is declared in the epistle to be a present reality and is expressly attributed to the fact that 'He hath given us of His Spirit.'[1] Thus, if we bring together the teaching of the two Johannine books in their relation to the New Testament as a whole, we reach two conclusions. In the first place the ethical law of the new community, the law of love to the brethren, is derived from and caused by the revelation of the Kingdom. Secondly, this response, derived from the love of God in Christ, is actualised in the new community by the gift of the Holy Spirit. As St. Paul puts it, 'God commendeth His own love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.' But on the other hand, as he states in the same passage, 'the love of God is poured out in our hearts through Holy Spirit which was given to us' (Rom. v. 5, 8). 'God sent His only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through Him' (1 John iv. 9). Christ is the source of the new life. 'For I live and ye shall live' (John xiv. 19). But He becomes our new life through the coming of the Paraclete (xiv. 15–19). And the consequence of the Paraclete's coming is knowledge of the mutual indwelling, by which we are branches of the vine and bear fruit unto God (xiv. 20; xv, 1 ff.). Thus the indwelling of God in the disciples in the New Order and the ethical response of love in that order are mutually complementary facts. They cannot be thought of apart; and both facts are brought to pass by the coming of the Paraclete. Thus we conclude that the Father and the Son take up Their abode with the disciple through the coming of the Paraclete. The law of the new community's life is on one side communion with God—the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. On the other side it is a reproduction in the new community of that love which is the law of God's life, through the indwelling activity of the Spirit.[1]

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[1] Possibly the ethical emphasis is also directed against antinomian gnosticism, as in 1 John. Cp. the similar emphasis upon 'knowledge of the truth' in these writings, as against false *gnosis*.

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[1] Cp. also 1 John iii. 24.

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[1] Some scholars would transfer the long discourse comprising chs. xv. and xvi. of St. John's Gospel to an earlier point before ch. xiv. The arguments in favour of this arrangement are briefly stated by A. H. McNeile, *op. cit.* p. 263. If this order be adopted the analysis of the evangelist's thought given in the text would not be materially affected. The section xiv. 15–31 would then *presuppose* the allegory of the vine instead of anticipating it.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY IN GOD.

(i) DATA AND APPROACHES

I

THE statements in St. John's Gospel concerning the Father, the Son and the Paraclete contain the most fully developed thoughts in the New Testament interpretation with regard to the new revelation of God, as that revelation was received in the experience of the New Order. These statements are not formal statements concerning the nature of the Godhead. Still less do they provide technical definitions. Their primary object is to show the mutual relations of God and man in the New Order of experience, through the mediatorial activity of Christ and the mission of His Spirit. But in seeking to show the full significance of these relations the writer penetrates further into their background, and develops conclusions concerning the eternal status of the Son and of the Spirit in the life of God, conclusions which in turn are reflected back upon his description of the New Order. The later metaphysical definitions and discussions of the Trinity were designed to draw out more clearly all that appeared to be implied in these conclusions, and to fix their meaning in exact language. The technical forms employed for this purpose have no inevitable permanence; nor could those forms *in themselves* guarantee or secure within the Church such a belief about God as the gospel of salvation requires. Thus, for example, Origen assigned to the Holy Spirit the metaphysical status of a third divine *hypostasis*. But the status of the Spirit depended upon that of the Son; and, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, the Nicene theology of sonship was made secure in the fourth century by considerations derived from the experience of redemption. During that century the status to be assigned to the Spirit depended upon the same set of considerations, and upon the position demanded for the Person of the Redeemer by the Christian experience of salvation. The theology of the Spirit was secured as a corollary of this second stage in the theology of sonship. In all this, patristic theology was but repeating, in a new cycle of thought and in relation to new problems, the stages of interpretation which are unfolded within the New Testament.[1]

For there too the Johannine conception of the Paraclete as a fully personal agent appears as a corollary of the evangelist's conception of the Son. St. Paul had reached an estimate of our Lord's cosmic significance which differs little from that of St. John's prologue, except for the precision introduced by the deliberate use of a technical and philosophical term. Similarly in St. Paul's thought the functions of the Spirit are parallel and complementary to those of Christ; and his conception of the Spirit shows a distinct tendency to develop into the doctrine of an *alter ego*. The Pauline interpretation of the Spirit does not attain the distinctness of the Paraclete passages; but we can say that it is fully compatible with the conceptions embodied in those passages. But St. John's Christology is carried a full stage further than St. Paul's in the Johannine conception of divine sonship. We should, therefore, expect there to be a corresponding advance in interpretation of the Spirit. This is what we actually find. For St. John's conception of the Paraclete as a third divine Person belongs to a stage of theological reflection which is never fully reached by St. Paul. Beyond the cosmic significance of the Redeemer, as head of the first creation as well as the second, lies the problem of the Redeemer's status in the eternal life of God. St. John pierces the veil of that problem in his treatment of the divine sonship. The experience of a New Order of fellowship in the redeemed community raised the question of a divine *κοινωνία*, from which that earthly fellowship could be derived. We have seen how St. John presses this question home and develops its implications, particularly in the great prayer of chapter xvii. That chapter contains no allusion to the Paraclete. But elsewhere in these last discourses the Paraclete is brought into intimate connexion with the Father and the Son. The relation of the Paraclete to the Father and the Son in the life of God is not indeed explicitly drawn out. But a description of such relations in their Godward aspect is not the primary object of these discourses. Here as elsewhere the evangelist's own dictum holds: 'He shall glorify Me.' The writer is concerned with the relation of the disciples to the Son in the New Order, and in particular with the actualisation of that relation in the New Order through the mission of the Paraclete. He is deeply impressed with the truth that the relation of the new community to the Son depends, for its significance, upon the status of the Son in the life of God. The fellowship of the new community is grounded upon the fellowship of the Son with the Father in an eternal order. The Paraclete is to be the *alter ego* of the Son in the new community, when the sensible presence of the Son is withdrawn from the disciples. More than that, it is implied in chapter xiv. that the Paraclete is the agent of a permanent relationship between the abiding fellowship of the Father and the Son on the one hand and the fellowship of the disciples in the New Order on the other hand. This interpretation of chapter xiv. is borne out by the teaching of 1 John iv. 7–21. The Paraclete is the agent actualising the new life of love which constitutes the earthly fellowship of the new community. But this new life of love is derived from the love of God revealed in the Son (1 John iv.). Similarly the fellowship of the Father and the Son enters into the fellowship of the disciples. The Father and the Son take up Their abode with the Christ-loving disciple. The revelation of the Son to which the disciple responds is a revelation which comes from the Father (xiv. 24*b*). All that belongs to the Father belongs also to the Son; and the Paraclete takes of that which belongs to the Son (thus derived from the Father), and will declare it to the disciples (xvi. 15). Thus the significance of the New Order is that the Paraclete takes what belongs to the mutual interrelation of the Father and the Son, and imparts it to the new community; or again that the fellowship of the Father and the Son enters into the Christ-loving fellowship of the new community through the coming of the Paraclete.

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[1] See above, ch. xi. pp. 304, 305.

Here again there is a considerable advance upon the teaching of St. Paul. For St. Paul the Spirit reproduces in the Christian the content of Christ's life. The law of that life is love; and this law of love, derived from Christ's life through the indwelling Spirit of Christ, is reproduced in the new community and its members. Thus there is an interchange of life between Christ as the Head and the new organism of the body with its members. He becomes the indwelling principle of their life; and they bear fruit unto Him, the fruits of the Spirit. Thus the life of His new humanity becomes actualised in them as His members; and the fellowship of the new community is derived from His human life of love. But St. John carries the whole conception further back along a path which St. Paul himself had begun to trace. In the New Order the members of the new community are destined to be conformed to the image of God's Son (Rom. viii. 29). He is the source, content and goal of the life of love embodied in the new community through the creative activity of His Spirit. This life of love, then, manifested in Christ's human life-story and embodied in the fellowship of the new community, derives from an eternal order of love, to which both the Son and the Spirit belong. The eternal order of love was first manifested in the incarnate life of the Son upon earth. For that life was essentially a manifestation, through fully human conditions and in a fully human response, of that eternal response of love and surrender which the Son ever makes to the Father. But secondly that eternal order of love is actualised on earth in the Christ-loving response of Christ's disciples and friends through the coming of the Paraclete. The Paraclete is the *alter ego* of Christ. He conveys the revelation embodied in the Incarnate Lord into the innermost life of the new community, and He generates in them the fulfilment of the new commandment. Thus the embodied response of the Son to the Father is generated in the new community; and their Christ-loving response to the revelation of the Son conveyed by the Paraclete is a response to the Father who gave that revelation. Thus the fellowship of the disciples, actualised by the Paraclete, is a continuous though fragmentary and partial embodiment on earth of the Son's response to the Father. This function of the Paraclete involves the conclusion that He, as the *alter ego* of the Son, belongs to the eternal order of love. He proceeds forth from the Father and is sent by the Father and the Son. His mission brings the eternal order of love into the fellowship of the new community; and in Him the new community is grounded upon that order which consists in the fellowship of Father, Son and Paraclete. So in 1 John i. 3–7 there is a reciprocity between the earthly fellowship which the writer desires to share with his readers and the divine fellowship of Father and Son. For the earthly fellowship of the new community, to which the writer belongs, consists in a fellowship 'with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ.' The earthly fellowship of the new community can have no existence except in dependence upon, and as a fragmentary manifestation of, the fellowship which exists between the Father and the Son.

If we bring together the teaching of St. Paul and St. John, we find that the former is especially concerned to teach the mutual indwelling of Christ and the members of His body through the indwelling activity of the Spirit in that body. Whereas St. John makes the mutual indwelling of Christ and His disciples depend upon their response to His revelation. But that response is rendered possible through the coming of the Paraclete to unfold the revelation to them. Thus far there is close agreement, allowing for the fact that St. Paul thinks mainly in terms of a new life and its transformations; whereas St. John (in this context) thinks mainly in terms of illumination and response to revelation. The allegory of the vine, however, and the metaphor of indwelling, qualify this contrast. But St. John goes further in making the new community and its fellowship depend upon the transcendent fellowship of the Father and the Son. Moreover he repeatedly makes the Son to be the connecting link between these two orders of fellowship.

This is the persistent theme of chapter xvii. But what is there unfolded in detail has already been emphatically stated in xiv. 20: 'Ye shall know that I am in My Father and ye in Me and I in you.' But of the Paraclete it is said (proleptically perhaps) in the same context that 'He is in you' (xiv. 17). Thus ultimately St. John agrees with St. Paul in referring to an indwelling of the Paraclete as well as of the Son; whilst he goes beyond St. Paul in his teaching about the dependence of this indwelling upon the mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son. For St. Paul the indwelling of the Spirit carries with it the indwelling of the Incarnate Lord. For St. John this is also true; but he adds that the indwelling of the Son carries with it a like intimacy of the disciples with the Father (xiv. 15–24). All these facts require for their background a mutual indwelling of Father, Son and Spirit on the level of deity. St. John expressly develops this thesis in so far as it relates to the Father and the Son. But when his teaching about the Paraclete is placed upon the background of St. Paul's language about Christ and His Spirit, the same conclusion must be drawn there also. In St. Paul's teaching the parallelism and identification between Christ and His Spirit are so close, that by looking at this side only we might suppose Them to be simply identical in all respects, and so conclude that the Two must be taken as One. If, however, we note the marked differences of Pauline language in describing the functions respectively of Christ and His Spirit, and if we then turn to the teaching of St. John about the Paraclete, it will become clear that this simple identification cannot stand. The identification is best understood as that of a mutual interpenetration which is compatible with divergence of functions. This interpretation of New Testament teaching received formal recognition in the developed doctrine of the Trinity, and is known technically as the doctrine of *coinherence*.[1] Thus a plurality of Persons is compatible with the unity of the Godhead. It remains to consider the relation of this doctrine to the argument of the present work.

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[1] περιχώρησις, *circumincessio*.

II

We are now in a position to resume the argument at the point which was reached at the end of chapter x. In that chapter there developed a discussion of the principle of individuality, to which we must now return. It will be well to recall and restate the conclusions which were reached at that stage of the argument and in the course of that discussion. The principle of individuality is manifested in the organic universe through a progressive series. The world which we know is broken up into a great variety of objects. These objects we perceive as enduring wholes despite the passage of nature which underlies them. This enduring wholeness of objects is attributed to principles of unity derived from the eternal order. The enduring objects arrange themselves in a graded series; and this fact is attributed to a corresponding gradation in the principles of unity. But underlying these objects which we perceive as distinct wholes there is a system of interconnected events in nature. An organism of nature is thus, for perception, an enduring object which is perceived in its wholeness. But from the point of view of scientific analysis it is an event or system of events, interconnected with the whole of that wider system of events which is the organic universe. When we bring together the distinctions of enduring objects perceived as wholes with the fact of underlying spatio-temporal connexions throughout nature, we are able to treat the universe of nature as an organic series stretching far beyond the limits of sense-perception, yet organised for knowledge as a series through our capacity for discerning principles of unity in objects. In this way the whole series of organisms is ordered in an ascending scale according to that degree of significant wholeness which the units of the series exhibit in relation to the series as a whole. Now the principles of unity in this ascending scale are ordered in such a way that their directive movement exhibits an advancing principle of individuality. This principle of individuality is exhibited in the life-story of an organism. Below the level of spirit it is subordinated to cosmic and racial laws of being. But in spiritual organisms the principle of individuality is no longer subsumed under a wider cosmic principle. It is in bi-focal relations with the social principle, with which it is held in tension through the community of both society and the individual with the eternal order. Confronted with the infinity of the eternal order spiritual organisms become aware that the principle of individuality in themselves has eternal significance. But they also become aware of its incompleteness. For the principle of individuality in man is a principle of self-transcendence which passes beyond itself to seek its fulfilment in the eternal order. In communion with that order this principle subserves the social principle; but it is also held in tension with it. The social order by itself does not provide an adequate end for the fulfilment of the principle of individuality in man.

Nor can this incomplete principle of individuality in man find its fulfilment in communion with the eternal order on the level of spirit. For the attainment of the eternal order's transcendent standards lies ever beyond its reach. Nevertheless the return of that order to concreteness, by incorporation into character in the individual, shows that there is profound affinity between the eternal order and the unfinished principle of individuality in man. In religious experience man is confronted with the absolute individuality of God in its pure concreteness. The essence of religion consists in the concrete dependence of incomplete created individuality upon absolute individuality as it exists in God. The crowning activity of created individuality is worship, which is essentially a recognition of dependence and presupposes a divine activity towards creation. Accordingly the religious interpretation of the universe recognises that God and the eternal order are one, and that all incorporations of the eternal order into the organic series are activities of the Creator. This interpretation, therefore, presupposes a principle of gracious self-giving in the Being of God, a principle which is manifested with advancing significance in the successive spheres of creation, revelation and redemption. Man's capacity for self-transcendence is the highest manifestation of the principle of individuality in the organic series; and it is also the highest analogy which we can find in our experience for the principle of self-giving in God. The religious interpretation of the eternal order means that the self-giving of God is manifested in all revelations of that order. Man's capacity for apprehending and responding to such revelations through self-transcendence constitutes him the crowning embodiment of the principle of individuality in the organic series; and the advancing principle of individuality in the organic series and in man is an expression in creation of the Creator's own likeness. The organic series moves towards the actualisation of that principle in its concrete fullness; but the principle is never actualised within the series. The multiplicity of spiritual organisms is never subsumed under a single higher manifestation of the principle within the series; and the individual spiritual organisms never attain actualisation within their own routes of development. They never can so attain, because the principle of individuality in man fulfils a law of self-transcendence. The created principle of individuality could by no process of self-development complete itself. But since the principle of individuality was implanted in the organic series by the Creator's gracious self-giving, it was most fitting that it should be brought to its completion by that same activity of gracious self-giving from which it took its rise. Accordingly the principle of individuality is finally actualised in the series through that complete and absolute self-giving of the Creator which we call the Incarnation. The principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is not a created manifestation of the principle of individuality nor a further development of that principle in its organic form. The principle of individuality in the Incarnate Lord is Absolute Individuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word. The principle of unity proper to His human organism in respect of its organic character is subsumed under the principle of absolute individuality proper to His Godhead. It follows that the perfect human organism of Jesus Christ is not less but more truly individual than ours can ever be. For it conforms to that absolute principle of individuality, which is the creative ground of our human organisms and the fountain source of our created and incomplete individuality. It is not less but more truly free than our incomplete individualities; for it conforms to the rhythm of absolute self-determined self-giving and to the perfect law of love in the Being of God.[1]

The argument which is summarised above was concerned to show that the principle of individuality in the universe is a product of creative activity, bearing a likeness to its Creator, yet unfinished and moving towards a completion beyond itself; and that this principle, which manifests the self-giving of the Creator, was finally actualised through His absolute self-giving in the Incarnation. Thus the created principle of individuality reached its completion in the absolute uncreated individuality of God as it exists in the Incarnate Lord. The doctrine of the Trinity, however, further differentiates the principle of individuality in God; for it claims that there is a revelation of plurality in Absolute Individuality. The Trinity in God is an ultimate mystery of revelation which we can neither prove nor disprove. But, as in the case of the Incarnation so here, we can welcome every ray of light which the domains of human experience can yield for the illumination of this ultimate mystery to our understanding. In surveying the domains of human experience with this end in view we are no longer concerned primarily with the completion of created individuality in absolute individuality, as in the previous discussion summarised above. We are now concerned with the principle of individuality in itself. We have to inquire what are the fundamental characteristics of that principle, which are disclosed to us through the successive domains of experience; in particular, what are the characteristics of the principle of individuality with respect to the contrasted aspects of unity and plurality.

As man looks out upon the world, what has always impressed itself first upon his experience is the fact of multiplicity. We first discover a multitude of objects; and it is only at a later stage that we learn to appreciate their connexions and so to discern the underlying unities of nature. Accordingly pluralism as a theory has had its defenders in widely different ages of history, from the atoms of Democritus to the monads of Leibnitz and his modern successors. But this doctrine can, at least, no longer remain unqualified. For the atoms have been found to be organic to one another and to the rest of the universe; and the monads have been discovered to have windows opening outwards on all sides, as the organic principle has pressed its way up through the hierarchy of the sciences into the life of man. At no point or level in the universe can we find a plurality which is unqualified by some law of interconnexion between units. At the base of the physical universe nature resolves on analysis into a system of events. But the simplest event-unit implies a system. The ultimate explanation of a single electron involves the whole universe. All events are organic, and upon every event supervenes a pattern which relates it to all other events. Thus in its lowliest manifestations the principle of individuality combines in itself the contrasted aspects of plurality and unity. This combination of contrasted aspects continues to operate with developing significance through the ascending scale of the organic series. Every organic whole includes within its unity a plurality of parts, levels and functions. Regarded as an event it embraces a system of events spread out through space-time. Regarded as an organism it extends over the stages of its time-span or life-story with an enduring pattern. But, again, every organic whole is not only a unit comprehending plurality within itself, but also a centre of activity interconnected with other such centres beyond itself. Its unity is not self-contained but dependent upon these external relations with the plurality of units beyond itself. In comparison with the march of the organic series as a whole through its aeons of evolution the life-story of its units seems a small matter. Below the level of spirit these single life-stories seem to have no permanent significance and are subordinated to the orbit of wider and wider cosmic and racial unities. Even on the level of spirit the curve of individual organisms within the organic system of nature makes a very transitory display. Thus the aspect of unity in the universe comes to be regarded as the ultimate truth before which plurality must give way. Thus the great monistic systems of thought make their claim to be heard.

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[1] See above, pp. 267–284.

Yet this claim, on the other hand, is countered by the fact that in the directive movement of the organic series the principle of individuality continually advances in significance, until on the level of spirit it attains an eternal significance through its capacity for self-determined communion with the eternal order. Moreover, with the arrival of this stage the individual organism is no longer merely subsumed under wider laws of being within the organic series. The individual unit on the level of spirit in the series is a self, that is a self-determining centre of organic spiritual life in relations with other such centres. In their organic aspect these centres are interconnected through the whole range of cosmic and racial laws of unity which pervade the series. But as they face upwards towards the eternal order these centres are bearers of ultimate values. Although based upon the series they, none the less, find their higher unity of interconnexions in no function of the series itself, but in the controlling character of the eternal order. This qualification, however, means that the principle of individuality manifested in finite spiritual centres or selves is not absolute in its character.

The limitations of the principle of individuality as it appears in man, at the summit of its development in the organic series, are to be seen in several directions. We have, therefore, to recognise these limitations as withholding a full manifestation of the principle of individuality in created spirits; and then we have to consider how far the principle of individuality thus limited in man still furnishes us with an analogy from which we may infer the character of absolute individuality as it exists in God.

III

The created principle of individuality as it exists in man is limited in three respects: first in its self-regarding aspect, secondly in its social outward-facing aspect, and thirdly in its relation to the eternal order. In the first of these aspects created individuality in man is limited because its self-harmonisation is incomplete. In the second aspect it is limited in its capacity for self-transcendence in its relations with other selves or spiritual centres of the social organism. But underlying both of these limitations is the third, namely, that it is limited in respect to its capacity for communion with the eternal order. Each of these modes of limitation has been fully considered in the earlier part of this work. Only a brief survey, therefore, will be needed here. The principle of individuality in man moves towards actualisation through communion with the eternal order. The principle is actualised through self-determination. And the proximate end of this self-determination is the dominance of the whole over its internal kingdom of parts, levels and functions ; so that the principle of the whole gives directive unity to all partial tendencies which are held in tension within it. But this law of self-harmonisation is not adequately realised by a pursuit of internal harmony as an end in itself ; for the principle of self-determination moves in precisely the opposite direction. The self can be harmonised only through passage beyond itself into the eternal order. The limitation of individuality in man in its self-regarding aspect lies in the fact that self-transcendence is incomplete. In so far as the self pursues paths of development which are not directed through self-transcendence towards the wholeness of the eternal order, to that extent a full manifestation of the principle of individuality is withheld. For in its true line of development human individuality is directed beyond its own internal kingdom towards the goods of the eternal order. Self-dependence and self-regard are not *primary* marks of true human individuality. They have a relative worth in respect to the unification of man's interior kingdom. But they are properly servants in a higher kingdom. They are intermediate to the more fundamental marks of individuality, namely, recognition of the eternal order and its standards, and self-transcending response to those standards. Consequently the true pathway of individuality leads away from the centre to the circumference. But, on the other hand, just in so far as human individuality follows the true route of its development through self-transcendence in communion with the eternal order, there is an increasing harmonisation and stability of its interior kingdom. Particular tensions may be increased. But the true harmony of the whole becomes increasingly stabilised. It becomes in fact more of a whole, less and less a divided kingdom at the mercy of particular tendencies and baffled by a conflict of incompatible motives. And as the unity of the whole gains control over interior multiplicity, so the genuine marks of individuality become increasingly manifest. Growth of individuality through self-transcending communion with the eternal order carries with it emergence of distinctive character and vocation. This again means a differentiation of function, and the maturing of special gifts of character and of natural endowment which are peculiar to the individual. These manifestations of individuality again have high social significance and find scope for their expression in the social organism. Thus the true self-determination of individuality achieves interior unity, wholeness and richness of distinctive content in its self-regarding aspect, just in so far as it achieves a self-transcendence which moves upwards and outwards towards the eternal order. Moreover this development of individuality has social significance, and finds scope for its expression in the social organism.

Secondly, the principle of individuality in man is limited in its capacity for self-transcendence in its relations to other selves or spiritual centres of the social organism. This second limitation may be traced in large measure to the first. We have seen that the true development of individuality has social significance and value. This is because the way of self-transcendence develops the true good of individuality, both in its self-regarding aspect and at the same time in its outward-facing and social aspect. The wholeness of individuality is one. Its two aspects cannot be separated. Thus the limitation of human individuality in its capacity for self-transcendence is reflected in the structure of the social organism. Incompleteness of harmonisation here only registers the incomplete self-harmonisation of its individual units. As harmonisation of individual organisms develops in them stability of character, a stability which incorporates the unchanging stability of the eternal order, so incomplete harmonisation makes character to that extent arbitrary and unreliable. The principles and standards of the eternal order call forth trust and command allegiance, because their unchanging stability, reality and significance provide a sure foundation upon which to build a life structure which has corresponding qualities. To the extent to which our limited capacities for self-transcendence spell failure to achieve these qualities in the life-structure of our individuality, to that extent we present an arbitrary and untrustworthy front to our fellow-men. They cannot rely upon the doubtful issues of our unharmonised character. Further, this limitation of self-transcendence is a universal characteristic of human individuality in its unfinished state. Consequently the limitation of dependability is reciprocal as between all units of the social organism ; and the social organism is inadequate to mediate or serve our dependence upon the eternal order. On the other hand, the reverse is also true. The true development of individuality has social significance ; because the more fully the eternal order is incorporated into individual character, the more completely does such an individual character become a centre of dependability in the social organism, mediating the unchanging stability and trustworthiness of the eternal order to other centres of individuality. The stability of the social organism depends upon the mutual dependability of its individual units ; and this in turn depends upon the measure in which the individual achieves wholeness through self-transcending activity directed towards the eternal order.

The conclusion just reached represents, however, only one half of the truth. If society depends upon the stability of its individual units, it is also true that individuality develops in dependence upon the stability of society. This has already been pointed out in the earlier part of this work. This dependence of individuality upon the social organism has its foundations in the organic connexion of the individual with society through physical and racial laws of being. But its spiritual aspect is due to the fact that all communion of the individual organism with the eternal order is mediated through concrete environment. Consequently its dependence upon the eternal order is mediated through that environment, and in a very high degree through the social organism. The individual comes to recognise the stability of the eternal order, in the first instance, through the dependability of the social organism ; and this initial factor in his experience continues to exercise a dominating influence throughout his life. The influence of environment penetrates the structure of the individual organism at all levels. Consequently the failure of self-harmonisation in the individual always has external as well as internal causes. The determinist usually points to this class of facts to prove the truth of his theory that the individual is wholly the product of his environment. If we ignore the facts for which he contends, we play into his hands. But those facts, important as they are, do not cover the whole ground. In particular they cannot alter a far more fundamental fact about human individuality, namely its capacity for recognising the claims of the eternal order and for responding to those claims by the principle of self-transcendence.

There is another aspect of the relations between individual centres in the social organism, which must now be taken into consideration. 'The influence of environment penetrates the structure of the individual organism at all levels.' But at the highest level the individual's environment in the social organism is spiritual. Individuals are penetrated by the spiritual influences radiating through the social organism. This law of penetration, like the law of dependence, has, of course, both negative and positive effects. In chaotic and debased states of society the true development of the individual would require a high degree of independence and imperviousness to penetration. But the natural dependence of the individual upon society and its influences makes such an achievement difficult and rare. Consequently on one side these laws of dependence and penetration operate for the limitation of truly developed manifestations of individuality. On the other hand, on a high level of society the combined spiritual influences which penetrate the individual may have an effect whose power is incalculable for the development of true individuality. If, however, the individual is thus penetrated by the influence of his environment and of the social organism, he in turn has a capacity for penetrating that environment, and in particular for penetrating other individual units of the social organism. This mutual penetration is the cement of society; and it is closely connected with the other characteristic social bond, namely mutual dependence. Mutual dependence is based upon mutual penetration; for without community of interests and mutual understanding there cannot be active co-operation. At the same time a fellowship based upon mutual dependence, and upon the co-operation which that renders possible, leads again to deeper mutual penetration of spirit and insight of each into the other's mind. But as in the case of dependence, so in the case of penetration: all such cross-connexions between individual centres are ultimately derived from incorporations of the eternal order into the organisms of spirit, both individual and social. Social intercourse is grounded upon organic inter-connexions which belong to all levels of organic structure. These organic inter-connexions subserve spiritual relations, but do not generate them. Thus in society there are a number of physical and psychological causes of mutual attraction. These provide the basis for the principal forms of social relationship, such as the relations between parents and children and between members of the same family or social group; or, again, the relations of friendship; and, most important of all, marriage and the mutual attraction of the sexes. But in none of these cases do purely physical or psychological factors generate a permanent spiritual relationship. In the case of sex, in particular, physical attraction and psychological affinity are capable of generating relationships on their own level of permanence; and, further, they are capable of subserving and mediating spiritual penetration. But the spiritual penetration which is the crown of sexual attraction is generated and sustained by factors belonging to the eternal order. The case of marriage, however, is only a highly specialised instance of what is true in general of spiritual penetration throughout the whole range of the social order.

But once more we must recognise that this capacity of individuals for mutual penetration is definitely limited in human experience. The limitation is due, in the first place, to the finite and unfinished character of human individuality. We are limited by the horizons of our own finite nature as spiritual organisms. Finite individuality varies from one unit to another. This variation of individuality is more prominent in the case of man than in the case of any other level of the organic series. Every human individual manifests particularities of his own on all levels of his organic life. Varieties of physical constitution underlie divergences of habit and mental constitution. Divergences of mental disposition and endowment are accentuated by divergent reactions to environment and to social training. Differences of taste, interest, sentiment and capacity underlie divergent apprehensions of the eternal order. These again lead to profound contrasts of judgment and conviction as to the character of spiritual realities, and by consequence as to the character of the response which these realities demand of us. Moreover these divergences are in mutual tension, because our horizons of knowledge are limited. In consequence there is not only divergence, but an inevitable clash and conflict of sentiments and judgments, which from our limited horizon seem to be mutually incompatible. This limitation of horizons involves vast areas of ignorance in our mutual knowledge of one another. We are ignorant of hidden motives, thoughts, intentions, and of a vast range of interior facts and activities in other centres of individuality. We are also limited in our capacity to understand and to appraise correctly the interior facts and forces of our own individuality. Now all this limitation of horizons has relevance and significance as a spiritual problem, because we are spiritual organisms having community with the eternal order. This problem has already been surveyed in an earlier context, as part of the general problem of non-attainment in relation to the eternal order. The account of non-attainment which was there given concerns us now only in so far as it throws light upon the fundamental characteristics of finite individuality. Within those limits, again, we are concerned with the question of non-attainment only in so far as it bears upon the question of an analogy between finite individuality and absolute individuality as it exists in God. In the previous discussion of non-attainment it was pointed out that a large part of such non-attainment is inevitable and belongs to the general fact of our finiteness and unfinished character as spiritual organisms. We become aware of this finiteness and unfinished character through our capacity for recognising the infinity of the eternal order. But the recognition of that beyondness of the eternal order throws light upon the tensions which we experience as individual units of the social organism. The limitations set to our capacity for mutual spiritual penetration are in very large measure part of the ordained conditions of finite individuality. But there are other aspects of the limitation in regard to which this cannot rightly be said. Limitations of horizon in respect to knowledge are partly transcended by the fact that the infinity of the eternal order returns to concreteness through incorporation into character in the form of wholeness of vision. Thus non-attainment in respect of knowledge is transcended by the passage of apprehension into response, of knowledge into character. Limitations of horizon in respect of knowledge may thus be in large part transcended through the intellectual excellence of character, which consists in wisdom and moral insight and which bears fruit in sympathy. But this transformation of limitations is confronted with the facts of ethical failure, those facts of non-attainment which we recognise to be not inevitable but culpable. In this sphere, then, the limits of spiritual penetration as between centres of individuality are not of such a character that we must assign them to the essence of finite individuality.

Reviewing then the characteristics of created individuality as we know it in man, we observe that its limitations fall under three aspects. (1) In its organic character it is unfinished. (2) In its relation to the eternal order it is finite. (3) In respect of ethical failure its non-attainment is not an inevitable characteristic. In its unfinished character created individuality is incompletely unified both in its self-regarding and in its social aspects. This incomplete harmonisation, however, can be in principle transcended through the community of spiritual organisms with the eternal order. But the pathway to interior and exterior unity of individual centres is balked by the finiteness of our individuality in relation to the infinity of the eternal order and by the consequent limitation of horizons. This obstacle, however, can be overcome in principle on the ethical side of individuality through the return of the eternal order to concreteness by incorporation into character. Consequently there is nothing in the structure of created individuality as such to hinder its advance toward ethical wholeness both in its inward and outward aspects. In principle man was created to attain a unified individuality; which would mean unification of the individual centres on the one hand and of the social relations of mutual dependence and interpenetration on the other hand. The whole advance of finite individuality in this direction, however, is arrested by the facts of ethical failure. As a consequence of these far-reaching facts we are habituated to conceptions of individuality which emphasise the separateness of individual centres from one another in self-dependence and self-regard; and we become habituated to points of view which either assume the inevitable predominance of individualism or, on the other hand, seek to force the socialising process without regard to the problem of individual unification. But we have seen that, in so far as individuality is developed along its true pathway of self-transcendence towards the eternal order, it becomes increasingly social; and that by consequence mutual interpenetration of individual centres in the social organism depends upon the transforming effects of the eternal order. If then the problem of ethical failure were transcended, it seems clear that our conception of individuality would be correspondingly transformed. The true meaning of individuality would then be manifested in such a degree that its ultimate goal would become luminous to our vision. We should think of individuality habitually in terms of a twofold unification; on the one hand wholeness of the individual unit transcending its present state of disharmony, and on the other hand interpenetration of individual centres in a unified fellowship.

Now when we turn from the last and most serious of the limitations of finite individuality referred to above, namely ethical failure, and recall the solutions of the problem of non-attainment set forth in the earlier part of this work, then a pathway opens up which not only gives promise of this ultimate goal of individuality in twofold unification, but which actually conducts us towards that goal through cumulative wholes of experience. The wholes of experience in question are those which are concerned respectively with the positive aspects of our relation to the eternal order, with the expectation and coming of the kingdom of God in history, and with the new creation embodied in the New Order of life in the Spirit. When we have reviewed once more some aspects of these successive domains of experience, we shall be in a position to consider the question, as to how far and within what conditions 'the principle of individuality thus limited in man still furnishes us with an analogy from which we may infer the character of absolute individuality as it exists in God.'[1]

IV

The most significant characteristic of our relation to the eternal order is not the fact of our failure to attain the standards of that order; but rather the fact that, despite this non-attainment in all its forms, we cannot rest content in the state of non-attainment. Again, this refusal to acquiesce in non-attainment is due to the character of our experience with respect to the eternal order. That experience has already been subjected to detailed analysis. All that is necessary here, therefore, is to consider the bearing of the facts upon the ultimate meaning of created individuality. Two considerations, arising out of our positive relation to the eternal order, have an important bearing. In the first place there is the fact of our continued allegiance to the claims of the eternal order. It is doubtful if man ever reaches such a state of cynicism and spiritual emptiness as to extrude altogether from his life the claims of the eternal order upon his allegiance. In any case the insistence of these claims and their constant recognition by the vast majority of mankind, in spite of all our experiences of disillusionment and in spite of the persistence and pervasiveness of the problem of evil, constitute a fact of immense significance for the true meaning of created individuality. Man cannot evade the ultimate conviction that his true home is in the eternal order and that his individuality was meant to reach its fulfilment through the transforming activity of that order upon his life. This one fact alone gives eternal significance to man's finite creaturehood, and compels us to look for the ultimate meaning of finite individuality in an infinite order. Such an order holds out endless promise for precisely that completion of individuality which consists in internal and external unification of our individual selves, and, by consequence, in unification of the social organism through interpenetration of individual centres.

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[1] See above, p. 366.

In the second place we have to consider the quality of the experience which has these dominating effects, notwithstanding the facts of non-attainment. We are driven to this undying allegiance to the eternal order, on the one hand by the commanding and convincing quality of its transcendent claims, and on the other hand by the manner in which the forms, principles and standards of the eternal order penetrate to the roots of our spiritual life. The claims of the eternal order convince us, because of their transcendent character; that is, because they command us from a range of infinity beyond our reach. But they also persuade and attract us by their intimate relation to our inmost spirits. By the very facts of this contrast we are assured of two things; first that we are knit to the eternal order by bonds of union which cannot be broken, secondly that our goal lies in that order to which we are thus knit, however far its standards transcend our present attainment. Consequently the quality of these experiences assures us that the meaning of our individuality is inseparable from the eternal order, and that we are destined for ultimate union with that order and for a goal of individuality which corresponds to such ultimate union. Thus the quality of our positive experience in relation to the eternal order reinforces the dominance and persistence of that relation in spite of non-attainment, and corroborates the conclusions with regard to ultimate unification which were drawn from that last-named fact.[1]

Our experience of the eternal order terminates in the ethical aspect of that order, where finite individuality is inadequate to embody final incorporations of the eternal standards. Here the law of self-transcendence requires a transformation of the task of ethical self-realisation; and that transformation takes place through passage into the domain of religious experience. Thus we pass to that domain of experience which had for its object a historical revelation of God's redeeming activity, and which was concerned with the expectation and coming of the kingdom of God in history. Previous stages of this work have shown that there is an essential congruity between the two conceptions, the eternal order incorporating its creative activities into the spiritual life of man on the one hand, and the kingdom of God as the goal of history on the other hand. But the great advance which the second of these two conceptions makes upon the first is that it places the goal of finite individuality, not in its own cultural and ethical attainments and achievements, but in the return of created spirits to God. The biblical concept of the kingdom of God must be regarded not only in its anticipatory forms, as projected by Jewish writers, but also in its final fulfilment through the gospel revelation. The religious revelation which finds its goal in the concept of the kingdom of God, thus broadly understood, transfers the ultimate significance of individuality from man to God. The unfolding drama of finite individuality in all its forms is thus seen to be a product of the Creator's self-giving; and the whole tendency of created individuality to find its goal through self-transcendence becomes in its ultimate form the return of finite spirits in uttermost self-giving to their Creator. The concept of the kingdom of God embodied in our Lord's teaching involves a threefold relationship between the Heavenly Father, the created order or fellowship which is the sphere of His sovereign rule, and the individual finite spirits who belong to the Kingdom and who owe allegiance to the Creator's sovereign claim. The Kingdom is to come on earth as it is in heaven. The implication must be that all the possibilities of a created fellowship on earth already exist in actuality in the life of God. All that the kingdom of God may be, as the goal of human history, can only come to pass through the self-giving of God in His activities of creation, revelation and redemption. Again, all that the ultimate manifestation of finite individuality can come to be in that created spiritual fellowship will return in the self-giving of worship to the abidingly concrete actuality of God, from whose self-giving it took its rise.

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[1] See the previous paragraph.

The broad contrast between the eternal order and the kingdom of God, as understood in the present work, is then sufficiently clear. When we consider the eternal order we are thinking of an order of reality in which finite individuality is to attain the completion of its development. When we consider the kingdom of God we are thinking of Absolute Individuality projecting an activity of self-giving into the field of human history. In the former case the interest lies in the completion of the finite principle of individuality. In the latter case the interest lies in the self-giving of God the Absolute Individuality. It has been a fundamental contention of this work that the concept of the kingdom of God is the more ultimate of the two, and that it takes up the other concept into itself. The completion of finite individuality, towards which our experience of the eternal order directs us, can only come to pass through the self-giving of God in His activities of creation, revelation and redemption. It follows, therefore, that the principle of finite individuality and all its possibilities of completion are derived from what God is eternally in His absolute individuality. Whatever the possibilities of finite individuality in its completion may be, those possibilities can only reflect what is already actual in the life of God. Moreover, when finite individuality attains to its goal, that goal will not be a completion lying wholly within finite individuality; for there can be no such completion of the finite. The completion of finite spirits will be in God, in the sense of self-giving to God and perfect communion with God. Whatever such completion can be will depend upon the fact that the actuality of God eternally contains within itself the reality of that completion.

For those who accept the biblical revelation of God as a revelation of Ultimate Reality, and the corresponding concept of the kingdom of God as an indication of the way in which divine activity is related to human history, it must inevitably follow that absolute individuality in God is regarded as the eternal archetype, ground and end of the finite principle of individuality in all its significant aspects. In one of its two fundamental aspects finite individuality is social. Accordingly the inner logic of this standpoint finds its satisfaction in a doctrine of the Godhead which affirms that the social principle is included within the fullness of Absolute Individuality. From this point of view the revelation of the Trinity in the New Testament crowns and completes the revelation of God and His Kingdom in the Scriptures taken as a whole. The doctrine of the Trinity, which in its fully developed form guards both the unity of the Godhead and the inclusion of the social principle within that unity, may be taken as an intellectual formulation of that crowning revelation ; a formulation, however, as necessarily inadequate to the reality as the human thoughts and words in which it is expressed.

It will, moreover, always be the case that the rational justification for accepting this doctrine can only appear in its full force *within the order of experience which the biblical revelation itself created*, that is to say within the New Order of the Spirit.[1] That order, understood in its most universal sense and in all its promise of actualisation in Christ, is the fulfilment in principle of the Old Testament anticipations concerning the coming of the kingdom of God in history. Within the Scriptures we can trace stages in the revelation of God corresponding to successive ‘ epochs ’ or ‘ moments ’ in the divine activity of self-giving on the field of history. The revelation of the Trinity was given in that epoch of divine activity which corresponds to the New Order of life in the Spirit. It was given through the medium of an experience which belongs to that order ; and it can, therefore, be fully appreciated only within that order. But both the revelation in question and the order of experience within which it was given entered the field of history as the culminating stage in the series of epochs of divine activity. Now at each stage in this epochal development of revelation there was proceeding a steady differentiation of the biblical conception of God, in divergence from all the other ways of interpreting ultimate reality which were in fact possible, and which have appeared sooner or later in the development of human thought. Within the New Order of life in the Spirit Christian thought cannot but read the biblical revelation of God as a connected whole, which has its own inner unity of development. The trinitarian interpretation of the Godhead, in which that development comes to rest, draws its material from the successive entry of divine activities of self-giving into historical experience. If the doctrine of the Trinity is accepted as true, the rational justification of this acceptance cannot depend simply upon the correct interpretation of certain passages in the New Testament. For the value of such passages must depend upon the degree of divine guidance which we ascribe to their authors; and this consideration compels us to fall back upon much wider grounds of acceptance. It has been argued in the earlier part of the present work that our experience of the eternal order is not incompatible with belief in God as concrete individuality; and within certain limits the positive aspects of that experience may be held to point definitely to the principle of individuality as an ultimate key to the meaning of the organic series. By consequence we may be led to infer that the principle also has ultimate significance in the eternal order. But without the support of religious experience, this conclusion would always remain at best a doubtful one. Still more is this true of anything like the biblical conception of God.

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[1] For appreciation of this very important truth I am under obligation to Mr. F. W. Butler. See his *Christianity and History*, p. 115.

Here however we must distinguish again. The Hebrew development of monotheism, although wholly distinctive in character, was not altogether without parallel. Where however we can trace parallel movements, as in Greece, the approach to theism is never altogether independent of religious influences. The approach to a conception of concrete individuality in God is not, then, exclusively biblical. But it does seem to depend, wherever it appears, upon a combination of religious experience with apprehensions of the eternal order. With the doctrine of the Trinity, however, the case is very different. The so-called ethnic trinities present no real parallel, when we have regard both to the historical revelation in Christ, which was the starting-point of the Christian conception, and also to the inner content of New Testament experience, on the basis of which the trinitarian interpretation of the Godhead developed in primitive Christianity. This view does not require that we should overlook or minimise streams of gentile influence which were undoubtedly playing upon the development of Christian thought, notably in the whole wisdom-logos group of conceptions and later in the Neo-Platonic atmosphere of Alexandria. When every allowance has been made for such influences, it remains true that the doctrine has its roots in a definite historical revelation interpreted through the medium of a distinctive order of experience. The doctrine of the Trinity is the ultimate differentiation of the Christian conception of God from other theistic systems of thought and from other forms of religious monotheism. Its ultimate rational justification, therefore, in so far as such a thing is possible at all, can only take the form of showing, or seeking to show, that it includes, guarantees and illuminates all positive elements of truth concerning the principle of individuality, disclosed within the cumulative wholes of man's spiritual experience. From this point of view the doctrine will be considered in the next chapter.

V

The Christian conception of God as Trinity in Unity includes contrasted aspects; and these contrasted aspects represent, and guarantee the validity of, divergent elements in the respective orders of experience which underlie the doctrine. (1) The doctrine asserts that there is ‘ personality ’ in God, or, in the terminology of the present work, that God is concretely individual. This aspect of the doctrine represents and guarantees a universal characteristic and interest of religious experience as we know it in the great mass of facts brought to light in modern anthropological studies. (2) The doctrine shares with all monotheistic systems of belief the assertion that there is but One God, in whom this principle of concrete individuality exists in absolute form. Here the Christian conception of God joins hands with the permanent interests of reason in asserting both the unity and the absolute character of ultimate reality. Thus it represents the permanent interests of religion as rationalised by incorporation of the eternal order. (3) The doctrine asserts a plurality of ' Persons ' in the Godhead. Here it represents most directly its own distinctive order of religious experience. For the aspect of the doctrine which emphasises the Trinity of Persons guarantees the validity of Christo-centric experience in the New Order. With regard to the second characteristic just mentioned (2) it is to be noted that biblical monotheism never represented a purely rational interest in the unity and absolute character of ultimate reality. The incorporation of the eternal order into Hebrew religion in no way diminished the concretely historical character of its revelation of God. Yahweh was still pre-eminently the God of Israel, although also the Creator of the universe. Thus it would be a grave error to suppose that religious monotheism of the Hebrew type is more purely ' rational ' than the Christian doctrine of God.[1] The Jewish and the Christian forms of theism are rationalisations, respectively, each of its own domain of religious experience. But in both cases the rationalisation was developed from certain specific religious data; and the development proceeded, along lines predominantly controlled by religious interests, to conclusions which were believed to represent the significance of the religious data in question. From the Christian standpoint, however, the doctrine of the Trinity takes up into itself all that is true in Hebrew monotheism. From that standpoint the Christian conception represents a richer form of religious experience, and further carries monotheism to a point where it is ultimately more defensible, because it takes account of and includes a wider and more significant range of facts. The doctrine of the Trinity is not an ‘extra,’ attached to some common residuum of all forms of theism. It is the completion of biblical monotheism, as the New Order is in principle the fulfilment of the kingdom of God.

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[1] Or, again, Islamic monotheism, as Dr. Farnell seems to hold. See his Gifford Lectures, *The Attributes of God* (1925), pp. 91 ff. In this work Dr. Farnell assumes that pure monotheism must conform to the Unitarian type. He does not appear to have considered the difficulties involved in such a position. See further below, ch. xiv. §§ i. and ii.

The three points enumerated above thus reduce themselves to two main aspects, namely the unity of the Godhead and the distinction of Persons in the triune God. These two aspects correspond broadly to two main interests, which are respectively the interest of reason and the interest of religion. Reason is always primarily concerned with the unity of experience. It ever seeks to penetrate behind the multiplicity which lies on the surface of sense-experience. It craves for ordered connexion and system. Even when it is occupied with a highly specialised field of experience corresponding to no more than a fragmentary aspect of reality, as in some particular department of science, it is still concerned with order and system, with laws, principles, concepts, ideas. It must follow the pathway of abstraction, even though it be seeking to understand the concrete. The more it pursues the concrete, the more surely it must move towards a unity of thought which is other than the concrete. Thus it is in a special degree congenial to reason to refer its own abstracting process to the order of reality which it finds in or behind the manifold of sense impressions. The unity of conceptual thought is reached by abstraction; and thus the ultimate unity of the eternal order comes to be regarded as necessarily having the same character. The degree in which this tendency has determined systems of thought is very mixed. The subject has already been considered at more than one point in the present work.[1] Reason in its tendency towards abstraction is perpetually confronted with the concrete; and thus it seeks to correct its own abstractive tendency by creating concepts more adequate to the concreteness which it finds in the real world. The eternal order seems to look both ways. For on the one hand it is the background of a highly concrete universe, in which the principle of concrete individuality is manifested at its highest in spiritual form. Yet on the other hand the eternal order is apprehended by reason, not in its wholeness, but under a number of aspects. These aspects of the eternal order are intelligible to us only in the form of canons, principles, laws and standards; and these latter are in abiding contrast with the concrete embodiments through which we apprehend them and respond to them. Owing to this double character of the eternal order, philosophical systems have frequently assigned to the principle of individuality a subordinate position, either as the denizen of a world of appearances below the level of the Absolute, or as a transitory factor in a developing system. Now when reason and religion are yoked together in partnership, the tendencies which have been described above do not cease to operate; and in consequence an inevitable tension is set up between two different sets of interests. The tension in itself is wholly beneficial to the true welfare of religion. We can see this fact on a large scale in the Old Testament. There the rationalising tendency towards unity, nourished by moral intuitions which were themselves supremely rational, came into conflict with primitive religious interests. By the tension set up in this way the religious engrossment in concrete forms of experience was not abolished but transmuted to a higher level, where the concrete individuality of God could mean more. The heightened significance thus manifested in the God of the prophets was not less concretely individual in character, whilst on the other hand it gave a deeper satisfaction to the religious impulse. The tension between reason and religion thus made possible a religious advance to a level where reason could feel at home. For religion and reason are incurable allies just because of their mutual tension. Each needs the other to complete it, and each provides a solvent of the other's problems. Yet none the less in biblical monotheism it is the eternal order which is taken up into religion; not (as in other forms of rationalisation) religion which is subordinated to purely rationalising conclusions. This predominance of the religious interest continued to operate throughout the development of the Christian conception of God in the New Order, both within the New Testament period and beyond it in the formative periods of patristic thought.

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[1] Especially in ch. iv.; see above, pp. 83–87.

It has been the object of preceding chapters to justify this statement in detail. We are, therefore, now in a position to estimate the tension of forces which must always continue to operate for reasoned faith in its attitude towards the doctrine of the Trinity, and to understand the difficult conditions under which the analogy from the principle of finite individuality can be applied to the understanding of that doctrine. In the preceding paragraph it has been pointed out that the interest of reason in the principle of individuality is ambiguous, because the eternal order looks in two directions, and because two contrasted tendencies operate in its interpretation. In the course of the argument the way in which these contrasted tendencies operate has emerged. On the one hand, there is overwhelming evidence for the affinity of the eternal order with the finite principle of individuality, and for regarding their relation as one in which the principle of individuality finds its fulfilment in the eternal order.[1] On the other hand, our experience of communion with the eternal order could never, in itself, lead us to an unhesitating affirmation of an absolute principle of individuality, refracted to us through aspects of the eternal order, as the end in which the finite principle of individuality is to attain its fulfilment. The tendency of reason operates in favour of a compromise. There must be fulfilment of the finite principle of individuality; but it must be a fulfilment in an order of reality whose unity and absolute character are contrasted with concrete individuality, as we know it, *in one degree or another*. The last phrase is italicised to indicate that the interest of reason is in tension with any such full recognition of the principle of individuality in God as the interest of religion requires. But none the less, when the eternal order is taken up into religion, a momentous transformation has been effected; and there must be *some* recognition of absolute individuality in God on the part of reason. The tension of interests, however, is not overcome; and therefore the analogy from finite to absolute individuality is not readily embraced in all its possible implications. The interest of religion, on the other hand, demands that the analogy shall be pressed as far as it can possibly carry us.

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[1] See above, pp. 375, 376.

If this demand of religion were too easily and readily granted, the anthropomorphic tendency might gain uncontrolled sway; and our conceptions of God would relapse into the obsolete crudities of primitive religion. Reason, however, compels us to criticise every step we take in applying the analogy. Thus the tension between religion and reason sets the stage for a true use of the analogy, a use which carries the analogy all the way, yet under conditions satisfying to reason.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY IN GOD.

(ii) CONCLUSIONS

I

IN a survey of the development of Christology in chapter xi. it was remarked that 'the doctrine of the Godhead in the third and fourth centuries presents the appearance of a series of reactions between the contrasted interests of unity and distinction of Persons; between an economic trinitarianism with modalist tendencies and a hypostatic or essential trinitarianism with tritheistic tendencies.'[1] But in fact neither modalism nor tritheism was accepted as true in the officially received theology of the Church, whether we consider the Nicene Creed in its original form, or the later version of the creed accepted at Chalcedon, or the balance of doctrine in the *quicunque vult*, or the balance of psychological and social analogies in St. Augustine's *de trinitate*, or the later Western development of Augustine's teaching as exemplified in the *summa theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas.[2] The two tendencies of thought, however, remain as permanent possibilities. For religious belief can never be wholly stabilised, if it is to have living power in human minds. Popular religious thought tends to pluralism; and if it accepts the traditional estimate of the Incarnation it usually cares more for the truth that there is a distinction of Persons than for the corresponding truth of unity in the Godhead. Thus it is in danger of an approach to tritheism in its efforts to appreciate the doctrine of the Trinity. Modalism, on the other hand, is a solution of the mystery which will always make its appeal, on a certain background of thought, to the rationalising tendency. The Sabellian theory has an obvious affinity with those types of monism which find ultimate unity in the Absolute, and which tend to relegate all plurality to a world of appearances. From this point of view, if the idea of God is introduced, it is valued chiefly as providing a rational background for the unity and order discerned behind the world-process. But a thoroughgoing monism is compelled to go further. It must treat the religious conception of God as ultimately no more than a mythological symbol, which cannot properly be identified with the Absolute, a sort of popular surrogate for absolute reality.[1] In Professor Alexander's scheme an alternative version is offered, where deity is the symbolical goal of finite individuality, and God is in process of actualisation through the development of the organic universe. Modalism is thus seen to rest upon a highly precarious philosophical background. As an interpretation of Christian theism it is open to all the objections which have been urged in the present work against the type of Christology which it appears to involve.[2] For it weakens its hold upon the truth of absolute individuality in God precisely at the point where for Christian faith that truth ought to be most luminous, namely, at the point where the self-giving of God to His creatures becomes absolute in the Incarnate Lord.

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[1] See above, p. 310.

[2] As to the teaching of Augustine and Aquinas it would be impossible to give adequate details in a footnote. The statement in the text records conclusions reached from a study of *de trinitate* as a whole, and of *summa theol.* i. qq. xxvii.–xlv. This opinion has the support of Dr. E. J. Bicknell in a recent paper, hitherto I believe unpublished, which I have been allowed to see. Dr. Bicknell's conclusions are briefly summarised in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, pp. 148–150.

The road to a modalist interpretation of the Trinity is blocked by the whole series of considerations which have been put forward in chapters ix.–xii. of this work. The organic conception of the Incarnation, there advanced, gives reasoned support to an interpretation of the Person of Christ in terms of super-organic individuality ; and an analysis of New Testament experience is seen to point persistently to the necessity of such an interpretation. A parallel doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit follows from the same analysis. The developed Johannine teaching concerning Father, Son and Paraclete supports the belief that in God there are three 'centres' of super-organic individuality. On the other hand, the language of the fourth gospel, when we have regard to its background in the whole experience of the New Order, cannot be brought into line with a view which makes the epochs of divine activity in creation, in Christ, and in the dispensation of the Spirit no more than modes through which an undifferentiated deity is manifested.

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[1] Cp. the discussion of religion by F. H. Bradley in *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xxv. pp. 438–454 (ed. 1893).

[2] See above, ch. x. § ii. pp. 256–262.

There is, however, much more involved in the issues raised by modalism than the bare fact of its conflict with New Testament experience. It actually weakens the religious conception of individuality in God. It is a universal characteristic of religion that its objects are conceived as having a concrete character. The religious interpretation of the universe is thus in contrast with interpretations derived from communion with the eternal order. Our experience of the eternal order is mediated through concrete environment. But the aspects of the eternal order so mediated are forms, principles and standards which are in abiding contrast with their concrete embodiments. Religion, however, is occupied with reality in its concrete wholeness. In its primitive forms it reads the world in terms of a naïve pluralism, and its gods are many. The analogy between human individuality and the divine is crudely drawn ; and men project into their pantheons a replica of the worst as well as of the best elements in themselves. Religion is essentially anthropomorphic. But the base and puerile elements in anthropomorphism are not inevitable accompaniments of a religious interpretation of the universe. This fact appears most clearly in the prophetic rationalisation of religion in the Old Testament. It belongs, however, to the very life-blood of religion that it should be able to draw an analogy between God and man, that is, between the absolute and finite principles of individuality ; and every form of religious monotheism continues to draw this analogy. However much incorporation of the eternal order enters into a rationalised religion, it still remains true that, in so far as the interest is predominantly religious, the experience involved is experience of communion with a ‘personal God,’ that is with concrete individuality. Although there may enter into the situation as a whole deeply significant apprehensions of the eternal order and responses to such apprehensions, yet these elements are taken up into the religious experience. Communion with the eternal order is taken up into communion with God. Where this proportion ceases to exist, where the religious interest is subordinated to communion with the eternal order, there and to that extent a transition has taken place from religion to some other domain of spiritual experience. Religious monotheism is bound up with a continued affirmation of absolute individuality in God. It follows then that a modalist interpretation of the Trinity, if it is to remain within the frontiers of theism, must continue to maintain, in common with all genuine monotheism, that there is absolute individuality in God. If it fails to do this it passes inevitably into a form of absolute monism, relegating all plurality, including the principle of individuality, to a world of appearances.[1] Now such a monism would at least be coherent. It would represent the view that the principle of individuality involves plurality wherever it exists; and this view is thoroughly confirmed by our whole experience of finite individuality, as previous analysis in the present work has shown.[2] At every stage in its manifestation the created principle of finite individuality is seen to have two aspects, unity and plurality. It moves steadily towards higher forms of unity. But at no stage in the organic series is the aspect of plurality eliminated. Consequently if the analogy between finite and absolute individuality is to be drawn at all, it is a highly arbitrary procedure to select one aspect of individuality for the purpose of the analogy and to ignore the other; to regard individuality in God as an undifferentiated unity, when the experience of individuality, from which the analogy is drawn, is of a wholly different character.

It seems, then, that modalism must always, wherever it appears, be in a dilemma from which there is no escape, so long as it seeks to maintain its illogical compromise. It clings to the principle of individuality in God; yet it refuses to accept the analogy in a thoroughgoing manner. The analogy is drawn from human experience; and there are two principal domains of that experience from which it can start. In the first place, there is our whole experience of the principle of finite individuality as it is manifested in the organic series upon the background of the eternal order. Here, at every stage, individuality is characterised by plurality as well as by unity. In this sphere there are two possible conclusions which may be drawn. One such conclusion involves a frank acceptance of pluralism, whose religious counterpart is polytheism in some form. But such unrelieved pluralism is, sooner or later, revolting to reason, and is in radical conflict with the higher revelations of unity which are manifested to us in our experience of the eternal order. A second possible conclusion, therefore, presents itself. The principle of individuality with its inevitable pluralism is in conflict with the revelations of the eternal order in two respects. On the one hand, its pluralism is in conflict with the unity of reality manifested in the eternal order. On the other hand, the concreteness of individuality is in permanent contrast with the abstract character of the forms, principles and standards of the eternal order. In this first domain of experience, therefore, it will always be possible to conclude that the principle of individuality has no more than a transitory significance, that it has no place in absolute reality. Thus it is that our experience of the principle of finite individuality, as it is manifested in the organic series, can of itself give us no assurance of absolute individuality in God. For the limitations of the finite principle of individuality are too far-reaching for it to conduct us to such an assurance. Yet notwithstanding these limitations the positive aspect of the eternal order confronts us with its assurance of a profound affinity between the eternal order and the principle of finite individuality, and even points the way to a fulfilment of finite individuality through communion with that order. But in the whole of this range of experience, which is concerned with finite individuality and its significance, there is no indication that its fulfilment will involve an elimination of plurality. If we stress the negative aspect of the eternal order it is possible to conclude that there can be no fulfilment of finite individuality, but rather negation or absorption into the Absolute. If, on the other hand, we stress the positive aspect of the eternal order, it is possible to conceive a progressive manifestation of the principle of individuality, but not in one of its aspects without the other. The actual fulfilment of individuality, which the positive aspect of the eternal order suggests, includes, as we have seen, increasing wholeness and interior unification of individual centres with increasing external unity as between different individual centres through the development of mutual dependence and interpenetration.[1] Starting then from this first principal domain of human experience, there is not the slightest ground for the modalist reduction of the doctrine of the Trinity. For in human experience we have no knowledge of finite individuality which is not social as well as self-regarding. An arbitrary and one-sided application of the analogy from finite individuality does not give us a more rational form of Christian belief. On the contrary, modalism can hardly escape the charge of irrationality, just because it does not take the analogy seriously, and yet will not altogether abandon it.

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[1] Or else it abandons the Absolute for evolutionary monism and a finite or developing God.

[2] See especially ch. xiii. above, pp. 364 ff.

In the second place, we have to take account of that whole domain of religious experience which developed historically through the incorporation of the eternal order into religion. Here we can leave out of account everything except the biblical development of monotheism. For all ancillary rationalisations, approximating to such monotheism in one degree or another, have received their ratification through incorporation of their contributory streams into the Jewish-Christian tradition; or else they have arisen later in dependence upon that tradition, as is the case with Islam on the one hand, or with modern philosophical theism on the other. Historically biblical monotheism arose in sharp reaction against the crudities of polytheism. It retained the analogy between individuality in God and in man without which it would have ceased to be religion. But in its Old Testament stage it developed one side of the analogy to the almost complete exclusion of the other. Religious revelation came through epochs of divine activity. Accordingly the indispensable first chapter of religious monotheism in its historical development was one which threw the emphasis upon the absolute unity of God. But even so there were present in the Old Testament revelation of God factors other than a bare assertion of unity as against polytheism. For in the first place, as we have already had occasion to notice, the rationalisation of Hebrew religion did not emasculate its concretely historical character, but rather emphasised it ; and this emphasis upon concrete experience was accompanied by a continuous witness to the concrete individuality of God and to the reality of His self-revelation to Israel. In the second place, Hebrew monotheism retained in the fullest degree the ancient religious conception of a covenant relation between God and His people. On the level of rationalisation occupied by the Old Testament the social aspect of deity could be sufficiently expressed through this conception. Thus the prophets developed the doctrine of God's love for Israel. The love of a father for his firstborn and the love of a husband for his wife were images which they found adequate for their purpose. In a more general sense Hebrew religion, like all the ancient ethnic religions, was thoroughly social ; and this is exemplified in the prophetic expectation of a kingdom of God as the goal of history, in which social as well as individual conditions would be transformed. Within its own order of experience Hebrew monotheism was, therefore, profoundly rational. But its rationality depended upon the fact that it pointed beyond itself to some fuller revelation of absolute individuality in God. One indication of this is to be seen in the fact that it combined with its emphasis upon the unity of God such tendencies towards plurality as are suggested by its notions of the word of the Lord and the spirit of the Lord. Within the unity of God, as apprehended by Israel, were incorporated the contrasted aspects of the eternal order, its transcendent majesty and its intimate nearness. Yet, when the Old Testament revelation had reached its maturity, this plurality of aspects tended to pass into a form where the abstractions of the eternal order gave way to the religious demand for concreteness. Thus the word and the wisdom of God became partially hypostatised. The Old Testament form of monotheism required the New Testament revelation for its completion. It cannot, therefore, be subjected to the kind of criticisms which confront a modern statement of theism as a completed philosophy. It represented only one epoch of revelation and only one stage in the application of the analogy from finite to absolute individuality. Biblical monotheism must be taken as one developing whole. When so regarded it offers no support to a theory of the Godhead which does violence to the most fully developed stage of its advancing order of experience. The New Testament revelation throws a flood of light upon the principle of individuality in its divine and human aspects. In particular it discloses the social aspect of individuality as having immense significance and possibility for man, because it belongs already in its perfection to the eternal reality of God's life.

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[1] See above, ch. xiii. pp. 366–376.

II

It has repeatedly been urged in the course of the present work that theism as a philosophical interpretation of reality must always be precariously situated unless it be closely related to the historical development of religious experience. It has further been argued that theism and the doctrine of the Incarnation are mutually supporting in their common assertion of concrete individuality in God.[1] They are thus mutually supporting within the distinctively Christian form of theism which includes the differentiation of Persons in the Godhead. Modalism as an interpretation of the Trinity is involved in all the classic difficulties of theism without the distinctive solution of these difficulties which Christianity offers. One of these classic difficulties is connected with the idea of creation. As a spiritual organism man finds himself to be a citizen of two worlds, the eternal order on the one hand and the organic series on the other. The whole character of human experience is determined by the contrasts between these two worlds. Yet, on the other hand, there can be no satisfying explanation of the organic series which does not make it dependent upon the eternal order. This has been expressed by saying that the series is the product of creative activity flowing from the eternal order; and that the ascending process of the series is actualised in a development, which is to find its fulfilment through man and his capacity for communion with the eternal order. Thus the series derives its significance from the eternal order. But the eternal order does not derive its significance from the series; nor does it depend upon the series. Such an idea would nullify our whole experience of that order in its transcendent aspect. We apprehend the eternal order through its concrete embodiments in the series. But in every such act of apprehension the eternal order transcends its embodiments; and the whole rich significance of man's spiritual experience is determined by this very quality of transcendence. Now for Christians God and the eternal order are one. The universe is the product of His creative self-giving; and our response to that self-giving of God is the worshipful response of creatures to their Creator. But when once the step has been taken of identifying God and the eternal order, we cannot place the transcendence of God over His creation on a lower level than that of the transcendence of the eternal order over the organic series. A rational conception of God must fulfil the conditions which are involved in our fundamental apprehensions of the eternal order. Now it is precisely these conditions which are so embarrassing to any and every form of monotheism, unless it includes 'hypostatic' distinctions within the Godhead. For every form of theism rests upon the analogy from finite to absolute individuality. But the principle of individuality in its finite form involves relationship and cross-connexions between centres of individuality; and on the level of spirit this involves the mutual relations of the social organism. As organisms we are in relationship with environment; as rational spirits we are in subject-object relations with the objects of perception; as moral beings we are in mutual spiritual relations of interdependence with our fellow-men.

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[1] See above, ch. ix. pp. 222–224.

Now theism involves the idea of a nexus of relationship between God and creation, between the Creator and His creatures. Creation, as a religious conception, involves the idea of a self-giving of God to His creatures. But is this idea of self-giving essential to our conception of God? For Christians there can be only one answer. God is love; and the self-giving of creation is an expression of His essential nature. If then the idea of self-giving is essential to Christian theism, the principle of self-giving must find its eternal expression in the life of God. This is precisely what the doctrine of the Trinity secures, when it is understood to mean 'hypostatic' distinctions and 'personal' relations within the Godhead. But if the Trinity be understood in a purely economic sense, so that the distinctions correspond only to aspects of God manifested in His activities of creation, revelation, inspiration or the like, then there are no eternal relations of self-giving within the divine life of Absolute Actuality. Thus the principle of self-giving in God, which is acknowledged to be essential, can find expression only *ad extra*, in relations with creation. But this is to make creation necessary to God, in the sense that the full actuality of God's life is incomplete apart from creation. This is to place God under a necessity *external to Himself*. God becomes dependent upon creation for the expression of His nature. For God is essentially love; and yet apart from creatures to love He cannot be love except in the sense of self-love. Thus we are driven either to the cold deity of Aristotle occupied in eternal self-contemplation, or to a contrary conception of God which can do justice neither to the Christian revelation nor to our apprehension of the eternal order. Where there is no subject-object relation within the Godhead, the idea of creation inevitably comes to mean that the world is the necessary object of divine activity. But this notion is in radical conflict with all our apprehension of the eternal order. The eternal order penetrates man's spirit so profoundly that we are able to recognise its essential character, wherever we are confronted with its embodiments. Any other reading of our spiritual experience leads to some form of scepticism which, sooner or later, undercuts the validity of reason itself. Thus the essential character of the eternal order is expressed through its immanence both in concrete embodiment and in the human spirit which recognises it in such embodiments. But this does not mean that the eternal order itself is what it is by virtue of its embodiments or by virtue of our apprehension of it in those embodiments. Such an interpretation would again negate the actual character of our apprehension of the eternal order. We apprehend its essential character when we are confronted with it; and the essential fact which we apprehend is precisely this, that the eternal order and its standards exist in their own right. No particular embodiment, no particular apprehension, can ever change or modify that which the ultimate reality of the eternal order is in itself. Its unchangeable reality exists prior to and independent of its incorporation into the organic series, prior to and independent of its incorporation into our spiritual experience. That is sheer bed-rock which we must accept.

Now if God is dependent upon creation for His self-expression in the sense that creation is the necessary object of divine activity, then there is no identity between God and the eternal order. The contrast between the eternal order and the organic series is not incorporated into the contrast between God and creation; for the most significant characteristic of the former contrast is not present in the latter. Thus God is made out to be something less than the eternal order. While the eternal order is utterly transcendent, and is recognised to be such in the very facts of its immanent embodiments, the transcendent otherness and actuality of God are diminished by the necessity of His immanent expression in creation. This difficulty is not overcome by postulating an 'eternal creation,' if by this phrase we mean something for which we can find analogy in our present experience of eternity and of creation. Creation must always be the product of eternity; that is to say, such processes as we recognise in the organic series must always be referred to an activity deriving from the eternal order. But an endless prolongation of such activity can never alter the character of the contrast between the eternal order and the serial processes which are derived from it in this way. Similarly if God is made dependent upon creation for His self-expression, the dilemma constituted by His dependence upon such a *perpetuity* of creation is merely camouflaged by this use of the adjective ‘ eternal ’ ; unless we mean to assert that eternity is no more than what is conveyed by the idea of an endless process. If it be granted that God is in some sense transcendent over His creation, then His activity of self-giving has for its necessary object something less than itself. Thus the self-giving of God has only a partial expression. From this it would appear to follow, either (1) that the principle of self-giving is not fundamental to the life of God, in which case love cannot be an essential attribute of His nature ; or (2) that the principle of self-giving, although fundamental to the life of God, never receives adequate expression, in which case there is something wanting to the fullness of God's life.

It is small wonder that theistic beliefs which can be reduced to such absurdities do not appeal to trained philosophers, who are not prepared to sacrifice their reason to the supposed interests of religion. It is not surprising that some philosophers, who are anxious to recognise the validity of religious experience, are constrained to regard the ordinary theistic conception of God as little better than a piece of popular mythology. By this is meant, not simply that its expression is mythological, but that the idea itself does not correspond to reality. If the God of religion is made out to be something less august than the ultimate reality apprehended through the other domains of experience, then it is no more than a just nemesis if philosophers place God on a lower level than the Absolute, or else accept the notion of an incomplete God and give to it applications still further removed from the absolute reality which alone can satisfy man's religious yearnings.[1]

For, in the last resort, it is religion which must sit in judgment upon the conception of God involved in modalism. If there is no eternal self-giving in God, then our worship is no better than self-delusion ; for we are offering it to something less divine than ourselves. If, on the other hand, God is such that His self-giving depends upon the world of creatures for its necessary object, then again our worship is offered to one who is very much less than absolute reality. Such a being is little better than an idol, a figment of our own imaginations. Worship is the highest act of rational creatures; and as such it must include, or be capable of including, the whole spiritual activity of man. The religious experience of communion with God is not simply identical with the other ways of approach to, and communion with, the absolute reality of the eternal order. But only in so far as it includes these other ways and takes them up into itself can its worship become all that it should be as the culmination of man's spiritual activity, the self-giving of finite individuality in its wholeness to the Creator, to whom it owes all that it has. This self-giving of finite individuality in its wholeness is possible because man's spiritual nature is one. In the earlier part of this work this truth was illustrated by the fact that there is continuity of structure between different domains of human experience. In particular is this the case as between religious experience and our apprehension of the eternal order. The contrasted emotional attitudes towards God in His majesty and in His intimate nearness are closely parallel to the corresponding contrasts of the eternal order. When the contrasted aspects in either sphere are not held together, in our apprehension, in due relation to one another, the result is a disastrous lack of proportion. As Kant taught, there is a majesty of the moral law which corresponds to the majesty of God. Failure to recognise this majesty leads to sentimental morality and to sentimental religion. On the other hand, there is an opposite perversion which we recognise alike in the moral prig and in the religious formalist. The conception of God as dependent for His necessary self-expression upon the world of creatures seems to be at bottom dangerously near to sentimentalism. Similarly there is a way of speaking about divine love which goes far to empty this conception of all dignity and real grandeur. Love which is not majestic is an emasculated parody of the high reality which that word ought to mean. It is therefore essential to the full richness of worship that the contrasted aspects of deity should be held together in a harmony whose depth and reality depend upon the tension which lies within it. The truth of this principle has been set forth in previous chapters, where prophetic and apostolic experience as portrayed in the Old and New Testaments was seen to have precisely these characteristics.[1] The Christian conception of God includes within itself the contrasted aspects of transcendence and immanence in the fullest degree.

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[1] See above, p. 388.

The development of biblical monotheism was accompanied by a progressive purification and illumination of these contrasted aspects. The pathway of development lay through continuous incorporation of the eternal order. Thus Christians are pledged to a worship which includes on its human side the consecration of all man's spiritual activities. All our response to the divergent aspects of the eternal order is properly taken up into that wholeness of response to God which is the essence of worship. This means, on the other hand, that God as the object of worship includes within Himself all the transcendent otherness of the eternal order as well as its penetrating nearness to our spirits. But the development of revelation which we can trace in the Bible shows a progressive manifestation of the fact that the contrasted aspects of deity are inseparably interwoven. Thus the more fully divine love was revealed to man, the more luminous became the truth that this love is realised to be most majestically transcendent precisely when it is most fully poured forth in our hearts. The essence of worship is that creaturely attitude which recognises this twofold fact, and which, recognising it, adores in humble and exultant self-prostration. When the love of God is poured forth in our hearts by His Spirit which is given to us, then and then only are we able to adore that love revealed in Christ in its transcendent sovereignty as the love of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The expression of this love in the epochal activities of creation, redemption and sanctification brings near to us the self-giving of God in stages of advancing intimacy. But it is through our experience of this intimacy of divine love in the crowning epoch of the New Order that we are impelled to recognise the true kingdom of love as an utterly transcendent order, a fellowship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, where the absolute reality of love exists in fullness of actuality. This is the conception which underlies the great high-priestly prayer of John xvii. The fellowship (κοινωνία) of Christ's body in the New Order is derived from the creative activities of an eternal actuality of fellowship in God, and will attain its completion in communion with that eternal actuality of fellowship. The doctrine of the Trinity is the ultimate explanation of the threefold fact (1) that the eternal order has affinity with the principle of individuality, (2) that the eternal order is congruous with the concept of the kingdom of God as the goal of history, (3) that the kingdom of God has been embodied in the life-story of the Incarnate Lord and is in process of actualisation in the New Order through the organism of Christ's body. The eternal order incorporates itself into finite individuality in concrete wholeness of character. But the crown of character is love (ἀγάπη) ; and love presupposes fellowship as the sphere of its activity. Thus the final union of religion with the eternal order is effected in the New Testament revelation that God is Love and Fellowship in Actuality.

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[1] See above, pp. 136–141 and pp. 173–177.

III

The dilemma of modalism consists in adopting the analogy from finite to absolute individuality, without applying the analogy all the way as the facts of finite individuality seem to require. But if we press the analogy all the way, difficulties present themselves on the other side. All the limitations of finite individuality confront us and seem to baffle thought. If we are to give a rational meaning to the conception of plurality in God, how can we preserve the truth of absolute unity for which monotheism stands ? We cannot retrace our steps ; yet how are we to go forward ? If we do not press the analogy all the way, we are involved in a dilemma which goes far to undermine the rationality of theism. If we hold to the analogy, we must tread a difficult path where we soon reach the limits of imagination and thought. Yet notwithstanding all difficulties we must go forward. Here, as in the parallel case of the Incarnation, we have to remember that our whole use of analogy must be combined with a principle of contrast. The real crux of the problem consists in determining where lies the domain of contrast, and so within what limits analogy may be pressed all the way. For the determination of this question guiding light appears at the very point where the difficulties of theism weigh most heavily, namely, in the contrast between the organic series and the eternal order. The difficulty of the theistic affirmation that there is concrete individuality in God is occasioned by the fact that finite individuality belongs to the organic series, and is therefore in contrast with the eternal order; whereas it is essential to theism to identify individuality in God with the eternal order. The fact of this contrast, however, which occasions such difficulty for accepting theism in general, actually illuminates the sphere within which the doctrine of the Trinity can safely receive the support of analogy. This will become clearer as we proceed.

The significance of the principle of finite individuality can be stated in terms of self-transcendence. Individuality in the organic series always involves a principle of unity transcending the plurality and multiplicity of an organism. On the level of spiritual organisms the principle of individuality attains the significance which is indicated by the term 'personality.' Here the transcending principle of unity is a principle of self-transcendence. What is transcended is organic plurality or multiplicity in all its forms. Thus the goal of a spiritual organism on the psychological level is a harmony, or unity, which transcends the claim and counterclaim of conflicting tendencies arising from divergent instincts and interests. But this law of psychological harmonisation is dependent for its fulfilment upon the distinctive spiritual activities of man's communion with the eternal order. The achievement of the self is ultimately not a psychological but a spiritual achievement. As soon, however, as we turn to the spiritual aspects of self-transcendence, we become aware that the very term 'self-transcendence' only suggests one aspect of the truth and that the negative aspect. The unity of a living organism is manifested in its total reaction to environment, a reaction which transcends the multiplicity of sense-impressions in such a way as to preserve the organism and promote its biological survival. Now on the level of spirit biological survival is replaced by self-actualisation. On the self-regarding side of finite individuality self-transcendence means spiritual unification. In the sphere of knowledge reason transcends the multiplicity of sense-experience by apprehending the rational unities of order and significance. The spiritual attainment involved in this process has for its ideal goal wholeness of vision, which apprehends the reality of the eternal order with ever-widening comprehension. Now as rational beings the more we transcend the multiplicity of sense-experience (which is one aspect of our organic plurality) the more truly do we become spiritual selves, rich in capacity for rational apprehension of reality. Thus we bridge the gulf between the two contrasted worlds to which we belong. In transcending the multiplicity of the organic world we approximate to the spiritual unification of the rational self. But in this very process we pass over from the self-regarding to the outward-facing aspect of our individuality. For the essence of such spiritual attainment lies in apprehension of the eternal order, that is of reality which always transcends us. The goal of all such spiritual apprehension is wholeness of vision or contemplation of reality in its wholeness. Thus in transcending a certain kind of plurality in experience, inseparable from our organic associations, we are transcending the self-regarding aspect of our individuality and passing over into the outward-facing other-regarding aspect. But this means that organic self-transcendence leads to self-actualisation in a higher order of self-transcendence. For contemplation of reality in the eternal order is a kind of self-forgetting. We lose ourselves in the contemplation of reality. For the religious man all such spiritual contemplation is crowned and completed in worship. All spiritual contemplation passes over into response; for it involves a self-effacing tension with reality, which is itself the response of receptivity. So in worship, not only is contemplation consummated, but also response; and the highest actualisation of the self lies in the self-giving of worship. Thus the goal of reason is not self-conscious attainment, but a selfforgetful self-giving whereby the self reaches its kingdom in the enjoyment and worship of Absolute Actuality.

On this conclusion there are two further comments to be made. (1) Contemplation and enjoyment of spiritual goods are essentially social. Material goods must be divided amongst competing claimants. Spiritual goods are shared by all, and must be so shared if we are to possess them fully. Consequently contemplation and enjoyment of spiritual goods presuppose a spiritual fellowship, a social order, a plurality of selves. (2) It follows that if we strip off, in imagination, the organic aspects of individuality, as we must do when we endeavour to think of God as absolute individuality, then the analogy will still hold as between our finite spiritual experience and the life of God in the Blessed Trinity. In spiritual organisms, such as we are, the life of the spirit is built upon a multigrade structure of organic plurality. The life of the spirit does not, however, derive its actualisation from this organic structure; for it is self-determined through communion with the eternal order. Accordingly, as the eternal order is contrasted with the organic series, so the spiritual principles of that order, whereby centres of finite individuality move towards actualisation through self-determination, can be wholly differentiated from the organic conditions within which spiritual achievement takes place. This differentiation not only can but must be made. The eternal order stands in contrast with the organic series; and man, though organically conditioned, derives his spiritual significance from his rationally self-determined communion with the eternal order. It is within this domain of man's true spiritual significance that the analogy from finite to absolute individuality must be applied. The spiritual development of man's finite individuality, although always mediated through organic conditions, has for its true environment the eternal order, which is in permanent contrast with all organic conditions. Thus the initial meaning of self-transcendence in our experience is that for man as a spiritual organism the life of the spirit conforms itself to laws of the eternal order in transcendence over organic conditions. This is the organic reference of self-transcendence, and it has a predominantly negative character. But, as we have seen, there is a deeper and more positive meaning of self-transcendence, which is disclosed in our communion with the eternal order. This consists in the contemplation of reality through all its aspects in the eternal order and in the self-forgetting enjoyment of spiritual goods. Self-transcendence in this deeper sense means that the self is actualised in a self-effacing tension with reality, which is the very birth in the soul of spiritual response and self-giving. The former kind of self-transcendence can have meaning only within conditions of organic experience and therefore falls outside the sphere of analogy to the life of God. But the latter kind of self-transcendence belongs to the very essence of spiritual experience in the eternal order and therefore falls within the true sphere of the analogy.

If we pass from the sphere of knowledge to the sphere of conduct a similar conclusion will be reached. Here also there are two levels of self-transcendence to be distinguished; one which belongs to the conditions of organic experience and the other belonging to the essence of spiritual experience in the eternal order, the one negative and the other positive, the former falling outside the sphere of our analogy, the latter being integral to that analogy. Here the initial form of self-transcendence must mean that human life has ethical significance in a response to standards of the eternal order, a response which transcends all particular and partial reactions to organic environment. For this is the essence of moral self-determination. The spiritual attainment involved in this process has for its ideal goal wholeness of character, which includes as an element within itself wholeness of vision. As we apprehend the standards of the eternal order with ever-widening comprehension, so in corresponding degree in a true human development there is increasing wholeness of response to those standards. Such a response is the expression of character in self-giving. Thus, again, in the sphere of conduct as in the sphere of knowledge, organic self-transcendence leads to self-actualisation in a higher order of self-transcendence. From one point of view the goal of spiritual attainment is character. But the attainment of character is not an end which can be rightly pursued for its own sake. For as contemplation must always pass into response, so character must always express itself in self-giving. As the essence of contemplation lies in the apprehension of reality transcending self, so the essence of ethical conduct lies in a response of self-giving to reality transcending self. If from one point of view the goal of conduct is character, it is also true that the crown of character is love, which is the ultimate response to reality. Thus in the sphere of conduct the deeper meaning of self-transcendence is the positive self-giving of love. Ultimately contemplation of absolute reality as the goal of knowledge rests upon character and passes into response; and the all-inclusive response is the self-giving of love. So once more we pass over from the self-regarding to the outward-facing or social aspect of individuality. Contemplation presupposes a spiritual fellowship in which spiritual goods are shared; and the self-giving of love demands a social order in which this the ultimate response to reality shall be made. The conclusion of this line of thought can now be stated. The essential structure of finite individuality can be seen at its highest in the spiritual experience and activity of man in his communion with the eternal order. Here the finite principle of individuality is seen to be self-transcending, outward-facing, social, self-giving, in knowledge and in conduct, in contemplation and in response. It possesses these characteristics not in ultimate antithesis to the eternal order, but through community with the eternal order. It attains actualisation in these characteristics through communion with the eternal order; and the unification of individual selves in the eternal order is, negatively speaking, in contrast with the organic plurality which belongs to man's organic structure. Thus the spiritual plurality of man's social structure can be actualised only in a fellowship of selves; and this actualisation depends upon a unification of the self which is transcendent over the organic plurality of the self. Finally, the essence of this spiritual plurality has the eternal order for its true environment, and is in permanent contrast with all its particular embodiments in organic environment. Consequently, if we strip off from our conception of individuality all thought of organic plurality, we are still left confronted with the spiritual plurality of finite selves in fellowship. It is this spiritual plurality which offers a true analogy to the Holy Trinity.

IV

There remains, however, another aspect of man's organic plurality to be considered before we can be said to have fully faced out the difficulties of the analogy from finite to absolute individuality in connexion with the doctrine of the Trinity. The last section took account of the individual self in its organic plurality as a spiritual organism. But a similar difficulty comes into view when we consider the fellowship of individual selves in society. There is a plurality of the social organism, corresponding to that of the individual organism, which to many minds has probably seemed an even more formidable obstacle to the application of an analogy from finite to absolute individuality. The social organism is built up out of a number of individual selves; and if we transferred this conception literally to the doctrine of the Trinity, the result would be tritheism. The Trinity of Persons are not three individuals. Whatever distinctions are involved in the Christian conception of the Godhead, these distinctions exist within one absolute individuality. Here we must recall conclusions reached in the last chapter concerning the relations between finite centres of individuality. In their organic aspect these centres are interconnected through the whole range of cosmic and racial laws of unity which pervade the series. But although based upon the series they find their higher unity of interconnexions in no function of the series itself, but in the controlling character of the eternal order. Organic interconnexions subserve spiritual relations, but do not generate them.[1] In other words, the key to the solution of the special difficulty here is to be sought in the same general principle of differentiation which was emphasised in the last section, namely, in the contrast between the organic series and the eternal order, that is between two distinct kinds of plurality, the one organic and the other belonging to the essence of spiritual relations.

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[1] See above, pp. 366 and 371.

The peculiar limitations of finite individuality are all connected with its unfinished character, and this again with all-pervading characteristics of the organic series. Every organism is an incomplete unity because it is built upon the cross-relations and interconnexions of finite units (part-events), such as atoms and cells, each of which is similarly incomplete in its unity and stability. At every level also there are social organisms whose unity is similarly incomplete because of the relative instability and incompleteness of their individual members. So also on the level of spirit, the unity of the social organism is incomplete, partial, fragmentary, crossed and thwarted at countless points by sharp tensions between individuals and groups within the whole. All that has been said previously about the limitations of finite individuality is inextricably bound up with an organic plurality which underlies not only individuals, but also their relations in the social organism. Thus, on its organic side, all the incomplete unities of the social order have an external spatio-temporal character, being ultimately based upon the extreme level of externality which belongs to purely physical relations at the base of the series. So it is that the social order is composed of *individuals* sharply differentiated from one another by the ultimate externality of physical conditions.

The principle of individuality in the organic series exhibits at all grades an externality of relationship. This characteristic of organic individuality, although differently constituted at each grade, never disappears as a characteristic from the manifestation of individuality in the series. This externality occurs in its maximum form at the base of the series. But, on the other hand, as the principle of individuality advances in significance and importance, its accompanying organic condition of externality becomes, in a sense, more pronounced by contrast with the emerging qualities of internality, which appear in ascending order in organisms possessing life, mind and spirit. This contrast reaches its climax in the social organism of man. Here the principle of finite individuality has attained its maximum significance in spiritual selves, each holding communion with the eternal order. As individuals they are differentiated by this very fact of spiritual selfhood, seeing that to each such individual attaches eternal significance through his community with the eternal order. Moreover, an element of infinity is introduced into the differentiation of spiritual selves by the very fact that each such individual is in self-determined relations with the infinity of the eternal order. There is more difference between two men than between two dogs, as there is more difference between two dogs than between two peas. Pea, dog, man, are a series, whose progression is determined by advancing incorporation of creative activity from the eternal order, to which corresponds an advancing differentiation of individuals. But in the last term of the series the differentiation has acquired a mark of infinity, corresponding to the positive infinity of the eternal order. Thus the tendency of the organic series lies in the direction of an increasing differentiation of individuals as such. The physical basis of finite individuality sets individuals apart in that organic plurality which characterises the social organism. On the other hand the relatively unstable and incomplete unities, which provide the cross-connexions of the social organism on its physical, biological and psychological levels, are in themselves utterly inadequate to unify the individual units of the social organism on that level of differentiation which characterises finite individuality as we know it at its maximum development in man. Now it follows from these considerations that what is true of the individual's relation to organic plurality is true in a parallel sense of society. Human society possesses spiritual significance by virtue of its transcendence over organic conditions. Those conditions, considered in themselves apart from their relation to the life of the spirit, do not and cannot promote a spiritually significant social order. In so far as they are not taken up into a spiritual order they actually set men apart in isolation. For example, in so far as a social group finds its controlling ends in material power, wealth and sensual pleasures, it is relapsing towards the level of animal group life. Moreover, in such a process, the human group does not simply remain a social organism in a more animal sense. It is rather an organism in process of disintegration towards the negation of its own existence in a degree of individualism of which the members of animal groups are incapable. This is inevitably so, because individuality has acquired in man a higher significance in contrast with organic conditions.

The spiritual significance of human society is, then, constituted in its transcendence over organic conditions. This corresponds to the first degree of self-transcendence which we have noted in its individual reference. But here again this fact has only a negative significance. Society develops towards its true goal through the spiritual co-operation of its individual members. This co-operation is rendered possible through the positive stage of individual self-transcendence and its social counterpart. The self-transcendence of spiritual organisms is not fulfilled in the reciprocal relations of the individual and society. These relations take place within a wider reference of both to the spiritual goods of the eternal order. But in so far as society finds its controlling ends in the eternal order, it finds there, too, the true worth and significance of its individual members. The religious form of this truth is expressed in the biblical concept of the kingdom of God, which is in process of actualisation in the new organism of Jesus Christ in the New Order. Within the true social order, thus conceived, society finds its proximate ends in appreciation of its individual members in their true worth and significance, and in serving the spiritual development of its members. The response of society to the eternal order is thus embodied in activity directed towards the true welfare of its members; and this activity again is necessarily expressed and embodied in the spiritual ordering of organic relations and material goods in due conformity to the standards of the eternal order. In such a true social order we can see that the relations between society and its members and between individuals within society are expressed in terms of function and of vocation. The true vocation of the individual is determined by the wider reference to the spiritual goods of the eternal order.[1] None the less this vocation can be expressed in terms of the individual's contribution to society. For ultimately the true development of the individual can never be contrary to the highest welfare of society, and *vice versa*. This fundamental fact underlies all particular tensions and frictions which, on a surface view, seem to conflict with it. The problem of the relations between society and the individual has received various solutions. Some of these have given priority to social authority, others to individual liberty. Neither of these conceptions is satisfactory by itself. Their rival claims, however, are transcended when society is conceived in terms of function and vocation upon the wider background of the eternal order. On such a view the individual finds his true vocation in terms of his social function; and society jealously guards the individual's liberty to develop his true vocation, because only so can his social function be actualised. Society can only become what it may and should become through the free self-determination of its individual members in all the richness of their diversity by reference to the standards of the eternal order. On the other hand, there can be no true self-determination of the individual which fails to satisfy the test that it must be capable of expression in terms of genuine social function, whereby the individual co-operates with the welfare of society.

Thus the individual finds his vocation in terms of his function in society; and society achieves its destiny through identifying its corporate interest with the true vocational welfare of its individual members. These mutual relations are actualised through that positive self-transcendence which belongs to the essence of spiritual experience, and which stands in permanent contrast with all forms of organic plurality. In other words, we have reached here a conception of spiritual plurality which is the correlative of spiritual unity, and which provides the true analogy from human society to the plurality of Persons in the Godhead. There will always be a difficulty for the imagination in the application of this analogy, precisely because it remains no more than an analogy from finite to absolute individuality. But this difficulty is not peculiar to belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather is it peculiar to all forms of theistic belief which assert that there is concrete individuality in God. Unitarian forms of theism appear to have the advantage only when their ascriptions of personality and unity to God take cover behind a nebulous veil of uncriticised thought, where the dilemmas discussed in the earlier part of this chapter have not been rigorously faced. All analogies are inadequate; and we may therefore conclude this section by pointing out the directions in which this particular analogy must in the very nature of the case be inadequate. In the social organism there is mutual dependence and interpenetration, as between society and its members and as between individuals in society.[1] The limitations of finite individuality render the analogy inadequate here on three distinct grounds. Thus (1) there is the externality which attaches to all organic individuality and which determines the structure of human society in terms of relations between a plurality of *individual* selves.[2] In God there is no such organic externality and no plurality of individuals. Interpenetration of individuals can never be complete. In God there is perfect interpenetration of the Persons within one absolute individuality. (2) In human society mutual dependence and interpenetration are included within a wider reference to the eternal order. In the language of religion this means that in the kingdom of God there are not two but three *foci* of reference.[3] The relations between society and its members are constituted in a more ultimate dependence upon God and the eternal order. Dependence and penetration cannot be mutually completed as between finite creatures, just because the latter are finite, and because the creatures cannot finally rest in anything less than the Creator. Human society could provide an adequate analogy to the Creator only if it were itself a rival claimant to deity. (3) Finite individuality is unfinished and in process of attainment. To this consideration belong all the facts of non-attainment. Some of these facts belong to the essence of finiteness and are, therefore, already included in the last point. There remain, however, ethical non-attainment and the universal experience of sinfulness. These facts, more than any others perhaps, balk the imagination in the application of the analogy. But they cannot altogether obscure from us the truth of what Love is in its absolute reality.[1] In spite of all man's failures there has hovered before the eye of faith a vision of an ideal society, a vision which we can trace back at least as far as Plato on the one hand and the Hebrew prophets on the other. In the creative experience recorded in the New Testament the revelation of human sin is carried further than anywhere else. But here the facts of sin, most fully exposed, meet their final solution in the redemption wrought by Christ. The revelation of the Trinity can be fully accepted only within that experience of redemption from sin which was its historical counterpart in the New Testament. The analogy from finite to absolute individuality, which presents so many formidable difficulties to reason, can be applied with confident assurance by faith within the context which alone is adequate to meet those difficulties, the illuminating context of the new fellowship in Christ. Within that context the problems of non-attainment have been, in principle, already solved. The fellowship of man redeemed finds its completion and consummation in the worship of the Absolute Fellowship which is God, Three in One.[2]

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[1] See above, p. 410.

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[1] See above, ch. xiii. pp. 368–373.

[2] See above, pp. 365, 407–409.

[3] See above, ch. xiii. p. 377.

V

We have now reached a point where some conclusions of this survey must be stated. God is revealed to us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Three Persons in One God. The word *person* must be regarded as indispensable; not because it is adequate, where no human phrases can be adequate, but because it has acquired a precise technical meaning in the history of doctrine, and because we cannot afford to dispense with the historical associations and delicate balance of theological meanings which have crystallised round the word in connexion with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The word *person* has this further advantage that, when used in this technical and historical sense, it can be clearly differentiated from the modern word *personality*. If we speak of ‘ personality in God ’ at all, the phrase must be carefully guarded to avoid either Unitarian or tritheistic implications. For this reason the word *individuality* has been preferred in the present work, just because it has both a wider and a narrower reference. It has a wider reference, because the principle of individuality, as here defined, runs through the whole structure of creation. Human personality is only one form which the principle of individuality takes, although it is the highest form of created individuality in the organic series. Human personality is so pre-eminently individual in our experience that we are liable to forget other aspects of individuality. The wider reference of the principle of individuality reminds us that, throughout the organic series, this principle includes plurality within itself. Thus the word individuality has also a narrower reference; for it need not necessarily mean a single self or centre of personality. Single personal centres of activity are the highest forms of individuality in the organic series. But the word individuality does not necessarily convey this particular idea. *It may mean less and therefore it can also mean more.*

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[1] Cp. ch. xiii. pp. 373–378.

[2] Cp. in ch. xiii. the argument of pp. 378–383, and in the present chapter pp. 400, 401.

The modern use of the word *personality* has a context wholly different from that of the patristic and theological use of the word *person* in reference to the Trinity. In modern speech ‘ three divine personalities ’ would mean three Gods. On the other hand a phrase like ‘ the personality of God ’ suggests Unitarianism. If, again, we speak of ‘ personality in God ’ we have to explain that we do not mean either of these two things. On the other hand the phrase ‘ One Absolute Individuality,’ as used in the present work, asserts a theistic position without introducing inconvenient uncertainties as to the nature of personality in God.

Thus the phrase *Three Persons in One Absolute Individuality* appears to strike the right balance. Individuality in God is something wider and richer than can be adequately suggested by any finite manifestation of the principle of individuality. Absolute Individuality is the creative ground of all possible manifestations of finite individuality. All that is significant in creation must be referred back to God. Consequently individuality in God must be both personal and social, including but transcending all that we mean by these characteristics of spiritual existence. God is not less but infinitely more personal and social than man can ever be. In God the contrast of the individual and social principles, or of the self-regarding and outward-facing aspects of individuality, is a contrast which is utterly transcended in eternal and unchangeable harmony, in perfect interpenetration of the Persons, and in fullness of beatitude which consists in absolute self-giving. The whole actuality of God is communicated from the Father to the Son, proceeds from the Father through the Son to the Spirit, and returns by the eternal response of the Son through and in the Spirit to the Father. Each of the Persons is whole God and possesses the whole Godhead. Thus there is one absolute individuality in three personal centres. Another phrase which would, perhaps equally well, represent the truth of the doctrine would be *Three Personal Centres of One Absolute Actuality*.[1] Here the emphasis falls upon the contrast between actuality in God and the developing processes or units of activity in the organic series of creation. Man is a self-determining unit of activity. Yet, notwithstanding this fact, he belongs to the series of finite embodied activities which constitutes this developing universe of events. Such activities flow from the creative actuality of God, and find their actualisation within the directive movement of the organic series as a whole ; a movement which is so ordered that its return to God is dependent upon the spiritual mediation of man. Thus all finite activity flows from the actuality of deity and can find its true goal only in return thereto. This actuality of God is differentiated in the Persons of the Trinity, a truth which we could never know except through such an entry of God into history as was actually given to religious experience in the epochal activities of revelation recorded in the Bible. But the revelation so given throws light upon the whole structure of the universe and of history as apprehended by man through successive domains of experience.

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[1] See above, pp. 109, 110, Additional Note A.

All thought and speech concerning the Holy Trinity must be utterly inadequate, like the naïve chatter of children concerning the mysteries of life and the universe. Yet, if we are to be recipients of the light which revelation gives to us, we cannot remain silent. Something must be said, even if it be a dangerous thing to say anything at all. Faith must seek to understand. What follows is put forward with these limitations and reservations in mind. The Father is the fount of actuality in the Godhead. The Son, as the eternal reproduction of the Father, is the adequate object of His self-expression and self-giving. The Spirit is the immanent yet personal principle of self-giving or love, who proceeds from the Father to the Son, and returns through the Son's response to the Father. The mutual relations of the Father and the Son are thus constituted in the Spirit, who is the bond of union, the principle of their mutual immanence and interpenetration. Since each is *totus deus*, the Persons are distinguished not by gradations but by functional relations.[1] Each Person is that which He is by virtue of the mode in which He possesses the whole Godhead in relation to the other two Persons. The actuality of God is expressed in the Processions, those 'natural, necessary and internal operations'[2] which differentiate the Persons. The Processions are eternal; and therefore their 'order' transcends temporal succession. Yet all temporal processes in creation are grounded upon them; and the whole spatio-temporal development of the universe is ordered and patterned in dependence upon the eternal operations in the Godhead. The organic universe is created *ex nihilo* to be the framework, or medium, through which purposes of eternal love are expressed under spatio-temporal conditions. What these purposes of eternal love are in their fullness lies far beyond our mental grasp.[1] But they include the creation of a community of finite spirits, who are objects of God's love, constituted to find their true end in the eternal order of love which is the life of God. God and the eternal order are one; and each of the Persons possesses the absolute reality of the eternal order in its wholeness and fullness. That absolute reality is identically the actuality or concrete individuality of God. Its wholeness is one and undivided, a unity of pure simplicity. But its wholeness is apprehended by finite spirits under a plurality of aspects, given to rational intuition in abstraction as forms, principles and standards of the eternal order. In religious experience God is apprehended as concrete individuality. But, again, in reflexion upon the concrete whole thus given reason apprehends God under those aspects which we call attributes.

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[1] See above, pp. 410, 411. This is spiritual plurality in contrast with the organic plurality of a graded series.

[2] Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, bk. i. § ii. 2.

The Persons of the Godhead are differentiated by the modes in which they possess the absolute reality of the eternal order in its wholeness; and creation is ordered and patterned in dependence upon the eternal operations in the Godhead. Creation is not in accidental relation to God, nor is it the necessary form of His adequate self-expression. It does express, however, in finite and fragmentary manner what God is essentially in being and character. This truth we can discern dimly in the structure of the universe, more clearly in the life of spirit, most clearly and explicitly in the historical revelation given in Christ and in the New Order of Christian experience. The created universe is the product of the twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit. The Word is the eternal object of the Father's self-expression, and the Spirit is the immanent principle of actuality and unity in their mutual relations. So we discern in the organic series a transcendent formative activity of creation weaving patterns of objects upon events, and an immanent energising activity underlying events, and binding their succession into the unity of series and process upon which enduring objects may be patterned.

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[1] Cp. Bishop Butler's sermon on 'The Ignorance of Man.' *Sermons* (edited by W. E. Gladstone).

The ascending scale of the organic series is the developing product of this twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit; and in this development the finite principle of individuality is progressively manifested as the product of the Creator's self-giving bearing the impress of eternity. When the finite principle of individuality reaches the level of spiritual self-determination, man recognises the impress of eternity upon creation. Thus creative activity becomes revealing, passes over into the form of revelation, and evokes from man a spiritual response to the self-giving of his Creator. This is the mode in which the twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit enters into man's spiritual experience. In revelations of the eternal order we apprehend its forms, principles and standards as aspects of that order embodied in objects of the concrete universe. But these aspects so revealed are aspects of the One Eternal Object, the Word, in whom the Father is perfectly expressed. We apprehend and recognise these revelations of the Word through the immanent activity of the Spirit uniting us to the self-revelation of the Word; and our self-determining response to such revelation is actualised by the same energising of the Spirit within us. In religious experience man recognises the self-giving of his Creator and the claims of that self-giving upon his finite capacity for spiritual response. But in recognising this claim man has, by various paths, been driven to the acknowledgment that his response to the claim is actually inadequate, and that the goal of life lies beyond the reach of his own endeavours. Thus in religious experience revelation passes over into the form of redemptive activity. The whole structure of the organic creation is stamped with incompleteness and insufficiency. Its true end lies beyond itself in God; but its own resources are inadequate to attain that end. This problem reaches its climax in human history, where the response of the creature to the Creator is frustrated by the free choice of men. This problem of history was met by divine action in history in the form of a special redemptive revelation. The preparatory epoch of revelation to Israel laid bare the problem, and evoked fragmentary expectations of its solution in a God-given kingdom of grace. Neither the

Kingdom nor man's response to it could come from within the resources of history; for the created principle of finite individuality was inadequate to such a consummation. But finite individuality bears the stamp of the Creator's own likeness, and was the product of the Creator's self-giving through the formative activity of the Word in all stages and processes of creation. It was most fitting therefore that creation should be brought to its true end in God through the Incarnation of the Word who is also the Son.

The due response of creation to its Creator was frustrated by human sin; and sin is the aversion of man from that filial response which he owes to his Heavenly Father. The Incarnation was the divine remedy for sin. The well-worn discussion as to 'what would have happened if man had not sinned' raises what is in effect an academic question, to which our limited knowledge admits of no clear answer. There can be no question that the New Testament takes its stand upon the actual facts. The entry of Jesus Christ into history is the divine answer to the sin of man. All true response of creation to God is the product of the formative activity of the Word in creation. But the Word is the Son, whose eternal and perfect response to the Father is the absolute response of actuality within the Godhead. All true response of finite individuality is grounded upon that one eternal response and is derived from it through the creative activity of the Word and the Spirit. The Person of the Son is differentiated within the Trinity by the mode in which He possesses the One Absolute Individuality. He possesses the One Individuality by derivation from the Father, a relation which has its complementary aspect of eternal response to the Father. The Son, then, became incarnate, that He might take up the response of creation into His own eternal response and so bring creation to its true end in God. The Incarnation was thus a new creation constituted in the Person of the Son, to redeem, renew and restore the old creation from its state of frustration and sinful estrangement. The material of the new creation was derived from the old creation, which is taken up by transformation into the new. There is thus an analogy between the two creations. The new is the fulfilment of the promise contained in the old. But, whereas the old creation embodies a partial incorporation of creative activity, the new creation embodies the Logos-Creator Himself. One who is in possession of absolute individuality in its wholeness entered into organic conditions appointed for finite individuality. The old creation derives from the twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit. The new creation was constituted by a similar co-operation of the Word and the Spirit. The old creation is constituted in a graded series by partial incorporations of formative activity from the creative Word supervening upon successions of events through the immanent energising of the Spirit's activity. The new creation was constituted in a single event of history and in a new organism. The new creation was constituted by the entry of the Logos-Creator in Person into the conditions of finite individuality; and the organism of His self-expression under those conditions was taken up by transformation from the old order to the level of deity through the new creative act of the Holy Spirit. The principle of finite individuality is a developing manifestation of the formative activity of the creative Word. This development is both renewed and consummated in the new organism of Jesus Christ. For the ultimate principle of unity in that organism is Absolute Individuality as possessed by the Eternal Son in His Person. The kingdom of God was embodied in individual form in the Incarnate Lord, because in His Person He is the very ground of the finite principle of individuality in all its manifestations, in the organic series of creation and in the processes of history. *He became finitely individual in His human organism, because the formative principle of individuation in creation flows from Him. But although He became finitely individual in His human organism, He is not in Himself a finite individual.* For He is not an organism but the Creator, who has taken organic creation into union with Himself. In His new organism He has become organic to creation. He does not belong to the organic series; for the series belongs to Him.[1]

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[1] See above, chs. ix. and x., especially pp. 237–239 and 282–283. The sentences in italics should be compared with two sentences on p. 223, where the phrase 'in the form of concrete individuality' occurs twice. Cp. also 'became finitely individual in His human organism' with the great Johannine phrase ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (John i. 14).

VI

The doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are mutually illuminating. We cannot hope to understand either apart from the other. On this ground the doctrine of the Trinity has received considerable attention in the present work, although the Incarnation provides the centre of the argument. The crux of the matter lies in the relation of the Incarnation to the principle of individuality. On this difficult subject we have now reached a point where something further may be added to what was said in chapter x. The sentences italicised in the last paragraph must be interpreted in the light both of the argument and of the terminology of this whole treatise if their meaning is to be rightly understood. Let us recall some of the considerations which provide the context. The ultimate question about the organic universe—a question therefore which is fundamental to the doctrines of creation and of the Incarnation—is the question of the relation of eternity to time or, if we prefer it, space-time. It may be that in the philosophy of nature, taken by itself, this question will always remain a somewhat dark riddle, in spite of some very illuminating discussions of the subject to-day.[1] But at any rate principles seen dimly in that sphere can be made to fit in well with a much wider context of beliefs where the principles shine out more clearly. Now in the present work the concept of the organism has been defined by reference to a principle of unity controlling and transcending plurality. The transcending principles of unity are derived from the eternal order; and therefore in every such organism eternity enters spatio-temporal conditions while remaining transcendent over them. The essential characteristic of the organic series through all its levels is that eternity enters into finite temporality while remaining transcendent over it. The principle of finite individuality is constituted by this law of the whole series; and finite individuality is developed in accordance with the degree in which eternity so enters into finite temporality. The highest degree in which this takes place in the series occurs in organisms of spirit. As organisms men are more concretely individual than organisms of lower grades; for the movement of the series is towards increase of concreteness. This has been explained in the present work by attributing ultimate concreteness to the eternal order and by thus identifying the eternal order with absolute individuality in God. The transcending principle of unity in a human individual constitutes what we call the 'self'; and the self is the unity of an individual spiritual organism in its wholeness of transcendence over its plurality of parts. The finite individuality of the self is more than an expression of eternity in finite temporality; for it has a relative independence which we call self-determination. It *is* an expression of eternity in finite temporality. But it also holds conscious communion with eternity. It is the product of eternity; but it also stands over against eternity as spirit having affinity with eternity. Thus finite spirits as individuals have spiritual affinity with one another and with God the Absolute Spirit. But the principle of individuality in man is unfinished, and therefore falls far short of the full concreteness of individuality as it exists in God. The human spirit is the highest expression of that law of the series whereby eternity enters into finite temporality while remaining transcendent over it. The human spirit has affinity with the transcendence of eternity, because eternity lies at the roots of our spiritual being. In so far as we fulfil this law of transcendence by communion with the eternal order, we advance in concrete wholeness of vision, of character, and of conduct. But (*a*) we never become fully individual as spiritual organisms, and (*b*) we never transcend the gulf which lies between the individual and social principles on the organic level of spirit. Now the Eternal Word is the creative source from whom flows all entry of eternity into the form of finite temporality. We are individuals in so far as we exist in Him; and our individuality must find its completion in Him. He possesses absolute individuality, which can never be in contradiction to the finite principle of individuality; for it is its very ground. Possessing absolute individuality, then, He can become finitely individual in His human organism, more truly so than we can ever be. *But this is true, precisely because in*

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[1] Notably in the works of A. N. Whitehead.

Himself He is not a finite individual. We are individual in dependence upon the eternity of His absolute individuality and through His creative activity. But this is only a partial incorporation of eternity. Thus we are not fully individual nor fully social. We are each of these only in a fragmentary way. That is the reason why there is tension and contrast between the individual and social principles in man. We are separate individuals, because we are only partial embodiments of the principle of individuality. The individualistic element in each of us is due to our finite and organic incompleteness. If, then, the Incarnate Lord were a finite individual He would not be completely individual, but just one among many incomplete individuals. The possibility and rationality of the Incarnation are seen in the doctrine of the Trinity. This we perceive dimly yet adequately by a faith which is itself illuminated through the grace of the Incarnate Lord. Such faith is not adequate to the truth ; but it is adequate to our guidance and salvation in dependence upon the truth. What is thus given to our faith is the true significance of individuality. Its essential character consists in an absolute self-giving which is one with self-actualisation. The Persons of the Trinity are not separate individuals because they are perfectly individual, inasmuch as each possesses absolute individuality in its wholeness. All that absolute individuality means is actualised in each of the Persons. They are infinitely individual because they are not separate individuals. The law of infinite individuality is a law of self-giving which expresses the actuality of the Persons ; and the self-giving of the Eternal Word is imprinted upon creation. Thus throughout the organic series eternity enters finite temporality, yet remains transcendent over it. This is a partial self-giving of the Eternal Word, who yet remains transcendent in His self-actualisation. The Incarnation is the final manifestation of this law under organic conditions. The Eternal Word has entered the finite temporality of the organism which He has made His own. He is, therefore, finitely individual in that organism in the fullest degree, because He remains transcendent over it in His possession of absolute individuality as an Eternal Person.

In the absolute actuality of the Trinity the individual and social principles, as we know them, are utterly transcended. This, however, does *not* mean that the spiritual significance of these two principles has vanished or is non-existent in God. It means just the opposite. They are both fully actualised ; and therefore the distinction between them, as we experience it, does not exist. The distinction between the two principles is transcended. But the distinction between the Persons is an ultimate distinction, because the One Absolute Individuality is eternally actualised in the Persons. These truths are embodied in the facts of the New Testament revelation. For on the one hand the Eternal Son, by His absolute self-giving in the Incarnation, became finitely individual in His human organism, while remaining self-actualised as a Divine Person in full possession of absolute individuality. Thus He fulfilled the organic conditions of His human life-story, and in that life-story gave a revelation of His Eternal Person. On the other hand the Person of the Incarnate Lord transcends His human organism. For the Incarnation is the final manifestation of the law that eternity transcends its entry into finite temporality. Now the Person of the Incarnate Lord also transcends the individual and social principles. They meet in Him, because He possesses absolute individuality in its wholeness. Accordingly, as in His organism He had an individual human life-story, so in that same organism He has a social history. But whereas the Incarnate Lord transcends the contrast of the individual and social principles *in His Person*, simultaneously possessing both in His possession of absolute individuality—*in the sphere of the Incarnation*, on the other hand, the organic manifestation of the two principles was successive. They were differentiated in a historical succession in two epochs of revelation or of redemptive activity. First came the epoch of His individual human life-story and then the epoch of His organic activity in His body the Church. But, notwithstanding this differentiation, the organism of the Incarnate Lord is one and not two. For the new creation is one. It was constituted in His Incarnate Person. It was actualised in His human life-story in its individual form ; and it is now in process of actualisation in its social form in the New Order in His body the Church. The transition from the first stage to the second came through the transforming event of the resurrection and through the transformed conditions which were set up by that event. It is not necessary that we should be in a position to answer all questions concerning the historical character of the resurrection as an event, before reaching this conclusion. For the transformed conditions of the new creation, manifested in the New Order, are written across the whole complex fact of the apostolic experience and its interpretation in the New Testament. Moreover these transformed conditions of apostolic experience are everywhere in the New Testament traced to the resurrection experiences and to events connected with those experiences. Accordingly, while the kingdom of God was incorporated into history in its ultimate individual form in the life-story of the Incarnate Lord, its social incorporation into history (which had previously been germinal and shadowy) is in process of actualisation in the New Order. Thus in the human life-story of the Incarnate Lord there was given a revelation of His Person. In the New Order, with its social experience of the new creation, the revelation of the Incarnate Lord passed into the yet fuller revelation of the Blessed Trinity.

CHAPTER XV

THE INCARNATION AND MAN

I

In the last chapter it was pointed out that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are mutually illuminating. This is a truth which must be steadily kept in view as we turn to some final considerations concerning the relation of the Incarnation to human life. In the Being of the Blessed Trinity the Person of the Son is differentiated by His relation to the Father, a relation which has two aspects. The Son is the adequate object of the Father's self-expression. In His Person He receives the actuality of the Godhead by derivation from the Father. He is the adequate object of the Father's thought and love. We may suitably speak of Him, therefore, as the Eternal Object. But, secondly, the relation between the Father and the Son is reciprocal. The actuality of the Godhead returns from the Son through the Spirit to the Father. This return of actuality in the Godhead is the response of the Son. The Spirit is the actuality of love which the Son receives from the Father and which returns to the Father in the eternal response of the Son. Thus the Son is the Absolute Object; and all objects which finite spirits can know derive their existence from the Son and are in some sense partial revelations of Him. Let us consider this aspect first.

In the present work a good deal of reference has been made to *enduring objects*, such as the physical objects which we perceive in ordinary sense-experience. In recent philosophical thought it has been pointed out that 'physical objects' are not pure objects, and that in two respects. First of all they are not simple objects, but rather complexes of objects; and the objects into which they can be analysed are of different kinds. Secondly, these complexes of objects are patterned upon events in space-time. A 'physical object' is thus always an object-event. In some respects it is more illuminating to call it an event than to call it an object. Nevertheless, in spite of their mixed character these object-events or physical objects have a relative unity as organic wholes, a unity which in the present work has been traced to the twofold creative activity of the eternal order, that is to say, of the Word and the Spirit. Regarded as activities or units of energy these object-events are to be referred to the immanent or underlying activity of the eternal order, that is to the creative activity of the Spirit. Regarded as organic wholes, whose characteristic unity has significance for knowledge (a significance whereby their position in the organic series can be assigned to them), they are to be referred to the formative activity of the eternal order, that is to the creative activity of the Word. In so far, then, as organic wholes are rightly called objects, they derive that character from the formative activity of the eternal order.[1] Through that formative activity the objectivity of the eternal order is in some sense embodied in the organic universe of enduring objects or object-events, and thus objective revelations of the eternal order are mediated to our apprehension. But the objectivity of the eternal order belongs to the actuality of the Godhead as possessed by the Eternal Word. For all formative activity in creation proceeds from Him. Accordingly, the Eternal Word is present in all creation with the omnipresence of the Creator, giving objective form to the whole organic series and in different degrees to its various grades. Thus He is present in our human spirits and we bear His 'image'; so that we have affinity with Him and affinity with His revelations of reality. For all such revelations are revelations of Himself. They are refracted to us through aspects of the eternal order in divergent domains of experience. Yet all revelation is ultimately one, proceeding as it does from the One Eternal Object in whom the Father is eternally expressed.

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[1] In the terminology of A. N. Whitehead we perceive them as enduring objects, because they are events into which 'eternal objects' are 'ingredient.' On the whole subject see further Additional Note C, *Objects and Events*.

Organic wholes may also be regarded as events, or systems of events, or again as processes of activity developing through space-time. In this aspect they must be referred to the immanent or energising activity of the eternal order, that is to the creative activity of the Spirit. Through this immanent activity of the Spirit the universe, regarded as a system of events, becomes capable of receiving the formative activity of the Word; and thus objects are patterned upon events. Through the immanent presence and activity of the Spirit at the roots of his being, man as a rational spirit is capable of apprehending those revelations of reality which confront him in the divergent domains of experience. But those domains of experience are, as we have seen, interlocked in continuity of structure. Thus, as all revelation is ultimately one, so all our spiritual experience is ultimately one, though we may be unable to unify it on account of our finite limitations; for all our apprehensions of the eternal order in divergent domains of experience are inspired by the immanent presence and activity of the One Spirit. All such revelations of reality, then, are as rays of light from the Word who is the one eternal object; and all spiritual apprehension of these revelations and response thereto is inspired by the One Spirit. Nevertheless, these ultimate unities of revelation and inspiration can never override the distinctiveness of the divergent domains of experience. Each domain of experience, such as science, art or morality, has its own organic unity and its own relative autonomy.[1] The ultimate unity of revelation and of experience must be a more inclusive unity which includes these divergences and autonomies within itself, while preserving to each domain its own proper identity and significance. Now religion is concerned with these ultimate unities of revelation and experience; for it is occupied not with aspects of the eternal order but with God as concrete actuality. This creates a difficulty; for as religion advances to its full dominion it recognises in God the Absolute Reality. It must therefore make claims for its domain of experience having a correspondingly universal and all-inclusive character. On the other hand the other forms of experience, as they advance to their full dominion, become increasingly occupied, each with its own domain and its organic unity, and increasingly assured of the autonomy which must be preserved in their respective spheres. Thus arises that tension between religion and culture which is a familiar feature of history. This tension also operates between the divergent domains of culture to some extent. It is not to be regretted, but rather welcomed. For it operates as a purge upon all false claims. In so far as it is transcended, this can take place only through the medium of a philosophy which takes full account of all domains of experience including religion.

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[1] See below, pp. 439, 440 and notes *ad loc.*

The Incarnation is the perfect fulfilment of man's religious need and brings within his reach the adequate object of religious experience. For religion is concerned with the unity of revelation;[1] and man's religious nature craves for communion with God in concrete wholeness of actuality. The Incarnation satisfies these conditions; for the Son, who is the eternal object, the Word, who is the source of all revelation, has entered into history in the unique event of the Incarnation. As the Eternal Object incarnate, He is the focus in history of all forms of revelation; and so the life-story of the Incarnate Lord is the supreme event of history, the goal towards which the universe as a developing system of events had previously moved, the starting-point from which all its subsequent history flows. From this point of view we can see why it is that Christianity is *par excellence* the historical religion. It is so because it is God's answer to the need of His creatures. It is conformed by its central fact to the whole structure of the universe; and so it provides for that structure the coping-stone with which it is completed. The structure of the universe is that of a space-time series interwoven with patterns of eternity. It is historical to the core and has a relative unity of development. But its significance as history depends upon its environment of eternity. Its relative unity of development derives from beyond itself and demands a more ultimate manifestation. What is true of history in general is true of man's individual life-story as the microcosm and unit of history. Its universal significance derives from its nexus with eternity; and the relative unity of its development depends upon a *rapport* with eternity through the domains of spiritual experience. But these domains of experience are divergent and fragmentary; and the fragmentary character of our spiritual experience looks beyond itself to a fuller completion. The relative unities of nature, of history and of man's individual experience mounting up in an ascending series demand a culmination. Such a culmination was bestowed by the Creator in the event of the Incarnation. The Incarnate Lord in His divine Person is the adequate object of the Father's love; and through His human organism He is both the goal of creation and the ultimate principle of unity in history. Creation, then, finds its end in Him and is accepted in the Beloved. The Incarnation as the focus of revelation in history can satisfy the demands of reason.

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[1] In the sense indicated in the last paragraph.

Religion, however, is concerned not simply with the unity of revelation but with man's salvation; and the New Testament offers a revelation of salvation from sin through the redeeming activity of the Incarnate Lord. In Him there is not simply a completed cosmology, but a new creation through which the old creation is redeemed. Creation is brought to its goal through redemption. The old creation is subsumed under the new. In the Incarnate Lord the whole time-series is taken up through man into a new order where it has a transformed history. Of this transformed history the Incarnate Lord is both the Beginning and the End, the Alpha and the Omega. For it is the response of redeemed creation in the Son to the Father. This leads us to consider the second aspect of the Son's relation to the Father, the relation of eternal response, as embodied in the new creation. The Incarnation is both a revelation of the Father's love in the gift of His Son and also a revelation within human conditions of the Son's response to the Father's love. It is thus in the second place a revelation of the true significance and glory of human life as consisting in a free response to God's love so revealed; and finally it is a revelation of the redeeming activity of God's love in the Son, whereby man's true response to His Creator is actually rendered possible in the transformed history which is the process of the new creation. In terms of response, once more, the new creation takes up the old into itself. The principle of response runs through the universe in all its grades with progressive significance. It begins in the reaction of all organisms to their environment. But as the true environment of creation is eternity, the traces of a response to the Creator are imprinted upon the lowliest organic reactions. In man this response becomes free and self-directed, but not adequate to his environment of eternity. In man, too, the response can be withheld because it is free; and the essence of sin consists in such a withholding of response from the creature to the Creator. The goal of history is the kingdom of God, where God manifestly reigns because man's response to the Creator's love is adequately rendered. The Incarnation was the incorporation of the kingdom of God into history, because in the life-story of the Incarnate Lord the adequate response of man was rendered to the Father's love. In the divergent domains of spiritual experience man's response to revelations of eternity is necessarily partial and dispersive. For here the response is from some one aspect of man's spiritual endowment to the corresponding aspect of the eternal order. But religion demands that wholeness of response which we call worship. To evoke such wholeness of response the absolute revelation of God's love was given in the redeeming activity of the Son towards mankind, which was also the adequate human response of the Son to the Father's love. The response of creation to the Creator, through all its levels, must be referred to the immanent creative activity of the Holy Spirit. In the life-story of the Incarnate Lord we see the true messianic Son, endowed with the messianic outpouring of the Spirit, rendering to the Father the true human response of the Kingdom which He proclaimed, and thus embodying the way of the Kingdom in His life and death. Under the historical conditions of the Incarnation and in face of human sinfulness the way of the Kingdom became the way of the cross, the way which our Lord followed to its uttermost fulfilment in His death. Thus Christianity came into the world as a way of life with a specific doctrine of life. Man attains his true self through the principle of self-sacrifice or dying to self. By this means he may transcend the self-regarding aspect of his individuality and attain a larger life in the kingdom of God by 'laying up his treasure in heaven.' The Incarnate Lord passed through the whole cycle of human experience under finitely individual conditions in His human organism.[1] He fulfilled the law of positive self-transcendence which belongs to the essence of human attainment for finitely individual spirits.[2] But in so doing He not only fulfilled the true law of human life. He also expressed in finitely individual and human terms the essential law of God's life of love as eternally actualised between the Persons of the Blessed Trinity.

II

The human organism of the Incarnate Lord was constituted in the Person of the Eternal Son. The human perfection of His life-story, thus constituted, was manifested in its directive movement of undeviating response through acceptance of the way of the cross unto death. Finally the perfection of human response, thus manifested in His life-story, was actualised by transformation to a new level of activity through His death and resurrection.[3] All that belonged to the true human response of the Son under the conditions of His earthly life-story is taken up as the permanent spiritual treasure of the kingdom of God to that new level of activity which is proper to the ascended Lord. On that level the social aspect of His human organism, constituted in the exalted Christ as its Head, is manifested in His mystical body through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the redeemed community in the New Order. It has been pointed out that the organism of the Incarnate Lord is not two but one; and yet it has two aspects. These were manifested in history, not simultaneously but successively, in two epochs of redeeming activity, namely the earthly life-story which the gospels record and the New Order of life in the Spirit which was inaugurated after the resurrection.[4]

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[1] See above, ch. xiv. pp. 420–424.

[2] Ch. xiv. pp. 402–407.

[3] See above, ch. ix. p. 242.

[4] Ch. xiv. pp. 424, 425.

But we must be on our guard against supposing that, because there was this succession of epochs in historical revelation, the one aspect was therefore simply replaced by the other. The Incarnate Lord is still 'the Man Christ Jesus' and will be so for evermore. 'He, because He abideth for ever, hath His priesthood unchangeable.'[1] To deny this would be to destroy the whole argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The human life of Christ, with its perfection of response to the Father, occurred once for all in history. But it has been gathered up into eternity. The doctrines of Christ's eternal priesthood and heavenly session are fundamental to New Testament thought.[2] The language employed is necessarily symbolical; but the truth conveyed is vital to the significance of the Incarnation for man. In a mystical order whose conditions transcend our understanding the Incarnate Lord remains for ever finitely individual in His human organism. The permanent treasure of His human response, taken up into an order which transcends our earthly experience, remains the foundation and background of that transformed history which is the process of the new creation in the redeemed community. Thus the organism of Jesus Christ, into which we are incorporated by the Spirit, possesses permanently two aspects: the one referred to Him as the Head, the other referred to the redeemed community as the body.

This twofoldness of Christ's organism constitutes, perhaps, a difficulty for our finite minds. But if so, it is a difficulty which belongs to the imagination rather than to the intellect. The difficulty may be considerably reduced if we take it into the context of much that has already been urged in this book. Throughout the organic series the principle of finite individuality has for its constant counterpart a principle of plurality, which rises by stages until it becomes in man the social principle on the level of spirit. At every stage the creative Word supplies the principle of individuation, whereby there is a transcending principle of unity in every organism. But in supplying a plurality of principles of unity the creative Word supplies the very principle of plurality itself. His formative activity in creation is thus equally individual and social in its tendency. We are compelled, therefore, to postulate a principle of unity in the social organism of man, which we call the social principle. On the other hand, whatever may be the case in lower strata of the series, the social organism of man is not a super-individual. For by successive differentiation the individual and social principles have in man attained a fundamental contrast, a contrast which is set up through the entry of the law of self-determination into the principle of individuality on the level of spirit. Now the tendency of the organic series is in the direction of an increasing differentiation of the principle of individuality. This movement of creation depends upon a nexus with eternity through the formative activity of the Word. The gracious self-giving of the Creator supplies the principle of individuation with advancing significance until the movement is crowned by the Incarnation of the Word in finitely individual form. Thus the Word became in His own Person the transcending principle of unity in a new organism. While transcending the new organism in His divine Person, He is therefore finitely individual in His organism.[1] But the formative activity of the Word is social as well as individual in its tendency; and every organism has a social as well as an individual aspect. Every organism has a relative significance in itself as to the mode of its interior unity. Every organism has with equal truth a significance which goes beyond itself and which is manifested in the mode of its unity with other organisms. On the other hand the progressive differentiation of the principle of individuality brings about successive transformations of the social principle. These transformations are to be referred to the formative activity of the creative Word as fully as the transformations which the principle of individuality undergoes. Thus the Word transcends the contrast of the individual and social principles, a contrast which is developed through the organic series by His own creative activity. But when the contrast attains its maximum development, that is in spiritual organisms, a higher unity of the two contrasted principles supervenes. The individual and social principles in man receive no further organic unification. But they are capable of attaining a relative unification, of a kind more significant than any organic unity, through the spiritual community of both principles with the eternal order. It was this group of facts which provided the argument for an analogy from finite to absolute individuality.[1] In other words, the doctrine of the Trinity provides a conception of Absolute Reality which gives the true background for the twofold structure of the organic universe with its individual and social principles. But both the eternal background and the organic structure of the universe receive their final illumination in the revelation given through the Incarnation. For it is here that God and creation are united in the new organism of Jesus Christ. In that organism creation is brought to its completion. In that organism the individual and social principles are adequately united in the Person of the Incarnate Lord. It is this fact which makes the Incarnation the coping-stone in the organic structure of the universe as well as the final revelation of deity in history. The organism of the Incarnate Lord is at once (1) the ultimate medium of God's self-revelation and (2) the adequate completion of the organic universe. As to the first of these statements we need only to recall at this point the truth that the new organism is constituted in the Person of the Eternal Son, who transcends the finite contrast of individual and social principles through His possession of absolute individuality in the Holy Trinity. But in transcending the two principles He includes them both in Himself. He transcends the two principles throughout their developing contrast in His organic creations, and finally He reunites them in Himself through His new organism. Thus the organism of the Incarnate Lord is the adequate completion of the organic universe. But the meaning to be attached to this second statement requires fuller consideration.

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[1] Heb. vii. 24.

[2] Cp. Heb. i. 3 and xii. 2.

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[1] See above, ch. xiv. p. 420.

If we consider a complex organism such as we find among the higher types of animals, we observe that its structure is built up out of a number of small units such as cells. These in turn are themselves organisms, in the extended use of the word, and are likewise built out of units of a lower grade.

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[1] Chs. xiii. and xiv., especially pp. 407–413.

Now each of these organisms embodies the finite principle of individuality through its transcending principle of unity. But each also includes within itself a plurality of organisms belonging to lower grades. This principle is apparently modified at the base of the series, where there are no lower grades, and at the top of the series, on the level of spirit, where there are no higher grades. But even so the two principles of unity and plurality are present at the base of the series, although with minimum significance. The modification at the top of the series, however, is the peculiarity which gives to the organic series its unfinished character ; a peculiarity which is significantly transcended to some extent in man's communion with the eternal order, and which is finally transcended in the new organism of the Incarnate Lord. The manner in which this final transformation takes place has now to be shown. If we consider the typical complex organism referred to at the beginning of this paragraph, we see that it is an individual organism by virtue of its transcending principle of unity derived from the formative activity of the eternal order, that is, of the creative Word. But, from the standpoint of the level next below, it is a social organism. The cells out of which this single organism is built are also organisms embodying the principle of individuality on a lower level. From the standpoint of this lower level, therefore, the cells are 'individuals' which are related together on one level by a 'social' principle. Now the 'social' principle of this lower level and its units is identical with the transcending principle of unity on the level next above them. The principle of individuality in the complex organism constitutes the 'social' principle of the simpler units which are taken up into its higher structure. Thus every individual organism includes within itself manifestations of the social principle, and is a super-individual to the grade below. But as the series advances the divergence of the individual and social principles (in fluctuating proportions through the biological kingdoms, but with a new depth of divergence in man) causes this simpler scheme of unification to dwindle away. In man the divergence is ultimate so far as organic conditions are concerned. But from another point of view it is not ultimate.

Organic plurality is now transcended by spiritual plurality, which has for its counterpart a more significant kind of unity. Now, all the way up the series, social principles of unity, equally with individual principles of unity, are derived from the formative activity of the creative Word. In possession of absolute individuality He transcends and includes both principles within Himself. In creation both principles derive from Him; and the traces of His self-giving are imprinted upon every unit of *either* principle at all grades. Thus man has affinity with the creative Word through the impress of His 'image,' not only upon our individual spirits but also upon the social organism itself. But still the fact remains that, whereas individual organisms are in some sense adequately subsumed under the social organism in the animal kingdoms, there is no adequate unification of a similar kind on the level of spirit. Here, however, we must carefully differentiate. There is a relative subordination of individuals to the social organisms of man; for otherwise there would be no social organism at all. But the subordination of individual man to his family, tribe, nation, race and so forth never includes within itself all that the individual signifies. The communion of the individual spirit with the eternal order always transcends these social groups. Now this transcendence of the individual spirit over the social group is due to the fact of man's spiritual affinity with the eternal Word through the impress of His image upon our finite individuality. The ultimate divergence of the individual and social principles in man is thus a direct sign of man's spiritual constitution. It makes possible the higher unity of spiritual plurality which is a type of the Holy Trinity. But this higher unity of spiritual plurality is possible, because spiritual organisms transcend their organic conditions through their community with the eternal order. In other words, man's capacity for the higher unity of spiritual plurality in the social organism is dependent upon the creative activity of the Eternal Word as that activity is embodied on the level of spirit; for through the creative activity of the Word the social principle, equally with the individual principle, attains its maximum significance at the summit of the organic series. The relative unity of the individual and social principles is already constituted with spiritual significance in human life through the gracious self-giving of the Word in the creation of finite spirits. How much more fully, then, must there be a unity of the two principles in the new organism of the Incarnate Lord, constituted as it is in His own Person through His absolute self-giving. This will become clear, if we now consider the character of the new organism more closely.

In the last paragraph it was pointed out that in typical organisms the individual and social principles are both included, but in different ways. The transcending principle of unity in which the organism is constituted is the individuating principle of that organism. But the same principle of unity is the ' social ' principle of the grade next below. The organism of the Incarnate Lord conforms to these general laws of organic structure. In the organism of the new creation the transcending principle of unity is the Person of the Eternal Son. He is the individuating principle of the new organism by His absolute self-giving. In accordance with the definitions laid down in an earlier chapter the new organism is thus constituted on ' the level of deity.'[1] Thus the new organism is individual because the Incarnate Lord is finitely individual in that organism. On the other hand, finite spirits, the individual organisms of spirit in whom the finite principle of individuality terminates, are taken up by transformation to become members of the new organism of Christ. In Him the organism is constituted on a superorganic level, the level of deity. We are taken up to that level, as organisms of lower grade are taken up to become the material of a higher organism. Consequently in accordance with organic structure the Incarnate Lord is the individuating principle of the new organism on His own level. But He is the social principle of the finite organisms of spirit which become members of His body and are taken up into union with Him. Accordingly, the new organism is individual to the Incarnate Lord ; and yet it is also the social organism of the new creation, of which we all are members. Thus the organism of the Incarnate Lord is the adequate completion of the organic universe.

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[1] See above, ch. ix. pp. 225–232.

III

The definition of the new organism reached in the last section must inevitably give rise to a number of important questions. What, for example, is the relation of the new organism to the divergent domains of spiritual experience in human life ? This question was deliberately omitted from the preceding section with a view to simplifying the argument. We must now return to it. The argument of the last section was occupied with showing that the new organism conforms to and completes the organic structure of the universe. But if this is true, then it must also provide the completion and adequate unification of man's divergent domains of experience. Now, if previous reasoning holds good, the new organism is clearly the ultimate medium of God's self-revelation to man. The whole argument of this book has been occupied with the truth of that conclusion. The argument was also summarised in the opening pages of the present chapter.[1] But we have still to examine the bearings of this conclusion upon the divergent domains of human experience as they are taken up into the new organism in the transformed history which is the process of the new creation. Now it is certainly necessary that all domains of experience should be taken up by transformation into the New Order. For not otherwise could the new organism be the ultimate medium of God's self-revelation and the adequate completion of the organic universe. From the side of human experience the general necessity for this transformation was stated in the first part of this work.[2] Some few remarks upon this point may be added here from the more developed standpoint which has now been reached. The divergent domains of experience with which we are here concerned are in principle four, namely, science, art, morality and religion.[3] Further analysis would reveal the fact that our concrete experience has a mixed character.

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[1] See above, pp. 426–430.

[2] See especially chs. v. and vi.

[3] Each of these terms must, of course, be understood in its most inclusive sense. Philosophy arises within the domain of scientific thought. But its object is the ultimate synthesis of all domains of experience. On the relation of such a philosophy to religion see the remarks above on p. 429.

But when we seek to differentiate ultimate significances, these four domains emerge as the spheres of differentiation. Three of them refer to the ultimate aspects of the eternal order, and the fourth to concrete actuality in its wholeness.[1] This classification is different from that employed elsewhere in this work, where four domains have been mentioned.[2] The difference is determined by a change in perspective owing to the fact that the terminology is employed here for another purpose. In the earlier context we were concerned with the successive stages of experience which provide the grounds for Christian theism. Here we are concerned with the divergence of human interests in different forms of spiritual activity. In the earlier context it sufficed to treat our experience of the eternal order as a single domain, emphasising its general character.[3] Here, on the other hand, it is important to observe that there is a tension between different spheres of human interest quite apart from further tension introduced by religion.

Now it has already been pointed out in the present chapter that 'in the divergent domains of spiritual experience man's response to revelations of eternity is necessarily partial and dispersive. For here the response is from some one aspect of man's spiritual endowment to the corresponding aspect of the eternal order.' Again: 'these domains of experience are divergent and fragmentary; and the fragmentary character of our spiritual experience looks beyond itself to a fuller completion.'[4] Religion, however, although diverging from the other domains of experience, is yet in principle capable of including them within itself in a way which is not reciprocal. For religion is occupied with the relation of man in his wholeness to the wholeness of concrete reality in God. Consequently the religious significance of the universe and of human life is in principle capable of taking up into itself the other domains of experience and their distinctive significances. But this does not mean that the other domains of experience are simply merged in religious experience, so as to lose their distinctive significance; for more inclusive wholes in the organic universe do not supersede those organic wholes which are taken up into them. In the Old Testament dispensation, when religion took up into itself higher rational and moral factors, the significance of the moral and rational orders of the universe became increasingly manifested in history through the inclusion of these elements in an organic whole of religious experience. The crowning example of this law has already been set forth in this work.[1] In the Incarnation there is no supersession of the gifts of creation. 'In the stages of this gracious self-giving no gift is recalled. All are gathered up through the cumulative wholes of the organic series to the highest level of that series, where all the stages of creative self-giving are present in the human organism. When, therefore, the process is crowned by the final self-giving of God in the Incarnation, there is no negation of what goes before, no supersession of preceding gifts. The Incarnation is inclusive of all.'[2] The new organism of the Incarnate Lord is constituted in His Person on the level of deity. Consequently all our fragmentary and divergent experiences of the eternal order can be taken up in the transformed history of the new creation and integrated in a new whole of experience on the new organic level which is constituted in the Incarnate Lord.[3] The divergent domains of experience have, in each case, their relative autonomy, an autonomy which cannot be superseded. Yet they all have an ultimate reference to absolute actuality in God; and so their divergence is balanced by interconnexion. This interconnexion was emphasised in earlier chapters of this work, where a certain sequence in the aspects of the eternal order was indicated. Thus we move from apprehension to response, from knowledge to conduct, from contemplation to action. Moreover, contemplation and thought return from the infinities of the eternal order to concrete embodiment in the intellectual excellence of character. So knowledge rests upon character, which in turn expresses itself in conduct. Again, all contemplation and conduct must eventually pass over into worship, which is essentially the religious attitude. For the law of positive self-transcendence, through all its particular applications, refers the spirit of man ultimately to God, the only adequate object of our finite self-giving.

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[1] Cp. the remarks on pp. 428, 429 above.

[2] See especially ch. ix. p. 219 above.

[3] On the other hand, it was also important in that context to draw out the contrasts between our experience of the cosmic series and our experience of the eternal order. But it was also pointed out that the *progression of revelation* through the series is taken up into the *infinite order of revelation* in the eternal order. In other words, our knowledge of the organic universe through sense-experience is organised in a hierarchy of sciences and co-ordinated by philosophy through our rational capacity for apprehending revelations of truth in the eternal order.

[4] See pp. 431, 430.

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[1] Ch. x. § iii. and § vi.; pp. 262–267 and 282–284.

[2] Quoted from p. 281 above.

[3] See above, p. 228, n. 2, and context.

The new organism of the Incarnate Lord is the sphere in which all gifts of creation and all endowments of the human spirit are to receive their actualisation by a process of transformation whose goal is the kingdom of God. This process of the new organism conforms to the principles of the Incarnation, from which it is derived. The true law of the new organism is therefore hostile to all supersessions of human interests. Where these supersessions have occurred in Christian history they have been violations of the true genius of Christianity. In the reactions of history supersession has been followed by movements for the emancipation of human interests. But in the true balance of man's complex nature this necessary emancipation of autonomous spheres of interests requires for its completion the principle of consecration. The perfected social organism of the kingdom of God will include within itself the free development of all true human interests and activities. But none of these can find its adequate goal within the confines of autonomous human achievement. Each and all require the consecrating touch of religion to transform their distinctive contributions into the materials of worship. The true social organism is a worshipping community, in which all the gifts of creation are developed to the glory of God and so return to the Creator who gave them. The new organism of the Incarnate Lord is the sphere of redeemed humanity, where the return of creation to the Creator is being effected through the transformation of human endowments and interests into the materials of worship. The Church is both the social nucleus of the new organism and also the organ of the kingdom of God in the transformed history which is the process of the new creation. Here, however, we must bear in mind that the organism of the Incarnate Lord has two aspects, corresponding to the two aspects of the Kingdom. The new organism is constituted in the Person of the Incarnate Lord and has already been actualized in finitely individual form in His human life-story. In Him the kingdom of God already exists. In His human response to the Father the Kingdom is present in actuality. On the other hand the social aspect of the new organism is referred to the redeemed community as Christ's body. In this respect the new organism cannot be complete until mankind is fully redeemed, and until all creation through man has reached its true end in God. Thus the new organism is potentially as inclusive as creation. Constituted as it is in the Person of the Incarnate Lord and already actualised in Him, it has its own extended process which moves out to the limits of history. If its social nucleus in history is the Church, its ultimate boundaries are as wide as the created universe. The new organism is complete in constitution and equipment, but incomplete in the actualisation of its own processes. The Incarnate Lord transcends these unfinished processes; for He possesses the Kingdom. The redeemed community, on the other hand, although complete in Him as to its constitution, is set within these unfinished processes. It cannot, therefore, be simply identified with the kingdom of God. As the social nucleus of the new organism it is the organ of the Kingdom; for it is the organ through which the Incarnate Lord is present in, and acts upon, the transformed and transforming processes of the new creation in history.

IV

The redeemed community is the social nucleus of the new organism. It may therefore be correctly described as the new organism in its social aspect, or as the new social organism of the Incarnate Lord. The new social organism, therefore, has no significance apart from the Incarnate Lord. For He is its transcending principle of unity. All social organisms derive their principles of unity from the formative activity of the creative Word. The new social organism, however, belongs to the new creation. It is differentiated, therefore, by the fact that its principle of unity is the Incarnate Lord Himself, the Word incarnate in His new creation. There is a parallel differentiation of the redeemed community with respect to the Holy Spirit. Every organism has been referred in these pages to the twofold creative activity of the Word and the Spirit. At each level of the organic series the two aspects of creative activity are manifested in the products of their co-operation as mutually complementary to one another. So in the new social organism there is a distinctive immanent activity of the Holy Spirit corresponding to the formative activity of the Word incarnate. The Holy Spirit, as experienced in the redeemed community, is the Spirit of the Incarnate Lord. As He was endowed with the messianic outpouring of the Spirit, so that messianic outpouring has passed over from Him into the redeemed community.[1] Thus His Spirit is the immanent bond of unity in the new social organism.

The relation of the new community to the creative activity of the Word and the Spirit within the sphere of the Incarnation is closely parallel to the whole structure of that twofold relationship of organisms to creative activity through all stages of creation, revelation and redemption. In man's communion with the eternal order the twofold relationship reaches its culminating point in the organic series. Here the immanent or underlying activity of the eternal order disposes the human spirit to receive and to respond to revelations of that order, whose objectivity both transcends and penetrates the human spirit, as it also transcends and yet penetrates the objects through which the revelations are mediated. Translated into the language of Christian theology this means that the Spirit of God, immanent in the human spirit, disposes man to receive and to respond to revelations of the creative Word. Man is constituted as a rational self-determining spirit through the creative self-giving of the Word and through the impress of His 'image' upon man by that self-giving. Consequently, the human spirit is capable of apprehending, receiving and responding to revelations of the Word in the objective order of the universe and of history. For, finally, the Word is the Absolute Object, who transcends and embraces that whole objective order, and yet penetrates all objects through which His revelations are mediated. This scheme of creative activity, as it passes into the form of revelation, holds good of the structure of religious revelation, wherever such revelation genuinely appears. But in the biblical religion, although not exclusively there, religion is primarily concerned with salvation; and revelation passes over into the form of redemptive activity. Here the Spirit of God disposes man to receive and to respond to the word of God's self-revelation. But here also God is revealed by the entry of His redeeming activity into history. This revelation of God's redeeming activity is mediated through objects and agents with an increasing emphasis upon mediatorial agents. The revelation, thus progressively bestowed, penetrates the human spirit with the assurance of God's gracious self-giving. But the revelation also transcends increasingly both its human recipients and the objects and agents through which it is mediated, until in the fullness of time the Redeemer appears, who is both the Eternal Object incarnate and the adequate agent of redemptive revelation. The new creation is occupied with the restoration and renewal of God's creative work and gifts through the salvation of man from his sinful estrangement. In the redeemed community of the New Order the revelation of God's love in Christ is mediated through an experience of salvation. 'The Incarnation is essentially the redeeming activity of God opening up the true way of life for man. The Incarnation is not primarily a theoretical answer to the intellectual problems involved in theistic belief, although it includes such an answer implicitly. It illuminates the mind, because it liberates the whole spirit of man.' [1] The true way of life for man was exhibited and achieved in the human life-story of the Incarnate Lord.[2] Christianity came into the world as a way of life with a specific doctrine of life; and this way and doctrine of life, once for all embodied in the life-story of the Incarnate Lord, is reproduced and perpetuated in the redeemed community. In the twofold scheme of creative activity the Spirit disposes organic processes to receive and to respond to the formative activity of the Word. In the redeemed community, however, this function of the Spirit is not simply applied to a further stage in the organic series. For the new organism is the product of a new creation, not a new level of the old creation.[1] The new creation was constituted by the Incarnation of the Word. But it is actualised in two epochs of redemptive activity. The first of these comprised the earthly life-story of the Incarnate Lord. The second derives from the events and experiences, which immediately followed the termination of that earthly life-story; events and experiences whose significance is focused for us in the two words Easter and Pentecost. The second epoch of the new creation began with the outpouring of the Spirit by the risen and ascended Lord.[2]

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[1] See above, pp. 197 and 320, 321.

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[1] Quoted from ch. ix.; see above, p. 224.

[2] See above, pp. 431, 432.

The second epoch of redemptive activity in the new creation is embodied in the new social organism, the redeemed community. The redeemed community is the product of the twofold creative activity of the ascended Lord and of His outpoured Spirit. The new social organism receives its objective form from the ascended Lord, who is its transcending principle of unity. Its interior unity and spiritual activity are derived from the new creative activity of the Holy Spirit operating in the sphere of the Incarnation.[3] The materials of the redeemed community are derived from the old order and taken up into the New Order by the transforming activity of the Holy Spirit. As the 'image' of the creative Word is impressed upon the spirit of man in the first creation, so the 'image' of the Incarnate Lord is impressed upon the spirit of man in the new creation. Through his creation in the image of the Word man is endowed with the capacity for a rational self-determining response to the Creator. Through his incorporation into the redeemed community—that is into the new organism of the Incarnate Lord—man becomes organic to the human response of the Incarnate Lord to the Father. Through the indwelling presence and activity of the Holy Spirit the human life and response of the Incarnate Lord are reproduced in the members of the redeemed community. The way of life in which Christianity consists was embodied perfectly in the life-story of the Incarnate Lord. The spiritual treasure of that life is eternal. It *is* the Kingdom of God in actuality. From it flows perennially the formative activity of the Word incarnate, which constitutes the creative principle of the Christian life lived in the redeemed community. The Spirit of Christ disposes the human material of the redeemed community to receive this life, and by His quickening activity transforms that material into conformity with the human life of the Incarnate Lord.

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[1] Cp. ch. ix. p. 228 and n. 2.

[2] It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that this spiritual fact does not depend upon the precise degree of historicity attaching to the narrative in Acts ii. The event of the Spirit's coming is written across the face of the New Testament literature.

[3] In that sphere the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Incarnate Lord. Here, as elsewhere, the complementary forms of creative activity are grounded upon the higher unities which belong to the interior life of the Blessed Trinity.

The starting-point of each individual life-story in the redeemed community is a new creation in Christ, which is also a new birth from the Spirit. Thus the individual spirit of man is reconstituted in Christ and becomes organic to the human response of the Incarnate Lord to the Father. By this fact a new state of communion with God is set up in the human spirit, a state which is negatively a cancelling of sinful estrangement, a forgiveness of sins, and positively the inflow of God's love into the heart through the indwelling of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit in the redeemed community is consistently referred in the New Testament either to the Father or simply to Christ's bestowal. The Spirit in the New Order is the Spirit of God and of Christ, the gift of God and the promise of the Father bestowed by Christ. In the Johannine teaching about the Paraclete the Spirit proceeds forth from the Father, is given by the Father at the Son's request, sent by the Father in the Son's name, and sent by the Son from the Father.[1] It is reasonable to infer from these statements that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son; and that this order of the Persons governs the structure of creative activity through all its stages, in the new creation as well as in the old order. With this the Christo-centric character of Christian experience is in harmony. For this experience is always referred in the first place to the objective revelation of 'the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ' in His Son. Upon the historical facts of Christ's redeeming life, death and resurrection the experience is grounded. From those facts it receives its form. To the transcendent Person of Christ the whole experience is referred and in Him it is focused. We are 'created in Christ Jesus.'[1] But, secondly, 'God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts;'[2] and 'hereby we know that we abide in Him and He in us, because He hath given to us of His Spirit.'[3]

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[1] Cp. above, ch. xii. § iv. and the conclusion of ch. xiii. § i. pp. 359, 360.

The Holy Spirit reproduces in the members of the redeemed community the content of the life, death and resurrection of the Incarnate Lord; not in external detail, but in a spiritual continuity of our life with His. As members of His new organism we are organically united to the Incarnate Lord. His human life is ours. The spiritual power and efficacy of that life can pass into us; and in that life which passes into us there is organically expressed the formative power and eternal response of His deity. Thus as we partake of His human life, through the indwelling of the Spirit, the response of the Son to the Father is reproduced in us. This response is the way of the Kingdom, which is also the way of the cross and the resurrection. Reconstituted in Christ, the redeemed spirit of man is in process of transformation through the indwelling activity of the Holy Spirit. A new way of self-transcendence is opened up, which carries redeemed humanity both in promise and in fulfilment to a level beyond the range of natural human capacity, as that capacity is constituted in the old order. The regulative standard of this new life is the revelation of God and His Kingdom given once for all in Christ and in His redeeming activity. The new life is directed by that revelation, which is the focus and consummation of all lines of revelation in the universe and in history. The new life finds its source in the domain of religious experience. But the Incarnate Lord as the Absolute Object, embodied in history yet transcendent over it, spans all avenues of revelation and all domains of experience. Consequently, the new life in Christ is not shut up within the domain of religious experience, as that domain arises in divergence from others. On the contrary, in so far as it is truly developed in accordance with its absolute standard in Christ, the new life passes out and enters into all domains of experience, bringing to them the consecrating touch of religion and receiving from them in turn the human materials of worship. Thus all life becomes religious, because all human interests are charged with significance for the new life. So too religion becomes, and is capable of becoming, fully human in its interest and in its scope. Christianity is the most human religion, because it is the most divine. It is the unfolding in history of the human response of Christ to the Father in its extension through the members of the redeemed community. In so far as the purpose of the Christian religion is fulfilled in man, the life of man becomes truly human, because it expresses in human terms that response to God for which man was made.

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[1] Eph. ii. 10.

[2] Gal. iv. 6; and note the order of *vv.* 4–7 here with the twice repeated ἐξαπέστειλεν.

[3] 1 John iv. 13.

The response to the revelation in Christ is made through the indwelling activity of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, whose creative activity underlies man's spirit and who quickens and inspires all human response to the eternal order, takes the human material of the redeemed community and sets it upon the way of self-transcendence, which is the way of the Kingdom. Human life is situated between conflicting claims of truth and error, of good and evil, of righteousness and sin. The Holy Spirit directs the recreated life of man into a way of response, whose goal is the truth and goodness and righteousness and love revealed in Christ. This way of response involves the conflict of self-transcendence or of dying to self, which was manifested in its ultimate historical form in the passion and death of

Christ. But this is also the way of true self-attainment, by which the spirit of man moves towards that final wholeness and harmony for which it was created. And so it is also the way of resurrection, by which man passes out of the toils of non-attainment, ethical failure and sinful estrangement into the spiritual liberty of the children of God. Man was made to attain this spiritual liberty through the law of self-determination, which involves self-transcendence. There is no attainment of liberty for our finite individuality, unless we wield the very relative autonomy which we possess in order to surrender it to the purposes of a larger whole than our finite selves. But we cannot surrender the spiritual fortress of the self unreservedly to any other finite individual, or to the social organism in any of its forms, or even to communion with the eternal order in one or more of its diverse aspects. Spiritual liberty may be won through self-surrender to each and all of these in various degrees, but only so with the proviso that such forms of self-surrender cannot be unreserved. In all of these something must be left over. The deepest level of man's spiritual craving is reserved for God alone in His concrete actuality, and can be satisfied only in those interchanges of love which we call communion with God and the offering of worship to Him. The eternal archetypes of these spiritual interchanges exist in the life of the Blessed Trinity. Through the new creation redeemed humanity is taken up into the organism of the Incarnate Lord, which is the adequate organ of these spiritual interchanges in so far as they can be embodied in finite form. In the Incarnate Lord we can contemplate the adequate object of all spiritual desire and the adequate end of all spiritual endeavour. To Him as the object of all desire and the end of all endeavour our re-created spirits are united by His indwelling Spirit. Thus the Incarnate Lord is truly present to our faith both as object and as end. As such He is the eternal focus of all spiritual activities in the redeemed community. But He is even more than this. His life is the content of the Christian life in its response to His transcendent otherness. He, who is both the Creator and re-creator of our spirits, can penetrate the members of His own organism in the sphere of the Incarnation more profoundly than can ever be the case with the divergent aspects of eternity. Yet it is also true that His penetration of redeemed humanity can include within itself in the kingdom of God all other penetrations of man's spirit by the refracted aspects of eternity. Our response to His penetration of our finite spirits is also *His* response to the Father actualised in us by His quickening Spirit, the Spirit who alone can restore and complete the fragmentary movements of the human spirit Godward. Such language, however, sanctioned as it appears to be by St. Paul, has no pantheistic reference. For the response of Christ in us to the redemptive revelation of Christ transcendent over us is the way of complete attainment and self-actualisation for finite individuality. The more Christ is formed in us, the more truly we become ourselves. The more we surrender to and are controlled by the new creative activities of His Spirit the more truly we become spiritually free individuals. The perpetual enlargement and enrichment of the re-created self, which the Incarnate Lord effects in His members, have for their goal a perfected society of spiritual selves, whose freedom is complete in God.

V

The new organism of the Incarnate Lord is developed and built up in its extended process through history. The first means by which this development takes place is through the incorporation of human material into the social nucleus of the new organism, that is the Church. The Spirit of the Incarnate Lord gives unity to the new social organism by His indwelling presence. The Holy Spirit in His deity possesses the absolute individuality of the Godhead in its wholeness. As a Person of the Trinity He transcends the individual and social principles as they exist finitely in the redeemed community. All His activities in the redeemed community are both individual and social. The new birth from the Spirit in baptism is the beginning of a re-created individual life which has in it the promise of completed selfhood. But this new life of the individual has no meaning apart from the redeemed community to which it belongs and within which it is manifested. The activities of the Holy Spirit, described in the New Testament interpretations of experience, are activities manifested within the sphere of the redeemed community.[1] Similarly the gifts and graces which He bestows are bestowed upon individuals within the redeemed community; and the effects or fruits of these bestowals are manifested in the new fellowship of the Spirit which characterises the redeemed community. Effective membership in the new community is judged by the possession of the Spirit's *charismata*. These were at first characterised by abnormal psychic phenomena. But St. Paul taught the Church a deeper and more ethical conception of the Spirit's gifts. Their true value is to be sought in their contribution to the building up of the body of Christ. The gifts are of various kinds. Some are for the building up of character by raising the spirit of man to heights of ethical and spiritual achievement beyond the range of 'natural' human capacity, although their effect is to make man more truly natural by developing his nature along its true path of development. Other gifts are functional. Their purpose is the equipment of individuals to fulfil adequately their special vocations and to exercise functions in the new social organism. But, whether primarily ethical or primarily vocational and functional in character, all the gifts alike have religious significance. For all are manifestations of the one operation of the Spirit, by which the redeemed community is built up corporately and individually in its response to the Incarnate Lord, the response of human faith to the one adequate object of desire and endeavour; a response which, again, is taken up into the one eternal response of the Son to the Father. Thus the redeemed community is extended and developed by the incorporation of new members, by their training in vocation and by the transforming development of individual character which builds up the new social organism in conformity to the way of the Kingdom. The new social organism thus developing is a worshipping community, whose bond of unity in worship is the Eucharist, and whose goal is 'the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ' in a perfected society of spiritual selves.

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[1] The case of Cornelius (in Acts x.) is not strictly an exception; for he was brought 'within the sphere of the redeemed community' by a gift of the Spirit preceding his baptism.

The process described in the last paragraph was referred to as the first means by which the new organism of the Incarnate Lord is developed and built up in its extended process through history. The method is that of an intensive development of the new life within the Church as the social nucleus of the new organism. But the building up of the Church as the new social organism cannot be the only means by which the new organism of the Incarnate Lord moves out in its development to the limits of history. For the Church is not the kingdom of God, but the organ of the Kingdom in the transformed history which is the process of the new creation.[1] Until the kingdom of God is manifested in that final transformation of history which lies on the horizon of Christian hope, the Church, as the new social organism, stands over against the larger organism of human society, interlocked with it in countless ways, yet distinct from it. The new creation can supersede nothing which is proper to human life in its own order. It cannot invade the autonomies of human life in such a way as to override them. It can, however, conduct such autonomous developments towards their true goal in Christ. Consequently, alongside the method of intensive development within the new social organism there is another method. There is not only an upward movement within the social nucleus of the new organism; there is also a movement outwards, which seeks to redeem and to consecrate man as he is in his divergent domains of human interest, and in all the varied structure of concrete embodiments to which human interests give rise and through which they are expressed. Man has many loyalties—intellectual, aesthetic, moral and social, civic and economic, national and international. All of these are embodied in their own characteristic institutions and have their own relative autonomies. These loyalties claim the allegiance of all men in this way or in that. They arise out of man's spiritual constitution and provide the environment of large parts of his spiritual life. They are essential to the fabric of the kingdom of God among men. They are to be taken up by transformation into the fabric of the new organism; and the Church, as the organ of the Kingdom, is the ministering servant of that vast process. The redeemed community, in so far as it is true to its vocation, holds up before mankind the revelation of the Kingdom manifested in Christ. It has a gospel to proclaim, which is not concerned solely with the redemption of individual character and the training of individual lives in a worshipping fellowship. For the redemption of individual character cannot be simply lifted out of the context of its manifold environment. The sanctification of character cannot be adequately accomplished apart from the sanctification of the activities, interests, occupations and relationships in which character is manifested. Thus the gospel revelation of the kingdom of God in Christ sets in motion a process of judgment (in the Johannine sense) not only upon the sins and failures of individuals, but upon all the collective failure and incompleteness, the moral blindness and social injustices, the malformations of structure, the complacent materialism and corporate denial of human values which from age to age enter into the very texture of human society. Conversely, the witness of the Church to that revelation must involve a demand for the transformation of all human activities and relationships until they are ultimately conformed to the reality of the gospel. But this demand is a spiritual demand which cannot force the issue by artificial methods. There are no short cuts to the kingdom of God. There is an apocalyptic urgency involved in its claims upon all human life. There is scope for the highest courage of witness, and not less of self-criticism, in pressing home those claims in their detailed application to the complex life of man. But wisdom and patience must also have their perfect work. The gospel includes a revelation of man's spiritual dignity and significance, which reinforces the witness of reason in declaring that we are made for spiritual freedom. The kingdom of God can come only through man's willing co-operation with the grace of God; and this co-operation cannot be forced. It must be freely given in response to the gracious invitation of the gospel with which the Church is entrusted.

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[1] Cp. the definitions given above in §§ iii. and iv. pp. 442, 443.

There are then two ways in which the new organism of the Incarnate Lord develops in an extended process through history towards the fulfilment of the kingdom of God. The one is interior, the other exterior. The one builds up intensively the social nucleus of the new organism; the other moves out extensively into the field of influence proper to the new organism, namely, the complex life of man, variously organised and differentiated, and endowed with a wealth of spiritual interests, gifts and needs. By the first way human individuality is taken up into the social nucleus of the new organism, that its Godward aspect may receive concrete wholeness of nourishment and of expression in a worshipping community. By the second way the leaven of the gospel percolates through the whole structure of human life, in its autonomously organised spheres of activity and embodiment, and lifts these diverse spheres of activity towards their true end in the kingdom of God. These two ways of development are interwoven in history and are mutually necessary to one another. The redeemed community is the special focus of religious experience and expression, and the organ through which the redeeming activities of the Incarnate Lord take hold of human life and lift it Godward. On the other hand, human life is one; and there is no simple and unambiguous dichotomy possible between the Church and mankind as a whole. The Incarnate Lord is organic not only to the redeemed community and its members, however we define these terms, but also to the whole human race with its divergent activities and their embodiments. All these are relevant to Him and He to them. He cares as much for the astronomer at his telescope as for the churchman at his prayers. He transcends and spans all domains of experience. Salvation means the gathering of all mankind into fellowship with God in a redeemed order; where the redeemed community will be one with the social organism of humanity, and where the whole structure of human life in its rich diversity will be gathered up into one harmonious oblation of worship to the Creator.

ADDITIONAL NOTE C

OBJECTS AND EVENTS

THE organic conceptions which have been embodied in the text of this book are closely connected with the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. It seems desirable, therefore, to indicate the extent of my obligations to that distinguished philosopher. This note is written with that end in view. I propose, first of all, to give a summary of some leading features of Professor Whitehead's thought, and then to indicate broadly the way in which the present work is related to that thought and to the terminology in which it is presented.

In referring to Professor Whitehead's published works the following symbols will be used for the sake of abbreviation :

PNK² = *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (2nd edition, 1925).
CN = *The Concept of Nature* (1st edition, 1920).
SMW = *Science and the Modern World* (1st edition, 1925).
RM = *Religion in the Making* (1st edition, 1926).

These works are all published by the Cambridge University Press.

I

One of the most important features of the system of thought set forth in these writings is the distinction drawn between *objects* and *events.* Large parts of the works referred to above are occupied with defining the meanings which Dr. Whitehead attaches to these two words. To understand his thought upon these two subjects and upon their mutual relations is to have penetrated to the heart of his system. But closely related to these topics are important discussions concerning *space* and *time.* The doctrine of events arises directly out of a radical transformation in our conceptions of nature, rendered necessary by recent advances and discoveries in mathematical physics. Absolute space, absolute time and absolute matter are now replaced by relative space, relative time and events. 'The way out of the perplexities, as to the ultimate data of science . . . is to express the essential scientific concepts of time, space and material as issuing from fundamental relations between events and from recognitions of the characters of events' (PNK^2 2·5). Space and time are interrelated in a four-dimensional continuum of space-time; and there is a plurality of space-time systems. Of these questions some account is given in PNK^2 Part III. Events are discussed in PNK^2 chs. v. and vi. They are also the principal theme of CN. In the latter work the discussion is related to a critique of earlier concepts such as substance, matter and ether. Objects are treated in PNK^2 chs. v. and vii., and more extensively in Part IV of the same work. They recur again in CN ch. vii. The general theory of the concept of nature (events, objects and space-time) is summarised in CN chs. viii. and ix. SMW is a work which it would be almost impossible to analyse, beyond saying that the system outlined in the earlier works reappears here on the background of a historical survey of science in its relation to the general development of European culture. But also in this work some aspects of the writer's thought are developed more fully. This is particularly the case with two subjects, (i) the concept of the *organism* and (ii) *eternal objects*. Moreover, whereas PNK and CN are occupied with 'nature' as the subject-matter of the physical sciences, SMW sketches out an organic conception of the universe as a whole. Into this sketch the philosophy of religion and other metaphysical questions are introduced. These wider considerations receive further treatment in RM.

The principal discrimination throughout is that which concerns distinctions between objects and events. This is probably the most difficult part of Dr. Whitehead's scheme. On the whole, perhaps CN ch. viii provides the clearest exposition for a preliminary approach. Nature exhibits two aspects, the one passing and the other permanent. The elements which pass are called events; the permanent elements are objects. Nature is essentially a process (PNK^2 Note II, p. 202). Events are the units of this process. Events cannot recur; for they are unique. They pass; and we cannot recapture them. This is what Dr. Whitehead means by 'the passage of nature.' Events overlap. Thus there is continuity in the moving process of nature. But if we look for this continuity in terms of bits of matter, stuff or material ether spread out through space we are on a false track. For modern physics asserts *discontinuity* in the path of the electron (SMW chs. ii. and viii.). Vibrations provide the key to the situation. 'We shall conceive each primordial element as a vibratory ebb and flow of an underlying energy, or activity. Suppose we keep to the physical idea of energy: then each primordial element will be an organised system of vibratory streaming of energy.' The vibratory ebb and flow is periodic. A definite period is therefore associated with each element. An illustration given is that of the ocean tides. 'This system, forming the primordial element, is nothing at any instant. It requires a whole period in which to manifest itself.' 'Apart from being a periodic system, such an element would have no existence.' Such a system may be called a 'vibratory organism' (SMW pp. 52–55). Thus, strictly speaking, there are no 'bits of matter.' In RM (p. 108) Dr. Whitehead accepts such a phrase as adequately representing Descartes' material substances; but he proceeds to show that the conception is altogether misleading. There are only organisms of various kinds with their mutual relations. Each periodic vibratory ebb and flow of the electron may be regarded as an event. Such a particular event never recurs. It passes. On the other hand, the electron endures as an organism. Here we pass over from the passage of nature to its other aspect—namely, permanence.

The permanent elements in nature are objects. Objects enter into events, but are always to be distinguished from them. There are different kinds of objects, which must be distinguished from one another: (i) The objects most familiar to common sense may be called *perceptual objects*. Such are chairs and tables, stones and trees. But under abnormal conditions we may be deluded in our perceptions. It is convenient, therefore, to distinguish again. (ii) *Physical objects* are perceptual objects which are *not* delusive. They are the common objects, such as those just mentioned under (i), which are perceived in nature by the human mind under normal conditions of experience. But again, if any permanent element can be called an object, further distinctions are necessary. Physical objects are complex; objects of other kinds enter into their constitution. For example, any such natural object has colour and shape, possibly also sound or scent, or again a plurality of colours. (iii) Colours, sounds, scents and so forth are *sense-objects*; for they are the immediate objects of our senses. Further, there is a correlation between different kinds of sense-objects, as they enter into nature, for example, as between objects of sight and touch. This is called the 'conveyance' of one sense-object by another. Through this fact of 'conveyance' we have sense-awareness of the more complex perceptual objects and physical objects, into whose constitution a plurality of sense-objects enter (CN pp. 154, 155). The relations of 'part' and 'whole' obtain between events, but not, strictly speaking, between objects as such. The reason for this is that 'part' and 'whole' belong to space and time, which are the modes of interrelationship between events. Objects enter into space-time relations not directly but mediately through their relation to events (PNK² 15·2. But this is somewhat modified in Note II, *ibid.* p. 202: 'Natural objects require space and time, so that space and time belong to their relational essence without which they cannot be themselves.') Objects are said to be *situated* in events. (iv) Besides sense-objects there is another important class of objects which enter into the constitution of the complex physical object. These are the electrons and protons, atoms and molecules, into which science analyses the physical objects. Objects of this type are called *scientific objects*. For a lucid account of these distinctions between objects the reader may also be referred to C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, Part II, ch. ix. pp. 328–335. The classification given above is by no means exhaustive. Dr. Whitehead apparently holds that there is an indefinite number of different kinds of objects. One further distinction which becomes important in his more recent works may be noted. Physical objects and scientific objects are characterised by 'endurance.' They are *enduring objects*. Sense-objects have an altogether different kind of permanence. They are characterised by 'eternality.' They are *eternal objects*. There are also other kinds of eternal objects besides (SMW pp. 126, 127 and 217).

The relations of objects to events are variously described. Sometimes objects are referred to as the characters or qualities which differentiate events. More frequently they are said to be situated in events, or again to be *ingredient* into events or into nature (cp. CN ch. vii. and SMW pp. 103 ff.: 'a sense-object has ingression into space-time'). To come to fuller details, enduring objects (whether they be electrons or mountains) are situated in events. The event passes and the object endures. There is, however, a continuity of events; and the enduring object is situated in a series of such events. Each event occupies a *duration* of space-time. This word *duration* has great importance in Dr. Whitehead's scheme. In the two earlier works durations of time are referred to occasionally (*e.g.* 'a determinate duration of time,' CN p. 37, cp. p. 58; and PNK^2 2·5). But this, he points out, is an abstraction. A duration, in the full implication of the term, is a 'temporal slab of nature' (PNK^2 16 and 33·3). 'The word "duration" is perhaps unfortunate in so far as it suggests a mere abstract stretch. This is not what I mean. A duration is a concrete slab of nature limited by simultaneity which is an essential factor disclosed in sense-awareness' (CN p. 53). 'Simultaneity' here does not mean 'being at an instant.' It is the 'togetherness' of nature disclosed to sense-awareness in the specious present. The specious present always involves a period of time, however brief. Consequently the simultaneity of nature is disclosed to sense-awareness in the four-dimensional continuum of space-time. The duration is the unit of this simultaneity. Events may be simultaneous within such a duration; and there is a continuity of durations, as there is a continuity of events. A 'percipient event' is the locus of the perceiving mind. The peculiar relationship of mind to nature through sense-awareness is indicated by saying that the percipient event is '*cogredient* with the duration' (PNK^2 16·2–16·5; CN pp. 108–111, 186–189). Upon this relationship of *cogredience* depends knowledge. But further, 'our knowledge of the peculiar characters of different events depends upon our power of comparison. I call the exercise of this factor in our knowledge "recognition."' 'Perception involves apprehension of the event and recognition of the factors of its character.' Thus there is *apprehension* of events and *recognition* of objects. Recognition and abstraction are mutually involved in each other (CN p. 189).

SMW is mainly concerned with outlining an organic theory of nature. This is the theme of the central chapters, although their form is that of a historical survey. Pp. 150–158 (ch. vi.) contain a typically important statement of such an organic theory. Here some of the leading concepts, such as events, eternal objects and organisms, are brought together in a unified scheme. An event is 'the ultimate unit of natural occurrence.' All events are interconnected. 'This interfusion of events is effected by the aspects of those eternal objects, such as colours, sounds, scents, geometrical characters, which are required for nature and are not emergent from it.' Through this relation of eternal objects to events patterns of aspects occur. 'A non-materialistic philosophy of nature will identify a primary organism as being the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped in the unity of a real event' (*ibid.* p. 151). 'However you analyse the event according to the flux of its parts through time, there is the same thing-for-its-own-sake standing before you.' 'It thus realises itself under the guise of an enduring individual entity, with a life-history contained within itself' (*ibid.* p. 153). 'An individual entity, whose own life-history is a part within the life-history of some larger, deeper, more complete pattern, is liable to have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its own being, and to experience modifications of that larger pattern reflected in itself as modifications of its own being. This is the theory of organic mechanism' (p. 156). 'The general principle is that in a new environment there is an evolution of the old entities into new forms' (p. 156). Again, 'the whole point of the modern doctrine is the evolution of the complex organisms from antecedent states of less complex organisms. The doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of organism as fundamental for nature. It also requires an underlying activity—a substantial activity—expressing itself in individual embodiments, and evolving in achievements of organism. The organism is a unit of emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal objects, emerging for its own sake' (*ibid.* p. 157). 'The emergence of organisms depends on a selective activity which is akin to purpose' (pp. 157, 158). 'Enduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal process; whereas eternal things are the elements required for the very being of the process' (p. 158). These quotations require no comment; they can speak for themselves.

Epistemology is considered in SMW pp. 128–134, after an interesting discussion of Bishop Berkeley's dilemmas (*ibid.* pp. 98–107). These dilemmas are solved by clearing 'space and time from the taint of simple location' (p. 106). The way is thus opened for the acceptance of a 'provisional realism' (*ibid.* pp. 93, 105, 132). Eternal objects receive a more systematic treatment in SMW ch. x. The author remarks that 'these transcendent entities have been termed "universals."' But he prefers to avoid the presuppositions which cling to that term 'owing to its prolonged philosophical history' (*ibid*. p. 228; cp. also PNK² Note I). In the same chapter (SMW x.) the term *occasion* makes its appearance with a technical meaning which it is not easy to determine (see also *ibid*. pp. 37–41, 65). The following chapter (xi.) treats of God in relation to the 'realm of eternal objects' and to the 'process of actual occasions.' The trinity involved in the last sentence (God, eternal objects, occasions) provides the threefold scheme of Dr. Whitehead's ultimate metaphysic. This scheme is in some respects more clearly and fully expounded in RM (particularly chs. iii. and iv.). It would seem that in SMW (chs. x. and xi.) and in RM (ch. iii.) the 'occasion' has replaced the 'event,' so far as terminology is concerned. But there is, perhaps, more than a mere change of term. The word 'event' was defined in the earlier writings in relation to the spatio-temporal continuum of nature. In Dr. Whitehead's earlier expositions of 'nature' mind is excluded from consideration, except in so far as it is involved in his statements about 'percipient events,' 'cogredience' and 'sense-awareness' (cp. also PNK² Note I, the last paragraph, p. 202). Thus the event seems to belong to the physical order. In the later works, however, a whole metaphysic comes into view, including God, a Platonic order of reality, and finite minds. In this scheme 'occasion' may mean either an event in the physical order as previously defined or a purely mental event (RM pp. 91, 102). 'Occasions of actualization . . . are the primary actual units of which the temporal world is composed.' 'The actual world is a community of epochal occasions' (*ibid*. p. 91). Here the term 'epochal' is introduced without explanation. But by reference to SMW ch. viii. we can get at the ideas which are implied. There we are told, in connexion with the quantum theory, that 'realisation proceeds *viâ* a succession of epochal durations' (p. 197). The last quotation occurs in a discussion about the 'periodic' behaviour of vibratory systems, such as the ultimate units of nature (here called 'primates') are supposed to be. The 'endurance' of such a system occurs through the 'reiteration' of its pattern in a succession of durations. On p. 193 we are told what is meant by 'reiteration.' 'In the organic theory, a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated sameness through time. The pattern may be essentially one of aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of time for its unfolding. A tune is an example of such a pattern. Thus the endurance of the pattern now means the reiteration of its succession of contrasts.' 'When we translate this notion into the abstractions of physics, it at once becomes the technical notion of "vibration."' Thus it appears that an 'epochal occasion' corresponds to a vibratory period in physics, or more generally to the reiteration of any pattern in its corresponding duration.

In RM the epochal occasion is the unit of structure pervading the whole of nature and history. Both matter and mind ' persist through a route of such occasions ' (RM p. 108). In a discussion of body and spirit we are told that ' there are two routes of creative passage from a physical occasion.' ' The physical route links together physical occasions as successive temporal incidents in the life of a body. The other route links this bodily life with a correlative mental life.' A mental occasion is designated ' an ultimate fact in the spiritual world, just as a physical occasion . . . is an ultimate fact in the physical world. There is an essential reference from one world to the other ' (RM pp. 102, 103). An epochal occasion is described as a ' concretion,' that is ' a mode in which diverse elements come together into a real unity.' ' The various elements which are thus brought into unity are the other creatures and the ideal forms and God ' (*ibid.* pp. 92, 93). The epochal occasion has already been described as a ' creature ' (*ibid.* p. 91). This would appear to be an unusual designation, when we remember that a mind is a route of mental occasions (*ibid.* pp. 108, 109). The thought seems to be that a vibration, a pattern and a single mental experience exhibit types of unity manifesting creativity. ' A mind must be a route whose various occasions exhibit some community of type of value.' ' An electron must be a route whose various occasions exhibit some community of type of value ' (*ibid.* p. 109). The term ' creature,' in its generally accepted sense, indicates an individual entity, that is, a thing or a living organism, as the case may be. Dr. Whitehead's use of the word seems to suggest that we should look below these units, which embody the permanent aspects of the universe. For their permanence is displayed in their reiterated patterns of activity. Occasion is the unit of process. It is the spear-head of creativity in process, because it is the focus of ' concretion ' (in a precisely defined use of that term). The type of unity and permanence which belongs to the electron is manifested precisely in the periodic vibration. The type of unity and permanence which belongs to a human mind is manifested precisely in a given unit of experience. The unit typifies and mirrors the whole to which it belongs. Occasions are strung along a route in the directive movement of the universe, regarded as a developing process. Occasions are also interrelated in communities in the social fabric of the universe, regarded as an interconnected scheme.

' The inexhaustible realm of abstract forms ' (RM p. 160), of ' ideal forms ' (*ibid.* pp. 93, 151 *et al.*) or of ' eternal objects ' (SMW) is described in its internal connexions and in its modes of ingression into the spatio-temporal continuum in two chapters to which previous reference has been made (SMW chs. x. and xi.). RM develops this description in relation to occasions, creativity and creatures. 'In the concretion the creatures are qualified by the ideal forms and conversely the ideal forms are qualified by the creatures' (RM p. 93). This system is completed in its conception of God, summarily stated in SMW (ch. xi. pp. 250, 257, 258), and more fully, but all too briefly, expounded in RM (especially pp. 150–160). It would be unsafe to attempt here an exposition or estimate of such short statements on such a subject. But it may be well to draw attention to a reservation laid down on pp. 110, 111 of RM (ch. iii. § vi. last paragraph) in regard to the question of immortality. 'There is no reason why such a question should not be decided on more special evidence, religious or otherwise, provided that it is trustworthy.' What is here laid down in regard to a particular topic arising out of the argument in that lecture (RM iii.) may well be taken as a canon of interpretation to be borne in mind in considering Dr. Whitehead's treatment of religion as a whole.

II

The bare summary given above is necessarily very inadequate. It has not been attempted with the idea of giving a complete account of Dr. Whitehead's thought, still less of doing justice to that thought. Within the limits of this short note that would be manifestly impossible. Some important questions have been deliberately omitted. Nothing, for example, has been said about 'the method of extensive abstraction' (PNK² Part III; CN ch. iv.). It belongs to the more technical side of Dr. Whitehead's writings. Its details pertain to a mathematical order which the present writer has no competence to discuss. It enters into the new conceptions of space which lie behind the new doctrine of events. A useful discussion of the subject will be found in C. D. Broad's *Scientific Thought*, ch. i. Two other topics have been omitted from the preceding summary, namely: (i) the criticism of the idea of 'simple location' with its 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' (SMW ch. iv.); and (ii) the description of 'abstractive hierarchies' (SMW ch. x.). The former is closely connected with Dr. Whitehead's 'provisional realism,' linking it to his theories about space, time and events. The latter provides an analysis of 'the realm of eternal objects.' Both topics, therefore, are highly relevant to material contained in the present work. They are omitted here because they are difficult subjects which cannot be usefully expounded in a brief statement.

The aim of the present note is more restricted. It seemed desirable to give some detailed justification for the use of new conceptions and modes of thought, for which Professor Whitehead is the leading sponsor to-day. On the other hand, it must of course be understood that the author alone is responsible for the use made of such material in the text of the present work. On that question something must now be said. When this book was planned and begun, I had only recently become acquainted with Dr. Whitehead's writings. His thought is not easy to assimilate on a first reading. Moreover, the terminology which he employs is to a large extent new and peculiar. That, no doubt, is mainly due to the originality of the thought which lies behind. For those who are not specialists in mathematics and physical science there are additional difficulties upon which it is unnecessary to enlarge. Accordingly the earlier part of the present work was written under the influence of Dr. Whitehead's thought, but without such detailed appreciation of that thought as a more prolonged study of his work alone could yield. I had, however, previously had the advantage of reading the Gifford Lectures of S. Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, works with which Dr. Whitehead acknowledges some affinity (SMW p. xi). J. C. Smuts' *Holism and Evolution*, also, made a strong impression. Moreover, other writers have in more indirect ways been preparing the ground for the new philosophy of nature. Some of these have received due acknowledgment in footnotes to the text of this book. The scheme of a graded universe, which is expounded with such fullness by Professor Alexander, can be detached as a scheme from the Spinozist and monistic interpretations which he gives to it. This scheme is becoming familiar to-day. It is clearly presupposed in Dr. Whitehead's later works. But it is also present by implication in PNK ch. xviii. (first published in 1919). Speaking generally, it would be true to say that the theory of objects and events and of their mutual relations became clearer to me as the writing of this book proceeded. Accordingly it is probable that this group of ideas is more precisely formulated in some of the concluding chapters of Part II than is the case anywhere in Part I (see, however, the statement on p. 124 of the text).

It would be a mistake to look for an exact reproduction of Dr. Whitehead's terminology in this book. To attempt such a thing would in any case have been precarious, cramping to thought, and of doubtful value, even if carried out systematically. In so far as the book is under obligations to his way of thinking, this dependence must be regarded as issuing in an interpretation and application of his principles rather than as involving anything in the nature of a point-to-point reproduction. Moreover, it is obvious that Christian theology has its own problems and its own 'special evidence' (cp. the quotation from RM with which the first part of this note concluded). In every age it has its own destiny to fulfil, although within certain conditions of thought and language which belong to a given state of knowledge. One of the most refreshing facts about Dr. Whitehead's outlook is his constant recognition that religion has its own contribution to make to the ultimate synthesis.

The general character of my obligations has now been stated. We must pass to some details which will illustrate these general remarks. The references which follow refer to the text of the present work unless otherwise stated. In chapter ii., at the beginning of § iii. (p. 40), there occurs a passage which is also quoted at length in chapter v. § iii. (p. 123). This passage has some importance, as regards terminology, inasmuch as it introduces a definite use of the term 'object'—a use which recurs repeatedly in succeeding chapters. Dr. Whitehead's comprehensive and many-sided theory of objects seemed to make it desirable that my own use of the word should be carefully determined. Accordingly, in the passage in question, the objects designated are called *physical objects.* The term is used deliberately, and is taken directly from Dr. Whitehead with the precise meaning which he attaches to it. If an elaborate terminology of objects was to be avoided this was the obvious course to take. For 'physical object,' as defined by Whitehead, stands nearer to the untechnical everyday use of the word 'object' than is the case with any other employment of the term in his scheme. I believe that this use of the word 'object' will be found to be maintained with tolerable consistency from the passage indicated onwards throughout the remaining chapters of this book, except where something else is clearly indicated in the context. The term *enduring object,* however, occurs in some later passages. As the summary above has shown, this must be taken, in the text, to include *scientific,* as well as *physical,* objects. Also one important exception will be noted presently. Examples of the prevailing use of the term occur on p. 279 (ch. x. § v.), where reference is made to 'organic unity manifested in physical objects' and to an 'ascending series of objects.' Again, a few lines further on there occurs the phrase: 'each physical object perceived has the character of a unit of active energy. . . .' In such instances I have had to take my own risks in choice of language. No one can read Dr. Whitehead carefully without realising that his use of terms subserves a series of very delicate discriminations which do not always lie open upon the surface of his condensed style. Some of these finer discriminations seem to be suggested rather than formulated. A case in point is the relation of organisms to objects. As I understand his thought, the organism in its spatio-temporal context represents the marriage of objects with events. In this connexion the complex physical object might in many cases be simply identified with an organism with approximate accuracy. (For the actual difference in the case of living organisms see PNK² 64·5 and 64·6.) Also, on Whitehead's reading of matter, a similar identification of terms in the case of 'scientific objects' would hold good (cp. again the sentence from PNK² Note II, p. 202, quoted above on p. 458 of the present work: 'Natural objects require, etc.'). Consequently I have not scrupled to use language which suggests such an identification, as in the passages from chapter x. quoted above. But if reference is made to that context (p. 279 above) it will be observed that a difference is also suggested. For if from one point of view an organism may be regarded as an object, from another point of view it may be regarded as an event with a special character, a patterned event, a grouping of events, a developing activity, a community of epochal occasions, or a route of such occasions. All these phrases suggest different shades of discriminations. But they could not have been largely employed in the text without running into lengthy and intolerable technicalities, and so distracting attention from the main argument of the book. For a similar reason, in the passage of chapter ii. § iii. (pp. 40, 123 above) to which reference has already been made, the word *duration* is used with the common meaning 'a period of time' or 'a determinate duration of time' (cp. the use of this phrase in CN and PNK^2 quoted above, p. 459). There was nothing to be gained by intruding Dr. Whitehead's technical use of the word in that particular context.

The 'realm of eternal objects' is represented in the text of the present work by the key-phrase 'the eternal order.' The terminology of objects has not been developed in this book in that context of thought. On the other hand, the eternal order (in my use of the phrase) corresponds so closely to the realm of eternal objects that the terminology of objects was always ready to hand. It is actually employed in the last two chapters of the book (chs. xiv. and xv.) in connexion with the doctrine of the Trinity. This is the 'important exception' referred to above on p. 465. From pp. 416, 417 onwards there occur references to the Eternal Son as the 'adequate' or 'eternal object of the Father's self-expression,' 'the One Eternal Object,' 'the Absolute Object,' or again 'the Eternal Object incarnate.' In this connexion, in so far as a terminology of objects and events is concerned, the essence of the whole book will be found in chapter xv. § i. The statement set forth in that section clearly involves the implication that the Eternal Word embraces 'the realm of eternal objects' in Himself. But as in the terminology of this book eternal objects are represented by forms, principles and standards of the eternal order, it was possible to reserve the term 'eternal object' with an absolute significance to the Person of the Eternal Son. In this connexion it is worth while to note the language used in a passage near the conclusion of RM (p. 154): 'This ideal world of conceptual harmonization is merely a description of God Himself. Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. The kingdom of heaven is God.' RM was read somewhat hurriedly whilst the present work was being written. Thus I had no recollection of the passage just quoted until it was re-read after the text of *The Incarnate Lord* had been completed. The relevance of the quotation, however, is obvious.

It will be useful to set beside these points of correspondence an instance of complete contrast in the terminology of the present work as compared with the writings under consideration. In Dr. Whitehead's terminology God is the 'principle of concretion' or 'the ultimate limitation.' 'God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality' (SMW pp. 250, 257). On the other hand, He is 'the actual but non-temporal entity' (RM p. 90), 'that non-temporal actuality which has to be taken account of in every creative phase' (*ibid.* p. 94). This denial of concreteness to God is in verbal contradiction to expressions such as 'concrete individuality' employed throughout the present work as applicable to deity, *e.g.* on pp. 86–88, 109 above. Etymologically Dr. Whitehead is correct. Words like 'concrete' and 'concretion' are employed in a number of connexions which bear out his use, a use which he has carefully defined. 'An epochal occasion is a concretion. It is a mode in which diverse elements come together into a real unity' (RM pp. 92, 93). With this definition God obviously cannot be concrete. This, however, is not the meaning which 'concrete' bears in the relevant passages of the present work. A reference to Murray's *New English Dictionary* will show the legitimacy of the word as I have used it. One meaning of the word is given as follows: 'Opposed to abstract. (The ordinary current sense.)'[1] The chief objection to my use of the word is that, as the dictionary points out, the term itself has had so many meanings that it has been the despair of logicians. This is serious. But on the other hand 'the ordinary current sense' of a word ought not to occasion difficulty. There is nothing abstract about God, just because He is Absolute Reality. The term selected to indicate this fact, as in the case of all language employed for attributes of the Deity, must necessarily be used by way of analogy and in a more eminent sense. In finite process there is concreteness all the way up the scale of the organic series. But as the series advances the principle of individuality becomes more inclusive of those aspects of reality which can be reflected in a finite order. Consequently it becomes further removed from abstraction, because more directly and fully significant of that which reality is in the all-embracing actuality of deity. Now just because, on the one hand, the series has this character of an advancing capacity for reflecting the significance of Absolute Reality, and yet, on the other hand, at the summit of the series the minds which so mirror reality are finite and limited, it follows that finite spirits can have only a discursive knowledge of reality, refracted through aspects of the eternal order and in divergent domains of experience. It is a commonplace of theology that we cannot know God in His simplicity; for the divine simplicity stands in uttermost contrast to abstraction. We cannot know the simplicity of God apart from abstraction. Yet that undivided simplicity spans all our avenues of approach to itself. This is one of the dilemmas of theism which can be transcended only by facing all the facts. Now if 'concrete' be taken to mean 'the opposite of abstract,' then the more inclusive the principle of individuality becomes with respect to the aspects of reality the more concrete individuality must be. This is expressed in the text by saying that 'the movement of the series is towards increase of concreteness' (see above, p. 422, and cp. also pp. 66, 67). But God includes all aspects of reality; for He is Absolute Reality. Consequently He is also utterly Concrete Individuality.

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[1] *Op. cit.* vol. ii. p. 776, col. i. § 5.

The illustration which has just been given will serve to show that, in spite of a large debt to Professor Whitehead, this book goes its own way and in some respects finds expression in a widely different use of terms. This conclusion will perhaps provide sufficient justification for the introduction of a point which has no immediate connexion with 'objects and events.' Incidentally the difference of terminology which has been illustrated probably runs back into more important differences between the main conclusions of the present work and the interpretation of religion which Dr. Whitehead has so briefly sketched out. But such larger considerations lie outside the scope of this note. It would be tempting to enlarge here upon Dr. Whitehead's use of the term *value*, a matter closely connected with the foregoing discussion of 'concrete' and 'concretion.' If comparisons may be suggested, his use of the term is nearer to that of S. Alexander than to that of W. R. Sorley, or again of Dean Inge. Of these three the last named would identify 'values' with the Platonic order of reality. For Whitehead, on the other hand, values are not constituents of the realm of eternal objects but 'emergent' (in the peculiar meaning which he assigns to that word in company with Alexander and Lloyd Morgan). Thus value belongs to the actuality of process. It arises because there is 'a real togetherness of the ideal aspects, as in thought, with the actual aspects as in process of occurrence.' 'The actuality is the value' (SMW pp. 154–155). In the present work 'value' is a term sparingly employed, partly because of these divergences in its current use, partly because on other grounds a certain ambiguity seems to cling to the word as it is often employed to-day.

One more explanation is necessary before this unduly prolonged note is brought to a conclusion. In chapter iii. § iii. of the text (p. 66) there is introduced a discussion of *repetitive energy* as characterising the 'succession of events in space-time.' The same topic is developed further in the next chapter (ch. iv. § i.) in connexion with the ideas of creation and 'the entry of the new.' This group of questions is connected, in the mind of the present writer, with points arising in SMW (chs. vi. and viii.) and ultimately with the relation of 'creativity' to 'epochal occasions,' which is more fully expounded in RM. With regard to SMW, the chief passages are the striking paragraph on vibrations of enduring objects (SMW p. 160; cp. p. 164) and the discussion of 'reiteration' on p. 193. To these must be added the conception of 'underlying eternal energy' or 'activity' (*ibid.* p. 154). Here we are concerned only with the meanings which are given to such conceptions in the present work. On p. 66 above 'repetitive energy' characterising the 'succession of events' is introduced with the following sentences: 'The "ideal" limit of this succession is the negative infinity of sheer repetition which has meaning only in the realm of mathematics. We can conceive the actual universe of the cosmic series as rising from this ideal limit through the actual events of space-time into an ascending order of concrete entities.' We can so conceive it. But of course in nature there are only routes of approximation to the ideal constructions of mathematics (cp. again C. D. Broad's account of this in *Scientific Thought*, ch. i.). The physical concept of 'vibration' is a case in point. If this be taken to be the basic form of 'reiteration' in nature, then there can be conceived a route of approximation from such reiteration to 'bare succession.' On the other hand, in actual nature a 'bare succession of events' is an abstraction which does not occur in fact. Even vibrations are characterised by their relation to 'vibratory organisms' and the mutual relations of such 'scientific objects.' There are no events wholly uncharacterised by relation to objects. Thus the actual 'repetitive energy' of the universe is already patterned with objects even at the base of the series. These considerations must be taken to be implied in my discussions of the subject. Nevertheless it is legitimate to abstract in thought 'this sameness of repetition' as 'the neutral material upon which the patterns of the universe are woven' (see above, p. 83). In my use of terms 'the new' is a permanent or eternal factor which, by entering into the groundwork of repetition, gives it characterisation and so creates fresh situations in the process of events. Dr. Whitehead's 'underlying eternal energy (or activity) in whose nature there stands an envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects' (SMW p. 154) has an obvious affinity with the 'twofold creative activity' which emerges into prominence in the later chapters of the present work. Cp. also, on p. 460 above, two quotations from SMW (p. 157) concerning 'substantial' and 'selective' activity.

ADDITIONAL NOTE D

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

THIS subject occupies a good deal of space in the text, particularly in chapter xii. In those sections the present writer preferred to develop his own conclusions without turning aside to consider alternative or conflicting judgments in detail. It seems desirable, therefore, to incorporate into a note some supplementary material. Since the publication of the late Dr. H. B. Swete's book, *The Holy*

Spirit in the New Testament (1909), the literature of the subject has increased. Two works seem to call for special notice here—namely, *The Spirit in the New Testament*, by Dr. E. F. Scott (1923), and *The Holy Spirit in St. Paul*, by R. Birch Hoyle (1927). Each of these is notable; and the second is written with the first in view. Referring to Dr. Scott's book Mr. Hoyle writes: 'but when he concluded by saying, "in a sense although the idea of the Spirit is primary for Paul, it is superfluous" (p. 243), one feels that the matter cannot be left there.' It would seem then that Mr. Hoyle wrote with the intention of supplementing or challenging what he found unsatisfactory in the earlier book. In the present note a brief survey of these two books will be followed by the consideration of one particular problem (the text 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18), with some concluding reflections upon the whole subject.

The two writers referred to both include in their surveys some discussion of the sources from which New Testament ideas about the Spirit were drawn, or by which those ideas were influenced. Dr. Scott will not allow that the New Testament conception of the Spirit 'was modified in any essential respect by alien [*i.e.* non-Jewish] modes of thought' (*The Spirit, etc.*, p. 47). 'The Stoic conception [of πνεῦμα] was radically different from the Hebrew one, and still more from that which meets us in the New Testament.' The great Johannine phrase 'God is Spirit' may suggest dependence. But in fact the evangelist 'employs the words in a sense directly opposite to that which they bear in Stoicism' (*ibid.* pp. 53, 54). So again the origins of the belief in the primitive Church are Hebraic; and the theory that it was borrowed from paganism cannot be entertained. 'There is no evidence that the belief in the Spirit did not arise until the Gentile influence had made itself felt.' The account in Acts, therefore, with allowance for legendary elements, 'may on several grounds be taken as historical' (*ibid.* pp. 81 ff.). Similarly 'the Spirit as Paul knows it has nothing to do with this πνεῦμα of the Stoics.' Nevertheless his 'Hellenistic bias' must be taken into account. St. Paul took the idea as he found it in the Church and applied it to current speculation 'to justify and explain his mysticism.' The bias appears particularly at two points. St. Paul's contrast of 'flesh' and 'spirit' reflects Hellenistic dualism; and his conception of revelation has been moulded by the current doctrine of *gnosis* 'whereby men have access to the higher world of truth which is hidden from sense and reason' (*ibid.* pp. 130–139, 165–176). What is the relation of the Spirit to Christ in St. Paul? It has become customary to assume that he identifies them. Dr. Scott concludes as follows: 'It cannot be made out that Paul anywhere identifies the Spirit and Christ. His aim, on the contrary, is to keep them distinct.' 'The Messiah and the Spirit were quite distinct conceptions, which the Christian mind refused to confound together'; 'they could not be made interchangeable.'

'Probably it never occurred to him that they could be thought of as identical' (*ibid.* pp. 178–183). Nevertheless 'he is unable to keep the two conceptions entirely separate.' The identification is unconscious rather than deliberate. He might have assigned some aspects of his religious experiences to the Spirit and others to Christ. But 'instead of circumscribing the sphere of the Spirit he extended it so that it covered all the motives and influences that control the Christian life.' Thus in effect he confused the two conceptions. 'When we analyse his thought by purely logical methods he leaves no place for the Spirit by unduly widening the field of its operation. Yet on a deeper view the effect of his virtual identification of Christ and the Spirit is to make both of them infinitely more significant' (*ibid.* pp. 183–186).

Dr. Scott has a similar theory about the Spirit in the fourth gospel. The first draft of this is to be found in his earlier work, *The Fourth Gospel* (2nd edition, 1908), chs. x., xi. It is reproduced in the later work with little change of emphasis. Briefly, he finds in this gospel two meanings of the word Spirit, 'a wider and a more specific one.' The latter is contained in the 'Paraclete' passages. Here the Pauline conception of the Spirit is narrowed down to the function of illumination. The great asset of these passages is their conception of an expanding revelation. 'If we can think of Christianity as the final religion, capable of an endless renewal, this is due above all else to the conception of the Spirit which was first set forth in the Fourth Gospel.' But he draws the startling conclusion: 'none the less the conception is superfluous.' 'The evangelist gave a new and profound conception to Christian thought, but logically there was no place for it in his theology' (*ibid.* pp. 206–208). The only reasons given are (*a*) that revelation has already been assigned to the Logos, and (*b*) that the return of the invisible glorified Christ (in the same context) renders unnecessary the functions of the Paraclete. When all allowance has been made for 'the fluctuating boundary in ancient thought between personality and personification' (H. A. Kennedy, quoted by Hoyle, *op. cit.* pp. 259, 260), the theory that the author of this majestic gospel introduced with such emphasis of language a wholly unnecessary personification, a sort of superfluous double of the Christ, which cannot in fact be reasonably distinguished from Him, since all His functions are performed by the indwelling Christ, is surely an extravagance of thought which carries with it its own refutation.

Early in his book Mr. Hoyle gives a list of recent and current views about the Spirit with representative names attached to each. The list includes the following ideas: (1) a semi-material substance, (2) supernatural power, (3) an abstract principle, (4) an influence or inspiration, (5) *élan vital* or *Geistes-leben*, (6) 'the collective spirit which animates the communal life of believers' (Schleiermacher), cp. *esprit de corps* and *Zeitgeist*, (7) Spirit as personal and distinct (the traditional view), (8) Spirit as personal but identical with the Risen Christ. Some of these views were considered in the text (ch. xii.). They form a heterogeneous collection, partly taken from the common stock of ancient thought, partly from emphasis on particular aspects of New Testament teaching, while some are frankly modern substitutes or would-be equivalents. In a later chapter Mr. Hoyle considers how much truth they contain. He does not differ materially from Dr. Scott as to the sources of New Testament pneumatology. But he dissents from the latter's view that the Spirit for St. Paul was 'in the last resort a supernatural essence . . . in some sense a substance' which 'had to be communicated by a material rite' (*The Holy Spirit in St. Paul,* p. 16; Scott, *op. cit.* p. 156; cp. Hoyle, *ibid.* pp. 280, 297). On the whole, St. Paul's conception received very little from Hellenistic thought and gave back much more (*ibid.* Part II, chs. iv. and v.): 'Spirit is a synthetic term and the existing confusion concerning the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is mainly due to forgetfulness of the many disparate elements connected together in the term' (*ibid.* p. 248). 'The confusion exists and is bound to exist so long as one of these aspects is taken as determinative of all the rest.' He concludes that 'the influence of the Divine Spirit in action upon different persons and combining them into a fellowship, a Church, must be interpreted in terms of personal conscious life.' Hence the Greek fathers of the fourth century 'had to assume that the actions of the Spirit proceeded from a personal source. That is surely what Paul intended when he described the action of the Spirit in revelation and teaching' (*ibid.* pp. 283, 284, cp. pp. 262, 263).

The difficult passage, 2 Corinthians iii. 17, 18, must now be briefly considered. In his commentary upon this epistle (I.C.C., 1915) Dr. A. Plummer wrote of the words 'the Lord is the Spirit' (*v.* 17): 'This statement has been misused controversially; on the one side to prove the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, on the other to show that St. Paul identifies the Holy Spirit with the Lord Christ. The Apostle is not constructing metaphysical propositions respecting the Divine Nature.' In *v.* 18 he translates the other obscure phrase: 'even as from the Lord who is spirit' or 'from the Lord, the Spirit' (*ibid.* pp. 103, 109). Similarly Dr. Swete wrote of this last phrase 'the glorified Lord, whose humanity is now *quickening spirit,* instinct with the powers of the Spirit of life' (*The Holy Spirit in the New Testament,* p. 196). R. B. Hoyle agrees with 'most modern writers' in holding that 'the Lord is the Spirit' means 'the Risen Christ is the Spirit.' But he recognises that against identification of the Risen Christ with the Spirit is the following clause of *v.* 17, where 'the Spirit' is again differentiated from 'the Lord' (*ibid.* p. 143). Dr. Plummer's paraphrase on pp. 93, 94 of his commentary seems to give the sense approximately. Dr. Scott and Mr. Hoyle agree that this text by itself settles nothing in the sphere of doctrine. 'The solitary passage "the Lord is the Spirit" has been much over-worked by contemporary writers' (Hoyle, p. 304). Even if we prefer the rendering 'the Lord, the Spirit' in *v.* 18 'it would not follow that Christ and the Spirit were made the same' (Scott, *op. cit.* p. 182). Finally, in the latest commentary on 2 Corinthians (Methuen, 1927) Dr. H. L. Goudge, referring to the supposed identification of our Lord with the Holy Spirit in *v.* 17, writes: 'to regard St. Paul as guilty of it is preposterous.' 'The distinction between the Lord and the Spirit is peculiarly plain in this very Epistle.' He cites chs. xi. 4 and xiii. 13 as instances. He suggests (as also does Dr. Scott) that the obscurity is due to the fact that 'the ancients did not possess our device of inverted commas.' If we read: 'Now "the Lord" is the Spirit' the reference is clearly to the citation from Exodus preceding. The whole passage is concerned with the controversy about the Law. For Christians 'the Spirit' has replaced 'the letter.' Judaisers acknowledged 'the Lord Jesus,' but substituted the Law for the Lordship of the Spirit over Christian life. The whole section should be read (*The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, pp. 34, 35).

The present writer cannot but feel that many who, like Dr. Scott, can attach no meaning to the idea of two divine Persons operating in the same sphere with parallel or reciprocal functions, are stumbling precisely at the point where the doctrine of the Trinity is most revealing, namely, in its conception of mutual indwelling or coinherence. The subject, however, has received such lengthy treatment in the text that it needs no further emphasis here. Dr. Goudge draws attention, in his comments on the passage just considered, to our tendency to think tritheistically. St. Paul was feeling after language which would express the distinctions within an all-embracing unity in such a manner as to do justice to his experience. But his absorption in practical tasks left him no time to work out his ideas. The principal reason for Dr. Scott's perplexity, when confronted with the thought of St. Paul and St. John, is his obsession with the idea that religion must be reduced exclusively to the ethical category (*The Spirit, etc.*, p. 245). That subject is discussed elsewhere in the present work (*e.g.* chs. v. and vi. and Additional Note B). The suggestion, therefore, needs no further comment in this note.

ADDITIONAL NOTE E

ORIGEN AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

THIS note supplements, with detailed references to authorities, the statements made in the text and footnotes (chs. xi. and xii. pp. 307–315, 318, n., 334, n.) concerning Origen's contribution to the Christian doctrine of God. For the text of Origen's works the present writer has used the following editions. For the *de* *principiis*: *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei jahrhunderte. Origenes Werke.* Fünfter Band. Dr. Paul Koetschau. (Leipzig, 1913.). For the *contra Celsum*: *Origenis opera omnia.* C. H. E. Lommatzsch. Tomes XVIII.–XX. (Berlin, 1845.). These have been worked through continuously. The other writings of importance for the statements in the text are: the *Commentary on St. John's Gospel* and the *de oratione,* together with some scattered references in other commentaries. For these the more important passages have been examined in A. E. Brooke's edition of *The Commentary of Origen on St. John's Gospel* (Cambridge, 1896) and in other volumes of Lommatzsch. The following authorities have also been consulted. They will be found to contain discussions of all the important passages bearing upon Origen's doctrine of the Trinity. C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Oxford, 1886). The whole book is important; but for the present note see especially Lectures V–VII and parts of Lecture II. A. Robertson, in the *Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.* Vol. IV, 'St. Athanasius' (Oxford, 1892), Prolegomena, ch. ii. (A), § 3 (2), *a* and *b*, especially pp. xxv–xxvii. A. Harnack, *History of Dogma* (E. tr., 1910), vol. ii. ch. vi. W. R. Inge, Arts. in Hastings, *E.R.E.*, 'Alexandrian Theology' and 'Logos' (1908, 1915). J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine* (Methuen, 1903), ch. xi.; cp. also chs. ix. and xiii. J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes*, Part I (Paris, 1905), ch. vii. For the doctrine of the Holy Spirit: H. B. Swete, *The Early History of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit* (1873), ch. i. (now out of print), *D.C.B.* vol. iii. Art. 'Holy Ghost,' and *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church* (Macmillan, 1912), Part I, ch. viii. For a special aspect of the subject see also P. H. Wicksteed, *The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy* (Hibbert Lectures, 1916; London, 1920), pp. 23 ff., 262 ff., and 333–347. Origen is one of those many-sided thinkers whose teaching and influence cannot be adequately summarised without risk of misrepresentation. But from the above authorities a fairly clear impression can be gained. There are, however, discernible two points of view in which a difference of emphasis emerges. For Harnack the Alexandrian fathers assisted enormously that process of 'secularising' Christianity in the early Church which is with him a favourite thesis. He holds that Origen shared practically all the presuppositions of pagan and gnostic thought, excepting only the docetic theory of Christian history and the fatalistic doctrine concerning human nature. His subordinationism was the inevitable consequence of monistic presuppositions; and these same presuppositions logically left no room for freedom. Wicksteed, following Bigg on this particular point, makes Clement the real author of Neo-Platonism (on this see Bigg, *op. cit.* p. 64 and n. 2). He goes on to minimise the differences between the Christian and non-Christian forms of Platonism in regard to their respective doctrines of the Trinity. For both parties the

Trinity was emanational and graded downwards into creation. He quotes from *Stromateis*, vii. 2, with Bigg's paraphrase (*Reactions, etc.*, pp. 333, 334). Whatever be the case with Clement a decidedly different estimate is given by Bigg with regard to Origen, and apparently by most other authorities. Bigg points out that Origen was in some respects much more scriptural and more conservative than Clement. His subordinationism was largely due to a scrupulous regard for certain texts of Scripture, namely, John xiv. 28 and xvii. 3 ; Mark x. 18 (= Matt. xix. 17). It was also in part simply inherited from his predecessors. One of the most important passages is in *de principiis*, i. 2. 13. The Leipzig edition restores the Greek to the text (p. 47) from Justinian, *ep. ad Mennam* (cp. Bigg, *op. cit.* pp. 181, 182, n. 2). Bigg quotes in comment a passage from *in Matt.* xiv, 7, where he notes that Origen refrains from attributing to the Son τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν, and remarks : ‘ It will be evident that Origen is here struggling against his own principles and endeavouring to reduce the doctrine of Derivation and Subordination, which he had inherited from his predecessors, to the narrowest limits consistent with the direct teaching of Scripture.’ ‘ What struck later ages as the novelty and audacity of Origen's doctrine was in truth its archaism and conservatism.’ He quotes from Denis, *Philosophie d'Origène*, p. 111, the following : ‘ La vérité, c'est que la pensée d'Origène se meut dans deux directions tout opposées. Lorsqu'il ne suit que la logique et les idées où sa fervente piété l'inclinait, il va à l'égalité des personnes divines. Lorsqu'il s'en tient à la tradition . . . il recule devant les consequences de sa piété et de la logique, et se jette à l'extrémité opposée.’

Dr. Inge remarks that ‘ Neo-Platonism is the latest stage in the development of Greek thought. Its connexion with Alexandria is less than is commonly supposed.’ ‘ We may speak of an Alexandrian theology, though not of an Alexandrian philosophy’ (art. ‘Alexandrian Theology ’). Of Origen's theology he writes in the same article : ‘ The charge of subordinationism in Origen's Christology cannot be maintained.’ ‘ Words like οὐ κατὰ μετουσίαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ θεός (*Sel. in Psalm.* 135) should have been enough to establish his orthodoxy on this side.’ ‘ The subordination which he teaches is one of person and office, not of essence.’ In a similar strain Dr. Robertson wrote (*op. cit.* p. xxvi) : ‘ Is he then a pantheist ? No, for to him God is Love.’ ‘ The idea of Will is the pivot of Origen's system, the centripetal force which forbids it to follow the pantheistic line which it yet undoubtedly touches.’ Moving from the One to the Many ‘ the Logos mediates, διὰ τὰ πολλὰ γίνεται πολλά : but this must be from eternity :—*accordingly creation is eternal too.* Here we see that the cosmological idea has prevailed over the religious, the Logos of Origen is still in some important particulars the Logos of the Apologists, of Philo and the philosophers. The difference lies in His *co-eternity*, upon which Origen insists without wavering.’ So Origen’s conception of the eternal order governs his system. The universe is eternal because God was never other than Creator. But the created spirits are mutable in will, subject to προκοπή, and capable of embodiment. The material world which we know is a small episode in the history of the universe. ‘From this point of view we must approach the two-sided Christology of Origen. To him the two sides were aspects of the same thing; but if the subtle presupposition as to God and the universe is withdrawn, they become alternative and inconsistent Christologies.’ So in the sequel: ‘Arius drew his line without flinching between the Father and the Son. This to the instinct of any Origenist was as revolting as it would have been to the clear mind and Biblical sympathy of Origen himself’ (*ibid.* p. xxvii). With regard to the Holy Spirit, Dr. Swete wrote (in his latest work on the subject): ‘Had Origen lived a century and a half later, he would doubtless have said with the best Greek theologians that the Spirit proceedeth eternally from the Father through the Son’ (*op. cit.* p. 132). Dr. Bethune-Baker concludes his account of Origen’s teaching on the Trinity with the following note: ‘The matter cannot be better put than it was by Bp. Bull, *Def. N.C.* II. ix. § 22 (Oxford translation): “In respect of the article of the divinity of the Son and even of the Holy Trinity, [Origen] was yet really catholic; although in his mode of explaining this article he sometimes expressed himself otherwise than Catholics of the present day are wont to do; but this is common to him with nearly all the Fathers who lived before the Council of Nice”’ (*op. cit.* p. 151, n. 2). Finally, we need Dr. Bigg’s reminder of the caution given by Origen himself (*de princ.* i, 6. 1.): ‘de his vero disputandi specie magis quam definiendi, prout possumus, exercemur’; and Dr. Bigg’s comment follows: ‘Origen never dogmatises’ (*op. cit.* pp. 193, 194 n.).

INDEXES

I.

INDEX OF REFERENCES.

(i)
OLD TESTAMENT, APOCRYPHA AND PSEUDEPIGRAPHA

Genesis
PAGE
i.–iii. 13 *n.*
i. 304, 319, 334 *n.*

Exodus
iii. 14 299 *n.*

Deuteronomy
viii 294 *n.*

Judges
v. 137

1 Kings
xxii. 24 344

Job
141 *n.*

Psalms
li. 11 210 *n.*
lxxx. 8 ff. 301 *n.*
civ. 30 208 *n.*
cxxxix. 141 *n.*
,, 7 210 *n.*

Proverbs
viii. 22 318 *n.*

Isaiah
137, 141 *n*
v. 301 *n*
xi. 2 208 *n.*
xxxii. 15 208 *n.*
liii. 10 184
lxi. 1 208 *n.*
lxiii. 10 325 *n.*

Jeremiah
137, 148

Ezekiel
PAGE
137, 148
ii. 2 208 *n.*
xi. 19 208 *n.*
xv 301 *n.*
xvii. 301 *n.*
xxxvi. 27 208 *n.*
xxxvii. 14 208 *n.*

Daniel
163 *n.*, 294 and *n.*

Hosea
137, 148
x. 301 *n.*
xi. 1 294 *n.*

Amos
137

2 (4) Esdras
294 and *n.*

Wisdom
i. 7 208 *n.*, 334 *n.*
vii. 22 208 *n.*
viii. 1 208 *n.*
xii. 1 208 *n.*

1 Enoch
294 and *n.*

(ii)
NEW TESTAMENT

St. Matthew
v. 20 173
x. 343
,, 20 344 and *n.*
xi. 295
,, 27 250
,, 28–30 167
PAGE
xi. 28, 29 248
xii. 28 344 *n.*
xvi. 24 194
xviii. 180
xix. 17 475
,, 28 248
xxiv. 3 193
xxviii. 19 319 *n.*

St. Mark
167 and *n.*
viii. 34 194, 288 *n.*
ix. 7 295 *n.*
x. 18 475
,, 45 172 *n.*
xii. 29–31 289 *n.*
xiii. 343
,, 11 344
xiv. 61–64 299 *n.*

St. Luke
167 *n.*, 178
iii. 22 295 *n.*
ix. 23 194 *n.*
ix. 24, 25 194 *n.*
x. 295
,, 21 250
xi. 20 344 *n.*
xii. 12 344 *n.*
xv. 167
xxi. 15 344
,, 33 193
xxii. 29, 30 248
,, 66–71 299 *n.*
xxiv. 49 321

St. John
178, 180, 198, 199, 250, 293, 295, 297–299, 297 *n.*, 303, 306, 310, 312, 315, 341, 347

PAGE
i. 1–18 . 226, 293, 297 and *n.*, 298, 303, 304, 312, 314, 319, 321, 327, 333, 356
,, 1, 2 . 298 and *n.*
,, 14 . 297, 304 *n.*, 420 *n.*
,, 18 . 297, 298 *n.*, 304 *n.*, 344 *n.*
,, 29 . 315
,, 32–34 342 *n.*, 345 *n.*
iii. . 333, 341, 342
,, 4 . 180
,, 16–21 . 347
,, 34 . 341
iv. . 342, 343
v. . 300, 302, 303
,, 17–30 . 299
,, 18 . 298 *n.*, 299
,, 23 . 303
vi. . 300
,, 57 . 301
,, 62 . 298
,, 63 . 342 *n.*
vii. 37, 38 . 342
,, 39 . 341, 342 and *n.*, 345
viii. 56–59 . 299
,, 58 . 298, 299 *n.*
x. . 300
,, 14, 15 . 301
,, 29–39 . 299
xi. . 302, 349
xii. 25 . 289
xiii. 34, 35 . 350
xiv.–xvii. . 300, 304
xiv.–xvi . 343, 348, 349
xiv. . 300 *n.*, 303, 351, 352, 354 *n.*, 357
,, 5–14 . 301
,, 15–31 350, 354 *n.*
,, 15–24 . 360
,, 15–19 . 354
,, 15 . 351
,, 16, 17 . 345
,, 16 . 346, 351
,, 17 . 352, 360
,, 18 . 349
,, 19 349, 351, 354
,, 20 349, 351–354, 360
,, 21–24 350–353
,, 23 303, 323, 350
,, 24*b* . 357
,, 26 344, 346, 351
,, 28 . 349, 475
,, 30 . 195 *n.*
xv., xvi. . 354 *n.*

PAGE
xv. . 300, 301 *n.*
,, 1 ff. . 354
,, 9–11 . 301
,, 26 . 344, 346
xvi. 7 . 345
,, 8–11 . 347
,, 8 176, 344 *n.*, 345
,, 11 . 195 *n.*
,, 12–15 347, 349
,, 12 . 347
,, 13–15 . 347
,, 13 . 345
,, 14 . 333
,, 15 . 357
,, 28 . 298
xvii. 302, 303, 350, 357, 360, 401
,, 3 . 475
,, 5 . 298
,, 6–11 . 301
,, 16–26 . 301
,, 20–26 . 302
,, 21–23 . 303
,, 21 . 302
xix. 36 . 315 *n.*
xx. . 302, 342, 349
,, 21 . 301

ACTS
172
i. . 340
ii. . 446 *n.*
v. 17 . 344
viii. 29 . 344
x. . 452 *n.*
xv. 28 . 344
xvi. 6, 7 . 344

ROMANS
180
i.–viii. . 292
i. 3, 4 . 295
,, 16 . 260
,, 18 and ff. . 176
iii. 25, 26 . 176
v.–viii. . 196
v., vi. . 178 *n.*
v. . 179, 293, 294
,, 1–11 . 172
,, 5 304, 321, 339, 353
,, 8 . 176, 353
vi. . 179–181, 323
,, 1–14 . 288
vii. . 196, 197
viii. . 178 *n.*, 194 *n.*, 210 *n.*, 323, 342
,, 1 . 196
,, 2 . 178, 197

PAGE
viii. 9–17 . 324
,, 10 . 196, 324
,, 11 ff. . 321 *n.*
,, 11 . 339
,, 14–17 . 339
,, 23 . 196 *n.*
,, 26, 27 320, 324 *n.*, 325
,, 27 . 322
,, 29 . 212 *n.*, 295 323, 358
,, 34 . 322
xii. 2 . 192
,, 4, 5 . 292 *n.*
xiii. 14 . 323 *n.*
xiv. 17 . 190

1 CORINTHIANS
293 *n.*
ii. 10, 11 . 324
,, 10 . 325 *n.*
,, 11 . 325
,, 16 . 324
iii. 16, 17 . 326 *n.*
xii.–xiv. . 178 *nn.*, 291 *n.*
xii. . 323
,, 7–11 . 324
,, 11 . 199, 325
xv. . 293, 294
,, 47 . 293 *n.*, 323

2 CORINTHIANS
iii. 17, 18 . 323, 470, 472, 473
iv. 4 . 295 *n.*
,, 10–12 . 179 *n.*, 288 *n.*
,, 10 ff. . 181
v. 14–21 . 172
viii. 9 . 293 *n.*
xiii. . 198
,, 13 . 326

GALATIANS
179
ii. 20 . 178 *n.*, 181, 182, 288 *n.*, 290
iv. 4–7 . 448 *n.*
,, 6 . 321, 448
,, 19 . 212, 288 *n.*, 323
v. 17 . 194
,, 22, 23 . 324
vi. 14 . 179, 181, 288 *n.*

Ephesians
PAGE
180, 296, 297
i. . . . 293
,, 9, 10 . . 296
,, 10. . 213 *n.*
,, 14. . . 191
,, 23. . 302 *n.*
ii. 4–6 . 288 *n.*
,, 6 . . 181, 277
,, 10 . 297, 448
,, 11–22 . . 190
iii. 9–12 . . 296
,, 14–17 . 324 *n.*
,, 14 . 313 *n.*
iv. 1–4 . 276 *n.*
,, 3. . . 326
,, 4. . 291 *n.*
,, 13–16 . . 296
,, 13 182, 213 *n.*, 302
,, 14 . . 326
,, 22–24 . 179 *n.*, 276 *n.*
,, 24 . 323 *n.*
,, 25–32 . 276 *n.*
,, 30 . . 325

Philippians
ii. . . 293, 294
,, 5 . . . 181
,, 6 . 293 *n.*, 295 *n.*

Colossians
PAGE
312
i. . . 196, 293, 295 and *n.*, 297
,, 12–14 . . 195
,, 15–20 . 213 *n.*
,, 24. . 302 *n.*
,, 27. . . 212
ii. 15 . 195 *n.*
,, 20–iii. 11 179 *n.*, 181
iii. 1–3 . 288 *n.*
,, 9, 10 . 192, 196
,, 10, 11 . . 190
,, 10 198, 212, 323

1 Thessalonians
iv. 3–8 . 276 *n.*

1 Timothy
ii. 5 . . . 433

Titus
iii. 5, 6 . . 324
,, 7. . . 325

Hebrews
184, 185, 296, 297
i. . . . 293
,, 3 . . 433 *n.*
PAGE
ii. 14, 15 . 195 *n.*
iv. 15 . . 251
vi. 4–8 . 183 *n.*
vii. 24 . . 433
xii. 2 . 433 *n.*
,, 18–24 . . 190

1 John
304, 347, 352 *n.*
i. 3–7 . . 359
,, 3 . 313 *n.*, 339 *n.*
,, 7 . . 313 *n.*
,, 9 . . . 184
ii. 1–3 . 315 *n.*
,, 1, 2 . 184, 346
,, 17 . . 193
iii. 8. . 195 *n.*
,, 24 . 353 *n.*
iv. . . . 357
,, 7–12 . . 353
,, 7–21 . 352, 357
,, 9. . . 354
,, 12 . . 353
,, 13 . 448 *n.*
,, 19 . . 353
v. 16*b* . 183 *n.*

Apocalypse
296
xxi. 26 . . 274
xxii. 17 . 344 *n.*

II.

INDEX OF PERSONS.

AINSLIE, D., 19 *n.*
Alexander, S., 3 *n.*, 22 *n.*, 27 *n.*, 31, 34, 47 *n.*, 85 *n.*, 256, 388, 464, 468
Apollinarius, 262, 264, 266. *See also* Apollinarianism
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 110, 228 *n.*, 387 and *n.*
Aristotle, xi, 47, 95, 100, 110. *See also* Aristotelianism
Arius, 286, 311, 315, 476. *See also* Arianism
Athanasius, St., 8, 13 *n.*, 225 *n.*, 236, 286, 310, 311, 315, 316
Augustine, St., 276, 310, 316, 337, 387 and *n.*

BERGSON, H., vi, vii, ix, 25 and *nn.*, 26, 31 *n.*, 34, 215.
Berkeley, Bishop, 18, 31 *n.*, 460
Bernard, J. H., 31 *n.*
Bethune-Baker, J. F., 233, 240 *n.*, 474, 476
Bevan, Edwyn, 318 *n.*
Bicknell, E. J., 387 *n.*
Bigg, C., 474–476
Bosanquet, B., 3 *n.*
Box, G. H., 294 *n.*
Bradley, F. H., 3 *n.*, 388 *n.*
Braithwaite, R. B., vii
Bright, W., 286 *n.*
Broad, C. D., viii, xi, 27 *n.*, 459, 463, 469
Brooke, A. E., 318 *n.*, 474
Bull, Bishop, 476
Burkitt, F. C., 184 *n.*, 294 *n.*
Butler, Bishop, 417 *n.*
Butler, F. W., 4 *n.*, 12 *n.*, 379 *n.*

CALVIN, 337
Carpenter, J. Estlin, 297 *nn.*, 303 *n.*
Clement of Alexandria, St., 8 *n.*, 311–314, 474, 475
Creed, J. M., 294 *n.*
Croce, B., viii, ix, 19
Cyril of Alexandria, St., 234

DANTE, 115
Darwin, Charles, 19, 24, 68, 70
Democritus, 364
Denis, 475
Descartes, 17 and *n.*, 18, 25 *n.*, 30 and *n.*, 31 *n.*, 32, 458
Dorner, 262 *n.*, 263 *n.*, 266 *n.*
Driesch, H., 25 *n.*
Driver, G. R. (and Hodgson), 7 *n.*, 233 *n.*

EUTYCHES, 262

FARNELL, L. R., 382 *n.*
Fichte, 30 *n.*
Figgis, J. N., 17 *n.*, 52 *n.*
Foakes-Jackson, F. J., 184 *n.*
Freud, S., vi

GARDNER, P., 297 *n.*
Gladstone, W. E., 417 *n.*
Gore, C., v, 262 *n.*, 320 *n.*
Goudge, H. L., 473
Green, T. H., 19, 30
Gregory of Nazianzus, St., 286 *n.*

HALDANE, J. S., 25 *n.*
Hall, F. J., 262 *n.*
Harmer, J. R. *See* Lightfoot
Harnack, A., 295, 297 *n.*, 474
Harvey, W. W., 318 *n.*
Hegel, 24, 25 *n.*, 30 and *n.*, 31 *n.*
Heraclitus, xi
Hermas, 317 *n.*
Hobbes, 18
Hodgson, L., 7 *n.*, 233, 234. *See also* Driver

Hogg, A. G., 335 *n.*
Hooker, Richard, 227 *n.*, 263 *n.*, 416 *n.*
Hoyle, R. Birch, 292 *n.*, 318 *n.*, 346 *n.*, 470–473
Hügel, F. von, 12 *n.*, 31 *n.*
Hulme, T. E., 17 *n.*
Hume, David, 18

IKHNATON, 103
Inge, W. R., 228 *n.*, 297 *n.*, 468, 474, 475
Irenæus, St., 225 *n.*, 308, 309 *n.*, 311, 314, 315 *n.*, 317, 318 *n.*, 334 *n.*

JAMES, William, 25 and *n.*
Jeans, J. H., 27 *n.*
John of Damascus, St., 262
Justin Martyr, St., 13 *n.*, 303 *n.*, 312, 317 *n.*, 318 *n.*
Justinian, 475

KANT, 4, 17 *n.*, 18, 26, 30 and *n.*, 31 *n.*, 32, 35, 123, 215, 399
Kennedy, H. A., 471
Kidd, Benjamin, 276 *n.*
Koetschau, P., 474

LAKE, Kirsopp, 184 *n.*
Leibnitz, 17 *n.*, 18, 25 *n.*, 365
Leo the Great, St., 233
Lewis, Wyndham, vi–xii
Lightfoot, J. B. (and Harmer), 317 *n.*
Lloyd Morgan, C., 27 *n.*, 31, 39 *n.*, 47 *n.*, 193 *n.*, 464, 468
Locke, 17 *n.*, 18, 25 *n.*, 32
Lommatzsch, 474
Loofs, F., 7 *n.*, 23, 233, 236, 237, 310 *n.*
Lotze, 19
Luther, 30 and *n.*, 263 *n.*

McDOUGALL, W., 47 *n.*
Mackintosh, H. R., 262 *n.*
Macmurray, J., x and *n.*, xi
McNeile, A. H., 293 *n.*, 354 *n.*
Marcellus of Ancyra, 310
Mason, A. J., 286 *n.*
Moberly, R. C., 251 *n.*, 273 *n.*
Murray, Sir James, 467

NESTORIUS, 233, 234, 237, 240, 255
Newton, 18

OEHLER, 317 *n.*
Origen, 7, 8 and *n.*, 250, 298, 307 *n.*, 307–311, 313–317, 318 *n.*, 334 *n.*, 355, 473–476
Otto, J. C. T., 317 *n.*
Otto, Rudolf, 136 *n.*

PASCAL, 261
Paul of Samosata, 255, 297, 310
Peter Lombard, 262
Philo, 307, 475
Plato, vi, 13, 88, 95, 307, 413. *See also* Platonism
Plummer, A., 472
Pratt, J. B., 47 *n.*
Pullan, L., 17 *n.*

RAVEN, C. E., 262 *n.*, 266 *n.*
Rawlinson, A. E. J., 184 *n.*, 250 *n.*, 295 *n.*, 297 *n.*
Reid, L. A., 30 *n.*
Relton, H. M., 262 *n.*
Ritschl, A., 21, 23, 30 and *n.*, 261
Robb, A. A., 27 *n.*
Robertson, A., 474, 475
Royce, J., 276 *n.*
Russell, Bertrand, 30 *n.*

SANDAY, W., 262 *n.*
Schleiermacher, xii, 471
Schweitzer, A., 23
Scott, E. F., 297 *nn.*, 470–473
Selwyn, E. G., v
Smuts, J. C., 17 *n.*, 27 *n.*, 52 *n.*, 464
Soddy, F., 27 *n.*
Sorley, W. R., 4 *n.*, 17 *n.*, 31 *n.*, 56 *n.*, 468
Souter, A., 317 *n.*
Spencer, Herbert, 22, 24 *n.*, 25
Spinoza, 32, 47
Stanton, V. H., 297 *nn.*
Stephen, Leslie, 4 *n.*
Stewart, M. B., 7 *n.*
Stirling, H., 19
Strauss, 23
Streeter, B. H., x and *n.*, 13 *n.*, 167 *n.*, 297 *nn.*
Swete, H. B., 318 *n.*, 334 *n.*, 469, 472, 474, 476

TATIAN, 334 *n.*
Tawney, R. H., 17 *n.*
Taylor, A. E., 24 *n.*
Taylor, Vincent, 167 *n.*
Telfer, W., 310 *n.*
Temple, W., 257 *n.*, 262 *n.*
Tertullian, 8 *nn.*, 286 *n.*, 307–310, 314, 317

Theophilus of Antioch, 317 *n.*, 318 *n.*, 334 *n.*
Thomas Aquinas, St. *See* Aquinas
Thompson, Francis, 147
Tixeront, J., 474
Troeltsch, E., 17 *n.*
Turner, Cuthbert, 295 *n.*
Turner, J. E., 18 *n.*, 30 *nn.*, 31 *n.*, 123 *n.*

WARD, James, 48
Watkins, O. D., 183 *n.*
Watson, J. B., vi
Webb, C. C. J., 4 *n.*
Weston, F., 262 *n.*
Whitehead, A. N., vii, ix, xi, xiv, 17 *n.*, 20 *n.*, 25 *nn.*, 27 *n.*, 31 *n.*, 34, 124 *n.*, 215 and *n.*, 235 *n.*, 329, 421 *n.*, 427 *n.*; detailed survey of his thought, 456–469
Wicksteed, P. H., 115 *n.*, 228 *n.*, 474
Williams, N. P., 179 *n.*
Wotherspoon, H. J., 275 *n.*
Wrede, W., 23

III.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Absolute, the, 19, 83, 87, 270, 388, 390 *n.* *See also* Activity, Actuality, Individuality, Objects.
Absolute reality, 83, 95, 417, 428, 435, 468
Absolute thought, 100
Activist conception of nature, 109, 235
Activity, 105–108, 109–110, 151, 415; God as absolute, 110; God as concrete, 136, 144; ethical, 148–150; of revelation, 143, 145, 151, 153; redemptive, 152, 154, 156–157, 160–164, 171, 207–212. *See also* Creative activity, Redemption
Actualisation through transformation, 242–245
Actuality, 106, 107, 109, 110; God as absolute, 86–88, 109, 110, 136, 137, 144, 147, 150, 158, 206, 400–401, 404, 415; of God, 164, 212, 213, 223, 228, 229, 232, 278, 280; Jesus Christ identified with absolute actuality, 164, 213, 228–229, 278
Adoptionism, 226, 233, 255–262, 277, 310
Aesthetic experience, 215–216
Animism, 47
Anthropology, 19, 20, 26
Antinomian gnosticism, 352 *n.*
Antiochene theology, 240
Aphthartodocetists, 266 *n.*
Apocalyptic conceptions, 104, 136, 157, 162–163, 193
Apollinarianism, 255, 262–267, 273, 282
Apologists, the, 8 *n.*, 475
Apperception, 26, 123
Apprehension and response, 55–59, 60–63, 67, 68, 71, 91, 123–124, 129, 153, 154, 159, 204–207, 209–211, 214, 216, 221, 243–245, 268, 330, 363, 373, 390, 395, 403–406, 418, 428, 445
Arianism, 255, 311, 315, 316, 334 *n.* *See also* Arius
Aristotelian causes, 220, 221, 242
Aristotelianism, 13, 47, 110. *See also* Aristotle
Ascending series, the, 36, 44, 67, 86, 87, 105; ascending transformations, 39, 40; ascending principles of unity, 79; ascending development, 99; ascending activity, 109; ascending unities, 127
Aspects of the eternal order, 109, 129, 159, 214, 216, 384, 385, 389, 400, 417, 427, 428, 431, 440, 441, 450, 467
assumptio humanitatis, 225
Atonement, the, 184–185. *See* Redemption
Augustinianism, 264, 273
ἀγάπη, 276, 304, 305, 312, 339
ἀρραβών, 191

Baptism, narratives of the, 294, 305, 320, 342 *n.*
Behaviourism, vi, vii, 47
Beloved Son, 295
Block universe, 25
Body of Christ, represents entry of new sociological factor, 276, 277; twofold relation to Christ and His Spirit, 287, 288, 291–293, 322–327, 338–340; as context of individual life, 291; relation of Pauline conception to contemporary physiology, 292 *n.*
Book of Heracleides, 7 *n.*, 234

Cappadocian fathers, the, 310, 316
Chalcedonian theology. *See* Conciliar theology, Councils
Charismata, 324–325, 352
Christian pneumatology, 318 *n.*, 472

Christology, 168, 183–185, 264, 292 ff., 301, 303, 306, 312–316. *See also* Conciliar theology, Councils, Incarnation
circumincessio, 360 *n.*
Cogredience, 459
Coinherence, 360, 473
communicatio idiomatum, 263
Comparative religion, 4, 154
Conciliar theology, 5, 6, 234, 253–255. *See* Councils
Concreteness, advance or increase of, 67, 69, 73, 87, 128, 144, 221 ff., 270, 468; concrete entities, 66; concrete activity, 105, 151, 213; concrete reality, God as, 94, 223; concrete relations, 95 *See also* Activity, Individuality
Concretion, 462
Continuum, 39, 48, 109
Contrasts. *See* Tension
Cosmic series, 26, 36–46, 51, 55–57, 60, 66, 75–78, 85–89, 98–100, 105, 112, 116, 120–121, 125, 130, 202–203, 220–221. *See also* Organic series
Councils, 253–255; Nicaea, 7, 310–311; Alexandria (362), 235 *n.*; Constantinople (1), 312; Ephesus, 233, 255; Chalcedon, 13, 235, 254, 267, 387
Creation, 3, 7, 9, 112, 121–122, 230, 256–258, 394–398, 415, 417–420, 430–431
Creative activity, 44, 105, 109, 143–144, 148, 202; of the eternal order, 84–89, 395; summary of, 207–211; its routes of embodiment, 211–213; two aspects of, 220–22; relation to Incarnation, 226–228
  Twofold creative activity, 327–336; of the Word and the Spirit, 326–328, 333–336, 417–420, 427
Cultus, 154–157, 160, 161

Darwinism, 19, 21
D.C.B., 318 *n.*, 474
Deborah's song, 137
Determination, two forms of, 79, 80
Determinism, 64, 65, 370
Development, 21, 22, 24, 40, 41, 66–69, 85, 86; individual, 62–65; of character, 106–108, 114–115; of dogma, 5–16, 198–200; of Christology, 5, 7
Directive movement, 98–100, 144, 221, 242–243, 276, 278
Dispersive incarnation, 292, 301
Dualism, 16–19, 25, 32, 47; ethico-religious, in the New Order, 193–197, 332–333
Duality, 20 *n.*
Duration, 25, 40, 87, 459, 461, 466
Durée, ix, 25

Ego, the, 48, 49. *See* Self
Élan vital, 471
Emancipation of human interests, 265, 442
Emergence, 44, 84. *See also* Evolution
Epistemology, 31 *n.*, 460
Epochal: development of revelation, 379–380, 393–394; durations, 461; occasions, 461–462, 466
E.R.E., 228 *n.*, 297 *n.*, 318 *n.*, 474
Esprit de corps, 471
Eternal order, the, 56–81, 97–100, 105–106, 108, 125, 127, 138–139, 142–144, 148, 210–212, 328–329, 362–363, 466; related to the series by immanence, 69; by contrast and incorporation, 75–78; relation to spiritual organisms, 56–81, 203–206, 366–376, 402–412, 437; creative activity of, 84–89, 207–210, 427–428, 444; relation to religious experience, 97, 98, 135 ff., 211, 389–390; direction of incorporation, 98–100; incorporation into character, 106–108; relation to the kingdom of God, 104–108, 274, 309, 377–378; incorporation into the kingdom of God, 167; relation to God, 109, 213, 362, 394–402, 417; negative aspect, 116–122, 371–374; positive aspect, 129–133, 375–376; twofold reference, 129–131, 167, 186, 213–14; aspects and standards of, 214, 216; domain of, 219; relation to the Incarnation, 228–232, 247–250; relation to perfection and development, 241–245; relation to reason and religion, 383–385. *See also* Apprehension and response, Aspects, Forms, Creative activity, Experience, Revelation
Eucharist, the, 169, 453
Eutychianism, 262–263
Events, 40–43, 45–47, 54, 55, 62–65, 67, 79, 81–84, 105, 123, 128, 152, 202, 208, 210, 279, 328–329, 361, 365, 426–428, 456–458, 461
Evil. *See* Non-attainment

Evolution, 21, 22, 24, 34; creative, 25, 35; emergent, ix, 35, 47 *n.*; multigrade, 235

Evolutionary monism, 85 *n.*, 390 *n.*

Experience, xii, xiii, 4; conscious, 50, 51; of the eternal order, 54–58, 71–75, 391–392, 440 *n.*; religious, 6, 9, 12, 14, 81, 89–98, 101, 112, 133–141, 153, 271, 392–394; N.T. as literature of, 165–166; the organic whole of Christian experience, 166, 171, 213; of salvation, 171–177; Christo-centric, 166, 294; its twofold reference, 170–171, 177–185, 287; its continuity with other domains, 159–160, 211–213, 418; relation of Christian experience to general structure of experience, 198–214; domains of experience: (1) successive, 213–214, 219, 440; (2) divergent, 109, 428–430, 439–442, 449–450, 453, 467

εἰκών, 295 *n.*

ἐνανθρώπησις, 226

ἐνέργεια, 110

Fallacy of misplaced concreteness, 463

Finalism, 25, 215

Forms, principles and standards, 85, 86, 93, 102, 129, 204–206, 214–216, 330, 418. *See also* Aspects, Eternal order

Geistes-leben, 471

Grades of the series, 31, 32, 34, 36; hierarchy of, 31, 32, 43; graded universe, 464. *See* Level

Group mind, 52, 337

Harmonisation, harmony, 62, 64–66, 69–72, 80, 112–116, 131, 142, 149, 275; new harmony in the New Order, 176–177, 189–198, 287; self-harmonisation, 366–367, 380

Heavenly session, 433

Hegelianism, 18, 21, 22, 310

Heresies, ancient, 254–255. *See* Adoptionism, Arianism, etc.

Hibbert Journal, 3 *n.*, 22 *n.*, 256 *n.*

Highest law of being, 37, 41, 51, 63, 65, 226, 230–231, 278–279

History, 20–27, 99–108, 113

Holy Spirit, the: in the New Order, 169–170, 172–174, 177–183, 188–191, 195–198, 219, 258, 274–276, 287–291, 304–306, 312–314, 344–351; doctrine of, 199, 317–360; early history of the doctrine, 317–320, 332–334; His creative activity, 202, 207–210, 212, 320–322, 326–328, 332–336; His relation to Christ, 322–325, 333–337; His Person, 325, 337 ff.; inadequate analogies to, 337–338, 340; His super-organic individuality, 338–339, 451; Holy Spirit in N.T., 340–344, 469–473; in the fourth gospel, 341–360. *See also* New creation, New Order, Paraclete, Procession

Hypostasis, 234–235, 307, 310, 355. *See ὑπόστασις*

Idea, the Hegelian, 21, 22

Ideal forms, 462, 466

Idealism, viii, xi, 19, 20, 30, 85

Incarnate Lord, the: His human organism, 237; it is taken up to the level of deity, 245, 283; His highest law of being, 238; He became organic to the universe, but is not an organism, 239; His twofold relation to the eternal order, 249, 252; adoptionist attribution of human individuality to Him, 255; relation to theories of supersession, 266; His super-organic individuality, 282, 292; His possession of absolute individuality, 282–283, 363–364, 419–420, 423; test of theories about, 284; distinction of natures in, 309; relation to Holy Spirit, 320–322, 333–337; His revelation of the Trinity, 425, 432; His relation to history, 429–430, 449; to the redeemed community, 446–451; response to Him, 449–451; His human organism in its two aspects, 424–425, 432–438, 443; its relation to human interests, 442, 449, 455. *See also* Incarnation, Logos, Word

Incarnation, the: and theism, 1–11, 22, 23, 27, 82, 111, 134, 223–224, 284–285, 394; approach to the doctrine, 28–30, 163–166, 220, 224–225, 232–233; in relation to sin, 141, 251–252; the structure of experience, 213; organic

conceptions, 221, 225–232, 234–236, 237–239, 242–245, 277–284; organic conception in relation to councils and heresies, 254–255 and ff.; two aspects of, 239; human experience of the Incarnate, 246–252; relation to revelation, 259–260, 429–430; to the doctrine of God, 284–287 and ff.; to the Trinity, 420–426; to history, 429–432
Indian philosophy, 93
Individuality: advancing significance of, 42, 45, 267, 271; concrete, 67, 68, 107, 109, 269–270, 467–468; relation to universality, 221–222, 257; relation to Christ, 223–224, 257; duplication of, 267, 270.
(1) Finite principle of, 41, 42, 60–63, 65, 67–69, 71, 79, 80, 105, 108, 267–273, 278–282, 420–421, 433, 436; in the New Order, 274–277; summary of, 361–364; its contrasted aspects of unity and plurality, 364–366, 390–392; its limitations, 366–375, 391
(2) Concrete individuality in God, 94, 95, 222–224, 257, 380; super-organic, 278, 285, 287, 292, 312, 326, 338, 388–389; absolute individuality in God, 268, 271–273, 280–283, 362–364, 378–379, 384, 390, 393, 414–415, 419–420, 422–424, 435, 437; in the Incarnate Lord, 282–283, 363–364, 419–420, 423; in the Trinity, 364, 414–415, 423–424; in the Holy Spirit, 451
(3) Relation of finite to absolute individuality, 271–272, 280–282, 378–379; analogy from finite to absolute individuality, 385–386, 389–392, 401–402, 403–413. *See also* Concreteness, Organism
Individuation, 420, 434, 438
Ingredient, 427 *n.*, 459
Inorganic, 25, 26 *n.*
Islam, 382 *n.*, 392

J.T.S., 7 *n.*, 233 *n.*, 294 *n.*, 295 *n.*
Jesus of history, 23
Jewish Law, the, 155–157, 160–162, 184, 192, 212

Kenotic theories, v, 262 and *n.*
Kingdom of God, 104–108, 167–169, 170, 173, 175–176, 180–185, 289, 410; domain of, 219; relation to the eternal order, 104–108, 213–214, 377–378; to the New Order, 170, 180–185, 342, 350–351; to the Incarnate Lord, 247–250, 420, 447; to the Trinity, 378–381, 401; to the redeemed community, 442–443; response of, 431–432; fulfilment of, 452–455. *See also* Eternal order
κοινωνία, 169, 258, 275, 287, 305, 312, 326, 339
κόσμος νοητός, 228 *n.*

Level in the series, 37, 38, 44, 45, 225–227, 230–231, 241–242; (*see* Grades); level of spirit, 45, 46, 50–55, 59, 61–74, 78–80, 105, 109, 129, 133; 'level' of deity, 225, 228–229; super-organic, 438; Christ belongs to, 245–250; Holy Spirit belongs to, 336–337, 340
Logos, the, 8 *n.*, 13 *n.*, 14; and Christian Platonism, 228; does not take place of central core in the Incarnation, 237; human organism united to, 238; Logos theology, 297, 303, 308, 310–316, 319, 321, 420, 475; in the fourth gospel, 297–298, 303–304, 327. *See* Word
Lutheran Christology, 262–263, 266 and *n.*

Manichæism, 264
Marriage, 371
Material, 20 *n.*
Mechanism, 18–20, 24, 25, 33; organic, 460
Mediaeval politics, 264
Mediaeval theology, 110, 262, 334–335
Metempsychosis, 47
Method of extensive abstraction, 463
Mind, 20 *n.*, 32, 46, 47, 54–56; as an organ of spirit, 46, 230–231; social structure of, 79; relation to the eternal order, 125–128
Mind, vii.
Modalism, 387–392, 394–401. *See* Trinity
Monads, 365
Monarchianism, 255, 297, 309, 319
Monism, 85 *n.*, 112, 365–366, 388, 390
Monophysitism, 255, 262–267, 270, 273, 282
Monotheism, 98–103, 380–383, 389, 400–401

Monothelitism, 283
Montanism, 275, 317, 319, 321

NATURAL theology, 4
Nativity, Narratives of the, 320–321, 327, 341
Neo-Platonism, 7, 228 *n.*, 381, 474
Neo-vitalism, 25 *n.*
New, the, 83–89
New community. *See* New creation, New Order, Organism (new), Redemption (redeemed community)
New creation, 170 ff., 192, 197; relation to old creation, 209, 227–228, 419–420, 430–431; to the Holy Spirit, 321, 332–335; to the new organism, 424–425, 438, 441, 443–453; two aspects of, 239. *See* New Order, etc.
New Order, the, 104, 108, 169, 170, 178–179, 209; referred (1) to creative activity of Holy Spirit, 170, 178, 182, 321–322, 340; (2) to Christ as transcendent and indwelling, 170–171, 178–179; (3) to the pre-existent Word, 321–322; indwelling of Christ in the New Order: (*a*) identification, 179–183; (*b*) distinction and dependence, 183–185
    Entry into, through baptism, 179–180; relation to kingdom of God, 170, 180–185, 191, 212–213, 219, 342–343, 425; revelation of a new humanity in, 187–189; new harmony and harmonisation in, 189–198; inclusive of other domains, 213; relation to old order, 191–198, 332–335; individuality in, 274–277; structure of New Order, 287–292, 294, 304, 306; relation to the new community, 326, 327, 425; to twofold creative activity, 327–328; to the Holy Spirit, 342–345; the New Order in Johannine teaching, 350–60. *See also* Body of Christ, Organism (new), Redemption
Nicene Creed, 8 *n.*, 13, 226, 311, 387
Nineteenth century, 19, 21, 23, 29
Non-attainment, 116–122, 130, 132–133, 140, 148–149, 159, 162, 189–190, 266, 273, 372–376, 413; accentuated by the revelation in Christ, 173–174; overcome in the New Order, 191–198. *See* Sin

OBJECTS, 33, 40–42, 57, 58, 123–128, 142–143; classification of, 124, 427 *n.*, 458–459, 465; relation to events, 459–460; to organisms, 465–466; physical objects, 40–42, 123–124, 279, 426–427, 458, 465; scientific objects, 124, 459, 465; sense-objects, 215 *n.*, 458; enduring objects, 328 ff., 361, 426–427, 459, 465; eternal objects, vii, 427 *n.*, 459; realm of eternal objects, 466
    The Absolute or Eternal Object, 416–418, 426–430, 445, 449
Occasions, 461, 462
Organ, 39, 46, 74, 222; human organism as organ of deity, 230–232, 238, 241; redeemed community the organ of the kingdom of God, 443
Organic conception: of the universe, 31 ff., 82, 116, 241, 361–363, 435, 456 ff.; of mind, 46–51, 54, 55; of the Incarnation, 225–232, 237–239, 242–245, 282–284; related to Holy Spirit, 335–337
Organic series, organic universe, 55, 58, 62, 63, 67, 69, 70, 74, 77, 79, 83–85, 91, 92, 99, 108, 109, 112 ff., 123, 125, 202–203, 277, 328–331, 361, 365, 395, 417–418, 421, 433, 467; progression of, 158; unity of organic wholes, 37, 38, 40, 41, 67, 365, 428; organic plurality, 364–366, 402–407, 407–410, 412, 433–437; organic self-transcendence, 402–406, 409–411
Organism, 15, 31, 32, 36, 37, 40–46, 54, 59–61, 99, 105, 279, 457, 460, 466
    Spiritual (human), 39, 43–53, 54 ff., 62 ff., 130, 131, 142, 229, 361–363; social, 51–53, 59–63, 67, 70–75, 80, 113–114, 116, 132, 277; individual, 59, 74, 75, 79, 108–109, 115; developing perfectly, 242–245; in the New Order, 275–278
    Social and individual organisms: Their co-ordination, 79–81; their limitations in mutual dependence and penetration, 368–374
    The new organism: A new organic process flows from the Incarnation, 228 and *n.*, 446; the human organism of the

Incarnate Lord, 237–240, 245–246, 282–284

The two aspects of the new organism, 424–425, 432–438, 443, 446; definition of the new organism, 438; its relation to the divergent domains, 439–443; to the Incarnate Lord, 443–444; two ways of development, 451–455. *See also* Redemption

Origenism, 310, 474–476. *See also* Origen

ὁμοούσιος, 13, 236, 310

PANTHEISM, 112, 270, 451

Paraclete, the: Teaching of John xiv–xvi, 341, 343–360; the Paraclete a Person, 344, 346, 356; His mission, 346 ff., 447; underlies John xiv 15–31, 348–354; the Paraclete and revelation, 347–348

Parousia, 191, 347

Passion, narratives of the, 175

Patripassianism, 308

Patristic thought, 6–8 and *nn.*, 13 and *n.*, 191 *n.*, 297, 303, 307–319, 317 *n.*, 333, 334 and *n.*, 355–356, 360, 387 and *n.*

Pelagianism, 264

Perception, unity of, 40, 123–125

Percipient event, 459

Personalism, x

Personality, x, xi, 414. *See also* Trinity

Philosophy, domain of, 439 *n.*

Platonism, vii, viii, xi, 104, 185, 228, 296, 309, 315, 474; Christian, 228, 307, 313. *See also* Plato

Pluralism, 364–365, 387, 389–391

Polytheism, 92, 391

Pragmatism, xii, 25

Principle of transcendence, 77, 127

Principle of universality, 257

Principles of unity, 37, 51, 61–65, 68–73, 77, 78, 84, 126, 127, 152, 241, 278–280, 434–438; transcending, 63, 68–71, 84, 87, 102, 113, 125–126, 152, 279, 329, 421, 433, 436

Procession of the Spirit, 318 *n.*, 416. *See also* Trinity

Progression of knowledge, 126–129, 142, 146–147, 330

Prolation, 311

Prosôpon, 233–234

Psilanthropism, 310 *n.*

Psychology, 5, 26, 47–49, 113; social, 72

Psycho-physical parallelism, 47 and *n.*

purus actus, 110

περιχώρησις, 360 *n.*

πνεῦμα, Stoic conception of, 470; *see also* 318 *n.*

προκοπή, 476

φύσις, 13, 235

Q, 167, 294, 305

quicunque vult, 225–226, 337, 387

REALISM, 30 and *n.*, 35; provisional, 463

Redemption—

Redemptive activity, 152, 154, 156–157, 160–164, 182, 186, 207–210, 212, 224, 445; redemption from sin in the New Order, 171–177; two aspects of, 195–196, 198; Person of the mediator, 182–185; new redemptive order, 209; redemption canalised, 265

Experience of redemption: Shows adoptionism to be inadequate, 260–262; its present power, 285; determined the course of N.T. thought, 304–306, 312, 314, 343, 356; provides a test of N.T. doctrine, 306; determined patristic development of theology, 308–309, 311, 314–316, 333–334, 355–356; historical counterpart to revelation of the Trinity and condition of its acceptance, 413

The Redeemer, 286, 302, 333; His place in the life of God, 312, 314, 318–319, 356–357; His historical reality, 314; His body as organ of His redeeming activity, 291; Johannine discourses, revelations of His redeeming activity, 301

The redeemed community: Sphere of Holy Spirit's activity, 320 ff., 334 *n.*, 335, 444; social nucleus of new organism, 443; its relation to creative activity of Word and Spirit, 444–451; in two epochs of redemptive activity, 446. *See also* Experience

Reformation, the, 335

Relativity, 26, 34

Religion, 89 ff., 265, 272, 389; primitive, 89–92, 95, 96, 135–136, 154–155, 386; Hebrew, 95–98, 100–104, 135–138, 152–157, 380, 382, 392–394; rationalisation of,

92–98, 137, 213, 392–393; religious interpretation of the universe, 89, 96, 100–104, 389; religion and revelation, 428–429; religion, salvation and response, 430–432; relation to other domains, 440–442. *See also* Experience
Renaissance, the, 16, 17, 265
Repetitive energy, repetition, 45, 46, 66, 83–89, 105, 130, 210, 329, 468–469; reiteration, 461, 469
Revelation, 12, 14, 57, 102, 129; different orders of, 128 *n.*; creative, 143; progression of, 142–143, 146 *n.*, 147, 150, 158, 330, 440 *n.*; infinite order of, 143–148, 159–160, 330, 440 *n.*; religious revelation, 134–141, 144–146, 150–157, 161–163; God as ultimate agent of, 145; response to, 148–150; instruments and agents of, 152–157; system of mediation, 152–157, 158–159, 161; progressive revelation, 146 *n.*, 150; revelation in Christ, 164–169; summary, 202–207; in relation to the Incarnation, 259–260, 429–430; biblical, 271, 378, 382; revelations of the eternal order, 129, 418, 444; of the Eternal Word, 426–429. *See also* Activity, Eternal order
Rhythm, 62, 63, 65, 74, 79–80, 89, 230
Ritschlianism, 4, 20. *See also* Ritschl

SABELLIANISM, 319, 388
Sadducees, 157
Sayings of Jesus, 295 *n.*
Self, the, 422. *See* Ego
Self-actualisation, 403–406
Self-consciousness, 30, 48
Self-determination, self-determining activity, 79–81, 106–107, 115, 194, 366–368
Self-transcendence, self-transcending principle, 79–81, 94, 108, 116–118, 189; its limitations, 366–369; it requires transformation, 377; its two aspects, negative and positive, 402–406, 409–411; the Incarnate Lord fulfilled its law, 432
Sensed content, 123–125
Simple location, 460, 463
Simultaneity, 459
Sin, 139–141, 152, 154–155, 160–162, 164, 194, 413; sin after baptism, 183; reconciliation, or salvation from sin, 171–177, 182–185, 189–190; relation of sin to Christ's human life, 246, 251–252; relation to theism, 266; sin cannot negate redemption, 273–274
Son of Man, 163, 238, 293–294
Sonship of Christ: human, 250; messianic, 294–295; development of conception in N.T., 295–297, 295 *nn.*; Johannine doctrine of absolute sonship, 298–304, 311–312; relation to synoptic teaching, 305–306; and to later theology, 306 ff.; theology of sonship, 308–316, 355–356
Space-time, 20, 26, 40, 43, 44, 55, 63, 65–69, 98, 105, 109, 125, 457, 459
spermatikoi logoi, 318 *n.*
Spiritual plurality. *See* Trinity
Stoicism, 8, 317–318 *n.*, 470
Subordinationism, 318 *n.*, 475
Succession, 24, 26, 40, 66, 67, 79, 84, 100, 116, 125, 142, 152, 468–469
Supersession, 264–267, 270, 273, 281

TELEOLOGY, 22, 25, 110, 216; teleological judgment, 215
Temptation, narratives of the, 294, 305
Tension, 68, 71, 78, 113–114, 138–142, 147, 158–162, 168, 175–176, 276–277; tension of contrasts, 138–141, 158, 160, 162; deepened and resolved in Christ, 173–177, 189–198, 399–400; tension of the New Order and the world, 332–335; of reason and religion, 383–386
Terminal concepts, 9 and *n.*, 11, 14, 166, 234 *n.*, 236
Terminology, 9–16, 232–234, 253–254
Terms, 9 *n.*
Theism, 3–9, 23, 35, 59, 82, 83, 101, 111–112, 133, 285, 380–383, 402; Christian, 5, 11, 35, 224, 266, 284, 394–398, 440; theodicy of Christian theism, 11
Time, 20–27, 40–43; time-god, vii, ix; time-philosophies, vi ff.
Tome of Leo, the, 233
Transfiguration, the, 295
Transformation, 38–40, 63, 65, 74, 78, 150, 166, 192, 195, 197, 241–242, 276; in the New Order,

(*a*) by fulfilment, 192 ff., (*b*) by redemption, 195 ff.; in relation to the Incarnation, 242–245; by passage from the eternal order to the kingdom of God, 377

Trinity, The Holy—
  Trinitarian development in N.T., 198, 304–306; in the early Church, 312–316, 317–319; adoptionism and the Trinity, 257, 388
  Distinction of Persons, 308–310; summed up in formula of three divine hypostases, 307, 310; contrasted tendencies toward tritheism and modalism, 310, 387–388; economic trinity, 310, 318 *n.*, 387; essential or hypostatic trinity, 310, 387, 395–396; personality in God, 337, 414; Persons in the Godhead, 337, 413–417, 423–424; plurality of Persons, 360, 382; personal relations, 396; contrasted with tritheism, 407, 423
  Eternal generation of the Son, 309; Holy Spirit and the Trinity, 337; the Johannine Trinity, 344, 346, 354, 389; its relation to Pauline thought, 356–363; contrasted aspects, 381–383; tension of reasoned faith in relation to the doctrine, 385; its relation to the principle of individuality, 364, 435, 451; to the kingdom of God and the New Order, 379–381; to the eternal order, kingdom of God and New Order, 401; dilemmas of modalism, 387–392, 394–401; analogy from spiritual plurality, 404–407, 410–413, 437; terminology, 413–416; distinctions, processions and relations, 416–19; the Trinity and creation, 396–401, 417–420, 446 *n.*; and the Incarnation, 420–425, 426; archetypes of spiritual interchanges exist in the Trinity, 450; Origen's teaching on, 473–476

Ultimate reality, 94, 95. *See* Absolute reality
Unconscious mind, 49, 50
Unitarianism, 382 *n.*, 412
Universals, 461
υἱὸς ἀγαπητός, 295 *n.*
ὑπόστασις, 13, 235 *n.*

Values, 23, 25, 30, 56, 59–61, 468
Variations, 68, 70
Vibrations, 83, 461, 468–469
Virgin Birth, the, 327
Vitalism, x, 25

Wisdom-theology, 13, 293, 307, 318 *n.*, 334 *n.*
Word, the Eternal: and organic conception of Incarnation, 228–229, 232, 250, 278, 282–283; new creation referred to pre-existent Word, 321–322, 327–328; the Word and the Spirit, 328, 336, 417–420, 427–428; relation to Trinity, creation and Incarnation, 417–420

Zeitgeist, 471

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